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Judgment
Shiv Dayal, J.
This is a second appeal from a decree for ejectment passed against the petitioner. The only ground urged before me is that the notice of eviction was not according to law inasmuch as by the notice, tenancy was determined on 1-6-1958 when the tenancy had commenced on 2-3-1953. There is no substance in this revision. In the first place, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act did not apply because there was a contract to the contrary. In the rent note itself there was a condition that the landlord would be entitled to evict a tenant after, giving one month''s notice.
Shri Inamdar''s argument is that there is no contract to the contrary as regards the second part of Section 106, that the notice must expire with the end of a month of the tenancy. This argument is devoid of force. When there is an agreement as to the period of notice, it is a contract to the contrary for all purposes of Section 106. The second provision requiring the notice to expire with the end of a tenancy month is concomitant part of the requirement and forms an indivisible condition.
Secondly, when tenancy commenced on the 2nd of every month and notice was given to determine the tenancy on the first day of a calendar month, it was in accordance with Section 106. As held in Rochaldas v. Ratanchand Baghmal, AIR 1954 Nag 292, a notice has to be liberally construed so as to find out the true intention of the party giving the notice.
For these reasons this appeal is dismissed in limine.