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Judgment
Odgers, J.—The first of these is a revision-petition against the order of Mr. S. Venkatasubba Rao, the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada,
dated 30th April 1925 whereby he appointed a commissioner to take the accounts in respect of points 5 to 8 (the meaning of which will be
explained later on) and whereby he framed an additional point on which the commissioner was also to take accounts.
The second is a petition to revise another order of the same date whereby the same Subordinate Judge allowed a petition by defendants in the
suit (O.S. No. 30 of 1916) for an independent enquiry and judgment by that Subordinate Judge on the points in dispute that arise in the suit as the
result of the judgment of the Privy Council.
The litigation of which the suit referred to 30 of 1916 is an off-shoot, originated in 35 of 1895 and concerns the Medur and Nidadavole estates.
The previous history detailed to us at great length is, I find, set out in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatadri Apparao v.
Parthasarathi Apparao. The earlier suit 35 of 1815 was in 1899 dismissed by the Subordinate Judge who found the adoption of Narayya Appa
Rao valid. Meantime on 14th December 1899 one Parthasarathi who was reversioner to the Nidadavole estate filed suit No. 44 of 1899 claiming
both that and the Medur estates against the two Appa Raos. There the adoption was held invalid. The appeals were consolidated in the High
Court and the latter held the adoption valid. The Privy Council in 1913 reversing the decision of the High Court : Venkata-Narasimha v.
Parthasarathi [1914] 37 Mad. 199, held the. adoption invalid and declared the right of Venkayamma who was the natural mother of the adopted
boy Narayya-Appa Rao and of the two Appa Raos to the profits of the estates after her death. As a result of this, Parthasarathi obtained one-third
of the Nidadavole estate. Venkayamma left a will, and the present-suit No. 30 of 1916 is by the assignee of Parthasarathy against the legal
representatives of the two Appa Raos (who are now dead). The plaintiff brings the suit as the assignee of the residues and legacies 1 and 2 left by
Venkayamma, and for the administration of her estate. The main defence to the suit is said to-be limitation, also that the testatrix had no right
pendente lite over the property and that the plaintiff is not the legal representative of Parthasarathy. On-29th November 1917 the Subordinate-
Judge of Bezwada decided the other-issues for the plaintiff, but held the suit was barred by limitation.
On appeal Sadasiva Aiyar and Phillips, JJ., differed and in the Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 20, 24 and 26 of 1921 Schwabe, C.J., Coutts-
Trotter and Kumaraswami Sastriar, JJ., held the suit not barred. This was affirmed by the Privy Council on 30th January 1925. The High Court
passed a preliminary-decree on the letters patent appeal which will be found in the Privy Council Record at p. 628. The suit was remanded in
order that the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada might inter alia make the necessary enquiries and take certain account (1) of the moneys which under
the declaration made by the High Court are-repayable by the defendants who were directed to pay the said moneys into Court, (2) of the debts
and liabilities, if any, of the deceased Venkayamma, which were payable out of her estate and (3) of the amounts due to the respective legatees
under the said will, Ex-A. The High Court also directed that after the necessary inquries and accounts had been taken the Subordinate Judge
should pass a final decree. It is from this that the present petitions come before us. The Subordinate Judge then was Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao, and
on 18th October 1922, he ordered the defendants to file a statement of accounts and to deposit their account books. This was done on 19th
December 1922 and in March 1923 the plaintiff''s objections were heard. On 4th April 1922 the Subordinate Judge framed tentative points for
determination on the accounts. Both sides objected, and, on 4th July 1923 the Judge finally framed eight points for determination and according to
his order
the following points for determination are framed for trial. The above issues as amended, etc. stand thus and are-renumbered.
Meanwhile defendants put in a petition to the High Court to amend the decree and judgment in the letters patent appeal in certain respects which
are not material to the present consideration. This petition was dismissed by the High Court constituted as before on 16th November 1923.
Statement of accounts and objections thereon were thereafter filed and the matter was posted for evidence before the Subordinate Judge on 20th
December 1923, 17th January 1924 and on subsequent dates up to 3rd May 1924 when the arguments were finished. Most unfortunately Mr. K.
Sambasiva Rao was transferred to another Sub- Court after the summer vacation and the District Judge Mr. K. P. Lakshmana Rao on 16th July
1924 reported to the High Court that Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao''s order in O.S. No. 30 of 1916 "" remains unwritten."" The High Court in an
administration order dated 25th July 1924 directed Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao to write his order on the points settled for determination and Send it for
delivery to his successor Mr. Siwvenkatasubha Rao; accordingly the order on the points heard and determined by Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao Was
pronounced on 29th September 1924 by his successor Mr. S. Venkatasubba Rao. On 3rd October 1924 the defendants put in a petition to the
Subordinate Judge praying that
he might be pleased to come to an independent judgment as to the enquiries and accounts that may be necessary to carry out the preliminary
decree of the High Court irrespective of the opinion recorded by your Honour''s predecessor and to appoint a com-missioner for the purpose of
making enquiries and taking accounts and to grant full opportunity for the defendants to adduce evidence after reviewing, if necessary, the opinion
recorded on points 1 to 4,
and on 30th April 1925 as stated Mr. S. Venkatasubba Rao passed an order re-fusing to review the order of Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao on the
ground that none of the conditions set out in Order 47, Civil P.C. existed to permit him to do so. But u/s 151, Civil P.C. on a consideration of the
law that he quoted, he found the preponderance of authority to be that the findings by a predecessor do not bind his successor who has to come to
an independent opinion of his own on the record on the findings.. He, therefore, decided to conduct an independent'' enquiry, but observed that
when an occasion arose for giving final judgment the findings recorded on points 1 to 4 by Mr. K. Shmbasiva Rao would along with the rest of the
evidence in the case be given their due weight and consideration. The civil revision petitions, therefore, come before us to revise this order and the
second order of the learned Subordinate Judge appointing a commissioner and referring an additional point to him. Several questions of law arise in
this case; and we have listened to a very, protracted argument on the law on each side. But as the case was, I considered, not free from difficulty, I
thought it was as well that the learned vakils should be allowed to state the law as fully as possible.
The first point taken is that this is clearly an interlocutory matter and that we should not or cannot in revision u/s 115 interfere. We have had
many cases quoted commencing with In Re: Nizam of Hyderabad [1886] 9 Mad. 256, which is the well known opinion of Muthuswami Aiyar, J.,
that the present Section 115 does not embrace interlocutory judgments. The matter depends on the construction of the words ""any case which has
been decided"" in the section and a Full Bench of the Lahore High"" Court Lal Chand Mangal Sen v. Behari Lal Mehr Chand AIR 1924 Lah. 425,
has decided that an interlocutory order is not a case and therefore refused to interfere in a matter such as this. For my part I think that the current
of authority in Madras is too strong to allow of any such decision here without reference to a Full Bench which under the circumstances I do not
consider necessary. Various opinions have been expressed by different Judges in our High Court and I conceive that Ayling, J.''s reference to a
Bench reported in Arpnachallam Chettiar v Arunachallam Chettiar AIR 1922 Mad. 436, was really intended to decide this point. The Bench held
that the question was concluded by authority in favour of interference. There is no doubt that what may be called the personal equation enters a
good deal into matters of this sort, and that it has become rightly or wrongly largely a question of discretion as to whether one should interfere or
not. For instance, interference has been held justified ""to avoid trouble, delay and expense,"" Kariya Goundan v. Thirukkaivelu Chetty AIR 1925
Mad. 585, Sobhanadri Appa Rao and Another Vs. Venkataramayya Appa Rao, , or if ""manifest injustice would result"" Sitaramayya v
Ramappayya [1917] 5 M.L.W. 207 or where there are patent irregularities of procedure, the power of superintendence is given to see that the
proceedings are properly conducted Poosapathi Ramachandra Raju v. Venkata Subbayyamma [1915] 29 M.L.J. 53, or to prevent the trial taking
an illegal course Jagannatha Sastri v. Sarathambal Ammal AIR 1923 Mad. 321, or prevent the illegal issue of a commission Somasundaram
Chettiar v. Gnana Sammanda Pandara Sannadhi [1908] 31 Mad. 60, though it has been said Arunachalam Chettiar v. Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi
AIR 1922 Mad. 55, that such interference should be exercised with ''''extreme diligence"" and the general rule is against it. In Dhapi v. Rampershad
[1887] 14 Cal. 768 the Court held that ""a case"" included an interlocutory order and that there was nothing in Section 115 to prevent the Court
from setting aside an interlocutory order if made without jurisdiction. The same view seems to have prevailed in Bombay Bai Atrani v. Deepsing
Baria Thakor [19l6] 40 Bom. 86, which held that a case may be wide enough to include an interlocutory order and that the word ""case"" is of a
wide and comprehensive meaning and covers a wider area than suit or appeal.
The difficulty partly arises from the fact that case"" is nowhere defined in the Code. Mr. Lakshmanna for the respondents would limit ""case"" to a
suit or some order arising out of what would be called on the original side an originating summons i.e., matters testamentary, insolvency,
guardianship, etc. That is too narrow a definition, I think, clearly appears from the case where the matter is most fully discussed Buddhoo Lal and
Another Vs. Mewa Ram, . There the District Munsif had passed a formal order on a question of jurisdiction to the effect that the suit was
cognizable by his Court. The majority of the Full Bench by 3 to 2 held that there was no case and that no case has been decided by the Court of
Appeal, that all that has been decided was one of several issues in the suit and that the defendants had their remedy by way of appeal in the suit.
Piggott, J., who discussed the use of the words ""case"" and ""suit"" in the CPC remarks that neither of them were defined, that a case need not
terminate in a decree, that ""case"" is a more comprehensive expression than ""suit"", that whereas all cases are not suits, every suit is at least a case.
As I have said before, it seems to me that the opinion of the majority of the Allahabad Court cannot now at least without a reference to our Full
Bench be followed in this Court. Further in the Allahabad case there was the weighty dissenting judgment of Walsh, J., who held that the fact that
the hearing was an interlocutory one or a preliminary one does not make it any the less a case. It seems to me too late as far as this Court is
concerned to hold that there can be no interference in an interlocutory matter or proceeding on the ground that it is not a case decided; for, I think
on a reference to the order of the learned Judge it does definitely decide that the matter will be independently enquired into by himself after
receiving the report of the commissioner though he certainly says that he is prepared to consider the findings already recorded by his predecessor.
Were he satisfied that was not going to interfere with these findings it, seems to me hardly likely that he would have taken this course. I am
therefore of opinion that, although this is an interlocutory matter, it is, under the Madras decisions at any rate, a matter which can be interfered with
by way of revision on the ground that it is a ""case"" decided by the Subordinate Court. As to whether one is called upon to interfere or not is of
course another matter and to the consideration of that I now proceed.
It is said on the one side that the order of Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao was a mere tentative matter just as though one might work out questions of
account roughly on waste pieces of paper and on the other that it is an order which was binding on his successor. If it was such an order it is
perfectly clear that Mr. S. Venkatasubba Rao had no jurisdiction to supersede it by an order of his own as regards points 1 to 4 which were the
only ones really decided by Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao. But if it was a mere expression of opinion or informal and tentative proceeding, it would be
disregarded by Mr. S. Sambasiva Rao''s successor. The form of the order would certainly tell against the latter contention. The points are set out in
order and findings are given on such of the points in many cases after an elaborate discussion of the evidence and all the different items of account
involved. It cannot at least be said that it is a mere rough working of sums on waste paper. It is a considered finding or series of findings on the
points that he had himself raised. Mr. Lakshmanna''s authorities for his contention resolve themselves under two heads (1) remand cases and (2)
what may be called original cases.
For instance it has been held in Calcutta on a remand Hira Lal v. Etbar Mandal [1916] 20 C.W.N. 43, that there is a chain of authority which
says that final orders may and often are decreetal and final in their character and therefore binding on parties in subsequent stages of the same
litigation; and it may be here incidentally remarked that there has been no appeal or review from Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao''s order. The Calcutta
Judges remark that an opinion expressed in a remand judgment would not bind a successor but an adjudication would. On the other hand a Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Gopinath Shukul v. Sat Narain Shukul AIR 1923 All. 384, held that a Court from which the appeal came for
final disposal could reconsider the remand order and the view of the law on which it is based; and in Kamini Kumar v. Durga charan AIR 1923
Cal. 521, Mookerjee, J., said that on principle it cannot be affirmed that an order made under Order 41, Rule 25, can be treated as erroneously
made. It is made with jurisdiction and must be treated as authoritative though all portions of the record must be considered in the final disposal. In
Musammat Masihunnissa and Others Vs. Musammat Kaniz Sughra, , it was held that an order of remand may be considered by the Bench that
finally disposed of the case and the order of the findings thereon may be ignored if the remand is under Order 41, Rule 25 and not Order 41, Rule
So that we can derive this from the cases on remand, in the absence of any Madras authority that if the order amounts to an adjudication it
cannot be interfered with by the successor. In any case the present case is not one of remand, and I am not convinced that the same considerations
would apply. But to go to the direct cases which to my mind are far more important and on which this matter has to be decided one way or the
other. In the Privy Council case reported in Ram Kir Pal v. Rup Kuari [1884] 6 All. 269 a District Judge Mr. Probyn had decided in an
interlocutory matter in execution that by a certain decree mesne profits were awarded. The Subordinate-Judge considered himself bound by this
decision of Mr. Probyn i.e., his predecessor. The Full Bench of the Allahabad-High Court held on a reference to it that res judicata did not apply
to proceedings in execution of a decree. Their Lordships held that the matter decided by Mr. Probyn was as binding between the parties and those
claiming under them as an interlocutory judgment in a suit is binding upon the parties in every proceeding, in that suit, or as a final judgment in a suit
binding upon them in carrying the judgment into execution. They held that Mr. Probyn had acted within his jurisdiction. It had never been reversed
or set aside and as they remark:
If the Subordinate Judge and the Judge were bound by the order of Mr. Probyn in proceedings between the same parties on the same judgment,
the High Court was bound by it, and so also are their Lordships in adjudicating between the same parties... The High Court acted as if they had
been sitting upon an appeal against the order of Mr. Probyn, but they were not so sitting.
To take the cases of our own Courts which are only two in number, a decision of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in Abdul Wahab v. Rokia Bibi AIR
1924 Mad. 406, and the other of Miller and Pinhey, JJ., Krishnaswamier Vs. Swaminadhier and Others, . In the former case we have the
advantage of a considered opinion by the learned Judge. In it Coutts-Trotter, J., (as he then was) had before him a case of dissolution of
partnership. Without making a preliminary decree he referred the whole case to the Official Referee who under the Indian Law is only a
commissioner. This order was not modified or reversed by appeal or review. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., held that Coutts-Trotter, J., had jurisdiction
to try the suit and that his order was under the circumstances binding on the parties in subsequent proceeding and though it was too late for the
latter to take any steps to get Coutts-Trotter, J.''s order set aside, it could come in the final decree which would be subject to an appeal.
In the latter case the Subordinate judge modified his predecessor''s order and had no power to do so. In that case the Court decided to
interfere in revision u/s 115. This was also the opinion of Greaves, J., in Basanta Kumar, Das v. Kusum Kumari Dasi [1917] 44 Cal 28, and as
pointed out in Kalimuddin Ahamed Vs. Esabakuddin and Others, , one Judge cannot sit in judgment upon another Judge''s order: of also
Bisheshwar Pratap Narain Sahi Vs. Asarfi Singh, , where it was held that there was no such power u/s 151. In Hook v. Administrator General of
Bengal AIR 1921 P.C. 11, a case that went to the Privy Council, the original side Judge had held that a certain disposition in a will constitute a
perpetuity holding that Section 11, Civil P.C. was not exhaustive and he gave the parties liberty to apply. The Administrator General after a certain
death took place, applied for further construction of the will to the Court and the next of kin tried to reopen the question of the perpetuity. The
decision of the Original Side Judge was held binding not only on the next of kin but also on the Judge who heard the further application. Reference
may also be made to another case in the Privy Council, Ahmed Musaji Saleji v. Hashim Ebrahim Saleji AIR 1915 P.C. 116. There Fletcher, J.,
declared a partnership dissolved, his order for subsequent accounts being merely consequential thereon.'' It was pointed out that this is a decree
though the latter part of it might have been separately made as an order and that the Code makes no provision for something which is neither a
decree nor an order. The High Court affirmed by the Privy Council held that it was preliminary decree and could not be questioned on a final
appeal as if it has not been previously impugned.
Now to take up the cases relied on by Mr. Lakshmanna and to see how far they bear out his contention that the order of Mr. K. Sambasiva
Rao was merely tentative or experimental. The two cases that he puts in the forefront of his contention are Amir Kazim v. Zanaib Begam [1897]
A.W.N. 150 and Ma Nye v. Ma Yauk [1908] 4 L.B.R. 256. As to the first of these cases it must be observed that it is not reported in the regular
series of the Allahabad High Court and is not of course binding as such upon us. But I do not want to put my decision of this matter on any narrow
ground of that sort as with the exception of the two Madras authorities that I have already cited there seems to me no. decided case in this
presidency on the matter. In Amir Kazim v. Zanaib Begam [1897] A.W.N. 150, which was a case of second appeal Mr. Leggatt had heard an
appeal in which his predecessor, who had only heard part of the case, had put on the record an opinion in the shape of a finding. The learned
Judges of the Allahabad High Court (Knox and Burkitt, JJ,), held that a Judge who ultimately decides the matter has seisin of the whole case and is
not bound to accept the view of the law on the facts as adopted by ''his predecessor who in this had wrongly interpreted a certain precedent. The
report in this case is extremely meagre. We have nothing but the bare judgment of the Court which is short and which really gives no reasons for its
view. If Mr. Leggatt''s predecessor expressed only an opinion and not an adjudication, as pointed out in Hira Lal v. Etbar Mandal there is no
doubt that he would not be bound by it. I think it would be unreasonable to regard this case as establishing a broad proposition which indeed in
face of the law already quoted it could not possibly be taken to do, i.e., that one Judge can always interfere with the proceedings of his
predecessor whenever he chooses to do so. In the second of these cases Ma Nye v. Ma Yauk, I must once again observe that this is not the
judgment of a High Court and as such we might refuse to be guided by it if for no other reason. But as I have already-said I am unwilling to place
my reasons on a narrow ground like that. In this case Captain Nethersole who I presume was in the position of a District Judge first dealt with the
case and framed issues. He thought it was indispensable to call evidence to show the source from which each piece of land and those in the
schedule came into the defendant''s hands and which is Mayung Yin''s. He further observed that
when this shall have been done there will be a decree for the plaintiff for the amount then found due on the mortgage etc.
Captain Nethersole was succeeded by Mr. Heald who differed from his predecessor on the question of the necessity of calling evidence for
the purpose stated above. The question was whether Mr. Heald had authority to go behind the findings of his predecessor and it was found that
Captain Nethersole''s judgment was given at a stage when a decree could not possibly have been made and was premature and unauthorized;
there Captain Nethersole''s orders did not decide the suit or have the force of a decree and might therefore be interfered with and might be
superseded by Mr. Heald''s. This was followed in Official Assignee v. Mahomed Hady [1918] 11 Bur. L.T. 97, by Robinson, J., of the Burma
Chief Court. Here again the question was as the quality of Captain Nethersole''s, pronouncement. It was held that it Could not amount to a decree
which probably may be accepted as perfectly correct. But the Court does not seem to have considered whether it might not have been an order
within the Code, at least as to that part of it which directed further evidence, but that does not seem to be considered in the judgment. The next
case is Hemandas v. Chellaram [1912] 5 S.L.R. 184 by the Assistant Judicial Commissioner of Sindh. One has again to advert to the sources of
the authority. There two preliminary , issues were argued before the District Judge, Mr. Knight, who delivered an interlocutory, judgment finding
the suit was not barred under old Section 539 which he held was directory and not mandatory. In the meantime the law was changed and Section
92, Civil P.C. was enacted. The Assistant Judicial Commissioner thought this decision was open to question as he found it was based on an
erroneous assumption. He held that Mr. Knight''s decision was not a decree nor contained the grounds of a decree. He, interfered u/s 151 holding
that the plaintiff had no vested interest at the date of the suit and that therefore could not claim to be unaffected by the change in the law. That is a
case which I think must be confined to particular facts, if indeed we can hold that it is an authority at all. The Assistant Judicial Commissioner
seems to treat Mr. Knight''s proceedings as obiter dicta. If they were, there is nothing more to be said. The decision may have rested on the
change in the law in the interim. In any case, the interference by the Assistant Judicial Commissioner was u/s 151. In Taj Begam v. Sarvi Begam
[1916] 14 A.L.J. 1171 Pandit Hukku awarded mesne profits and held that mesne profits included interest. He passed no final orders but desired
further information. Before this was obtained one of the parties appealed and the appeal was dismissed as premature. It was held by the High
Court that he could have corrected his previous orders and that as his discussion was purely academic, his successor might disregard ''it. There the
orders seems to have been entirely tentative.
In Balvant Ramchandra v. Secretary of State [1908] 32 Bom. 432 the issue as to whether a certain land was unassessed waste at the time of
the grant was found to be based on a mistaken hypothesis and the only question before the Bench was stated to be whether having regard to the
grant the Government entitled to declare the land in dispute ""reserved forest""; all the other questions having been previously disposed of by the
Bench of the same Court. The learned Judges held that that part of the former judgment namely that on remand, which was founded on a mistaken
hypothesis should be discarded but the Bench held that judgment to be binding on them as regards all points specifically decided beyond possibility
of revision. It is really a case of remand and falls under the observations made supra with regard to such eases. Haitennessa Bibi v. Kailash
Chandra Sabha [1912] Cri.L.J. 259 is a case in the Calcutta High Court and is one that came before the Bench under somewhat peculiar
circumstances.
Geidt, J., who heard the appeal referred it to a Bench, who at the request of the learned Judge, disposed of the whole case in order to save
circuitous procedure. I say it is a case based on special circumstances because by consent of the Judge apparently the whole case was placed
before the Bench to make any order that they might think fit. Two cases in Allahabad required consideration. One is Mubarak Husain v. Bihari
[1894] 16 All. 306 where Mahmood, J., had framed issues and ramanded the case for findings. Aikman, J., disregarded these findings and came
to his own conclusion on the final disposal of the appeal. A Bench of the same Court held that this was within his competency. This is again a case
of remand and is to be ranged with those cases which go the length of saying that as the Judge who finally disposed of the case has seisin of the
whole case he may disregard any expressions of opinion previously recorded. Lachman Prasad v. Jamma Prasad [1887] 10 All. 162 I have kept
to the end because it is distinctly a curious case. It was a case before Sir John Edge, C.J., and Brodhurst, J. The District Munsif decreed the suit.
The Subordinate Judge confirmed it; thereupon the defendant-appellant appealed to the High Court and the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of
objections with regard to the door or window and the northern drain. Oldfield and Mahmood, JJ., remanded the appeal to the lower appellate
Court for a finding as to how and to what extent the door or window affected the privacy of the plaintiffs. On a return of this finding the matter
came up before Oldfield and Brodhurst, JJ., who remanded the case on an issue as to whether by local custom there is any right of easement by
which the plaintiffs have a right to have the privacy of their apartments maintained by the removal of the door and window. The Subordinate Judge
again returned a finding on this that no custom had been established. The case came up before the Chief Justice and Brodhurst, J.
The contention was that the present Bench had to decide the whole case and that the Bench should not treat the appeal as already decided and
the questions arising on the memorandum of ''objections were the only matter open. So the question was whether the order of Oldfield, and
Brodhurst, JJ., constituted a binding order in this case. The matter appears to have been decided on considerations of the practical difficulty
pointed out by the learned Chief Justice which would arise from separating the appeal and the objections and treating the whole as having been
decided on 11th January 1887 and the objections as decided in November of that year. But as the Chief Justice points out it must not be inferred
that where Judges have heard arguments on some of the issues and have come to or expressed their views on those issues and have remanded
another issue, the same Judges should be bound to hear on the return to the remand the case de novo. Brodhurst, J., withdrew his opinion
expressed in the order of 11th January and the appeal was dismissed, the objections being allowed. The decision seems to have been given on the
ground that the order of Oldfield and Brodhurst, JJ., was merely an opinion, and it is also not improbable that the findings ultimately returned
reacted at least as far as one of the Judges was concerned on his former opinion expressed in January. It is a curious and rather a special case and
cannot I think be treated as laying down any rule of universal application.
To sum up, it seems to me that what we have got to consider on this part of the case is whether the order of Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao really
amounted to an adjudication or not. I have examined the order and I am of opinion that it is something much more than merely experimental or
tentative or opinionative. It is almost really a question of fact in which case, as the decisions show, if it is an adjudication it is binding; if it can be
brought within the category of a mere opinion, it is not. It therefore seems to me on the best considerations I can give to it that this order of Mr. K.
Sambasiva Rao was binding on his successor and that therefore, the latter had no jurisdiction to make the order of 30th April 1925 deciding (1)
that he would allow an independent enquiry and judgment by him. self and (2) appointing a commissioner for the purpose of reopening the matter. I
confine my remarks at present to points 1 to 4 which were all considered in detail by Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao.
I think, therefore, on the Madras view of the competency of the Court to. interfere u/s 115 even when the matter is interlocutory and the
construction that is contained in the judgment cited as to what is a case decided"" I must hold that this is a case for our interference u/s 115. Revn.
Petri. No. 421 of 1925 must therefore be allowed with costs.
As regards Civil Revn. Petn. No. 423 of 1925 we were apparently in error in supposing that the learned vakil for the petitioner had no
argument to urge as regards points 5 to 9 (of which points 5 to 8 were framed by Mr. Sambasiva Rao and the additional point 9 by Mr. M. S.
Venkatasubba Rao) which have been referred to a commissioner. We have accordingly now heard the arguments on these points and it is clear I
think that it would be undesirable to refer the points as they stand wholesale to a commissioner. Points 1 to 4 were decided by the Subordinate
Judge Mr. K. Sambasiva Rao himself and it appears to me that the proper course to be taken with regard to issues 5 to 9 is that the Subordinate
Judge should first decide the points of law that arise on these and should then if necessary for the purpose of taking accounts or other evidence
refer any matters to a commissioner. Issue 5 appears to be a question of fact. Issue 6 refers to moneys collected between 4th July 1898 and 9th
March 1899 and the point referred to the commissioner is whether any of these amounts became the property of venkayamma. Certainly this is
point of law. A point of law is also contained in issue 7 in the words ""and whether the defendants are liable therefor."" The eighth is also
objectionable in that it has left to the commissioner to allow or to disallow the sum''s expended on the collections of the sums referred to in point 6.
The new issue point 9 is equally objectionable in that the commissioner is to report what moneys are attributable to the income of the Medur Estate
between the dates already given after deducting from the income the expenditure that should legitimately be charged to the widow''s estate of
Venkayamma, This clearly involves a point of law. -It may. be added that we have heard no argument that the Subordinate Judge had no
jurisdiction to frame the points. I therefore think that the better course, in fact the only right course, would be that the Subordinate Judge should
himself first decide the points of law involved in the issues and the ascertainment of sums of money collected or expended, etc., may be left to a
commissioner- I think, therefore, we ought to interfere with the order of the Subordinate Judge and direct that it be set aside and the matter
remanded to him to take action in the light of the above remarks. I would allow no costs for this civil revision petition.
As regards the first four points (1 to 4) we having already held that they are binding on Mr. Venkatasubba Rao, that part of the order in which
he holds that these four points should be considered by the commissioner must be deleted.
Curgenven, J.
These civil revision petitions arise out of a cause of litigation which has been in progress since 1895. But for the main question argued before us
it will be sufficient to refer to the preliminary decree passed by this Court on 4th April 1922 in Parthasarathy Appa Rao v. Venkatadri Appa Row
AIR 1922 Mad. 457. By that decree the suit was remanded to the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada with directions to restore it, to take the
necessary accounts between the parties and to pass a final decree. Accordingly the Subordinate Judge then in office Mr. Sambasiva Rao Naidu
framed eight points for determination, received statements of accounts, heard objections took evidence and wrote an order recording his findings
on points 1 to 4. As he was transferred before he could deliver this order, it was pronounced by his successor Mr: Venkatasubba Rao on 29th
November 1924- Shortly afterwards, on 3rd October 1924 the defendants applied to Mr. Venkatasubba Rao by a petition u/s 15.1 and Order
47, Rule 1, to review his predecessor''s opinion recorded on points 1 to 4, if necessary, otherwise to come to an independent judgment
irrespective of that opinion. Mr. Venkatasubba Rao disposed of this petition in the order dated 30th April 1925 against which C.B.P. No. 424 is
preferred. He found no sufficient reason to review Mr. Sambasiva Rao''s findings but deemed that course unnecessary inasmuch as he considered
the findings to be premature and not binding upon him. He accordingly allowed the application for an independent enquiry upon the eight points
already framed and upon a ninth, which he newly framed himself.
The primary question for decision in C.R.P. No. 424 is thus whether Mr. Sambasiva Rao''s order was binding upon his successor. I may I
think start with the general proposition that a decree or a judicial order passed with jurisdiction and in consonance with the provisions of the Code
is binding, and can only be set aside by means of certain prescribed procedure, such as by appeal, review or revision. The party in whose favour
such a decree or order has been made has secured something in advantage, an interest or a right of which the Court cannot validly deprive him
except by one of these recognized modes of procedure. This proposition is, I think too well established to need the citation of particular authority
in support of it. Order 20, Rule 3, lays down that the Court shall not alter a judgment, one signed save as provided by Section 152 or on review. It
may be said that this rule is restricted in its scope to a judgment accompanying the decree in a suit, since Order 20, relates to ""judgment and
decree."" But it is unnecessary to rely upon this express provision, since apart from judicial authority it is the clear policy of the code that a judicial
order once passed cannot be superseded unless and until it is reversed by some method which the code pre-scribes. In the case of certain classes
of orders an appeal is allowed by Section 104 and Order 43, Rule 1; while in the case of others the only means of attack is by revision. This
general proposition seems too well established to need support from case-law. I may, however, refer to the Privy Council case Ram Kirpal v. Rup
Kuari which related to an order passed in execution deciding that upon the true construction of the decree it awarded mesne profits. Their
Lordships observed that the order:
was as binding between the parties and those claiming under them as an interlocutory judgment in a suit is binding upon the parties in every
proceeding in that suit, or as a final judgment in a suit is binding upon them in carrying the judgment into execution. The binding force of such a
judgment depends not upon Section 13, Act 10 of 4877, but upon general principles of law. If it were not binding there would be no end to
litigation.
Some other cases which support this proposition I shall have occasion to refer to later, as for instance, Ahmed Musaji Saleji v. Hashim
Ebrahim, Abdul Wahab v. Rokia, Bibi, Krishnaswamier v. Swaminadhier and Basanta Kumar Das v. Kusum Kumari Dasi. In the last of these
cases a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court was asked to revoke an order in execution passed by another learned Judge of the same Court
on the ground that it was made without jurisdiction, and he held that he could not do so either u/s 152, Civil P.C. or by review or by the exercise
of his inherent jurisdiction. But though these methods of getting rid of the order were suggested no attempt was made to argue that the order was
not binding so long as it remained in existence. In Hiro Singh v. Ahmed Hussain AIR 1922 pat. 204 the question arose whether an order recording
full satisfaction of a decree passed by one Judge could be recalled by his successor, and although the contention was raised that the order was ex
parte and passed behind the back of the decree-holder and that the certificate of full satisfaction, was a forgery, it was held that even if the order
was erroneous the decree-holder should have had recourse to Section 115, Civil P.C. and that the Court had no power whatever to recall an
order once it had been perfected, which I take to mean signed and delivered. Yet another instance of an order held to be binding although
contested on the merits as not in accordance with the decree, was disposed of in Bisheshwar Partap Narain Sahi v. Asarfi Singh.
Accepting then that a judicial order passed with jurisdiction to pass such ''an order, and framed in accordance with the provisions of the code,
is binding on the parties, on the Judge who made it, and on his successor in office, is the order under reference such an order? As regards its form,
Mr. Sambasiva Rao''s findings are in the nature of a judgment upon the points dealt with, and it is true that no formal order seems to have been
drafted to go with it. A similar case was dealt with in Khirode Sundari Debi v. Gnenedra Nath Pal Chauduri [1902] 6 C.W.N. 283 where an
appeal petition was preferred accompanied by a '''' judgment"" alone. The learned Judges considered the question whether the ""order"" for which the
judgment gave the grounds must be a separate document, and held that there was no provision in ''the code requiring a Court when deciding any
matter which is other than a regular suit, to draw up a formal order in; addition to and distinct from the document containing the reasons for the
order. I do not think therefore that there is any substance in this objection. If it be further objected that Mr. Sambasiva Rao''s order does not in
fact order anything, the answer would, I think, be that an order under the Code, like a decree may be merely declaratory. An order of this nature
would seem to be covered by the definition in Section 2 (14) as the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a ""decree."" The
code does not contemplate anything other than a decree or an order and since these findings do not amount to a decree they necessarily fall, I
think, into the other class. That this order is judicial and not administrative does not admit of doubt. It is an adjudication, so far as it goes, of the
rights of the parties. Further, the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on these points. But it is said that in so adjudicating upon them at that stage of
the proceedings it was not- acting in accordance with the provisions of the Code. It should have deferred such adjudication until the whole
evidence had been taken and materials were available for passing the final judgment and decree. To adopt the word used by Mr. Venkatasubba
Rao, the adjudication was '''' premature.
The first observation'' to be made upon this position is I think that the code nowhere specifies what classes of orders may be made and what
may not be made. It is true that there are many express provisions empowering the Court, in the circumstances for which they are designed, to
pass an order. It is not necessary to quote particular instances. But it remains true, I think, that a Court is inherently competent to pass orders not
so expressly provided for, in cases where it is satisfied that the circumstances call for such action. In the words of Woodroffee, J., in Hukum
Chand Boid v. Kamylanand Singh [1906] 33 Cal. 927
The code doss not. affect the power and duty of the Court, in cases where no specific rule exists, to act according to equity, justice and good
conscience though in the exercise of such power it must be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles and is not in conflict
with them or the intentions of the legislature.
The learned Judge proceeded to cite a number of instances in which it had been held that the Court had inherent power to pass orders
although the code contained no express provision for them such for instance as to consolidate suits, to allow a defence in forma pauperis, to
remand a suit in cases not provided for by Order 41, Rule 23 or 25 etc. The test accordingly seems to be whether in recording and announcing his
findings at that stage the learned. Subordinate Judge who passed the order acted contrary to the provisions of the code in so doing. Dealing first
with the express provisions, Section 33 lays clown that the Court after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a
decree shall follow. This section does not say that the Court is precluded from passing what has been referred to as an interlocutory judgment at an
earlier stage of the proceedings. This section has been amplified in Order 20, Rules 6 and 7, which provided that the decree shall agree with the
judgment and shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. The clear conclusion to be drawn from these general provisions, is, I
''think, that the proper course in normal circumstances is for the Court to defer judgment until the hearing of the case is concluded rather than that a
formal announcement at an earlier stage of any decision is irregular and unlawful. One exception to the general rule is furnished by Order 14, Rule
2, where upon issues both of law and of fact arising, the Court is of the opinion that the case may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it is
directed to try those issues first and may postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined The
question really is whether this specific rule has the effect of excluding the determination of issues not in the nature of preliminary issues of law or
whether upon the analogy which the rule furnishes, it is open to the Court to record findings upon some of the issues before the case as a whole is
concluded. This question arose in Bhuban Mohini Dasi and Others Vs. Kumud Bala Dasi and Others, where Mookerjee and Chotzner, JJ., held
that the Court has ample authority
to direct successive trials of different issues and even to record interlocutory judgments thereon to be made the base of the final judgment at the
conclusion of the trial of the whole case.
This view follows an earlier Calcutta case Annapurna Debya Vs. Amiyanath Banerjee and Others, are cited. In the former of these two cases
the suit was one in ejectment against a number of defendants occupying different portions of the plaint ''property and in remanding the case for
retrial the learned Judges directed the lower Court to consider whether any inconvenience would result from trying the suit against all the
defendants at once or whether it should direct successive trial of the issues separately affecting different defendants. They add:
Following the English practice interlocutory judgments may, if the plaintiffs succeed, be given against different defendants as their cases are
disposed of, final judgment for possession of the whole property being reserved till the conclusion of the trial of the whole case.
It is this case which is cited as authority for a similar view taken in Ramendra Nath v. Brojendra Nath [1918] 45 Cal. 111. In Abdulla v.
Behari Lal AIR 1926 Lah. 638 some issues in the suit were disposed of by one Judge and the remainder by his successor who only gave judgment
upon the latter issues. There was an appeal and it was held that not only this latter judgment but also the judgment of the first. Judge should have
been filed with the memorandum of appeal to make competent. The ground given for holding this was that the decision of the first Court was a
judgment within the meaning of the code. Similarly in Narpat Rai v. Devi Das [1911] 13 P.W.R 1911 a case from the Punjab Chief Court it was
held that a written order deciding an issue constituted a judgment. In the same connexion reference may be made to the remarks of Mr. Stanyon,
Assistant Judicial Commissioner, Nagpur, in Mahu v. Kishan [1912] 8 N.L.R. 92 where he held that no appeal lay against an adjudication upon
some among the total number of points, but that that adjudication was a foundation partially laid for a decree to be drawn up subsequently, when
the other points calling for judgment had been tried and decided.
The conclusion I am inclined to draw from a consideration of these decisions is that, although the code makes no provision save in the special
case dealt with in Order 14, Rule 2, for the preparation and delivery of what has been called an interlocutory judgment on a judgment adjudicating
upon some among the issues decided before delivering the final judgment and decree the Court would not necessarily be acting illegally or
irregularly, or in contravention of the terms of the Code, in so doing. It may well be in furtherance of the disposal of a suit if a Judge who has heard
the evidence upon an issue where all the evidence bearing upon that issue has been taken, gives his finding upon it rather than leave that duty to a
successor not so advantageously placed. On the view that the power of the Court extends to the adoption of this course I think it lies upon the
party advancing the proposition to show that a finding so recorded, signed and delivered is not binding upon the successor of the Judge who made
it.
Reference has been made to a considerable body of case-law on either side in support or in disproof of this position. Turning first to those
cases which appear to favour the respondent''s contention that such an order is not binding, I may refer to those which relate to the binding nature
of an order of remand passed by an appellate Court. Instances of such cases are Lachman Prasad v. Jamna Prasad, Kamini Kumar v. Durga
Charan, Hira Lal v. Etbar Mandal, Balwant Ramachandra v. Secy. of State, Mubarak Husain v. Bihari, Haitennessa Bibi v. Kai-lash Chandra,
Masih un-nisa Bibi v. Kaniz Sughra Bibi, Bara Estate v. Anupchandra [1917] 2 Pat. L.J. 663 and Gopinath Shukul v. Sat Narain. The general
effect of these decisions is that in the case of a remand order passed under Order 41, Rule 23, any opinion or conclusion expressed by the Court
passing that order is not binding upon the Court which finally disposes of the appeal after the return of the findings. In some cases e.g. in Balvant
Ramachandra v. Secy. of State, this view was adopted with some hesitation and not without qualification. But it is, I think, possible to accept this
position as good law without regarding it as applying by analogy to the circumstances of the present case. Although the Court may give reasons in
the judgment which accompanies an order of remand, these reasons are intended rather to justify the resolve to remand the case than as a direct
contribution towards its final disposal. In the formal order drafted upon such a judgment, nothing appears beyond a direction to the lower Court to
return certain findings. It is thus reasonable to hold that when these findings, as well as the record of the previous enquiry come up for final
adjudication in appeal, the whole case is opened and the appellate Court is not bound by the intermediate proceedings. It may use them or not as it
thinks fit. This, I think, is what is expressed by the learned Judges in Masih-un-nissa Bebi v. Kaniz Sugra Bibi where they say that the appellate
Court, in finally disposing of the appeal,
can consider the question whether that order i.e. of remand was a proper one and if it cornea to the conclusion that that order should never have
been passed, it can ignore the findings on the remanded issues and any evidence which may have been taken after the order remitting the said
issues. The reason for this is obvious. No appeal lies against the order remitting issues nor does that order dispose of the pending appeal.
Consequently the tribunal which undertakes the responsibility of finally disposing of the appeal is seized of the entire case and has jurisdiction to
reconsider the propriety of an interim order such as that remitting issues, passed by another Judge or by a Bench differently constituted.
I do not think therefore that cases of this description furnish an analogy of any value. Apart from these eases, the respondent relies upon three
or four decisions, the first of which to be considered is Amir Kazim v. Zainab Begam. That case is valuable to him for the following observation:
We cannot say too emphatically that the Judge who decides a case has seisin of the whole case; he is responsible for the findings and for the
decree and it is for him to decide them according to his view of the law and the facts, and he is in no way bound to accept either the view of the
law or the facts which his predecessor had adopted and with which his opinion may be totally at variance.
Unfortunately, the facts which elicited that statement of legal principle cannot'' be clearly derived from the judgment and, indeed it is not certain
whether this may not have been yet another case of an appellate order remanding a suit for findings. As an unqualified statement of law it would
appear to be too wide, because it would apply even to a case where the Court had determined the issues under Order 14, Rule 2. Without a fuller
knowledge of the context it is difficult therefore to decide how much weight is to be attached to this pronouncement. There is a case of the Chief
Court of Lower Burma Ma Nye v. Ma Yauk which is an authority for the position that inasmuch as the code nowhere contemplates a judgment in
a suit being given before a decree can be drawn up according to it, such a judgment embodying the findings on the issues or some of them is
premature and unauthorized; and the successor of the Judge who delivered it is at liberty to ignore it and deal with the whole case. This case, which
was followed in another Burma case, Official Assignee v. Mahomed Hady is no doubt an authority for the view pressed upon us by the respondent
that an interlocutory judgment is not binding upon the successor. In another case Hemandas v. Chellaram not of a High Court but of the Sind
Judicial Commissioner''s Court there was a finding by one Judge that the suit was not barred u/s 539, Civil P.C. of 1882, which to some extent
corresponded to Section 92 of the present code. His successor who disagreed with this finding deemed himself to be at liberty to reconsider it. If
this implies, as it appears to do that the Successor of the Judge who first decided an issue under Order 14, Rule 2, may proceed to redecide it, I
must respectfully express my doubt whether it is good law. In Taj Begam v. Sarvi Begam there was a decree which provided for mesne profits but
not for interest upon them. The Subordinate Judge who had to execute it held that by force of the definition of mesne profits interest was
admissible: But he passed no final orders and merely directed the decree-holder to furnish certain information. As Sundar Lal, J., points out, a final
order could only be made when the figures were supplied to and examined by the Judge, and he goes on to say:
What happened is analogous to what is often done, viz., recording a judgment on some of the issues in the case, the final judgment being passed
later on when the remaining issues were decided.
Later on in his judgment he says:
There was nothing,, to preclude Pandit Mohan Lal Hukku, on the true state of facts being brought to his notice, at any time before he made his final
order from correcting his previous orders on the issues provisionally decided by him.
Then the learned Judge proceeds to compare the case of a suit remanded on appeal which I have dealt with above. This case also affords
some authority for the view that an order which is other than final is not binding, although it will be noticed that the declaration that interest was
admissible was not carried into a formal order. I am inclined to think that the view taken in this case would be difficult to reconcile with the decision
of the Judicial Committee in Ram Kir Pal v. Rup Kuari to which I have already referred.
Coming now to the cases cited by the appellants, there is in the first place a class of them in which the order under question is held to amount
to a decree, and being a decree is necessarily binding. Such a case is (Raja) Peary Mohan Mookerjee Vs. Manohar Mookerjee, . I should not
further allude to it were it not for a remark in the judgment which bears upon the point which I have dealt with earlier. In finding that the order
Tinder reference was in essence a preliminary decree, the learned Judges remark that it is not essential that a preliminary decree should conform to
one of the specific cases mentioned in Order 20, of the code, these cases being only illustrations of preliminary decrees, helping in determining the
true meaning of the definition of the term ''decree''. In the same way it is not necessary, I think, for an order to be valid that it should be referable to
any specific provision of the code. We must look at the nature of its contents. Book v. Administrator General of Bengal relates to an administration
suit in which judgment and decree were passed only disposing partially of the questions raised and leaving over certain matters for settlement on a
future occasion. The validity of a decree so framed was called in question, but it was held that so far as it related to the matters disposed of it was
binding. The case is not of much use here as there is no true analogy between a decree which disposed of some only of the questions arising and
the order now under challenge. The Privy Council case Ahmed Masaji v. Hasim Ebrahim, is another instance in which the order passed was held
to be a preliminary decree. It began by declaring the partnership dissolved and went on to refer certain matters to the Assistant Referee. The
contention was that the latter portion of it was not a decree but an order, but their Lordships observed:
The Code makes no provision for something which is neither a decree nor an order, nor for anything which is both, neither does it provide that one
adjudication by the Court can be resolved into diverse elements, some of which are decrees and some orders.
The circumstances of that case differ from those dealt with by Kumaraswami Sastriar, J. in Abdul Wahab v. Rokia Bibi. The suit was for
dissolution of partnership and the taking of the partnership accounts, and after settlement of issues Coutts-Trotter, J., as he then was, passed an
order referring the whole case to the Official ''Referee. The Official Referee''s report came before Kumaraswami Sastri, J. and exception was
taken to the terms of the reference as embracing matters which the Official Referee-had no jurisdiction to decide. It was accordingly contended
that the order of Coutts-Trotter, J. was without jurisdiction and ultra vires.
The learned Judge, however, while agreeing that the Official Referee had no power to decide certain of the questions referred to him, declined
to adopt the view that Coutts-Trotter J''s order of reference could be treated as a nullity. He says:
The cases cited by the Advocate-General do not touch the question as to how far in the same suit and in the same proceedings, it is open to the
parties to get behind an order passed, however incorrect that order may be. No authority has been cited in favour of the contention of the
Advocate-General that I ought to go behind the order of Coutts-Trotter, J.
and further on:
The order of Coutts-Trotter, J., standing a� it does unreversed or unmodified either by appeal or review must, I think, be taken to bind the
parties in subsequent proceedings in the suit, and that the only remedy of the plaintiff is to carry the order in appeal.
The position I take it was that Coutts-Trotter, J., had jurisdiction in a suit of that character to make a reference to the Official Referee and
accordingly that any reference which he made, whatever its terms, could not be held to be void. Similarly in the present case it must depend, in my
view on whether Mr. Sambasiva Rao had jurisdiction at that stage of the proceedings to record ''his findings upon four issues. If as I think, he had
jurisdiction to do this, his order would be binding upon his successor. I do not find much assistance from any other cases cited for the appellants. It
appears to me that the best authority for their position lies in the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Kir Pal v. Rup Kuari,
and especially in the passage which I have already cited verbatim.
For the general reasons which I have already given that Mr. Sambasiva Rao''s order although not specifically authorized by the code, was yet
not in contravention of its terms and that he had jurisdiction to pass such an order as a step towards the framing of the final decree, I am of opinion
that the order was binding on his successor.
The question then arises whether we are competent to revise Mr. Venkatasubba Rao''s order of 30th April 1925, which must be taken, I think
to have been interlocutory in character. There is a great diversity of judicial opinion as to whether the provisions of Section 115, Civil P.C. can be
applied to interlocutory orders. In Allahabad a Full Bench has decided this question in the negative and elsewhere a similar position has been,
taken up. But whatever view I might feel inclined personally to take, I agree that it is advisable to follow the preponderant view taken by this
Court. In re Nizam of Hyderabad Muthuswami Aiyar, J., refused to revise an interlocutory order on the ground that the section presupposes a
decision or an order in the nature of a decree. Since then, however, the opposite view has been fairly consistently held though in several of the
cases cited before us the question whether or not the words ""any case which has been decided"" applied to the circumstances has not been
specifically discussed. Although the order under reference may be interlocutory, yet since it goes to'' the extreme length of ignoring a predecessor''s
order and opens up again issues which it was the aim of that order to close, I think that, if any class of interlocutory orders should be open to
revision, an order of this chara