High CourtsSingle Bench(1980) 04 MAD CK 0019

M. Pitchai and Anr vs Cholan Roadways Corporation and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 8 April 1980 · Citation: (1981) 2 LLJ 116

HON’BLE JUDGES
S. Mohan, J
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No''s. 3780 and 4281 of 1979

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Judgment

42 paragraphs · 906 words

S. Mohan, J.—The Short point that arises for consideration in these write petitions for certiorari is what exactly is the construction to be

placed on Standing Orders of Cholan Roads Corporation Limited concerning the definition of ""workers"". Under Clause-2, sub-clause (a)

''worker'' is defined as, any person employed by the management either directly or through any agency in connection with the company''s business.

In these two writs petitions the petitioners are foremen who are sought to be retired at the age of 55 which according to the Corporation would be

the age of superannuation since the definition of worker contained in the certified standing orders would not embrace foremen. In the Counter

Affidavit of the Corporation the duties concerning foremen in paragraph - 2 it is stated in W.P. No. 3780 of 1979 as follows :

The petitioner while he was in the service of the respondent was a foremen in the workshop of the I respondent at Unit I in Tiruchirapalli. He was

drawing a basic salary of Rs. 515 and allowances. The nature of duties was entirely supervisory and he had several workmen under him and under

his immediate controlled. His duties were to supervise the work done by them. As a matter of fact the petitioner himself knew fully well about the

factual position that his service conditions were governed by the Service Rules of Cholan Roadways Corporation limited as these Rules are

applicable to all non-workmen employees. As the nature of the work carried on by the petitioner was purely supervisory and as his basic salary

was Rs. 515 and allowances, the question of application of the Standing Orders cannot and does not arise. The Standing Orders would be

applicable only to the category of ""workmen"" to which the petitioner did not belong"".

It is in the light if this the only controversy that is raised before me as to the scope of the interpretation of the definition has to be decided.

2.

Mr. A. L. Somayaji, learned counsel for petitioners would urge that it is open to the parties to enlarge the definition in S. 2(1) so as to take in

persons who are exercising supervisory function and, therefore, when the intention of the parties was to adopt an enlarged definition than the

Statutory definition contained in S. 2(i) of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders. It is open to the respondent Corporation to request the

Court to construe it in any other way. I may also in this connection note that Mr. Somayaji, learned counsel for the petitioners, so far as no reply

has been filed to the averment in the counter-affidavit in paragraph-2 extracted above would say that he will proceed on the basis that what is

stated in the counter affidavit could not be denied. As against this Mr. Sanjay Mohan learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation would state

that this is a case in which the Standing Orders are drafted with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act behind the purpose and unless

there are express words so as to include persons exercising supervisory function or in other words unless the parties have in clear terms adopted a

wider definition than what is contained in Section 2(i) there is no reason to deviate or depart from the statutory definition contained in S. 2(i) Such

being the position person like the petitioners who are foremen exercising supervisory functions will not fall within the definition of ""worker

contained in Certified Standing Orders.

3.

On a careful consideration of the above argument I am of the view that the stand of the respondent is unassailable. The Statutory definition of

Workman"" contained in S. 2(i) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, is an under :

Workman"" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any Industrial Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual supervisory,

technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, but does not include any such person :

(i) ...............

(ii) .................

(iii) .......................

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five-hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of

the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.

It has to be remembered in this connection that the Standing Orders of the Cholan Roadways Corporation Ltd., cam to be certified or when the

parties wanted the Standing Orders to be framed, it was in the background of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. As a matter of

fact the certification it self is done only under the Act. Therefore, unless there are express words to indicate that the intention of the parties was to

adopt a different definition than what is contained in the statute it cannot arise by implication. This is the basic principle of construction. In other

words, one cannot readily assume that there was any intention on the parties to deviate or depart from the Statutory definition, Of course, It can be

done provided there are clear words to that effect, and I find no such words in this case. Consequently, accepting the contention of the respondent

the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. Excepting the interpretation relating to the definition of worker in the Certified Standing Orders of Cholan

Roadways Corporation Ltd., no other point is argued before me : There will, however, be no order as to costs.