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Judgment
Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J.—This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed on 31st March, 2007 by the learned Additional District Judge at Sealdah in Title Appeal No. 127 of 2006 affirming the judgment and decree dated 26th September, 2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court at Sealdah in Title Suit No. 624 of 1994, at the instance of the defendant/appellant.
A suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiff/respondent against the defendant/appellant herein on the ground of reasonable requirement of the original plaintiff, since deceased and the members of his family. The said suit was filed in September, 1994. Since then the nature of requirement and/or the extent of requirement of the plaintiffs/respondents and the members of their family has been changed due to various factors. The original plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit and his legal heirs and heiress were substituted in his place. The requirement which was originally pleaded in the original plaint lost its significance due to change of circumstances. The plaint was repeatedly amended for bringing the subsequent change in the nature and extent of requirement of the plaintiffs and the members of their family, on record.
Presently, this Court is concerned with the last amendment by which the present requirement of the plaintiffs and the members of their family were brought on record.
Of course, certain objections have been raised by Mr. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the appellant for the first time in this Second Appeal, against acceptance of the amended pleadings of the plaintiffs by the Courts below. Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that though the plaintiff''s prayer for amendment of plaint was allowed by the learned Trial Judge twice, but the plaintiff did not carry out such amendment in the original plaint as per the provision contained in Order 6 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, submitted that since the plaintiff did not carry out such amendment in the original plaint as per the provision of Order 6 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff, will not be permitted to amend the plaint subsequently. Mr. Chatterjee also drew the attention of this Court to the original plaint, the amended plaint and the substituted amended plaint submitted by the plaintiffs simultaneous with the schedule of amendment which was given by the plaintiffs in their two applications under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to show that the amended plaints which were filed by the plaintiff either in March, 2005 or in September, 2006 under the caption of "amended plaint" and "substituted amended plaint" have no resemblance with the pleadings which the plaintiff was allowed to bring on record by way of amendment Vide Order No. 37 dated 5th January, 1998 passed by the learned Trial Judge.
Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the provision contained in Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC is not a mere procedural matter inasmuch as the consequence for non-compliance of the requirement of the said provision is provided in the said provision itself. By drawing the attention of the Court to the said provision, Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that if such amendment is not carried out within the time as specified in order 6 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party whose prayer for amendment was allowed, will not be permitted to amend the plaint subsequently. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, submitted that though the said provision deals with the procedural aspect but the tenor of the said provision shows that such provision is mandatory in nature and as such, the said provision is the substantive law.
Mr. Chatterjee, thus, contended that since the respondents admittedly did not carry out such amendment in the original plaint even though his prayer for amendment was allowed twice, the Court should not have considered the amended pleadings of the plaintiff/respondent.
Mr. Chatterjee, thus, submitted that under such circumstances both the Courts below ought not to have considered the requirement of the plaintiffs as pleaded in the amended plaint or in the substituted amended plaint. But since neither of the Courts below tried the suit and/or the First Appeal on the basis of the original pleadings of the parties, the entire trial of the suit and/or First Appeal has been vitiated and thus, the judgments and/or decrees passed by both the Courts below should be set aside.
According to Mr. Chatterjee, this Court, under such circumstances should proceed to consider this appeal on the basis of the original pleadings of the parties. Mr. Chatterjee also addressed this Court on the merit of this appeal, which, I like to discuss after considering the objection raised by Mr. Chatterjee as above.
In reply to the submission of Mr. Chatterjee as recorded above, Mr. Ganguly, learned Advocate, appearing for the respondents submitted that since such objection was never raised by the defendant/appellant earlier, the appellant should not be allowed to raise such objection for the first time in the Second Appeal. Mr. Ganguly submitted that had such objection been raised earlier, the plaintiffs could have rectified such defects earlier. According to Mr. Ganguly, these are all curable defects which even now can be rectified by the respondents with the leave of this Hon''ble Court.
Mr. Ganguly contended that carrying out amendment in the original plaint is the ministerial job of the Court. By referring to the original plaint, Mr. Ganguly pointed out that it was recorded therein in red ink that the original plaint is amended vide Order No. 37 dated 5th January, 1998, but, in fact, such amendment was not carried out by the office of the learned Trial Court. According to Mr. Ganguly, the litigant cannot suffer for such negligence on the part of the office of the Trial Court.
Mr. Ganguly further pointed out that when the original plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint for the second time on 14th March, 2005, vide Order No. 87, the plaintiff was directed to file the amended plaint within fourteen days. Accordingly the original plaintiff filed the amended plaint with proper verification on 23rd March, 2005. According to Mr. Ganguly, filing of the amended plaint with proper verification of pleadings thereof, is substantive compliance of the provision of Order 6 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, he submitted, that no irregularity was committed by any of the Courts below, in trying the suit and/or the First Appeal by taking note of the amended pleadings of the plaintiffs/respondents.
Mr. Ganguly submitted that the CPC is the handmade of justice. The said Code prescribes the procedure for conducting a civil suit before the Civil Court and such procedure is followed only for achieving justice from the Court of law. Mr. Ganguly contended that the provision contained in Order 6 Rule 18 of the CPC is the procedural law and as such for noncompliance of such procedural law, the substantive right of a party cannot be denied.
Mr. Ganguly further contended that the defendant/appellant never raised any objection regarding acceptability of the amended plaint, due to noncompliance of the provisions contained in Order 6 Rule 18 of the CPC either before the learned Trial Court or before the learned First Appellate Court. According to him such an objection cannot be raised for the first time in the second appeal before this Court particularly when the defendant/appellant filed his additional written statement against the amended plaint twice, without raising any objection regarding the acceptance of the said plaint. That apart, he pointed out that evidence was led by both the parties on the amended pleadings of the parties. Mr. Ganguly, ultimately submitted that since the trial of the suit and/or the First Appeal was not vitiated for such defects, the suit need not be sent back to the Trial Court again for retrial. As such, Mr. Ganguly invited this Court to dispose of this appeal on merit.
In support of such submission Mr. Ganguly relied upon the following decisions of the different High Courts:
In the case of Sri Ramchandra Prasad @ Jaiswal v. Sri Rajesh Kr. Jaiswal and Ors. reported in 2001(4) ICC 687.
Bool Chand Vs. Ayodhyalal,
Society Ltd. Vs. Smt. Mary Fernandes and others, .
Gobardhan Patra v. Ashutosh Nandi reported in 1988 (2) CLT 199.
Mohammed Yousuf Vs. Bharat Singh, .
Pahali Raut Vs. Khulana Bewa and Others,
Mr. Ganguly further contended that the objection regarding nonverification of the plaint cannot be raised for the first time in Second Appeal. He further contended that even if there was defect in verification of the plaint, the decrees passed by both the Courts below cannot be set aside in the Second Appeal for non-compliance of the provision of Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of such contention he relied upon the following decisions of this Hon''ble Court:
In the case of Charan Mandal v. Gorachand Poddar and Anr. reported in 19 CWN CCXX.
Prasar Bharati Broadcasting Corpn. of India Vs. Debyajoti Bose, .
Mr. Ganguly, thus, invited this Court to dispose of the appeal on merit without giving any importance to the objection raised by Mr. Chatterjee. Mr. Ganguly has submitted an amended plaint by incorporating the pleadings which the appellant was allowed to bring on record by way of amendment of his pleadings in terms of the order being No. 37 dated 05.01.1998 for regularizing the records of the suit. Let the said amended plaint be kept with the Trial Court''s record for maintaining the records of the suit in order.
Let me now consider the substance of the objection raised by Mr. Chatterjee as recorded above.
On perusal of Lower Court records, this Court finds that the plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaint firstly on 5th January, 1998 vide Order No. 37. By the said amendment the plaintiff wanted to remove certain typographical mistake in his pleading. The plaintiff also wanted to elaborate his pleadings regarding reasonable requirement by bringing on record the changes which occurred in the nature and extent of his requirement due to passage of time. Such amendment was allowed. In the plaint also, it was recorded in red ink that the plaint was amended vide Order No. 37 dated 5th January, 1998, though the amended pleadings were not incorporated in the body of the original plaint by the office of the learned Trial Judge. Even the amended plaint cannot be traced out from the Lower Court records. But fact remains that defendant filed his additional written statement to the amended pleading of the plaint, in the suit. The new pleadings which the plaintiff was permitted to bring on record were sufficiently dealt with by the defendant in his said additional written statement.
Subsequently, when the plaintiff was again allowed to amend his plaint for the second time in March, 2005 the plaintiff filed the amended plaint within the time which was allowed to him by the learned Trial Judge. A copy of the said amended plaint was served upon the defendant and the defendant also filed his additional written statement to such amended plaint. The subsequent requirement which was brought on record by the plaintiff by such amendment, was also sufficiently dealt with by the defendant in his said additional written statement.
The original plaintiff died subsequently and the heirs and heiress of the original plaintiff were substituted in the place of the original plaintiff since deceased. After the legal representatives of the original plaintiff were substituted in the said suit, they filed the substituted amended plaint in the suit. In fact, only the cause title of the amended plaint was changed in the substituted amended plaint. In the place of original plaintiff, the substituted plaintiffs were placed in the substituted amended plaint without altering the pleadings of the amended plaint.
In fact, the original plaintiff filed the said suit as he reasonably required the suit premises for the professional requirement of his eldest son and his daughter-in-law. Since the requirement of the said son and daughter-in-law was pleaded in details in the amended plaint filed in March, 2005, the plaintiffs proceeded with the trial of the said suit on the basis of such amended pleadings. Trial of the said suit commenced subsequently on 17th November, 2005, after filing of the additional written statement by the defendant for the second time.
Thus, when the trial commenced, both the parties were fully aware about the claim of their adversary. Knowing fully well the respective claims of the parties, both the parties participated in the trial of the suit. Both of them, not only adduced their independent evidence on the amended pleadings of the parties but the defendant also cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiffs to the fullest extent on the present requirement of the plaintiffs as pleaded by them in their last amended plaint. Thus, for all practical purposes, neither party was taken by surprise for introduction of the present requirement of the plaintiffs in the suit. No undue hardship was caused to anybody in proving their respective claims in the suit in the light of the amended pleading of the parties.
Though there were some technical defects in maintenance of the Lower Court records by not incorporating the amended pleading in the original plaint and also by not re-verifying the amended pleadings in the original plaint itself, but such defect cannot vitiate the trial of the suit in view of the fact that the plaintiff even can prove the ground of his reasonable requirement by evidence without even narrating the particulars of his requirement in great details in his pleadings. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision of our High Court in the case of Jagat Bandhu Batabyal v. Jiban Krishna Roy reported in (2001) 3 CHN 244.
In a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, the basic pleadings are as follows:
The plaintiffs are the owners of the suit premises.
The plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for his own occupation and for the occupation of the members of his family or for the occupation of the persons for whose benefit the premises are held. The nature and extent of the plaintiffs'' requirement should be stated in the plaint in brief.
The plaintiffs are not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere.
These are the three basic pleadings which must be pleaded in the plaint. The nature and extent of requirement is a matter of evidence which the plaintiffs are required to prove by evidence. Even if such evidence are not pleaded in the plaint with full particulars and in great details, still then, the trial may not be vitiated, if the parties proceed with the trial of the suit with the knowledge of the claims of each other.
It is not the case of the appellant that the basic pleadings are lacking in this particular case. Here, of course, in the original plaint, the requirement of the plaintiff''s eldest son and his daughter-in-law (both are doctors) were pleaded. In fact, the entire foundation of the suit was based on their requirement. Due to passage of time, the nature of their requirement was changed and the extent of their requirement was also increased. Such changes were brought on record by way of amendment twice, but there were some omissions in carrying out such amendments in the record partly due to negligence on the part of officials of the Court and partly due to default on the part of the plaintiff. But in my view such omission in carrying out such amendment in the original plaint cannot vitiate the trial of the suit due to such procedural lapses. It is no doubt true that the compliance of Order 6 Rule 18 of the CPC is mandatory as a consequence of non-compliance is prescribed in the said provision itself, but at the same time, this Court cannot ignore the series of decisions cited by Mr. Ganguly, wherein it was held that such an objection cannot be raised for the first time in appeal particularly when the defendant after obtaining several adjournments, ultimately submitted his additional written statements twice in the suit and further for the reason that both the parties adduced their respective evidence on the aforesaid amendment pleadings of the parties at length in the suit.
Even the objection regarding improper verification of the amended plaint cannot be raised at the time of trial of the suit unless such an objection is raised in the written statement. In the instant case, no such plea was taken by the defendant in any of his additional written statements and as such, such objection cannot be taken note of at this stage, in view of the decision of this Hon''ble Court in the case of Himjit Construction Vs. Tarun Sarkar, .
Thus, this Court holds that the trial of the suit was not vitiated as neither party was taken by surprise due to introduction of the changed requirement of the plaintiffs in the suit and/or for bringing such changed requirement of the plaintiffs within the zone of consideration by the Courts below in the facts of the instant case.
In this regard reliance may be placed on the following decisions cited by Mr. Ganguly:
Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Shri Chandramaul,
Nedunuri Kameswaramma Vs. Sampati Subba Rao, .
Shri Mundri Lal Vs. Smt. Sushila Rani and Another,
Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others,
Long fourteen years have already passed during the trial of the suit at various stages before different forums. The original plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit.
The volume of practice of the plaintiff No. 2 and his wife has increased substantially over these long fourteen years. Both the plaintiff No. 2 and his wife are now attached to various reputed nursing homes in the city. Both of them want to carry on their profession more scientifically and effectively. When for achieving the said ambition they want to install various machineries for scientific investigation such as USG and CTG machines at their residential chamber, this Court cannot ignore such claim of the plaintiffs because of non-compliance of the provision of Order 6 Rule 18 of the CPC in the facts of the instant case. Both of them also claim that they have sufficient means to install those machines, but they are unable to install those machines for want of accommodation in their residential chamber.
Thus, when in the present set of facts both the Courts below tried the suit and/or the First Appeal by taking note of the present requirement of the plaintiff, this Court cannot hold that both the Courts below committed an illegality in considering the amended pleadings of the parties.
Merit
While admitting this appeal under the provision of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following substantial questions of law were formulated by the Division Bench of this Hon''ble Court:
i) Whether the learned Judges of the Courts below committed substantial error in law in not taking into consideration that during the pendency of the suit one of the tenants left the tenanted portion of the premises in question and, thus, additional space in the premises in question was available in order to meet the requirement of the plaintiffs?
ii) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error in law in not considering the material evidence on record?
iii) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error in law in holding that the requirement of the plaintiffs was bona fide and reasonable one?
In course of hearing of this appeal an additional question of law was formulated which is set out hereunder:
Whether alleged requirement of the plaintiff is bona fide and reasonable or a mere fanciful desire?
This appeal was, thus, heard on the aforesaid substantial questions of law. Let me now consider the merit of this appeal with reference to the aforesaid substantial questions of law.
The suit premises is a four storeyed building. The first floor and second floor of the said building are occupied by the plaintiffs and the members of their family. The said two floors are exclusively issued for the residential purpose of the plaintiffs'' family. The third floor of the said premises is let out to tenant. Admittedly the plaintiffs do not require any additional accommodation for their residential purpose.
There are three shop-rooms in the ground floor of the said premises. Those three rooms are situated on the front side of the suit premises. The middle shop room is the suit shop-room. The plaintiffs are in possession of three rooms in the ground floor. One of such rooms is used by the plaintiff No. 2 as his doctor''s chamber. Another room in the ground floor is used by the wife of the plaintiff No. 2 as her doctor''s chamber. The other room is used as their office room and the passage is used for the purpose of sitting of patients/visitors as well as for the ingress and egress to rooms in the possession of the plaintiff''s in the ground floor and also for using the toilets.
The plaintiff No. 2 is a gynaecologist. His wife is a paediatrician. Both of them have substantial practice. In addition to the rooms which they have in the ground floor of the said premises they claim that they require two sitting rooms (one A.C. and another non A.C.) for the patients and visitors, one room for setting up USG machines and one room for setting up CTG machine. They also require one office-cum-enquiry room and one record room for keeping the record of the patients. The learned First Appellate Court being the final Court of facts held that at least 7 to 8 rooms are required by the plaintiffs to cater their bare needs. Both the Courts below concurrently held that the rooms in the first floor are not suitable to meet the requirement of the plaintiffs for running their clinic there, for the simple reason that the patients will not be in a position to climb the stairs upto the first floor because they are either carrying mothers or post delivery mothers. Both the Courts below also held that the requirement of the number of rooms as claimed by the plaintiffs for their chambers, sitting rooms for their patients is in consonance with the West Bengal Clinical Establishment Rules. Thus, both the Courts below passed and/or maintained the decree for eviction against the defendant/appellant.
Mr. Chatterjee was very candid in his submission to the effect that the requirement of the plaintiffs is neither bona fide nor reasonable. Mr. Chatterjee contended that the defendant is in possession of only one shop room in the said premises. As such, the plaintiffs'' requirement of seven to eight rooms cannot be satisfied even by evicting the defendant from the suit shop room. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that during the pendency of the suit, one of the tenants in the ground floor of the said premises namely Arun Babu surrendered his tenancy in respect of one room having similar accommodation as that of the suit shop room, but instead of utilizing the said room the plaintiffs demolished the same. According to Mr. Chatterjee if the plaintiffs had any bona fide requirement they should have utilized the said room for their professional purpose. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, contended that the plaintiff''s requirement of the suit premises could have been satisfied by the room which the other tenant namely Arun Babu vacated during the pendency of the suit. But since the plaintiffs did not utilize the said room, both the Courts below ought to have held that the requirement of the plaintiffs are not bona fide or in the alternative the requirement of the plaintiffs of the suit shop room should have been held to be satisfied by the room which the plaintiffs got during pendency of the suit.
Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that it is the plaintiffs'' own case that they want to utilize the suit shop room after removal of the existing common wall between the suit shop room and the doctor''s chamber of the plaintiff No. 2. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, contended that the suit shop room as it stands now, is not suitable for the purpose for which they require the suit shop room. Alteration is required to make the suit shop room suitable for their use. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that under the Municipal Building Rules such alteration cannot be done without any sanction plan, but since no such sanction plan has been proved, it can safely be concluded that alteration in the said room cannot be effected by the plaintiffs and without such alteration, the suit shop room cannot be used by them. As such, the plaintiffs'' requirement can not be held to be bona fide. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant has come to know that the third floor flat has been vacated by the tenant and the said third floor flat is now in the possession of the plaintiffs. As such, the requirement of the plaintiffs can be satisfied by the said additional accommodation which is now available to the plaintiffs in the third floor of the said premises. Accordingly, the appellant has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 for permitting the appellant to bring the said facts on record by way of additional evidence.
Mr. Chatterjee, thus, prayed for an appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for ascertaining as to whether the said third floor flat is in possession of the plaintiffs or not.
Mr. Ganguly refuted such submission of Mr. Chatterjee by contending that the possession of the room in ground floor which was in occupation of another tenant namely Arun Babu was given to the plaintiffs, but since the said room was unauthorisedly constructed on the passage of the said premises, the plaintiffs demolished the said room for making the passage wider so that the ambulance can get easy access upto the doctor''s chamber through the said passage. Mr. Ganguly further submitted that when both the Courts below concurrently found on scrutiny of the materials-on-record that the plaintiffs reasonably require 7 to 8 rooms in the suit premises for their professional purpose and/or for setting up USG machine and/or CTG machine, it cannot be held that the plaintiffs do not require the suit shop room. Mr. Ganguly further submitted that no municipal sanction is necessary for making minor alteration in the suit shop room. In fact, the plaintiffs are required to fix a door on the existing common wall between the suit shop room and the doctor''s chamber of the plaintiff No. 2. The said alteration is necessary only for the purpose of giving direct access to the doctor''s chamber through the said shop room which is situated in the front of the building on the road side. Mr. Ganguly, thus, submitted that the defendant cannot dictate the plaintiff as to how he will use the suit premises as the plaintiff is the best judge to decide the manner in which he wants to use the suit premises. In support of such submission Mr. Ganguly also relied upon the following decisions:
Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another, .
Gorachand Dey v. Chhaya Bagchi reported in 78 CWN 337.
Mr. Ganguly further submitted that when both the Courts below concurrently held after scanning the materials-on-record that the accommodation in the first floor is not suitable for the purpose for which they require the suit premises, no inspection is necessary for ascertaining as to whether the third floor flat is now in possession of the plaintiff or not and further for ascertaining the suitability of its use for professional purpose of the plaintiffs.
Mr. Ganguly ultimately submitted that the hearing of the Second Appeal is not the third trial of the suit and as such, this Court while considering the Second Appeal should restrict itself only to the adjudication of the substantial question of law which in the opinion of Mr. Ganguly is absent in the instant case.
Thus, by relying upon the following decisions of Hon''ble Supreme Court Mr. Ganguly prayed for dismissal of this appeal:
Gurdev Kaur and Others Vs. Kaki and Others, . Let me now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the context of the submission made by the Counsel of the respective parties. The scope for interference in the Second Appeal is very limited. In fact, the Second Appeal is not the third trial of the suit. Thus, this Court is required to find out as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in the appeal warranting interference.
Both the Courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs reasonably require at least 7 to 8 rooms in the ground floor to meet their professional requirement. This Court does not find any perversity in such findings of the Courts below inasmuch as such findings are based on evidence. On scrutiny of the pleading and evidence of the parties, this Court also holds that the plaintiffs require at least two doctor''s chamber in the ground floor, two sitting rooms for their patients, one room for setting up of USG machine and one room for setting up CTG machine and one record room. The plaintiffs have sufficient fund to install those machines in their chamber. When the plaintiffs want to carry on their profession more effectively and scientifically, this Court cannot hold that such requirement of the plaintiffs is not bona fide. In my view, the ground floor accommodation is suitable for the purpose of catering the need of the plaintiffs.
If the plaintiffs require seven rooms in the ground floor, this Court cannot hold that accommodation available to the plaintiffs in the ground floor in three rooms can satisfy their requirement.
It is, however, true that the requirement of the plaintiffs could have been satisfied partially by utilizing the room which was surrendered by another tenant namely Arun Babu during the pendency of the suit. Admittedly, instead of using the said room, the plaintiffs demolished the same. Though the plaintiffs claim that the said room was an unauthorized construction on the passage of the said building but, in fact, it has not been proved that the said room was an unauthorized construction.
However, the plaintiffs have given another explanation for demolition of the said room. They claimed that the said room was demolished for giving access to the ambulance directly upto the doctor''s chamber through the said passage. This explanation in my view is not an unreasonable one. Be that as it may, even by using the said room the plaintiffs'' requirement could not have been fully satisfied as they require four more rooms for their professional purpose. Accordingly, this Court holds that the suit room is reasonably required by the plaintiffs for their professional purpose.
This Court is in total agreement with the findings of the Courts below to the effect that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs to the first floor is not a reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and as such, the requirement of the plaintiffs cannot be satisfied by the available accommodation in the upper floors of the said premises.
As such, this Court holds that no inspection is necessary, as prayed for by the appellant, for ascertaining the available accommodation of the plaintiffs on the third floor of the said premises. The appellant''s application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC is, thus, rejected.
Before concluding this Court holds that for effecting minor alteration in the suit shop room by way of fixing a door on the common wall in between the suit shop room and the petitioner''s doctor chamber, no sanction from the Municipal Authority is necessary. Even assuming that any sanction from the Municipal Authority is necessary and in the absence of such sanction such alteration is not possible but, still then, they can do so after obtaining sanction from the Municipal Authority. That apart, even without altering the said room, the said room can be utilized for setting up the USG or CTG machine which is also the requirement of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal. The judgment and decree of the Lower Court, thus, stands affirmed. This appeal is, thus, dismissed on contest.
Be it noted here that no dispute has been raised with regard to the title of the plaintiffs in the suit property and as such, the said issue is not discussed herein.
Let the Lower Court records be sent down to the Court below immediately. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with formalities.