AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
E. Dharma Rao, J.—When the petitioner was functioning as Branch Manager at Karankota Branch of the State Bank of Hyderabad, he was charge sheeted for committing some financial irregularities, which was followed by suspension pending enquiry and after completion of Domestic Enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and also the proposed punishment and consequently issued final notice calling for the explanation and after considering the same, the petitioner was dismissed from service through the impugned proceedings dated 29-8-1989. This order of the Disciplinary Authority was assailed before the Appellate Authority, who confirmed the same by his order No. DPC/163 dated 2.5.1990.
Aggrieved by the above said order, the present writ petition is filed on various grounds and as it is offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
The main contention raised by the petitioner is that he was appointed by the Executive Committee, but the impugned order dismissing the petitioner was passed by the Chief General Manager who is lower authority to the Executive Committee, therefore, it is against the provisions of the State Bank of Hyderabad (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979(for brevity the Regulations), hence liable to be set aside.
He further contended that Regulations 3(e) defines the Competent Authority designated by the Board or the Executive Council and Regulation 3(p) defines the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Reviewing Authority, specified as such by the Executive Committee from time to time and that the Executive Committee has not specified the Chief General Manager as the Disciplinary Authority. Further under Regulation 68 the Disciplinary Authority alone has got the power to impose the punishment contemplated under Regulation 67, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Chief General Manager who was designated by the Board dismissing the petitioner from service is illegal and liable to be set aside.
He next contended that when the charge sheet was issued and enquiry was conducted by the General Manager ( Operations ), the proposed punishment was suggested by the General Manager ( Planning & Development) is contrary to the provisions of the Regulations having a bearing on the service conditions of the petitioners inasmuch as the Officers have no authority to transfer the powers inter se among themselves. On the other hand even the Circular dated 13-2-1985 issued by the Head Office of the State Bank of Hyderabad, enabling the Officers to transfer power in between them is contrary to the provisions of the Regulations. On that ground also the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
The petitioner further contended that the Enquiry Officer has not allowed him to engage the services of an Advocate to present his case and defend him before the Enquiry Officer and thus principles of natural justice were violated.
Lastly it is the contention of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer has not conducted the enquiry in a fair and proper way violating the principles of natural justice and thus offended Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, for all the above reasons, the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside.
The respondents have controverted these contentions by filing detailed counter stating that when the petitioner was working as a Branch Manager at Karankota Branch of the State Bank of Hyderabad, he has committed certain financial irregularities and, therefore, he was placed under suspension by proceedings IV/DPC/10688 dated 17-11-1984 by the Disciplinary Authority. Subsequently charge sheet was issued by letter No. DPC/1424 dated 7-9-1985 and as per the instructions, the petitioner submitted his defence on 22.10.1985. There after, consideration his explanation, the Disciplinary Authority, General Manager (Operations) through his proceedings DPC/1843 dated 19.12.1985 informed that his explanation was not satisfactory and, therefore, proposed to conduct a Regular Domestic Enquiry and appointed Sri J.V. Subrahmanyam an Officer of SMGS, as Enquiry Officer. As per Regulation 68(2)(vii) of the Regulations, the petitioner is entitled to take the assistance of Bank Officers to defend him as his defence representative but the Regulations do not permit the Delinquent Officer to engage an Advocate before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer rejected his representation on 31.1.1986 enabling him to take the assistance of a lawyer through proceedings dated 1.2.1986. Therefore, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2116 of 1986 and Writ Appeal No.172 of 1988 which was dismissed on 25-2-1988 directing the petitioner to take the assistance of one of the two officers specified by the Head Office of the State Bank of Hyderabad viz., Sri T.Madhusudhan Rao and Sri N.R.Seetharam. But the petitioner has not chosen to take the assistance of any one of the above said Officers. The enquiry Officer who was appointed earlier was replaced by Sri B.V. Narsing Rao through proceedings dated 12-7-1988 to continue the enquiry. Once again the petitioner renewed his request to appoint an Advocate on 20-11-1988, but for the above reasons, the same was rejected. Thus, when the petitioner failed to take the services of any one of the Officers, as directed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 172 of 1988, when he failed to participate in the enquiry, it was closed on 30-1-1989 and the report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority dated 13.2.1989 holding that the charges were proved. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer recommended to the Appointing Authority - Chief General Manager (2nd respondent) the penalty of dismissal from service through his proceedings dated 9.8.1989 and the Appointing Authority - Chief General Manager, after considering the enquiry report and the other material, passed impugned order on 29.8.1989 dismissing the petitioner from service and the order was communicated to the petitioner on 29.8.1989.
Aggrieved by the same, petitioner filed appeal dated 11.11.1989 and the same was considered and disposed of by the Appellate Authority through his proceedings dated 2.5.90.
It is further stated that though the petitioner was appointed by the Executive Committee initially, but the Board of Directors of the Bank at its meeting held on 31.3.1984 approved the revised scheme of delegation of administrative matters and the said decision was communicated by the Head Office Circular dated 2.5.1984. The General Manager has been designated in Junior Management Grade Scale I and the Appellate and Reviewing Authority have been spelt as the Executive Director and the Managing Director respectively. The transfer of financial and administrative powers to the Executive Director and further decided by the Board to create post of Chief General Manager instead of Executive Director, as earlier approved by the Board. So as per the resolution passed by the Board of Directors Dated 31.3.1984, for the purpose of administration of the provisions of the Regulations, the Chief General Manager will be competent authority for all matters for which the Board had designated the Executive Director earlier. The General Manager, who has headed the operations, functioned as Disciplinary Authority and the charges were framed accordingly and served on the petitioner. The disciplinary proceedings were conducted as per the service Regulations. As suggested by the General Manager (Operations), earlier he functioned as Chief Vigilance Officer and he was well versed with the detailed investigation initiated against the petitioner, in order to avoid any allegation of bias against him, the General Manager (Planning & Development) was nominated by the Chief General Manager to act as Disciplinary Authority in this case. Accordingly, the Disciplinary Authority''s order was signed by the General Manager (Planning & Development) and, therefore, the appointment was given to conduct an impartial enquiry in a fair and reasonable way in the interest of the petitioner only.
It is further stated that the Disciplinary Authority has conducted the enquiry as per the provisions of the Regulations and in consonance with the rulings of the Apex Court and this Court. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the respondents is in accordance with law and does not warrant any interference by this Court.
To appreciate the rival contentions of both the parties, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Regulations which are having a bearing on the facts of the case.
Regulation 3(d) defines Board as Board of Directors of the Bank. Regulation 3(e) defines Competent Authority as the authority designated by the Board or the Executive Committee and till such authority is designated authority for the purpose immediately prior to the appointed date. Therefore, according to this regulation, the Board or the Executive Committee is empowered to designate the Competent Authority.
Regulation 3(g) defines Executive Committee as the Executive Committee of the Board. Regulation 3(p) defines Disciplinary Authority and Reviewing Authority and power was given to the Executive Authority to specify the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority.
Regulation 36 of the Subsidiary Banks General Regulations, 1959 contemplates the meetings of the Board shall be convened by the Chairman, or subject to any direction that may be given by him, by the Managing Director of the Subsidiary Bank, at least six times in each year and at least once in each quarter; that the meeting of the Board shall be held at the head office of the Subsidiary Bank or at such other places as may be specified in the notice convening the meeting; that a copy of the proceedings of such Board meeting shall be circulated as soon as possible thereafter for the information of the Directors and shall be signed by the person presiding at that or the next succeeding meeting.
Under Regulation 37 hereof , the resolutions of the Board in writing signed by a majority of the Directors of the Board shall be valid and effectual, and shall be deemed to be the resolution passed by the Board on the date on which it is signed by the last signatory to the resolution; the resolution passed by the Board are binding on the Executive Committee, appointed by the Board of Directors under Regulation 38 (4) Regulation 38 of the Subsidiary Banks General Regulations, 1959 contemplates the constitution and powers of the Executive Committee. Regulation 38(4) contemplates in the exercise of its powers, the Executive Committee shall be bound by such general or special directions as the Board may consistently with the Act and the Regulations give from time to time, but subject to any such direction, the Executive Committee may transact all the current business of the subsidiary bank.
It is also pertinent to mention here that Regulation 68(1). It contemplates that the Disciplinary Authority may itself, or shall when so directed by its superior authority, institute disciplinary proceedings against an Officer. It further provides that the Disciplinary Authority or any authority higher than it may impose any of the penalties in Regulation 67 on an Officer.
Proviso to this Regulation provides that where the Disciplinary Authority is lower in rank than the Appointing Authority, in respect of the category of officers to which the Officer belongs no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Clause (e), (f), (g) and (h) of Regulation 67 shall be made except by the Appointing Authority or any authority higher than it on the recommendations of the Disciplinary Authority.
The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J. Sudheer, has very much relied on this provision on the ground that when the Officer was appointed by the Executive Committee, a major penalty was imposed by the Chief General Manager, who is inferior authority to the Executive Committee and, therefore, the impugned order is vitiated by the proviso to Regulation 68(1) of the Regulations. He further reiterated the contentions that the petitioner was not given the assistance of an Advocate before the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer has not conducted the enquiry in a fair and reasonable way and the General Manager (Operations) and the General Manager (Planning & Development) have interchanged their powers to recommend the proposed punishment against the petitioner.
As seen from the above said provisions of the Regulations of 1979 and 1959, the Board of Directors of the Bank is at the apex position in the administration and it is empowered to nominate the Executive Committee and the Executive Committee in turn designate the Disciplinary, Appellate and Reviewing Authorities from time to time. But consequent upon the proposal submitted to the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors in its meeting passed resolution dated 31.3.1984 transferring the appointment power from Executive Committee to the Chief General Manager. But in the instant case, though the Executive Committee appointed the petitioner yet the disciplinary proceedings were initiated subsequent to the passing of the resolution-dated 31.3.1984 transferring the appointment power from the Executive Committee to the Chief General Manager. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this transfer of power by the Board of Directors from Executive Committee to the Chief General Manager in Civil Appeal No. 4469 of 1995 and delivered the judgment on April 6, 1995 holding that the Chief General Manager was made the Appointing Authority prior to the exercise of power and he was also the Disciplinary Authority and, therefore, entitled to impose the punishment. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that as on the date of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, by virtue of the resolution passed by the Board of Directors dated 31.3.1984 the Appointment Authority was transferred from Executive Committee to the Chief General Manager. Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner that the impugned order or dismissal was passed by an authority inferior to the Appointing Authority does not deserve consideration and is accordingly rejected. As observed earlier, the Board of Directors is placed at the apex of the administration to deal with the business affairs of the Bank and as a necessary corollary; it is empowered to transfer the appointment powers from Executive Committee to the Chief General Manager. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the Civil Appeal referred to above, I need not dwell upon the authorities cited by the petitioner in support of his contention.
With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officers have interchanged their powers, when the authorities with a view to avoid any allegation of bias, in all fairness have transferred the Enquiry from General Manager (Operations) to the General Manager (Planning and Development) and once I have already held that the impugned order was passed by the Competent Authority, it does not amount to contradicting the Regulations. It is for the convenience and interest of the petitioner such arrangement was made. That apart, ultimately it is for the Appointing Authority either to accept or reject the recommendations made by the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, this contention lacks merit does not deserve any consideration and is accordingly rejected, inasmuch as the transfer of powers inter se the Officers is not in contravention of the Regulations.
Insofar as the contention of the petitioner that he was not allowed to take the assistance of an Advocate before the Enquiry Officer is concerned, the respondents have asserted that there is no Regulation enabling the petitioner to take such assistance from an Advocate. The petitioner also failed to bring to the notice of this Court any such provision in the Regulations. That apart, the petitioner approached this Court and filed writ petition and also Writ Appeal No. 172 of 1988 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court but permitted the petitioner to take the assistance of any of the Officers specified by the Bank, which the petitioner did not avail. When there is no provision in the Regulations to permit the petitioner to take the assistance of the Advocate, he is not entitled to ask for such a relief contra to the provision enabling him to take the assistance of the Advocate. Therefore, I am unable to accede to the contention of the petitioner that the impugned order is vitiated by the act of prohibiting him from engaging an Advocate.
Lastly it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry was not conducted in a fair and proper way. The Enquiry Officer was appointed to hold a fact-finding enquiry in respect of the financial irregularities committed by the petitioner when he was working as Branch Manager at Karankota Branch of the State Bank of Hyderabad. After appreciating both oral and documentary evidence, the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report. This Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot act as an Appellate Authority against the findings of Enquiry officer and it cannot re-appreciate the evidence to reverse the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Appellate Authority exhaustively considered the Enquiry Report after giving notice to which the petitioner has submitted his explanation and after considering the same, the Appointing Authority has passed the impugned proceedings as per the Regulations and Resolution in the interest of the Bank which deals with the public money, and the same was confirmed by the Appellate Authority.
That apart, as seen from the records, though ample opportunity was given to the petitioner in compliance of the order in Writ Appeal No. 172 of 1988 dated 25-2-1988, the petitioner failed to take the assistance of any one of the two Officers specified by the bank. Thus he did not choose to participate in the enquiry. Therefore, having chosen not to participate in the enquiry and did not avail the assistance of any one of the two Officers to present his case, the petitioner is now estopped from contending that the domestic enquiry was not properly and fairly conducted by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the respondents.
The writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed but no order as to costs.