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Judgment
Venkataswami, J.—This civil revision petition is filed by the landlord in rent control proceedings against the judgment of the Appellate
Authority in R.C.A. No. 1196 of 1983, on the file of the Court of Small Causes (IV Judge), Madras, confirming the order of the Rent Controller,
in R.C.O.P.No.3387 of 1982.
Brief facts are the following:
The petitioner is the owner of No. 70, Arcot Road, Kodambakkam, is now in dispute. In the said premises, apart from the respondent, there are
other tenants. The respondent was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 300 excluding electric charges. The relevant averments in the petition for eviction
read as follows:
The petitioner is carrying on business in Javuli and other business under the name and style of ''Mahadeva Iyer and Sons'' at No. 12, Big Bazaar
Street, Koothanallur Post, Thanjavur District. The business is flourishing well. The petitioner has decided to open a branch shop at Madras and is
making arrangements for the same.
The petitioner does not own any other building except the building in the occupation of the respondent and situated in No. 70, Arcot Road,
Kodambakkam, Madras-24, which is in occupation of the respondent. The petitioner requires the premises in his occupation of the respondent for
the purpose of the business he is carrying on.
The respondent resisted the eviction petition contending inter alia as follows:
The respondent again submits that admittedly the petitioner is not carrying on business in the City of Madras either in any rented building or in any
other building not belonging to the petitioner. He only intends to open a Branch at Madras. Such a claim will not fall within the application of
Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
... ... ...
The landlord is not entitled to file a petition for eviction against the tenant stating that he got a business somewhere in the North or South of India
and, therefore, he wants to open a Branch in all cities available in India or in Tamil Nadu Such a claim is opposed to the specific provisions of the
Act especially requirement contained in Section 10(a)(3)(iii) of the Act.
... ... ...
The oblique motive of the petitioner is to get enhanced rent of Rs. 1,000 per month and advance rent of Rs. 10,000 free of interest which was
refused by the respondent, as it was totally unbelievable. Therefore, the false petition is filed by the petitioner pointing out the most frivolous and
false and unsustainable claims.
Before the learned Rent Controller, the petitioner''s son was examined as P.W. 1 and Exs.P-1 to P-S were also marked. On the side of the
respondent, one of the partners was examined as R.W. 1. Exs.R-1 and R-2 were also marked on the respondent''s side.
The learned Rent Controller, on a consideration of the pleadings, evidence both oral and documentary and the arguments of the counsel on both
sides, found that none of the Exs.P-1 to P-5 indicates that the petitioner has made any preparation to start a branch business at Madras, that the
petitioner has not made any arrangement for opening a branch shop at Madras, that though there is no written demand of enhanced rent, the fact
that the rents for the other tenants have been increased recently whereas the respondent is paving the same old rent for the past several years
which shows that the petitioner''s real intention is somehow to evict the respondent and let out the premises for higher rent, and that the requirement
of the petitioner in respect of the premises for starting his branch office for his textile business is not bona fide. On those findings, the learned Rent
Controller dismissed the eviction petition.
The petitioner preferred an appeal against the dismissal of the eviction petition in R.C.A. No. 1195 of 1983.
The appellate authority, on are-appreciation of the evidence and after hearing the counsel on both sides, also held that no preparation has been
made and that it is only at the stage of intention to start a branch at Madras and that, therefore, the petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is not
maintainable in view of the decision in Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co., Ltd. v. V.I. Bahdurnissa 95 L.W. 144, that the appellant before it was very
particular to have enhancement of rent for the portion in the occupation of the respondent and with a view to let out the premises for a higher rent,
the petition for eviction was filed and that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide, and consequently the Appellate Authority confirmed
the dismissal of the eviction petition, by dismissing the appeal.
It is under the above circumstances, the present C.R.P. has been filed.
Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, in his elaborate arguments, mainly concentrated to attack the
finding of the Authorities below which held that the petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was not maintainable, According, to .the learned senior
counsel, the Authorities below went wrong to. thinking that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act can be invoked only when the landlord is carrying on a
business in a city, town or village in a rented premises while in same city, town or village, he owns a premises in which somebody else is carrying
on business. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, even if the landlord is carrying on business only in a place other than the city, town
or village in which the tenant is carrying on business in the premises belonging to the landlord, he can invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. On the
admitted fact that the petitioner is already carrying on the business in textiles at Koothanallur and wants to carry on business at Madras by opening
a branch in the portion of the non-residential building of his own, but in the occupation of the tenant/ respondent can move the Rent Controller u/s
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, is the contention of the learned senior counsel. In support of that, he placed reliance on several judgments. He also argued
about the meaning to be given to the words ""is carrying on"" occurring in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
Mr. Unni Krishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant, with all vehemence, contended that this Court, sitting in revision, will
not interfere with the concurrent findings of the authorities below oh facts. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent, the Authorities
below having given concurrent findings on the bond fides of the landlord, this Court will not replace these findings by coming to a different
conclusion. For this, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy
Chettiar, . On the scope of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, to contend contra, he also equally placed reliance on numerous decisions.
After going through the arguments, I am of the view that the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the finding of the
Authorities below on the question of bona fides being a concurrent one, cannot be interfered with in the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, , is well founded and if that be so other question need not be
gone into. We have seen that both the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority have concurrently held that the requirement of the
landlord was not bona fide on the ground that the petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was filed with an oblique motive of getting enhanced rent and
also a fabulous advance. It is now beyond doubt that even for the purpose of a petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act; the question of bona fides plays
an important role. Vide the decision in Hameedia Hardware Stores, represented by its partner S. Peer Mohammed Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, .
In Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others Vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar, , the Supreme Court, while interpreting the scope and ambit of
Section 25 of the Act, has categorically held as follows:
...The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstance that both the expressions ''appeal''
and ''revision'' are employed in the1 statute. Quite obviously, the expression ''revision'' is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction
than that conveyed by the expression ''appeal''. In fact, it has to be noticed that u/s 25 the High Court calls for and examines the record of the
appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy itself u/s 25 appears to be that
the power confer red on the High Court u/s 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore despite the wide language employed in Section
25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the findings of the subordinate
authority. The power conferred on the High Court u/s 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the
revisional power of the High Court u/s 115 of the CPC but in the, words of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate Vs. Vithalrao
Maruthirao Janagaval, . ""It is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal.
Some argument was advanced whether a finding as to the bona fide requirement of a landlord is not a mixed question of fact and law. Reference
was made to Madan Lal Puri Vs. Sain Das Berry, , and Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra AIR 1969 S.C. 186, on the one hand and T.B. Garvate v.
Nemi Chand 1966 M.P.L.J. 28, and Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, , on the other hand. We do not think it is necessary for the purposes of this case to
enter into a discussion of this question. Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of
revisional power. It must, however, be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice. A concurrent
finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding
which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
The above ruling directly applies to the facts of this case. On that ground, I dismiss the civil revision petition. However, there will be no order as to
costs.