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Judgment
M.K. Jain, Acting C.J.
This Writ Appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 20.7.2000 passed in W.P. No. 12164 of 2000.
One Md. Ismail, alleged to be the Secretary of Madras Pavement Traders Welfare Congress, filed Writ Petition No. 12164 of 2000, alleging
that the Society, registered under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act bearing Regn. No. 100/76 got duly renewed form time to time. It has a
strength of 311 traders and hawkers, out of which 205 are originally carrying on business in Anna Salai. It is alleged that the traders and hawkers
belong to uneducated and economically weaker section of the Society and that they were parties to the earlier writ proceedings. They used to sell
articles like cheap clothing, plastic items, toys, bangles, chappals, old books and other items. This kind of activity is being carried on for the past 3
to 4 decades between the road side near Simpson Roundtana and the Spencer''s building, having been permitted to do this kind of trade activities.
Petitioner also addressed a letter to the Commissioner of Police, Madras in June 1976, and they agreed to maintain discipline and not to use
handcarts. Aggrieved by the constant threats and interference, Petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 11424 of 1986 seeking a direction
against the Respondents viz. the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, the Commissioner of Police, Madras and the State Government, not to
interfere with the Petitioners trade, which was admitted and interim injunction was granted on 4.11.1986. The interim injunction granted earlier was
subsequently made absolute on 22.7.1987. In that writ petition, Commissioner of Chennai Corporation filed a counter stating that the Corporation
has no jurisdiction over the disputed stretch of land on Anna Salai, and it vests only with the High Ways Department, the second Respondent
therein, and the Corporation is not going to take any action against the Petitioners. In view of this, Petitioners withdrew the writ petition, with
liberty to agitate their right, if any, in accordance with law, it is stated that till February 1999, there was no interruption from the Highways
authorities. But, afterwards the Highways authorities along with Police Authorities started trying to interfere with the Petitioner''s trade and issued
notices on 7.2.1999 and 9.2.1999 to the Society. Petitioner Society filed a civil suit before the City Civil Court, Chennai praying for a permanent
injunction, along with an application seeking for interim injunction, which was rejected for non compliance of Section 80, CPC It is also alleged
that on 27.2.1999 the officials on the Highways Department, with the assistance of the Police on account of the drive for removing encroachments
in the city removed the members of the Petitioner society and prevented them from doing their business on the pavement. They made oral
representation to the office of the Chief Minister. Members of the Petitioner society were once again allowed to resume trade with effect from
18.5.1999 to 6.6.2000. But without any prior intimation, the Highways authorities with the assistance of the local police evicted them forcibly and
confiscated their goods. Hence, the Petitioner Society filed writ petition, as stated, praying to direct the Respondents to implement the order of the
Supreme Court of India in SLP. No. 22689 of 1997 by identifying hawking zones in Chennai city.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has not considered the decision in Sadan Singh v. New Delhi
Municipal Committee AIR 1989 SC 1988, and erred in not entertaining the writ petition. In that case, the Apex Court has held that the right to
carry on trade or business on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are mearo: exclusively for
passing or re-passing and for no other use. The learned Counsel further submits that the Petitioners were enjoying the benefit for all these years on
the basis of the stay order grated in W.P. No. 11424 of 1986 and on account of the undertaking given by the Corporation of Chennai, not to evict
the Petitioners though the same has been withdrawn. But without appreciating that fact, the writ petition was dismissed, on the basis of the order
passed in W.P. No. 719 of 1994 dated 28.4.2000.
We have heard the learned Counsel and perused the materials on record. The only grievance of the Petitioner is that they enjoyed the benefit on
the strength of the interim order granted in W.P. No. 11424 of 1986 and that writ petition was withdrawn only on the ground that the Highways
Department, which has jurisdiction over the said stretch of land, has not been impleaded as party Respondents and, therefore, it cannot be said
that the Petitioners, as encroachers, have any right to remain in the pavement, which is a public road. More so, nothing has been placed on record
to show as to who are the members and who are the office bearers of the Petitioner Society at that time, and who have filed the present writ
petition. Therefore, in our considered view Petitioner Society cannot take advantage of the interim order granted earlier, that too has come to an
end on 13.12.1996. So far as the other argument that the members of the Petitioner Society should not be evicted till they are provided with
alternative site, in view of the direction of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 22689 of 1987 is concerned, a perusal of the order of the Hon''ble
Supreme Court reveals that the alleged scheme was to be framed for Pondy Bazar Petty Shop Traders only. The said decision will not give any
right to the present Petitioners. Petitioners cannot contend that they should not be removed, till a scheme as per the decision of the Supreme Court,
is framed and evaluated by the Corporation. At the same time, the Corporation has got the power to evict the unauthorised occupants. The
Petitioner, being encroacher having no legal right or licence, cannot take advantage of the decision of the Supreme Court, nor on the basis of the
alleged undertaking as no specific orders have been passed by the competent court or shown to us. No doubt, it is the bounden duty of the State
to provide amenities for trade, but at the same time, without any subsisting right or licence, Petitioners cannot be allowed to squat on the basis of
same directions issued in the earlier case, as stated above. Therefore, Petitioners cannot be equated with the hawkers, who were the parties before
the Supreme Court, and contend that before removing them, they should be given alternative site. Though, Government is free to frame a scheme
to rehabilitate them, it depends upon the number of the persons or societies having some right, and subject to place, feasibility and other
circumstances. As stated, in the circumstances, Petitioners cannot take advantage of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the SLP cited
supra. The learned single Judge has rightly followed the order of another learned single Judge in W.P. No. 719 of 1994 dated 28.4.2000. A
reference can be made to the order of the Division Bench of this Court passed in W.A. No. 947 of 2000 dated 5.7.2000 wherein this Court, while
considering the cases cited on the points, dismissing the Writ Appeal. In view of the matter, this Court Cannot show any indulgence to perpetuate
the illegality by allowing them to use the public road without any basis. The learned Counsel also cannot take advantage of the alleged interim order
passed/the observation made in W.P. No. 4578 & 1180 of 1997 dated 28.1.1998, by the Division Bench, and no order has been filed by the
learned Counsel. No doubt, to maintain judicial propriety, Bench is bound to follow the decision of the co-ordinate Bench; if differ (sic) to refer to
a larger Bench. But at the same time, granting interim order cannot be a precedent, as it is not a final decision. As such, it is not always necessary
to follow the interim orders. That apart, each case depends upon the facts and circumstances of its own. As discussed, Petitioner has not been able
to show any legal or subsisting right, to get any indulgence, from this Court. This Court certainly can pass appropriate direction in the writ
jurisdiction, only when the order passed is without jurisdiction, or passed without following the principles of natural justice. That too each case
depends upon the facts and circumstances of its own. As stated, the learned Counsel cannot take advantage of any general observation made,
regarding some comprehensive scheme, for persons of similar nature, at interim order stage in W.P. No. 1180 of 1997 and connected cases dated
28.1.1998. A particular individual case needs investigation regarding the fact position of that case, and it cannot be gone into in the writ
jurisdiction. The learned single Judge, in the facts of the given case, has not entertained the writ petition, in view of the order passed in W.P. No.
719 of 1994 dated 28.4.2000. As discussed, Appellant has not been able to satisfy us, on any count, to grant any indulgence. In view of this we
find no error or illegality in the order of the learned single Judge, so as to call for any interference. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, C.M.P. No. 11065 of 2000 is also dismissed.