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Judgment
G. Satapathy, J.
The petitioner M/s. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Limited by way of this writ petition invokes the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the impugned order dated 25.08.2026 passed by learned 2nd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (SD), Berhampur (in short, the “Tribunal”) in MAC No. 102 of 2025(264/2024-GDC).
Heard, Mr. Jyoti Ranjan Deo, learned counsel for the writ petitioner and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Mishra, learned counsel, who appears for OP Nos. 1 to 5-cum-claimants by waiving notice, but notice against OP No.6 stands dispensed with in view of the provision under Order XLI, Rule 14(4) of the CPC since OP No.6 has been set ex-parte by the learned Tribunal.
After having considered the rival submissions upon perusal of record, there appears no dispute about the writ petitioner filing two petitions for summoning the Income Tax Officer to prove the fraud in exhibiting the document under Ext.17 and to hold an enquiry U/S. 169(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, the “Act”) read with Sec. 379 of BNSS and to proceed against the claimants-petitioners therein. Conversely, another petition has been filed by the claimants- petitioners therein, who are OP Nos. 1 to 5 herein to recall Ext.17 and pass necessary award in favour of the claimants basing on IT documents for the assessment year 2023-24 and supporting bank documents. It, therefore, appears that the document which has been exhibited under Ext. 17 appears to be not a genuine one and thereby, the same can be ignored/recalled by the learned Tribunal in seisin over the matter in exercise of inherent power U/S. 151 of the CPC since there is no express provision provided in CPC to recall exhibit or to expunge the evidence.
Right now, the grievance of the writ petitioner gives rise to another question as to whether the learned Tribunal can proceed against the petitioner-claimants U/S. 169(2) of the Act read with Sec. 379 of BNSS, but Sec.169(2) of the Act only confers on the claims Tribunal the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of the witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of the documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed. According to Sec.169(2) of the Act, the claims Tribunal shall be deem to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Sec.195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), which is repealed by BNSS w.e.f.01.07.2024; whereas Sec. 379 of BNSS makes it apparently clear that when, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 215, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, (a)record a finding to that effect;(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
On a careful perusal of the aforesaid provision of law, it appears to the Court that unless the Court feels it to be ‘expedient in the interest of justice’, it shall not direct for an enquiry, but if such Court feels it ‘expedient in the interest of justice’ it may direct for such preliminary enquiry, which is, of course, not mandatory for the Court to direct for a preliminary enquiry in each and every case before proceeding in terms of the aforesaid provision. In this context, this Court is fortified with the decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Another vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Another; (2005) 4 SCC 370; wherein a Constitutional Bench of five Judges of Apex Court has held in paragraph 23 as under: -
“23.In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless has to be discarded.”
Coming back to the case at hand, it appears that the claimants have approached the learned Tribunal for grant of compensation, but it is often found that the claimant(s) is/are poor litigant(s) and the case is conducted by his/their mentor by contacting Advocate, however, sometimes, the claimant(s) may not know the true purport of the document which is produced before the Tribunal for tendering it in evidence and thereby, the claimant(s) in some cases appear(s) to be innocent. Further, it is found from the impugned order that Ext.17 has not been pressed by the claimants by way of filing a petition and thereby, there is no necessity to summon the Income Tax Officer to prove the veracity of Ext.17 which is admittedly not a genuine document in terms of the rival submissions and thereby, summoning the Income Tax Officer to prove the fraud in Ext.17 becomes infructuous.
At this stage, Mr.Deo raised another grievance for the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner-cum-insurer has not been provided with sufficient opportunity to lead evidence before the learned Tribunal since after disposing of the petitions of the writ petitioner, the learned Tribunal has posted the matter on 19.09.2026 for further OP evidence, if any and argument, but this Court, however, considers it in the interest of justice to provide some time to the writ petitioner to lead evidence which in the circumstance may be just and proper to provide the insurer 30 days’ time to complete its evidence. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal is requested to provide 30 days’ time w.e.f. the date of production of copy of this order to the insurer to complete its evidence and the claimants are also directed to cooperate the Tribunal for completion of evidence by the side of the writ petitioner.
In the result, the writ petition stands accordingly disposed of in the light of observation indicated above, but there is no order as to costs. This Court, however, believes and trusts that the learned Tribunal would dispose of the claim application as expeditiously as possible.