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Judgment
Ismail, J.—This is a petition to revise the order of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Madurai, functioning as the appellate authority
under the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority ordered, the eviction of the Respondent from the
premises in question on the application filed by the Petitioners. While ordering eviction the Rent Controller gave three moths'' time to the
Respondent herein to vacate the premises. When an appeal was preferred by the Respondent-tenant, while confirming the order of eviction passed
by the Rent Controller, the appellate authority gave one year''s time to vacate and surrender possession to the Petitioners herein. It is this grant of
one year''s time that is challenged in the present civil revision petition by the landlords.
According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, the authorities functioning under the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960 a no jurisdiction to
grant more than three month''s time the aggregate to a tenant to vacate and surrender possession of the property. If support of this contention,
reliance is placed on the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e) of the Act which provides that the maximum time which the Rent Controller may give
to a tenant for vacating the premises is only three months. This argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is countered by the learned
Counsel for the Respondent putting forward two contentions. The first contention is that the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e) has no application
to any order except an order of eviction passed u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act. The second is that the order of eviction in the present case has been
passed u/s 14(1)(b) and to such an order the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e) has no application.
As far as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting the same. Section 10(3)(e)
along with the two provisions reads as follows:
10(3)(e) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put landlord in
possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order
rejecting the application:
Provided that, in the case of an application under Clause (c) the Controller shall reject the application, if he is satisfied that the hardship which may
be caused to the tenant by granting it Will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such
time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is that because the first proviso refers to Clause (c), the second proviso must be taken
to be the proviso to the first proviso and that therefore that proviso also will apply only to an order of eviction passed u/s 10(3)(c). I am unable to
accept this contention. In the first place, the first proviso to Section 10(3)(e) deals only with rejection of the application and does not deal with the
allowing of an application and therefore the question of giving time to the tenant does not arise. Secondly, the presence of the words, provided
further occurring in the second proviso makes it clear that said proviso is a proviso to Section 10(3)(e) itself and not a proviso to the first proviso
to Section 10(3)(e). Hence there is no substance in the first contention.
The second contention, as I have pointed out already, is base on the language contained in Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, The order of eviction in
the present case has been passed by the appellate authority u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. That is a provision under which a landlord is entitled to obtain
possession of the building from the occupation of the tenant on the ground that the landlord requires the premises for the immediate purpose of
demolition and reconstruction. Section 14(1)(b) states:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 on an application made by a landlord, the rent
controller shall, if he is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such
demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the
tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.
There is no proviso to Section 14(1)(b) corresponding to the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e). It is in view of this alone that the learned
Counsel for the Respondent contended that there is no limitation whatever on the length of the time that can be given by the Rent Controller, when
an order of eviction is passed u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. As against this, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contends that to construe the
provisions in such a way will defeat the very purpose of the order passed by the Rent Controller because Section 14(1)(b) itself contemplates the
landlord requiring the building for the immediate purpose of demolition. When such immediate purpose is accepted by the Rent Controller and the
Rent Controller while ordering eviction gives an unduly long time, the very immediate purpose of demolition for which alone the order for eviction is
passed will be defeated. I find that there is considerable substance in this contention. If I am to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the
Respondent the position will be that there is no limitation whatever on the length of time that may be given by the Rent Controller or the appellate
authority in relation to an order for eviction passed u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. But that could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Certainly
when the Legislature is silent with reference to a matter, the Court cannot add anything to it. At the same time the Court has an obligation to
construe a statutory provision reasonably consistent with its object. If the object for which eviction is ordered u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act is taken into
account, the only conclusion the Court can come to is that in order to alleviate any hardship or suffering to which the tenant may be subjected, the
Rent Controller is entitled to give a reasonable time to him and that reasonable time can be fixed as three months in the aggregate on the analogy of
the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e) of the Act. If the various grounds mentioned in Section 10(3) are taken into account along with the second
proviso to Section 10(3)(e) , there appears to be no justification for providing for a longer time, when an order for eviction is passed u/s 14(1)(b).
Therefore, after considering the scheme of the Act as well as the purpose for which an order for eviction is prayed for and granted u/s 14(1)(b) of
the Act and taking into account the second proviso to Section 10(3)(e), in the context of the grounds on which an eviction can be ordered u/s
10(3), I am of the opinion that it is reasonable and fair to construe that even when an order for eviction is passed u/s 14(1)(b) the aggregate time
which the Rent Controller can give is only three months. If so, the appellate authority cannot grant any time like one year in the present case.
Hence the civil revision petition is allowed and the direction of the appellate authority granting one year time to the Respondent herein for
vacating the premises in question will stand set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
Since three months'' time from the date of the order of the appellate authority has already expired, the learned Counsel for the Respondent prays
for one more month''s time and the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has no objection to give one month''s time. Accordingly the Respondent will
have one month''s time from this date to vacate the premises in question.