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Judgment
O R D E R
PER: DR. SANJIV KUMAR, MEMBER (A)
This Original Application has been filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:-
“(i)To quash the Order No. SK/STA/4-4/CGL/LSG (Gen1)/Postal dated at Bengaluru-560 001, the 09.09.2024, issued by the respondent No.2 read with Endt No.B1/3-5/CGL/Dlgs dated at Mangaluru the 24.09.2024, issued by the respondent No.4, collectively produced as Annexure-A8,
(ii)Direct the respondents to revisit the seniority of the applicant vis-à-vis the respondents Nos. 5 to 10 in the seniority list of HSG-II in accordance with law and,
(iii)Grant such other relief deemed fit, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Central Administrative Tribunal2. These reliefs are sought on the following grounds and on the basis of the legal provisions relied upon by the applicant:-
“(i)The observation made in the impugned order that for officials appointed prior to 04.11.1992, date of confirmation is the criteria for fixation of seniority and not date of appointment and as such the seniority of the applicant has been fixed based on her date of confirmation in PA cadre, is not in accordance with law. It is not supported by any rule or statutory provision. There is no legal sanctity for the cut-off date 04.11.1992 for the purpose of assigning seniority. In any event, the seniority in PA cadre is irrelevant when the applicant has been promoted to the cadre of HSG-II based on the seniority in the LSG cadre. It is not known as to whether the seniority lists are issued cadre wise, in particular for cadres of Postal Assistant, LSG, HSG-II etc. As such, the criteria adopted for fixing seniority in PA cadre considering 04.11.1992 as the cut-off date is not in accordance with law. Therefore, the respondents are directed revisit the seniority of the applicant vis-à-vis the respondents Nos5 to 10 in accordance law.
(ii)It is submitted that the probationary period of the applicant in the PA cadre has not been extended and as such, there is no justification to alter the seniority of the applicant vis-à-vis the respondents Nos 5 to 10. The records do not disclose the seniority of the officials in the cadre of LSG, the feeder cadre for HSG-II cadre. The impugned position assigned to the applicant in the cadre of HSG-II on promotion and the criteria adopted for the same is not in accordance with law. The official respondents are liable to be directed to have a relook in to the procedure adopted to promote the officials to the cadre of HSG-II and rectify the defects crept therein.
(iii)The assurance given by the respondent No.4 as per the order dated 11.01.2021, Annexure-A4 that the issue pertaining to her seniority in the cadre of PA in Circle Gradation List was under consideration and will be Central Administrative Tribunalpursued with the Circle Office, has not been adhered to. The seniority of the applicant has not been finalized in the Circle Gradation List so far. However, the promotions have been made to the post of HSG-II without finalizing the seniority list of the Postal Assistants, resulting in an erroneous order of promotion to HSG-II cadre (in terms of the impugned order).
(iv)The applicant has been made to suffer unintended transfer to Sirsi Division, which appears to have been done based on the seniority of the officials in the cadre of HSG-II. On the other hand, the seniors have been retained in Mangaluru Division while the junior HSG-II officials have been considered for transfer outside the parent Division. There is no objectivity in the action taken by the respondents No. 1 to 4. The transfers of the HSG-II were done arbitrarily.”
The brief facts of the applicant’s case, as set out in the synopsis, are as follows:-
“ The applicant was appointed as Postal Assistant on 20.06.1991 in Puttur Division and transferred to Mangaluru Division in 1992. She was confirmed on 20.06.1993. The respondents Nos 4 to 10 were appointed as Postal Assistants subsequent to the appointment of the applicant. The applicant and the respondents Nos 4 to 10 were promoted to the Lower Selection Grade. The service of the respondents Nos 4 to 10 has been considered from the date of their passing the examination for confirmation, whereas the service of the applicant has been considered from the date of confirmation. As a result, the respondents Nos 4 to 10 have become senior to the applicant PA LSG cadre. In response to the representation submitted by the applicant, the respondent No.4 issued an order dated 11.01.2021 stating that the seniority of PAs in CGL (Circle Gradation List) is done at Circle Office and the issue would be pursued with the Circle Office. Despite this assurance, the seniority in the CGL has not been rectified and further promotions to HSG-II has been done as per the list prepared earlier. The respondent No.4 has issued clarification to the applicant that her seniority has been fixed in PA cadre based on the date of her confirmation as she was appointed prior to 04.11.1992 and the seniority of those who were appointed subsequent to the said date have been fixed based on the date of their appointment, as per the prevailing rules. The applicant has filed this application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking a direction to official respondents to rectify the seniority list of PAs based on the date of their appointment and not on their date of confirmation, for the purpose of further promotion to HSG-II.”
Upon notice, the respondents filed their reply statement. No rejoinder has been filed. Both parties have also filed citations in support of their respective contentions.
The case was taken up for final hearing on 03.09.2026. Shri A.R. Holla, learned counsel for the applicant, and Shri S. Sugumaran, learned counsel for the respondents, were present and heard.
We have carefully gone through the entire record and considered the rival contentions advanced by the parties.
From the submissions of the parties and the material on record, it is evident that the basic facts are not in dispute.
The present application challenges Order No. SK/STA/4-4/CGL/LSG (Genl)/Postal dated 09.09.2024, issued by Respondent No.2, read with Endt No.B1/3-5/CGL/Dlgs dated 24.09.2024, issued by Respondent No.4, collectively produced as Annexure-A8. By the impugned order, the applicant’s seniority in the LSG cadre has been assigned with reference to her date of confirmation as a Postal Assistant rather than her date of appointment as a Postal Assistant. The applicant’s principal contention is that her seniority in the Postal Assistant cadre ought to have been determined from the date of her appointment and not from the date of her confirmation. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Ministry of Personnel, P.G. and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training, Office Memorandum No.20011/5/90-Estt.(D) dated 04.11.1992 makes a distinction between seniority already settled before that date and seniority to be determined thereafter. According to the respondents, pursuant to the said OM, seniority prospectively came to be delinked from confirmation and was thereafter to be determined from the date of appointment, in accordance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
We have examined the said OM, which reads as follows:-
“No. 20011/5/90-Estt.(D)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions
(Department of Personnel & Training)
New Delhi, the 4 November, 1992.
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject:- Delinking seniority from confirmation.
The seniority of Government servants is determined in accordance with the general principles of seniority contained in MHA O.M. No. 9/11/55-RPS dated 22.12.59 (copy enclosed). One of the basic principles enunciated in the said O.M. is that seniority follows confirmation and consequently permanent officers in each grade shall rank senior to those who are officiating in that grade.
2.This principle has been coming under judicial scrutiny in a number of cases in the past, the last important judgment being the one delivered by the Supreme Court on 2.5.90 (JT-1990(2) SC-264) in the case of Class II Direct Recruits Engineering Officers' Association Vs. State of Maharashtra. In para 47(A) of the said judgment the Supreme Court has held that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.
3.The general principle of seniority mentioned above has been examined in the light of the judicial pronouncement referred to above and it has been decided that seniority may be delinked from confirmation as per the directive of the Supreme Court in para 47(A) of its judgment dated 2.5.90. Accordingly in modification of the general principle 4, proviso to general principle 5(1) contained in MHA (now DOPT) O.M. No. 9/11/55-RPS dated 22.12.59 and para 2.3 of this Department O.M. of even number dated 7.3.86 (copy enclosed) it has been decided that seniority of a person regularly appointed to a post according to rule would be determined by the order of merit indicated at the time of initial appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.
4.These orders shall take effect from the date of issue of this Office Memorandum. Seniority already determined according to the existing principles on the date of issue of these orders will not be reopened even if in some cases seniority has already been challenged or is in dispute and it will continue to be determined on the basis of the principles already existing prior to the date of issue of these orders.
5.All Ministries/Departments etc. are requested to bring these instructions to the notice of all concerned for guidance and compliance.”
A careful reading of the above OM makes the position clear. It records the earlier principle that seniority followed confirmation, refers to the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Class II Direct Recruits Engineering Officers’ Association vs. State of Maharashtra, and, in consequence of that pronouncement, modifies the earlier instructions so that seniority of a person regularly appointed according to the rules is determined by the order of merit at the time of initial appointment rather than by the date of confirmation. At the same time, however, paragraph 4 expressly gives the revised principle prospective effect from 04.11.1992 and protects seniority already determined under the earlier principles as on that date, including seniority which may have been challenged or remained in dispute. Thus, the OM itself supplies the basis for the distinction drawn by the respondents between seniority already settled before 04.11.1992 and seniority to be determined thereafter.
The applicant has not been able to show us any material contrary to the aforesaid OM, nor has she challenged the validity or applicability of its provisions. The OM was issued in 1992 and, in terms of paragraph 4 thereof, preserved seniority already determined under the then prevailing principles. The material facts show that the applicant was confirmed in service only on 20.06.1993, after clearing the departmental examination, whereas the private respondents with whom she seeks comparison had been confirmed before 04.11.1992. Consequently, the seniority position of those officials had already acquired finality under the then prevailing principle before the OM came into force.
For clarity, the dates of appointment and confirmation of the applicant and the private respondents are set out below for comparison.
| Sl. No. | Name | Date of Appointment | Date of Confirmation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M. Padmaja (Applicant) | 20.06.1991 | 20.06.1993 |
| 2 | Rekha Prashanth (Respondent No.5) | 22.02.1992 | 01.11.1992 |
| 3 | Nalinakshi (Respondent No.6) | 28.07.1991 | 03.11.1991 |
| 4 | I Chandrashekar (Respondent No.7) | 02.11.1991 | 03.05.1992 |
| 5 | Matilda N. Sequeira (Respondent No.8) | 28.07.1991 | 03.11.1991 |
| 6 | Aditi S Sharma (Respondent No.9) | 03.09.1991 | 03.05.1992 |
| 7 | Mahabala Naik (Respondent No.10) | 22.02.1992 | 01.11.1992 |
The above comparison shows that all the private respondents with whom the applicant seeks to compare her seniority had been confirmed before the OM dated 04.11.1992 came into force. Their seniority rights had therefore crystallised under the principle then prevailing. The applicant did not challenge that seniority position at the relevant time, although the record shows that the concerned officials had obtained earlier confirmation after clearing the departmental examination. These facts have neither been denied nor controverted. In these circumstances, the applicant’s claim, raised at this stage, that she should now be treated as senior to those officials cannot be accepted.
The record further shows that the applicant did not challenge her seniority at the level of Postal Assistant when it was determined. The respondents have placed on record the Circle Seniority List relating to Postal Assistants recruited prior to 04.11.1992 (page 165 of the OA), which shows that the applicant was confirmed substantially later than private Respondents No.5 to 10. Their seniority had thus crystallised before the cut-off date of 04.11.1992, whereas the applicant had not yet been confirmed. Significantly, that seniority position was not challenged by the applicant at the relevant time. The relief now sought is confined to revisiting her seniority vis-à-vis Respondents No.5 to 10 in the HSG-II seniority list. However, HSG-II is a subsequent promotional stage. If the foundational seniority in the Postal Assistant cadre is not itself disturbed, merely revisiting the subsequent HSG-II seniority would not, by itself, provide the applicant the relief she seeks. In substance, therefore, the applicant’s prayer necessarily requires reopening the seniority position at the Postal Assistant level, which had been settled nearly three decades earlier. Such a challenge at this belated stage cannot be entertained, particularly when it would necessarily affect the settled rights of other employees.
The applicant was promoted to the cadre of Lower Selection Grade (LSG) with effect from 27.05.2016 vide order dated 04.06.2018. Even at that stage, the applicant did not challenge her seniority at the level of Postal Assistant vis-à-vis Respondents No.5 to 10. The absence of any challenge at the earlier stages is material because the present claim seeks to unsettle a seniority position which has long operated and has subsequently formed the basis for further promotions.
The applicant has raised four distinct grounds in paragraph 5 of the OA. We consider them seriatim.
The first ground challenges the observation in the impugned order that, for officials appointed prior to 04.11.1992, seniority was to be determined with reference to the date of confirmation and not the date of appointment. The applicant contends that this criterion is unsupported by any rule or statutory provision and that there is no legal sanctity to 04.11.1992 as a cut-off date. She further contends that her Postal Assistant seniority is irrelevant once she has been promoted to HSG-II through the LSG cadre. We have considered this contention in the light of the OM dated 04.11.1992. As discussed above, the OM expressly preserves seniority already determined under the earlier principles as on the date of its issue, while delinking seniority from confirmation prospectively. The distinction drawn by the respondents is therefore supported by the OM itself. This ground does not advance the applicant’s case.
In paragraph 5(ii), the applicant contends that her probationary period in the Postal Assistant cadre was not extended and that there was therefore no justification for altering her seniority vis-à-vis Respondents No.5 to 10. She also submits that the records do not disclose the seniority of the officials in the LSG cadre, which is the feeder cadre for HSG-II, and consequently challenges the position assigned to her in HSG-II and the procedure adopted for promotion. These contentions cannot assist the applicant at this stage. They seek, in substance, to reopen the consequences of a seniority position which had already crystallised decades earlier and which has since operated through successive promotional stages. Reopening that position now would necessarily affect the settled rights and promotional interests of other employees. We therefore find no sufficient basis to interfere on this ground.
In paragraph 5(iii), the applicant relies upon the assurance allegedly given by Respondent No.4 in the order dated 11.01.2021, Annexure-A4, that the issue relating to her seniority in the Postal Assistant cadre in the Circle Gradation List was under consideration and would be pursued with the Circle Office. The applicant contends that, despite this, her seniority in the Circle Gradation List was not rectified before further promotions to HSG-II were made. We find no convincing material establishing that the said communication amounted to an assurance that could override the applicable rules or unsettle long-standing seniority rights. An administrative communication indicating that a matter would be pursued or considered cannot, by itself, confer a right contrary to the governing seniority principles or reopen seniorities that had long since crystallised. This ground, therefore, also does not support the applicant’s claim.
In paragraph 5(iv), the applicant contends that she suffered an unintended transfer to Sirsi Division, allegedly on the basis of the seniority of officials in the HSG-II cadre, while seniors were retained in Mangaluru Division and junior HSG-II officials were considered for transfer outside the parent Division. She alleges lack of objectivity and arbitrariness in the transfers. The nature of this grievance indicates that the immediate cause for approaching the Tribunal appears to be the transfer. That, however, cannot revive a seniority dispute which the applicant did not agitate for nearly three decades. The seniority position at the Postal Assistant level, which underlies the subsequent promotional seniority, cannot be reopened at this belated stage, particularly when such reopening would affect the settled rights of other employees. The grievance relating to transfer, therefore, does not furnish a basis for granting the reliefs sought in the present OA.
The applicant has relied upon the following citation:-
V. Vincent Velankanni vs. Union of India and others in Civil Appeal No. 8617/2012 with Civil Appeal Nos. 010944-010946/2024 decided on 30.09.2024 by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Inter alia other things para 30 of the order reads that, “It is a well-settled proposition that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to the rules, his seniority has to be reckoned from the date of the initial appointment and not according to the date of confirmation, unless the rules provide otherwise.”
Paras 37, 42 and 50 of the order were also referred to, and paragraph 50 is the most relevant for the present controversy, which reads as follows:-
“50.Thus, much water has flown under the bridge and retrospective application of the GO issued in 2015 would open floodgates of litigation and would disturb the seniority of many employees causing them grave prejudice and heartburn as it would disturb the crystallized rights regarding seniority, rank and promotion which would have accrued to them during the intervening period. To alter a seniority list after such a long period would be totally unjust to the multitudes of employees who could get caught in the labyrinth of uncertainty for no fault of theirs and
Central Administrative Tribunalmay suffer loss of their seniority rights retrospectively.”
The above decision does not assist the applicant. On the contrary, the principle emphasised therein is that reopening settled seniority after a considerable lapse of time, particularly where it would disturb crystallised rights of other employees, is impermissible. The applicant relies upon the judgment for the proposition that seniority ordinarily follows initial appointment unless the rules provide otherwise; however, in the present case, the question is not merely the general principle governing seniority but whether a seniority position already settled under the applicable pre-04.11.1992 regime can be reopened after nearly three decades. On that aspect, the citation relied upon by the applicant supports the respondents rather than the applicant.
The respondents have also relied upon the following citations:-
K.R. Mudgal & others vs. R.P. Singh & others, reported in 1986 AIR 2086, dated 30.09.1986, which mentions the following:-
“ We may also refer here to the weighty observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Maloon Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India & Ors., [1975] Supp. S.C.R. 409 at page 413-414 which are as follows:
" Although security of service cannot be used as a
Central Administrative Tribunalshield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult to doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects. It should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time."
We feel that in the circumstances of this case, we should not embark upon on and enquiry into the merits of the case and that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches alone.
We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed in the High Court. We also direct that all the promotions made in the Intelligent Bureau shall be reviewed in accordance with the impugned seniority list dated January 28, 1976. There shall be no order as to costs.”
The principle emerging from the above citation is that a seniority position, once settled, should not ordinarily be reopened after the lapse of many years, particularly at the instance of a person who remained silent during the intervening period. The rationale is equally applicable here, where reopening the seniority position would create administrative complications and affect the rights and promotional interests of other employees.
The respondents have also relied upon another decision of this Bench in OA No. 619/2024 dated 02.06.2025, which, inter alia, observes as follows:-
“19.We have carefully gone through this note and decision of the Department of Posts and, based on the same endorsement of the department to the applicants, and we do not find any shortcoming in those documents. Both the note as well as the endorsement are speaking, reasoned and convincing. In the case of promotion where seniority and interest of others are also interlinked, the employee should be awake and should agitate their rights at an appropriate time. In such cases delays and latches cannot be post-facto appreciated to grant retrospective benefits. At this late juncture, bringing forth stale claims and asking us to interfere with the decisions of the Department, and to provide retrospective relief to the applicants in our considered opinion is not justified and convincing.
20.We have carefully gone through the grounds claimed by the applicants in the Original Application, and we do not find any of them convincing. The applicants have failed to make out any case for themselves before us to interfere with the impugned orders. Hence, we are not convinced to condone the delay at this juncture. Considering the same, we pass the following orders:
M.A 627/2024 for condonation of delay is dismissed and, accordingly, the O. A No.619/2024 is also dismissed for the reasons as discussed above.
21.As to cost : No costs.”
The above decision proceeds on the same principle: where promotion, seniority and the interests of other employees are appropriate time. Delay and laches cannot ordinarily be invoked after a long interval to obtain retrospective alteration of an established position. The principle is particularly apposite here because granting the applicant’s prayer would require reopening seniorities which had been settled before 04.11.1992 and would necessarily affect the seniority and promotional interests of others.
In the present case also, granting the applicant’s prayers would necessarily require reopening the seniority positions settled before 04.11.1992. At this stage, such reopening would not only unsettle a position that has operated for decades but would also prejudice the seniority and promotional rights of other employees who have arranged their service careers on the basis of the existing position. The settled principles governing delay and laches therefore operate with full force against the applicant’s claim.
We may also examine whether, in a matter relating to seniority, it would be permissible to intervene at this stage and modify a seniority position settled long before 04.11.1992, in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh, 2008 (SCC) 648, (DD: 13.08.2008), which, inter alia, mentions the following:-
“5.To summarise, normally, a belated service related (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.”
In the present case, the dispute directly concerns seniority. If any relief were to be granted to the applicant, it would necessarily require the seniority position at the Postal Assistant level to be revisited. The Circle Seniority List of Postal Assistants had long been finalised in respect of those who were confirmed in service on or before 04.11.1992. Private Respondents No.5 to 10 had acquired whereas the applicant had not yet cleared her departmental examination and had not been confirmed. Her relative seniority consequently stood below theirs under the regime then applicable. The applicant did not challenge that position when it was determined, nor during the subsequent stages of her service.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that, at this belated stage, the seniority of the applicant vis-à-vis the private respondents cannot be reopened, challenged or interfered with. The impugned orders disclose no infirmity warranting interference. The applicant has consequently failed to establish any ground for grant of the reliefs sought.
In view of the above, we pass the following order:-
ORDER
OA lacks merit and accordingly is dismissed.
All associated MA(s), if any pending, shall be treated as disposed of.
No order as to costs.