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Judgment
KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing of the Award dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure P-3) passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, whereby respondent No.2-workman has been directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages and all consequential benefits.
As per the pleaded facts, the petitioner(s), a Cooperative Sugar Mill engaged respondent no.2 workman as a Cane Surveyor with effect from 12.04.2022 and claims to have continued till 28.03.2023. His case before the learned Tribunal was that his services were terminated without notice, charge-sheet or payment of retrenchment compensation and that he had completed more than 240 days of service in the preceding period. He further pleaded that the management had employed persons junior to him in his place. The case of the petitioner-management before the learned Tribunal, however, was that respondent No.2 had not worked continuously from 12.04.2022 till 28.03.2023. It was pleaded that he was initially allowed to engage as a Cane Surveyor with effect from 12.04.2022 for 89 days; thereafter, after a break of more than 29 days, he was again engaged on contract basis at DC rates for 60 days. It was further pleaded that the engagement of respondent No.2, along with two other workers as Cane Surveyors, was subsequently approved on the previous terms and conditions for the crushing season 2022-23 with effect from 17.09.2022 till closure of the season on 27.03.2023, and that his services were never extended thereafter. It was accordingly pleaded that there was no requirement to comply with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the workman had not completed the requisite 240 days preceding the alleged termination. Petitioner-management contended that respondent No.2 was never appointed on a regular basis and that there was no sanctioned post against which he had been appointed. The management pleaded that the engagement was necessitated by the requirements of the crushing season and that regular appointments were not being made. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Tribunal framed issues, inter alia, as to whether the termination of the workman was illegal and, if so, whether he was entitled to reinstatement with back wages and other benefits; whether he had worked for more than 240 days; and whether his engagement was on a temporary/contractual basis. The parties led their respective evidence. The workman examined himself and also examined WW-2 Kulwant Singh of the petitioner-management, whereas the management examined MW-1 Ravi Kumar Malhotra, Time Keeper of the petitioner-Mill.
Vide the impugned Award dated 05.05.2026, the learned Tribunal held that the workman had put in more than 240 days of service and consequently found violation of Section 25-F of the Act. The learned Tribunal accordingly directed the petitioner-management to reinstate the workman in service with full back wages and other consequential benefits.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner(s), inter alia, contends that the impugned Award suffers from patent errors of law and fact. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that respondent No.2 was never appointed on a regular basis and that his engagement was purely temporary and for specified periods. According to learned Senior Counsel, the material on record clearly establishes that the workman was engaged under separate sanctions and thereafter for the crushing season and that his engagement was not extended after closure of the season. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the learned Tribunal erred in holding that the workman had completed more than 240 days of service. It is submitted that even according to the case of the workman, he was not continuously engaged throughout the period claimed by him and that the learned Tribunal itself relied upon the statement of WW-2 regarding the number of days worked. It is argued that the intervening breaks between the sanctioned periods of engagement were required to be taken into consideration and that the workman could not be treated as having rendered continuous service merely on the basis of the aggregate period.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that, in any event, the cessation of the workman's engagement upon expiry of the specified period and closure of the crushing season falls within Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. It is, therefore, contended that such cessation does not constitute retrenchment and the provisions of Section 25-F were not attracted. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the learned Tribunal failed to properly appreciate this aspect of the petitioner's defence while holding the termination to be illegal.
Learned Senior Counsel also submits that, even assuming that there was any violation of Section 25-F, reinstatement with full back wages could not have been granted as an automatic consequence. Reliance has been placed upon Incharge Officer v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126, to contend that in the case of a short-term/daily-wage engagement, the appropriate relief has to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner(s) and have gone through the impugned Award and the material available on record.
The principal challenge of the petitioner(s) is founded upon the assertion that the learned Tribunal erred in returning a finding that respondent No.2 had completed the requisite number of days and further erred in treating the cessation of his engagement as retrenchment attracting Section 25-F of the Act.
A perusal of the impugned Award shows that the learned Tribunal did not return its finding merely on the basis of the statement of the workman. The Tribunal considered the evidence led by both sides. In particular, WW-2 Kulwant Singh was examined and the Tribunal took into consideration his testimony as well as the attendance record produced before it. On appreciation of the said material, the Tribunal recorded a finding that the workman had worked for more than 240 days during the relevant period.
The said finding is a finding of fact based upon evidence available on record. It may be that the petitioner(s) seeks to draw a different inference from the sanction orders, the intervening periods of engagement and the seasonal nature of the establishment. However, the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not that of an appellate court. Unless the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffers from a patent error of law or jurisdiction, this Court would not substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the Tribunal.
In the present case, the petitioner(s) has not been able to demonstrate that the finding regarding the number of days worked is based on no evidence. On the contrary, the learned Tribunal has referred to the oral testimony of WW-2 and the attendance record while arriving at its conclusion. Merely because the petitioner(s) seeks to interpret the evidence differently would not furnish a ground for interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
The contention based upon Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act also does not persuade this Court to interfere with the impugned Award. There can be no dispute with the proposition that where an engagement is genuinely for a fixed period and comes to an end in accordance with the terms governing such engagement, the cessation may fall within the statutory exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb). However, whether the engagement in a particular case was in fact of such a nature is dependent upon the terms of engagement and the evidence brought on record.
In the present case, the management had raised the plea before the learned Tribunal that the workman had been engaged under separate sanctions and thereafter for the crushing season. The said defence was thus before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the rival cases regarding the nature of the engagement and the evidence led by the parties and, upon appreciation thereof, returned its finding in favour of the workman. The petitioner(s) has not been able to demonstrate that the conclusion so reached is contrary to any admitted contractual term or is based on no evidence.
The attempt of the petitioner(s), in substance, is to have the evidence relating to the various periods of engagement reassessed and a different conclusion drawn therefrom. Such an exercise would amount to appellate re-appreciation of evidence, which is not warranted in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The mere possibility of another view being taken from the same material cannot be a ground for interference with the Award.
Once the finding of the learned Tribunal regarding the workman's having completed the requisite period of service is found not to be perverse, and the Tribunal's conclusion regarding the nature of cessation of his engagement is also not shown to suffer from any patent legal infirmity, the consequential finding regarding non-compliance with Section 25-F does not call for interference. The Tribunal has recorded that the workman was not served with notice and that retrenchment compensation was not paid to him.
As regards the contention that reinstatement with full back wages could not have been granted automatically, the proposition that reinstatement is not an inevitable consequence in every case of violation of Section 25-F is well settled. The relief has to be moulded having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the judgment in Incharge Officer v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126, relied upon by learned Senior Counsel, does not lay down an inflexible rule that reinstatement can never be granted to a daily-wage workman. The question of appropriate relief necessarily depends upon the facts of the particular case.
In the facts of the present case, the learned Tribunal, after considering the material before it, has directed reinstatement with full back wages. No such perversity, arbitrariness or patent error of law has been demonstrated in the grant of such relief as would warrant interference in exercise of the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
On an overall consideration of the matter, no ground for interference with the impugned Award dated 05.05.2026 is, therefore, made out. The present writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.