M. Bhaktavatsala vs Smt. Shantha Murthy

Vikramajit Sen, Ag. C.J.

This appeal assails the order of the learned Single Judge who had applied the decision of the Supreme Court in D.P. Maheshwari vs. Delhi Administration and others (AIR 1984 SC 153). In the said case their lordships have stated that "It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues."

The controversy in the instant case at this stage is whether the appellant falls within the definition of an ''industry'' and the respondent-employee is within the contemplation of the word ''workman''. The Labour Court has returned a finding against the appellant on facts. While doing so, the Labour Court took into account the fact that the amendment to Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had not been notified and therefore not to be referred to. The preliminary objection raised by the appellant was therefore turned down.

Learned counsel for the appellant states that in D.P. Maheshwari''s case, the entire gamut of facts had been discussed. That had become necessary because the concerned High Court had gone into the facts. Therefore, while expressing that the preliminary finding of special tribunals at interlocutory stage or on preliminary issues should not be altered under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, their Lordships were compelled to go into the factual matrix. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on paragraphs 68, 69 and 70 in Ramesh Chandra Sankla Etc. Vs. Vikram Cement Etc., , which are reproduced as under;

A "jurisdictional fact" is one on the existence of which depends the jurisdiction of a court, tribunal or an authority. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court or tribunal cannot act. If an inferior court or tribunal wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, a writ of certiorari lies. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of jurisdictional fact, a subordinate court or an inferior tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess.

The counsel referred to a recent decision of this Court in Arun Kumar v. Union of India, Speaking for the Court, one of, us (C.K. Thakker, J.) observed: (SCCp. 758, para 74)

A ''jurisdictional fact'' is a fact which must exist before a court, tribunal or an authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or nonexistence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It: is the fact upon which an administrative agency''s power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess.

It was further observed: (SCC p. 759, para 76)

The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or condition precedent for the exercise of power by a court of limited jurisdiction.

Drawing the distinction between "jurisdictional fact" and "adjudicatory fact", the Court stated: (Arun Kumar case, SCC p. 761, para 84)

84.... It is clear that existence of ''jurisdictional fact'' is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of ''jurisdictional fact'', it can decide the ''fact in issue'' or ''adjudicatory fact''. A wrong decision on ''fact in issue'' or on ''adjudicatory fact'' would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present.

The principle was reiterated in Carona Ltd. V. Parvathy Swaminathan & sons.

We are unable to appreciate the topicality of these paragraphs. They were given totally in different circumstance i.e. where certain directions had been made by the High Court despite holding that the jurisdiction under Articles 227 of the Constitution of India, had not been brought home. Since those directions were ensured with quality was not forgotten their lordships had made the clarifications.

The dictum of D.P. Maheshwari is not difficult to appreciate. This is especially so in labour disputes where the difference in financial capacity can result in the claims being frustrated by the adoption of dilatory tactics i.e. questioning of the forum concerned. We should not be understood as indicating in the present case the appellant had adopted dilatory tactics. The solitary principle is when there has been a preliminary finding on a issue, since intrinsically it is open to a different conclusion at the end of the hearing, the hierarchy of appellate forums should not be inflicted on the claimant. We find no error in the impugned order, inasmuch as it applies the ratio in D.P. Maheshwari.