Mahadeo Balku Bhosale vs Shabir Illahi Bagwan & 6 Ors

The present Revision Petition, under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act") has been filed against the order dated 10.08.2017 of the Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mumbai Circuit Bench, Kolhapur (for short "the State Commission") whereby three Appeals No.351, 352 and 353 of 2016 were dismissed on account of being barred by limitation. Petitioner had also filed applications for condonation of delay in filing the Appeals. However, there was a delay of 6 years and 9 months in filing the Appeals and the applications for condonation of delay were dismissed.

The present Revision Petition has also been filed with a delay of 506 days and along with the Revision Petition, an application for condonation of delay has also been filed. In the application, it is alleged that the Petitioner was under the impression that the State Commission will send a copy of the order and so he did not enquire about the order and after considerable time, he asked his local counsel to obtain certified copy of the order which was received on 12.12.2018. Thereafter, he engaged a counsel in Delhi in January 2019 and hence, delay had occurred which was beyond his control.

We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the Petitioner on the application for condonation of delay.

Condonation of delay is not a matter of right. The applicant has to set out a case showing sufficient reason which prevented it from coming to court. In "Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361", the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

"It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

The applicant is, therefore, required to show that he had been diligent and acting bonafidely. In the present case, the reasons given in the application are very vague. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Appeal in which the impugned order had been passed, had itself being filed with a delay of 6 years and 9 months. This fact itself reflects on the conduct of the Petitioner.

In the case of "Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578," the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the special nature of the period of limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has to be kept in mind. The Apex Court has held as under:

"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to esntertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."

The Petitioner has certainly failed to explain the delay in filing the present Revision Petition. The previous conduct of the Petitioner also does not inspire confidence. The Application has no merit. The same is dismissed as we found no ground to condone the delay.

Consequently, the present Revision Petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.