M/s Manoj Spares And Service Center vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors.

Sanjay K. Agrawal, CJ:

Invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of the India, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the Order-in-Appeal dated 12.05.2026, by which petitioner’s appeal preferred under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2017’), has been dismissed holding that the appeal is barred by limitation and delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned.

The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop:

Mr. Sharad Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Order-in-Original was required to be communicated to the petitioner by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017. The period of three months provided in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 would start running from the date of communication of the order, or decision to the petitioner and since the order was never communicated, as mandated under Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017, therefore, as soon as the petitioner came to know about the order, he immediately preferred an appeal on 19.04.2026. He, therefore, submits that the appeal could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and as such, the impugned order dated 12.05.2026 is liable to be set aside.

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue would submit that the order was uploaded on the GST portal and therefore, the petitioner deemed to have the knowledge about passing of the order. As such, uploading of order on the common portal, as required under Section 169 of the Act of 2017, itself is sufficient compliance and therefore, the appeal has rightly been dismissed by the Appellate Authority. He, therefore, submits that this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice that Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 as under:

A careful perusal of Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 would show that against the Order-in-Original, an appeal would lie to the Appellate Authority within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. As such, the Adjudicating Authority is required to communicate the order to the person aggrieved for the purpose of providing a remedy to the person adversely affected by the order and thereby limitation would commence from the date of communication. However, the word “communication” used in Section 107(1) has not been defined in the Act of 2017 or the rules made thereunder, therefore, the same deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of contextual interpretation and keeping in view the language of the relevant provisions (see Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others^{11.(2010) 5 SCC 23}).

The word “communication”, according to Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), means, information given; the sharing of knowledge by one with another; conference; consultation or bargaining preparatory to making a contract. A “communication” is ordinarily considered to be a deliberate interchange of thoughts or opinions between two or more persons, as distinguished from “res gestae” expressions which are spontaneously or instinctively provoked, or made while under such shock or excitement as to preclude the possibility of design. The ordinary meaning of communicate is to impart, confer or transmit information (see Union of India v. S.P. Singh^{22.(2008) 5 SCC 438}).

In the matter of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India and others^{33.(1990) 1 SCC 568}, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with communication of grounds of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act), held that “communicate” is a strong word. It requires that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands, so as to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation

In the matter of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu^{44.1992 Supp (1) SCC 471}, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 35-E of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 held that if the intention is to provide a remedy to the person adversely affected, the statutory provision has to be so constituted that limitation commences from the date of communication of order, and observed in paragraph 18 as under:

Similarly, in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta and others^{55.(2007) 7 SCC 309}, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that an order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. It is required to be communicated where communication thereof is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby. Their Lordships further held that the word “made” occurring in Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 cannot be construed to mean that unless the order is communicated, it should be deemed to have not been made.

In the matter of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and another^{66.(2003) 6 SCC 186}, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for filing a review under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, should commence from the date of the order or its communication. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reasoned that the limitation period should start from the date of communication or knowledge of the order, aligning with principles of fairness and practicality. Their Lordships allowed the appeals, set aside the Bar Council’s orders, and restored the appellant’s (therein) enrollment as an advocate. Their Lordships further held in paragraph 14 as under:

Coming to the facts of the case in light of the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 and in light of principles of law rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that regard, it is quite vivid that Section 107(1) mandates that the purpose of communication of order by the Adjudicating Authority is for the purpose of enabling the person aggrieved to file appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the order so communicated and that period is also specifically provided to be three months from the date of communication of such decision to him by the Adjudicating Authority. In this case, the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal has been restricted to the Appellate Authority for a further period of one month in addition to three months, as specified in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017. Therefore, considering the period of limitation to file appeal as three months + one month = four months, appeal can be preferred within three months from the date of communication of the order or decision and delay of one month in filing the appeal can be condoned. Therefore, the order has to be mandatorily communicated and the person aggrieved must be communicated with the decision or order. In other words, the party affected by the order or decision must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of three months would start running from the date of communication to the person affected of order by the authority concerned.

However, Section 169 of the Act of 2017, which provides for service of notice in certain cases, states as under:

According to Section 169 of the Act of 2017, any decision, order, summons, notice shall be served by any one of the methods, as prescribed in clauses (a) to (f), reproduced hereinabove. However, clause (a) to (c) would be alternative and if not applicable, then clause (d) to (f) would be followed. Sub-section (2) of Section 169 provides that every decision, order, summons, notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which it is tendered or published, or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in sub-section (1).

In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Saral Wire Craft Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax and others^{77.(2015) 14 SCC 523} may be noticed herein in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the provisions contained in Section 37C of the Central Excise Act held that every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. It has been observed by their Lordships as under:-

Considering the provisions of Section 169 of the Act of 2017, which provides the manner of serving the copy of decision or order, summons, notice, it is quite vivid that the purpose of communicating the order to the person aggrieved, in this case the appellant herein, is for the purpose of enabling him to prefer an appeal against the order of the Appellate Authority, as only three months period has been provided from the date of communication to prefer appeal and the Appellate Authority is empowered only to condone the delay for further one month and thereafter, after three months + one month, no further jurisdiction has been conferred to the Appellate Authority to condone the delay.

As such, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Singh Enterprises V. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others^{88.(2008) 3 SCC 70}. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority was obliged to strictly comply with the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 read with Section 169(1) of the Act of 2017 and communicate the order to the person aggrieved, which, in the present case, has not been done and only the order has been uploaded on the GST Portal, as submitted by the learned counsel for the Revenue, which, in our considered opinion, would not amount to the communication of order in terms of Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017.

Since the provision relating to communication has to be construed strictly and even, as stated by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, in accordance with Section 107(1) read with Section 169(1) of the Act of 2017, the petitioner was never communicated with the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority in order to enable him to file the appeal. As such, the period of limitation of three months would not start running unless the order in question is served by the Adjudicating Authority.

It is to be noted that the Rules are creature of a Statute and the Rules cannot circumscribe the mode that had been provided under the Statute. The Statute under Section 107 mandates communication of the order to the person aggrieved by registered post/ e-mail, etc.

The Rules cannot be limited to only serving it through electronic modes. The provision contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 qua communication to the affected party is mandatory in nature and unless the order is communicated to affected person, the period of limitation would not start running. As such, the Appellate Authority is absolutely unjustified in holding that the appeal is barred by 8 months and 23 days.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 12.05.2026 is set aside, and as according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant immediately after coming to know about the order, deposited the entire dues on 10.04.2026 and filed the appeal on 19.04.2026, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned and the matter is remanded back to the Appellate Authority for hearing and deciding the appeal on merits.

With the above observations, the petition stands allowed. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.