Madhya Pradesh Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Ltd. (MPPKVVCL) & Ors. vs Arunendra Prasad Maurya

Per: Justice B. P. Sharma

Since common questions of fact and law arise in this batch of writ appeals, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common judgment. This order shall govern the disposal of all these appeals. For the sake of convenience, facts stated in Writ Appeal No.616/2024 are taken into consideration.

The appeals under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 arise out of orders passed by learned Single Judge whereby the writ petitions preferred by the respondents-employees were allowed and the charge-sheets issued against them were quashed on the ground that the officers issuing the charge-sheets were merely holding current charge of the higher posts and were, therefore, not competent to exercise disciplinary powers. Aggrieved by the said orders, the Electricity Distribution Companies have preferred the present appeals.

The respondents are employees of the appellant - Electricity Distribution Companies. Allegations of misconduct having been levelled against them, charge-sheets were issued proposing departmental enquiries under the applicable service regulations. The charge-sheets were issued by officers who, at the relevant time, were holding current charge of the posts of Chief Engineer, Additional Chief Engineer or other higher disciplinary authorities pursuant to orders issued under the Delegation of Powers of the Company. Instead of participating in the disciplinary proceedings, the respondents challenged the charge-sheets before learned Single Judge contending that the officers issuing the same were not substantively appointed to the higher posts and consequently lacked jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The Companies (appellant herein) opposed the writ petitions by asserting that the officers concerned had been entrusted with the current charge along with full powers of the higher offices under the Delegation of Powers and were therefore competent to discharge all functions attached to those posts, including disciplinary functions. Learned Single Judge, relying principally upon Full Bench decision of this Court in Girija Shankar Shukla vs. SDO, Harda, AIR 1973 MP 104 , accepted the contention of writ petitioners, held that officers merely holding current charge could not exercise statutory disciplinary powers and consequently quashed the charge-sheets. Hence, the present appeals.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true scope of Delegation of Powers and the settled legal position governing officers entrusted with current charge. It is argued that appellant - Companies are public utility undertakings where higher posts frequently remain vacant owing to transfers, promotions and retirements and in order to ensure continuity of administration, current charge of such offices is entrusted to senior officers with full powers. Once such officers are authorized to discharge the functions of the higher office, no distinction can be drawn between administrative and disciplinary powers unless the governing rules expressly provide otherwise. It is further contended that issuance of a charge-sheet is merely the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and does not determine the rights of the employee. Consequently, interference at the stage of issuance of charge-sheet on a technical objection relating to competence was wholly unwarranted.

In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel appearing for the Companies relied upon Gopalji Khanna vs. Allahabad Bank and others, (1996) 3 SCC 538, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized the competence of an officer placed in charge of office to discharge the functions attached thereto. Reliance is also placed upon the Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in A. Savariar vs. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission & Another, 2008 (4) CTC 753 , holding that an officer holding current charge is competent to discharge statutory functions unless a contrary intention appears from the governing statutory framework. The appellants further relied upon P.S. Dhanwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and other (Writ Appeal No.575 of 2020) , submitting that the Division Bench upheld the competence of an in-charge authority after examining the statutory framework, and Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra VidyutVitaran Company Ltd. and Others (Writ Appeal No.1261 of 2024), wherein this Court upheld disciplinary proceedings initiated by an authority functioning under the applicable Delegation of Powers. It is further contended that learned Single Judge misapplied the Full Bench judgment in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra), which arose in an entirely different statutory context where no delegation or authorization existed empowering the officer concerned to exercise the powers of the higher office. It is also submitted that the interpretation adopted by learned Single Judge would have serious administrative consequences by invalidating innumerable administrative and disciplinary actions taken by officers lawfully entrusted with current charge under the Delegation of Powers.

Supporting the judgment under appeal, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the controversy is one of jurisdiction and not of administrative convenience. According to the respondents, disciplinary powers flow from the applicable service rules and not from executive instructions. The Delegation of Powers is merely an administrative arrangement and cannot enlarge or substitute statutory authority. It is contended that learned Single Judge correctly distinguished between an officer functioning as In-charge of the Circle and one merely holding current charge of the post and rightly concluded that the latter could not exercise statutory disciplinary powers. Reliance is placed upon Girija Shankar Shukla (supra), which, according to the respondents, continues to govern the field and clearly lays down that statutory powers cannot ordinarily be exercised by an officer merely holding current charge. Reliance is also placed upon Kiran Narwariya v. State of M.P., 2013 SCC OnLine MP 8654 , submitting that the competence of an officer holding current charge depends upon the governing statutory provisions. The respondents sought to distinguish Gopalji Khanna (supra), A. Savariar (supra), P.S. Dhanwal (supra) a n d Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra) on the ground that those decisions turned upon different statutory frameworks or peculiar facts and, therefore, did not dilute the ratio of Full Bench decision in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra).

It is further contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the service conditions of the employees are governed by the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 as adopted by the Electricity Companies together with the statutory service regulations applicable to the establishment. The disciplinary authority is specifically identified under the relevant rules. Such authority derives its jurisdiction from the statutory framework itself and not from administrative orders issued from time to time. Consequently, unless the statute or statutory rules expressly authorize an officer holding current charge to exercise disciplinary powers, the same cannot be assumed merely because such officer has been directed to discharge the current duties of the higher office.

It is further submitted that learned Single Judge has recorded detailed and well-reasoned findings after examining the applicable Delegation of Powers, the statutory rules and the judicial precedents cited before the Court. The appellants have not demonstrated any patent error of law or perversity in the conclusions reached by learned Single Judge. Merely because another view is possible on interpretation of the Delegation of Powers does not justify interference in intra-Court appeals. The respondents contend that the judgment under appeal is fully consistent with the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court and does not call for any interference.

We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and have carefully perused the material available on record.

The issue is not whether the allegations against the respondents are sustainable, but the principal question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether an officer who has been entrusted with the current charge of a higher post under the Delegation of Powers framed by the Company is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and issue charge-sheets in respect of employees over whom such higher authority exercises disciplinary jurisdiction or whether such statutory powers remain confined only to the substantive holder of the office. Learned Single Judge proceeded primarily on the basis of Full Bench judgment in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra). However, in our considered opinion, the said decision has to be understood in the factual and statutory context in which it was rendered. The Full Bench was dealing with a situation where there was no statutory or executive authorization empowering the officer holding current charge to exercise the powers attached to the higher office. The present cases stand on a different footing. The appellant Companies have framed a comprehensive Delegation of Powers under which officers entrusted with current charge are authorized to exercise the powers attached to the higher office. Such entrustment is neither casual nor informal but forms part of the administrative mechanism devised to ensure continuity of governance in the functioning of Electricity Distribution Companies.

The Delegation of power of M.P. Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Ltd. dealing with this issue in Part-A, Section - IV, Sr. No. 1, reads as under:

The Electricity Companies have framed a comprehensive Delegation of Powers, under which officers entrusted with the current charge of higher offices have been specifically authorized to exercise the powers attached to such offices. The entrustment of current charge in the present cases was not an informal or casual administrative arrangement. Each officer was specifically directed by the competent authority to hold the current charge of the higher office together with the powers attached thereto. Such entrustment formed part of the established administrative mechanism governing the functioning of Electricity Distribution Companies.

The Delegation of Powers framed by the Company does not carve out any such distinction. On the contrary, it entrusts the officers holding current charge with the powers of the higher office. Once such entrustment is made by the competent authority under the governing administrative framework, the officer functions as the head of that office for all practical purposes during the period he continues to hold charge. Unless the applicable statute expressly prohibits exercise of a particular function by such officer, the Court would not ordinarily read into the Delegation of Powers a restriction which the rule-making authority itself has not incorporated.

It is well settled that the purpose behind entrusting current charge is to ensure continuity of administration. Public institutions cannot remain paralysed merely because substantive appointments to higher posts have not immediately been made. Particularly in organizations dealing with essential public services such as electricity distribution, the administrative machinery is expected to function uninterruptedly. Vacancies occurring on account of retirement, transfer or promotion cannot result in suspension of statutory or administrative functions. It is precisely for this reason that the competent authority entrusts current charge of higher offices to senior officers until regular appointments are made.

If the interpretation adopted by learned Single Judge is accepted in its entirety, every administrative decision taken by an officer holding current charge including grant of sanctions, approvals, administrative orders, contractual decisions and disciplinary proceedings would become vulnerable to challenge solely on the ground that the officer was not the substantive incumbent of the post. Such an interpretation would render the entire mechanism of current charge appointments practically unworkable and defeat the very object for which such arrangements are made.

In Gopalji Khanna (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court was examining the competence of an officer who had been placed in charge of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director. Rejecting the challenge to his competence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the officer was discharging the functions of those offices and was therefore entitled to perform all duties attached thereto. The emphasis laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not upon the substantive appointment of the officer but upon the authority conferred upon him to function as the incumbent of that office. Learned Single Judge distinguished Gopalji Khanna (supra) by observing that the present cases involve exercise of statutory powers. In our opinion, such distinction does not completely answer the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court itself recognized that the officer functioning in charge of the office was competent to discharge the functions attached to that office. The judgment does not support the proposition that every statutory function automatically stands excluded merely because the officer is holding current charge.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has had the occasion to consider the question whether a person holding the current charge of a higher post competent to exercise the powers of the disciplinary authority is attached to that post. The issue stands authoritatively settled by holding that an officer entrusted with the current charge of a higher office is vested with all the executive powers, duties and functions attached to that office during the period of such entrustment. Consequently, any disciplinary action, including the imposition of penalty by such officer in the capacity of the disciplinary authority, is legally valid and cannot be faulted merely on the ground that the officer was holding only the current charge of the higher post. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna (supra) has held as under:

Support for this view is also available from the Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in A. Savariar (supra). The Full Bench, after an elaborate consideration of the earlier authorities including Gopalji Khanna (supra), held that unless a contrary intention is expressed by the Government through statutory provisions or executive instructions, an officer holding the post in charge possesses the authority to discharge the statutory functions and responsibilities attached to that office. The Full Bench expressly overruled the contrary view adopted in earlier Division Bench decisions and authoritatively recognized the competence of officers holding current charge. The relevant para regarding the interpretation of the word “in-charge” is as follows:

Learned Single Judge, while referring to A. Savariar (supra), appears to have emphasized only the observations regarding statutory framework without noticing the ultimate conclusion recorded by the Full Bench. The ratio emerging from A. Savariar (supra)is that the competence of an officer holding current charge has to be determined from the governing legal framework. In the present case, the Delegation of Powers expressly authorizes the officer to function as the incumbent of the higher office. Therefore, the principle laid down in A. Savariar (supra) lends support to the stand of the appellants rather than the respondents.

Equally significant is the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra). The controversy therein also arose from the issuance of a charge-sheet by an officer holding current charge. After examining the original record, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and upheld the competence of the authority acting under the applicable Delegation of Powers. Although the facts of every case is different, the principle emerging from the said judgment is that the validity of the charge-sheet has to be tested with reference to the authority conferred under the governing administrative and statutory framework and not merely with reference to the nomenclature "current charge".

The respondents have placed reliance upon Kiran Narwariya v. State of M.P., 2013 SCC OnLine MP 8654 . In our opinion, the said judgment also does not carry the matter any further. In that case, learned Single Judge upheld the competence of the authority issuing the charge-sheet upon finding that the officer concerned was substantively holding an equivalent post and had additionally been entrusted with another charge. The judgment turned upon its own facts and cannot be read as laying down an inflexible proposition that every officer holding current charge is incompetent to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

From a cumulative reading of all the aforesaid judgments, the legal position which emerges is that no absolute proposition of law can be laid down that an officer holding current charge is invariably incompetent to discharge statutory functions attached to the higher office. The issue necessarily depends upon the governing statutory provisions, the applicable service rules and the Delegation of Powers under which such officer has been entrusted with the higher office.

Another important aspect which deserves consideration is the nature of the impugned proceedings. The charge-sheet merely initiates disciplinary action. At that stage, the guilt of the delinquent employee remains to be determined after a regular enquiry conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. No penalty is imposed by the mere issuance of a charge-sheet. Therefore, even otherwise, learned Single Judge ought to have exercised considerable restraint before interfering at the threshold, particularly when the challenge rested solely upon the technical objection relating to the competence of the authority issuing the charge-sheet.

Accordingly, this Court pass the following order.

No.1449/2024) filed by the Electricity Distribution Companies succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders passed by learned Single Judge in respective petitions are set aside.

No.1724/2024) preferred by the employee is dismissed.

No order as to costs.