High CourtsDivision Bench(2019) 07 UK CK 0251

Madan Lal & Others vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 30 July 2019

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ · Alok Kumar Verma, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Special Appeal No. 713, 714 Of 2019, Delay Condonation Application No. 9874, 9876 Of 2019

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Judgment

15 paragraphs · 1,338 words

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

1.

The delay in preferring these appeals is not opposed and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay condonation applications stand disposed of.

2.

This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No.1732 of 2017 dated 27.05.2019 dismissing the Writ Petition.

3.

A common order was passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No.1735 of 2017 and batch, which included Writ Petition (M/S) No.1732 of 2017. The appellant herein had filed the said Writ Petition seeking a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the case, and to quash the recovery citation dated 13.07.2017. By proceedings dated 13.07.2017, the petitioner was imposed a penalty of Rs.500/- for every polythene bag recovered from his shop.

4.

Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that, pursuant to an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in "Lalit Miglani vs. State of Uttarakhand" (order in Writ Petition (PIL) No.140 of 2015 dated 02.12.2016), the Government of Uttarakhand issued order dated 11.01.2017 directing that there shall be a total ban of sale, use and storage of plastic carry bags throughout the State of Uttarakhand w.e.f. 01.01.2017; no person shall be permitted to bring carry bags in the State of Uttarakhand by any means of transport, including bus, trains and air; plastic/thermacol bags and material were also banned; the ban should be widely publicized through loudspeakers; and any violation of the order would entail a find of Rs.5,000/-.

5.

This Government Order dated 11.01.2017 was given wide publicity, including by the District Administration of Bageshwar. Subsequent to a raid being conducted on the appellant-writ petitioner's premises on 02.03.2017, 157 polythene bags were recovered from his shop. In terms of the order of this Court in Ajay Singh Rawat vs. Union of India & others (order in Writ Petition (PIL) No.31 of 2012 dated 04.12.2014), the appellant-writ petitioner was imposed a fine of Rs.500/- for each polythene bag recovered from his shop. Contending that only a fine of Rs.5,000/- could have been imposed, and not Rs.500/- per polythene bag, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

6.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that imposition of penalty would act as a deterrent for polythene users; this was in the wider public interest of safeguarding the ecology of the State; and, since imposition of fine was in terms of the order of the Division Bench in Writ Petition (PIL) No.31 of 2012 dated 04.12.2014, the respondents were justified in imposing such a penalty.

7.

Mr. Anchit Khokhar, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would draw our attention to the order passed in Writ Petition (PIL) No.31 of 2012 dated 04.12.2014, wherein the Division Bench had recorded the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that the Divisional Commissioner, Nainital would recover fine of Rs.500/- per polythene bag from the guilty shopkeepers from whose shops thousands of polythene bags were recovered. This statement of the learned Additional Advocate General was recorded by the Division Bench in its order dated 04.12.2014. Mr. Anchit Khokhar, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, may therefore be justified in his submission that there was no direction in Writ Petition (PIL) No.31 of 2012 dated 04.12.2014, to recover a fine of Rs.500/- per polythene bag.

8.

The fact, however, remains that a Division Bench of this Court had, in its order in Writ Petition (PIL) No.140 of 2015 dated 02.12.2016, imposed a total ban on the sale, use and storage of plastic carry bags w.e.f. 01.01.2017, and had held that no person shall be permitted to bring carry bags in the State of Uttarakhand by any means of transport, including bus, trains and air; and the State Government should launch a special campaign to make the people aware of the use of paper and jute bags to save the environment. The Division Bench had thereafter, in its order in Writ Petition (PIL) No.140 of 2015 dated 18.04.2017, opined that, despite the mandatory directions issued by the Court prohibiting the use, storage and transportation of plastic carry bags, the same was in use; and all the District Magistrates of the State should undertake before the Court to stop the use, storage and transportation of plastic carry bags. All the District Magistrates and Sub-Divisional Magistrates were directed to ensure that plastic carry bags were not used, stored or transported throughout the State.

9.

The order of the Division Bench, in Writ Petition (PIL) No.140 of 2015 dated 02.12.2016, imposed a total ban of the sale, use and storage of plastic carry bags throughout the State of Uttarakhand w.e.f. 01.01.2017. It is not in dispute that the appellant-writ petitioner's shop was raided on 02.03.2017, more than two months after 01.01.2017.

10.

In examining the appellant-writ petitioner's contention that a fine of Rs.5,000/- alone should have been imposed, and not Rs.500/- per plastic carry bag, we must bear-in-mind that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary. Exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees' Association, Eluru W.G. District vs. Bar Council of India, New Delhi: 2004 (5) ALD 180). The jurisdiction of this Court is exercised only in furtherance of the interest of justice and in larger public interest, and not merely on a legal point being made out. The interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. The Court has to weigh public interest vis-à-vis private interest while exercising its discretionary powers. (Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1997 SC 1236; ManoharLal v. Ugrasen & others: (2010) 11 SCC 557; Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd v. Metcalfe and Hodgkison Pvt. Ltd: (2005) 6 SCC 138; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd: (2000) 2 SCC 617).

11.

A writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari are discretionary, unlike a writ of habeas corpus which can be sought as a matter of right. One of the principles inherent is that the exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice. (State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu: (1994) 2 SCC 481). Even if a legal flaw might be electronically detected, (RashpalMalhotra v. Mrs. Saya Rajput: AIR 1987 SC 2235 and Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt: AIR 1989 SC 1972), or some defect is found in the decision- making process, this Court would exercise its discretion with great caution and only in furtherance of public interest, and not merely on the making out of a legal point. Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, should it intervene. (Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd: (2000) 2 SCC 617).

12.

The submission of the appellant-writ petitioner, in effect, is that while they may have flouted the order banning the use of plastic carry bags, all that the respondents are entitled to do, for their admitted violation, is to impose a fine of Rs.5,000/-, and not beyond. This Court, in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not come to the aid of a person who admits having violated the law, and yet seeks protection of the Court.

13.

We must bear in mind that the scope of interference in an intra-court appeal is extremely limited. It is only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality would interference be warranted. The learned Single Judge has refused to come to the aid of the appellant-writ petitioner, who had sought his protection while admitting that he had flouted the law. Such refusal to exercise discretion to entertain the Writ Petition, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be said to suffer from a patent illegality warranting interference in an intra-court appeal.

14.

The Special Appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.