M. Krishnappa vs Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Limited and Others

P.B. Bajanthri, J.—In the above writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the validity of issuance of show-cause notice dated 21.6.2012 vide Annexure-"A" by which the first respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings on certain allegations stated in the charges.

The petitioner joined service in the first respondent organization namely "Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Limited", which is a State owned Corporation. Presently petitioner is on deputation to Karnataka State Breweries Corporation Limited, which is also a State owned Corporation.

There was a conscious decision for closure of Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Limited by the State Government, accordingly, an order was issued on 24.9.2009 by State Government. Thereafter, second respondent-Government has taken consequential steps like introduction of voluntary retirement scheme etc. on 22.2.2012. Among others the petitioner on apprehension that status of those on deputation in the respective post and place would be disturbed, filed writ petition before this Court and this Court granted an interim order on 21.2.2012 in W.P. 638-677/2012.

The first respondent issued show-cause notice to the petitioner on 8.5.2012 with regard to certain irregularities committed by the petitioner in the office of the first respondent and sought explanation of the petitioner. On 16.5.2012 the petitioner submitted his explanation. After perusal of the said explanation of the petitioner, the first respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings by framing three charges and issuing show-cause notice on 21.6.2012 vide Annexure-"A". The alleged charge relate to disobeying the communications sent through courier to attend the case in Crime No. 385/2003 in which he was arrayed as one of the first respondent-Corporation witness. Thereafter, office of the first respondent contacted the petitioner over phone informing him to attend the aforesaid case as a witness of the Corporation. Despite the aforesaid communication, the petitioner failed to obey the first respondent''s instructions thereby the petitioner has committed misconduct. Further charge is that the petitioner was sent on deputation consequently, he was required to handover charge of the post held by him in the first respondent organization to one Sri. K.C. Shivanna, which he failed to do so. Further allegation is that certain irregularities committed by the petitioner was noticed by the public enterprises committee, Karnataka Legislature Secretariat and the petitioner failed to co-operate in solving the irregularities as directed by the Committee. In fact, the petitioner failed to furnish necessary explanation with reference to the irregularities committed by him.

The petitioner in support of the petition contended that issuance of charge memo dated 21.6.2012 by the first respondent is without authority of law, the first respondent-Managing Director has been assigned only to execute various procedures relating to closure of Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Limited, therefore, the Managing Director of the first respondent cannot be the disciplinary authority. In support of this contention, the petitioner relies on the Government Orders dated 24.9.2009, 22.2.2012 and 10.11.2009 read with Circular issued by the first respondent dated 29.2.2012 and office order dated 31.3.2012 of the first respondent, vide Annexures-"B to F".

The petitioner also contends that he is on deputation to Karnataka State Breweries Corporation Limited. Therefore, first respondent cannot issue show-cause notice and initiate disciplinary proceedings. It was also contended that among others the petitioner had obtained an interim order in W.P. Nos. 638-677/2012.

The first respondent filed statement of objections and produced notification dated 19.9.2011 of the second respondent as Annexure-R1 and contended that by the said notification one Dr. H. Subbaiah was promoted to the post of Joint Director of Agriculture and posted as Managing Director, Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Limited and in the said notification function of the Managing Director is not restricted to various procedures relating to closure of the first respondent Corporation like implementation of voluntary retirement scheme etc. In other words, it was contended that Dr. H. Subbaiah was appointed as a full time Managing Director. The first respondent stated that show-cause notice was issued seeking explanation of the petitioner and on receipt of the explanation, and having not satisfied with the explanation offered, the first respondent proceeded with initiation of enquiry by issuing show-cause notice along with the articles of charge on 21.6.2012. Therefore, without submitting explanation to the charge memo, the approach made to this Court by the petitioner is wholly premature and untenable in law. It was further contended that the petitioner has mixed up the issues relating to implementation of voluntary retirement scheme and initiation of disciplinary proceedings unnecessarily, which is not warranted.

The respondent No. 1 vehemently contended that the petitioner has to submit his explanation to the charge memo and notice vide Annexure-"A" as he has not made out a case so as to interfere with the impugned show-cause notice and article of charges.

This Court can interfere insofar as challenge to the charge memo/initiation of enquiry only on two grounds, namely that initiation of enquiry is by an incompetent authority or there is any malafide action in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or both. In the present case, the petitioner contended that the first respondent had been assigned only to discharge the functions of the closure of the first respondent-Corporation and various procedure and he has not been assigned function of the disciplinary authority. The petitioner has not produced any material to show that the second respondent-Government restricted first respondent-Managing Director''s powers to the extent of implementation of closure of first respondent-Corporation procedure. On the contrary, the first respondent has produced appointment/posting of one Dr. H. Subbaiah, as Managing Director vide notification dated 19.9.2011. While appointing him as Managing Director of the first respondent, no conditions were imposed namely, about the functioning of the Managing Director. Therefore, the Managing Director has every power of disciplinary authority. The petitioner has not urged any malafide in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner has not made out a case so as to interfere with the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.

The petitioner unnecessarily mixed up the issue relating to voluntary retirement scheme and other related procedure and pointing out that he has obtained interim order in W.P. Nos. 638-677/2012 among others. The said matter has nothing to do with the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the aforesaid contention is not at all relevant to the present case.

Yet another contention argued by the petitioner''s counsel is that the petitioner is on deputation therefore, the first respondent has no authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. However, no provision of law has been brought to the notice of this Court that if an employee of the first respondent is sent on deputation the first respondent is denude of his power to initiate disciplinary proceedings. At this stage, it is relevant to note that the petitioner has been sent only on deputation and his lien would be continued in the first respondent. Therefore, the first respondent continued to be the disciplinary authority. Hence, there is no lacuna in initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.

The Apex Court and other Courts have time and again held that initiation of inquiry can be examined by Courts only if the initiation of disciplinary enquiry is by an incompetent authority or there is any malafide action in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In identical matter the Apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, has held as follows:--

"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board Vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh and others, , The Special Director and Another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Another, , Ulagappa and Others Vs. Divn. Commr. and Others, , State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another, , etc.

The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet.

No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."

In view of the facts and circumstances, the petitioner has not made out a case so as to interfere with the impugned initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the writ petition is rejected and the interim order granted in the above writ petition stands cancelled. No order as to costs.