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Judgment
Sadasivayya, J.—We are not satisfied that in the face of the statutory provisions, viz., S. 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, there survives some common law right of the past under which a party to an industrial dispute has an unqualified right to be represented by a legal practitioner in proceedings under the said Act.
Nor do we find any reasonable ground for the argument that the right to be represented by a legal practitioner is part of the fundamental right of freedom of speech, the right to hold property and the right to carry on any trade or business. Therefore, the limited restriction imposed by S. 36 in a law sanctioned by Parliament in the exercise of its legislative competence as conferred by the Constitution, cannot be viewed as an abridgment of any fundamental right.
We have not been shown that S. 30 of the Advocates Act which gives every advocate a statutory right to practice before any tribunal or court, has been brought into force. Further, the complaining party in the present case is not an advocate who has been denied his right to practice. So, S. 30 will be of no assistance to the petitioner. Section 32 of the Advocates Act has no application to representation by an advocate.
We decline to admit this writ petition. It is dismissed.