Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs Dr. S.K. Yadav and Others

K.K. Lahoti, J.

The petitioners have sought following reliefs in this petition:

(i) Writ in the nature of certiorari may please be issued for quashing the impugned order dated 25.5.99 (Annex.P/9) passed by the Labour Court and the impugned order dated 3.8.2000 (Annex. P/15) passed by the Industrial Court.

(ii) Any other writ, direction or order as this Hon''ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may please be issued in favor of the petitioners.

The petitioners have challenged order (Annex. P/9) dated 29.5.1999 by Labour Court, Jabalpur in Case No. 327/96 MPIR by which the Labour Court allowed the application filed by first respondent u/s 31(3) read with Section 61 of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Adhiniyam, 1960 and set aside, the order dated 21.9.1996 as illegal and directed reinstatement of first respondent with all ancillary benefits. The said order was appealed by the petitioners before the Industrial Court, Jabalpur in Case No. 420/MPIR/99 which was decided by order dated 3.8.2000 (Annex.P/ 15) and was dismissed. This order is under challenge in this petition.

The learned counsel appearing for petitioners assailed the order on following grounds:

(1) That the Labour Court in the impugned order has found that the Departmental Enquiry against first respondent no. 1 was proper, even then erred in interfering with the findings of the enquiry.

(2) That the Standard Standing Orders are not applicable in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board as the M.P. Electricity Board has adopted Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1996 and the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Rules and the Labour Court erred in reversing the finding on charge no. 1 on the ground that the enquiry was not initiated within a period of one year as required under the Standard Standing Orders.

(3) That the first respondent remained absent without any sanction of the leave and after due enquiry, the services were terminated. Even if the misconduct is not found proved, the first respondent was not entitled for any back wages.

The learned Senior Advocate appearing for first respondent supported the orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and submitted that the M.P. Electricity Board has adopted M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Reliance is placed to the Apex Court judgment in M.P. Vidyut Karamchari Sangh Vs. M.P. Electricity Board, and submitted that the Labour Court rightly quashed the findings and punishment on charge no. 1. And so far as charge no. 2 is concerned, the Labour Court has recorded a finding that first respondent submitted an application for leave on medical ground which was neither considered nor any decision has been communicated to first respondent in this regard. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his joining report with fitness certificate which was accepted by the petitioners and the respondent was permitted to join service. In the circumstances, the Labour Court has rightly quashed the charge no. 2 also.

So far as back wages is concerned, the learned counsel for first respondent submitted that when the charges against the respondent were not proved and the punishment has been set aside, he was entitled for back wages. This order has been passed by the Labour Court which needs no interference.

Considering the contentions of the parties, firstly the question may be seen whether the Standard Standing Orders framed under M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 shall apply to the employees of the petitioners. The Apex Court considering similar question held in M.P. Vidyut Karamchari Sangh (supra).

The Board adopted Fundamental and Supplementary Rules which per se were not applicable to the employees of their undertaking. They were adopted by the Board. The provisions of the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules to the extent they were made applicable having regard to the provisions contained in Section 79(c) would, thus, be deemed to be the Regulations governing the term and conditions of the employees of the Board. The requisite notification u/s 2(2) of the 1961 Act was, thus, required to be issued by the State Government.

This leads us to the question as to the applicability of Standing Order 14-A vis-a-vis the agreement/settlement entered into by and between the parties dated 10.6.1996. In terms of Standing Order 14-A of the 1963 Rules the age of superannuation was fixed at 58 years. The proviso appended to standing order 14-A of the 1963 Rules, however, postulates that nothing therein shall adversely affect the operation of the term of any agreement on the subject if the age of retirement is not less than 58 years. We have noticed that clause (S) (9) of the settlement refers to the age of retirement which was registered in terms of Section 33 of the 1960 Act. The said agreement, keeping in view the proviso appended to Standing Order 14-A and having been issued in compliance with the requirements of the Act will operate in the field. In terms of the said agreement the age of retirement was to be the same as that of the employees of the Central Government on acceptance of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission. The Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and clause (5) of Article 148 made rules known as the fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 1998 in terms whereof clause (a) was amended in the following terms:

(a) Expect as otherwise provided in this rules, every government servant shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of sixty years.

Provided that a Government servant whose date of birth is the first of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of sixty years.

Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, however, has been couched in a different language in terms whereof a settlement will be binding as is agreed upon by the parties and shall continue to be binding despite expiry thereof until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement.

The decision of this Court in South Indian Bank Limited V.A.R. Chacko, LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur and Karnataka SRTC vs. KSRTC Staff and Workers'' Federation which have been rendered having regard to the phraseology used in sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act will thus have no application to the facts of the present case.

In view of the settled law by they Apex Court, there is no iota of doubt that the Standard Standing Orders are applicable to the employees of the petitioners-Board and the finding in this regard by the Labour Court is affirmed.

The Labour Court in the impugned order (Annex.P/9) has recorded a finding that the charge sheet issued on 8.7.1994 and the charge no. 1 relates to the period of 11.9.91. Under order 12(6) of S.S.O, no proceedings can be initiated against the employee for major punishment after one year of its commission. The aforesaid findings are in accordance with the aforesaid provisions and needs no interference.

So far as charge no. 2 is concerned, the Labour Court has found that the respondent submitted an application for leave on medical ground, but respondent was never informed about the acceptance or rejection of the leave application. If the respondent submitted leave application to the petitioners on medical ground, the petitioners were under obligation to decide the aforesaid application and to communicate its result to the respondent. In absence of which if respondent remained on leave and thereafter joined service along with the fitness certificate which was accepted by the petitioners and permitted the respondent to join service, then the Labour Court has rightly held that no misconduct is proved against the respondent.

So far as last contention that the Labour Court erred in directing the reinstatement of the respondent along with back wages in concerned, the Labour Court has assigned the reasons in this regard and when the charges have not been found proved, then respondent was entitled to be reinstated with back wages.

Considering aforesaid, this petition has no merit. It is dismissed with no order as to costs.