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Judgment
N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J.—This writ appeal is directed against the order made in W.P. No. 13000 of 2003 dated 21.4.2011, wherein the
appellant has prayed to quash the order dated 12.6.2002 passed by the second respondent herein and for a direction to pay compensation
equivalent to five years salary and usual allowances, last drawn by him as on the date of his retirement on 30.4.1998 together with interest rate to
be determined by this Court. The appellant/writ petitioner was employed as Clerk-cum-Godown Keeper in the year 1960 in the respondent Bank,
who was promoted as an Officer on 15.4.1972 and further promoted as Manager and posted at the Pondicherry Branch. Charges were framed
against the appellant for certain delinquencies and after enquiry, he was dismissed from service. The said dismissal order was challenged by the
appellant and ultimately the Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ appeal filed by the appellant by judgment dated 13.3.2001 in W.A.
No. 25 of 1993, reported in Kasi M. Vs. Management of Indian Bank and Another, with the following directions:
Inasmuch as the appellant completed his superannuation age of 58 in the year 1998 itself, he cannot be ordered to be reinstated. In O.P.
Bhandari Vs. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. and Others, having regard to eight years left at the time of illegal termination of the
employee as also other factors, the Supreme Court held that compensation equivalent to three years salary including allowances, besides provident
fund and retirement benefits as well as costs would be proper. Though in this case the bank has not suffered any loss, the appellant is entitled to the
compensated for the loss of eleven years of his services with prospects of higher emoluments. We are of the view that compensation equivalent to
five years salary (last drawn) including allowances besides provident fund and retirement benefits would be proper compensation fro the appellant
since he could not be reinstated at this stage. The respondent-bank shall pay the appellant the following:
(1) Salary last drawn by the workman including usual allowances for the period commencing from the date of termination of his service and the
impugned order till the date of payment of compensation equivalent to five years salary including usual allowances.
(2) Provident fund amount payable to the appellant and the retirement benefit computed as on the date of his actual retirement would be paid
within a period of three months from this date.
(3) The appellant is entitled to the relief u/s 89 of the Income Tax Act read with Rule 71-A of the Income Tax Rules.
The appeal in (is) accordingly allowed with the above direction. No costs."" The above cited judgment of the Division Bench has become final.
Thereafter the appellant was paid with the salary equivalent to five years last drawn, as compensation. The said payment was also received by the
appellant/writ petitioner.
After receipt of compensation, the appellant/writ petitioner has chosen to agitate the quantum of compensation in the writ petition contending
that the last drawn wages should be calculated considering the date of retirement and not the date on which the appellant/writ petitioner was
permitted to serve. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that last drawn wages should be given a liberal meaning and the appellant is not
seeking review of the order but praying for interpreting the words ''salary last drawn''.
We have also heard the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank.
The learned single Judge considered the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner and dismissed the writ petition,
taking note of the order of the Division Bench, specifically stating that for the purpose of payment of compensation, salary last drawn by the
appellant including usual allowances from the date of termination, provident fund and the retirement benefits are to be computed as on the date of
actual retirement.
The said finding given by the learned single Judge is perfectly in order. The appellant is trying to re-open the issue already settled in the year
2001 and the appellant is not entitled to re-agitate the matter by way of another writ petition. It is an admitted position that the appellant has not
challenged the order of the Division Bench dated 13.3.2001 before the Honourable Supreme Court and therefore he is bound by the said direction
issued.
The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, clearly held that there should
be finality in judicial proceedings. In paragraphs 12 and 13 the Apex Court held thus,
The principles of res judicata are of universal application as they are based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, is
constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that it is
for one and the same cause. This doctrine of res judicata is common to all civilised system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a
proper trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should for
ever set the controversy at rest.
That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result
under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing
his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved
to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which
sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent
abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.
Further, in paragraphs 21 and 22, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held thus,
Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of this Court in The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers'' Association and others
Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, laid down the following principle: (SCC p. 741, para 35)
''an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and
ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming
into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata
underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the
ground of res judicata''.
In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive
res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions.
(Emphasis Supplied)
In the said decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court followed its earlier Constitutional Bench decision reported in Devilal Modi, Proprietor, M/s.
Daluram Pannalal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and Others, State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain, ; The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering
Officers'' Association and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, ; and K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and Others, .
In this case, the order of the Division Bench having been allowed to become final and the benefit arising out of the order having been received
by way of compensation on the basis of last drawn wages, the appellant/writ petitioner is not justified in contending that the compensation should
be calculated on the basis of the wages payable on the date of retirement. The wages ''last drawn'' by an employee/worker in terms of Section 17B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was the subject matter of issue in very many cases and it is a settled law that last drawn wages of a workman
is the salary he received while in service, i.e., prior to dismissal, removal/termination. Considering the issue raised by the appellant/writ petitioner in
that view of the matter, we hold, no case is made out to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. Consequently, the writ appeal is
dismissed. No costs.