M. Muniyappa vs Supdt., of Police, Kolar and Others

The petitioner was appointed as a Police Constable in the service of the 3rd respondent-State of Karnataka on 5-4-1968. It is alleged by him that after four years of service he was surprised with the charge memo dated 23-7-1972 issued against him as a result of which there was a departmental enquiry against him in which the finding was that he had obtained his appointment by producing a certificate regarding his date of birth, knowing that the said certificate was a false one. In the result he was dismissed from service on 10-1-1973 by an order passed by the 1st respondent, Superintendent of police, Kolar, who was also the disciplinary authority. Against the said order of dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Inspector General of Police which came to be rightly disposed of by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (2nd Respondent) by his order dated 24-7-1973 confirming the order of the disciplinary authority. Thereafter the petitioner preferred a revision petition under the provisions of the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 1965. That revision petition also came to be dismissed and the orders of the lower authorities were affirmed. Aggrieved by these orders, true copies of which are to be found at Exts. P, R and T to the petition, the petitioner has filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, challenging the legality and correctness of the same, inter alia contending, (i) that the entire proceedings against him starting with the service of the charge memo culminating in his dismissal are illegal as Karnataka Police Services (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 1965 offends Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as there has been discrimination in the framing of the said Rules, while the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957 were already there covering all Government servants and therefore, the 3rd respondent had no power to frame separate Rules for discipline and control of persons belonging to the Police Department and that even if the 1965 Rules were to be held intra vires, then the discrimination persists inasmuch as Rule 11(5) of the 1957 Rules gives greater choice for the delinquent inasmuch as he is entitled to the service of any Government servant, while Rule 6(5) of the 1965 Rules restricts the rights of the petitioner and the like of him to a choice of a Police friend only; (ii) that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated inasmuch as the enquiry was not held in his presence in violation of the Rules of Natural Justice and the provisions of the Rules; (iii) that the appellate authority viz., respondent.1, Dy. Inspector General of Police, passed the order which is not a speaking order considering all the grounds urged by the petitioner; (iv) and that the order passed by the 3rd respondent-State in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction suffered from the same error of not being a speaking order and therefore not an order in the eye of law.

(For convenience the Karnataka Police Services (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules of 1965 and the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal Rules 1957 are respectively referred to as the 1965 and 1957 Rules).

Sri M. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that the second contention urged in the petition would not survive for consideration in the light of the facts borne out by the records produced by the learned Government Advocate. It is seen from the records that the petitioner did participate in the enquiry and was given the opportunity to cross examine the only witness examined and the petitioner first took time to seek the assistance of a police friend for the cross examination and when the enquiry was continued on another day actually declined to exercise his right of cross examination by stating that he had no questions to ask the witness.

The first contention that the 1965 Rules are ultra vires inasmuch as they violate Arts. 14 and 311(2) of the Constitution is not well founded. The learned Counsel has argued that all employees of the State being Government servants most be governed by the 1957 Rules and the State cannot make special rules like the 1965 Rules for persons employed in the Police Department of the State. It is difficult to accept this argument. No doubt all employees of the State are servants of the State but, all of them do not perform the same duties nor are they required to possess the same quantisations. The Police Department has special responsibilities and require special training of its personnel in order to effectively carry out the duties and functions of maintaining law and order, and preventing crimes being committed as well as investigating crimes that are committed, for the security and well being ofthe society to whom they owe special obligations as the custodians of law. Therefore, like in other departments, there are special Cadre and Recruitment Rules for the Police Department specifying different and distinct qualifications for different classes of Policemen recruited to perform different police functions such as Armed Reserve Police Civil Police, Wireless and Women Police, Mounted Police etc. Similarly, the higher cadre in the Police department at the all India level is separated from the Administrative service and special recruitment is made and training is given to the members of the Indian Police Service differing from other services under the State. this is necessarily so having regard to the duties and functions of Police Officers and other men in the Department who fall under the Special Cadres of being Police men. Rule 1 of the 1965 Rules provides for the application of the Rules to the members of the Karnataka State Police force, thereby making the actual employees of the State in the Police force entrusted with the enforcement of law and orders and other duties such as the investigation of crimes or prevention of crimes or controlling traffic etc., and thereby excluding other employees in the Police department itself who are treated as ordinary Government servants governed by the 1957 Rules. This special classification of the members of the Police force is a reasonable classification having regard to the nature of duties and functions of members of the Police force in the discharge of their obligations to the Society. They are specially trained in many respects different from the members of other services under the State and for obvious reasons they are required to maintain higher degree of discipline and training and need more effective control than the other ordinary employees of the State. Once this conclusion is arrived at that the classification is reasonable, then Article 14 is not attracted and if the object sought to be achieved has reasonable nexus to the purpose of classification then the article is act attracted and there will be no discrimination on that ground, as the law in this behalf is well settled by the Supreme Court.

However, the learned Counsel argued even if there was reasonable classification of members of the Police force into one class and other employees of the State into a different class, nevertheless the greater freedom gives to the other employees of the State than the members of the Police force under Rule 11 (5) of the 1957 Rules to choose any Government servant which would include a member of the police force as against the restriction imposed under Rule 6 (5) of the 1965 Rules confining the choice of the member of the Police force to take the assistance in a departmental enquiry to a member of the police force itself would be violative of Article 14. This also is not a tenable argument for the reasons already given inasmuch as the members of the Police force form a special group and for the inevitable need of maintaining a high degree of morale in the force it is but necessary that they be separated and permitted to assist themselves in the matters of discipline and control. This cannot be held to be an unreasonable restriction imposed on them. Therefore, this argument also must fail.

Lastly, the learned Counsel on the question of Constitutional vires of the 1965 Rules submitted that on the ground of there being restriction on the choice of assistance in the Departmental enquiry the members of the police force have been darned the reasonable opportunity in departmental enquiry contemplated in terms of the provisions contained in sub art (2) of Art 311 of the Constitution. This argument should be stated delay to be rejected. It is now well settled by a plethora, decisions as to what constitutes reasonable opportunity in a departmental or domestic enquiry. On examining both the 1957 and 1945 Rules, with special reference to Rule 11(5) and Rule 6(3) of the two rules respectively, one cannot but see that there in adequate opportunity for a fair defence to be put up by the delinquent at such departmental enquiry. There is no violation of the Rules of natural justice in contravention of sub-article (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution as long as the delinquent has reasonable opportunity to meet the charge against him. In this view of the matter, Rule f(5) of the Rules does not in any manner violate sub-art. (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution.

The 3rd and 4th contentions advanced for the petitioner can be disposed of together. It is seen from the orders passed by the respondents 2 and 3 that they have considered the grounds urged by the petitioner in his memorandum of appeal and revision respectively. In fact on going through the memorandum of appeal of the petitioner, it is found that he had not urged any ground as such but had made more assertions of facts stated by his earlier reply to the show cause notice. There is also an assertion in the memorandum of appeal that the enquiry was conducted in his absence and behind his back. Respondents 2 and 3 have dealt with such of the grounds which could be discerned from the long narration of facts asserted by the petitioner. I therefore, do not see any error of law or infirmity in the impugned order of dismissal confirmed in appeal and revision which calls for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution

Therefore, this petition is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.