Lucknow Development Authority vs Ramrati

I N D E X

A. EXORDIUM:-

B. FACTUAL MATRIX:-

Petitions Filed By SSB:-

Petitions Filed By UPEIDA:-

Petition filed by LDA:-

Petitions Filed By Land Owners:-

C. ISSUE TO BE DECIDED:-

D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF REQUIRING BODY:-

On Behalf of SSB:-

(i) LARRA is an Authority constituted under Section 51 of the Act of 2013 and not a Court:-

E. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF UPEIDA:-

F. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LDA:-

G. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LAND OWNERS:

H. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF U.P.:-

I. CONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENTS CITED BY THE PARTIES:-

Decisions cited by learned counsel for the Petitioners (requiring body):-

“29.

We are of the view that the respondents may not be justified in seeking to distinguish the judgment of this Court in Sundaram Finance [Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad, (2018) 3 SCC 622 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 593] . It cannot be in the region of doubt that when the authority passed the award under the Act, it was (sic not) a civil court. It is not a court within the meaning of Section 38CPC. If there is no court, which can be said to have passed the award in this case, then it is inconceivable as to how it could be maintained in the same breath that it is indispensable to the maintaining of the execution proceedings in another court that the court which passed the decree must necessarily transfer the proceedings to the latter court. For the effective working of Section 39CPC, in other words, there must be a court which has passed a decree. In the context of CPC, we are of the view that there is no such court within the meaning of Section 38 in these cases. Instead, we have what is essentially arbitration proceedings and what is passed by the said authority is clothed only with the effect of a decree and it is enforceable as a decree. No doubt on the certificate being granted it resulted in a deemed decree. In such circumstances, we are of the view that there is no merit in the contention of the respondents. The attempt to distinguish the judgment based on the presence of the words “decree as defined in clause (2) of Section 2CPC” is equally misplaced. This is for the reason that we would think that the words “decree as defined in clause (2) of Section 2CPC” as used in Section 103 of the Act is to reinforce in the concept of a decree with greater clarity and by way of abundant caution. The mere presence of these words by itself cannot support the attempt at distinguishing the principle which has been laid down in the decision of Sundaram Finance [Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad, (2018) 3 SCC 622 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 593] which is that in view of the fact that Sections 38 and 39CPC are not as such applicable, the decree-holder may seek to execute the decree in any court which otherwise has jurisdiction. This would mean that the finding by the High Court in this regard is flawed and is liable to be overturned.”

“64.

This order came to be challenged by the appellant before the High Court in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We have already noted the three issues framed by the High Court for consideration. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, the High Court is of the view that an award can be challenged in a proceeding under Section 47CPC on the very limited ground of the award being a nullity or void ab initio or suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction. However, the High Court opined that if an aggrieved party does not challenge an award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it cannot be permitted to object to its execution by alleging it to be a nullity though such a plea of nullity can be entertained if it is of such a grave nature that it is not even capable of being waived by one or the other party. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the plea of nullity qua an arbitral award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47CPC but such a challenge would lie within a very narrow compass. * * * 67. The High Court is correct in answering the first issue that a plea of nullity qua an arbitral award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47CPC but such a challenge would lie within a very narrow compass.

68.

Section 36 of the 1996 Act deals with enforcement of arbitral awards. Sub-section (1) says that where the time for making any application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 has expired, then subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of CPC in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. As per sub-section (2), where an application to set aside an arbitral award has been filed under Section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render an award unenforceable unless an order of stay is granted by the court. Therefore, in terms of Section 36 of the 1996 Act, an award can be enforced in accordance with the provisions of CPC in the same manner as if it were a decree of a civil court.

69.

Section 47CPC deals with questions to be determined by the court executing decree. As per sub-section (1), all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Execution of decrees and orders is provided for in Order 21CPC. The law is well settled that at the stage of execution, an objection as to executability of the decree can be raised but such objection is limited to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. The law laid down by this Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670] is that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject-matter of objection under Section 47CPC and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The aforesaid proposition of law continues to hold the field.

70.

Objection to execution of an award under Section 47CPC is not dependent or contingent upon filing a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The High Court was not justified in taking the view that since the appellant did not file a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, therefore, it was precluded from filing an application before the executing court to declare the award as void and hence non-executable. * * *

72.

Lifting of the moratorium does not mean that the claim of the respondent would stand revived notwithstanding approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority. Moratorium is intended to ensure that no further demands are raised or adjudicated upon during the corporate insolvency resolution process so that the process can be proceeded with and concluded without further complications. View taken by the High Court cannot be accepted in the light of the clear cut provisions of the IBC as well as the law laid down by this Court. In view of the resolution plan, as approved, the claim of the respondent stood extinguished. Therefore, the Facilitation Council did not have the jurisdiction to arbitrate on the said claim. Since the award was passed without jurisdiction, the same could be assailed in a proceeding under Section 47CPC. View taken by the High Court that because the appellant did not challenge the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, therefore, it was precluded from objecting to execution of the award at the stage of Section 47CPC, is wholly unsustainable.”

“19.

It, thus, transpires that by judicial interpretation, words cannot be added to a statute, which would include the rules, regulations and instructions issued under a statute, as an excuse to give effect to its plain meaning of the language of the regulations. If the legislature has left a lacuna, it is not open to the court to fill it on some presumed intention of the legislature. But where the courts find that the words appear to have been accidentally omitted, or if adopting a construction deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply additional words but should not easily read words which have not been expressly enacted. The court should construct the provisions harmoniously having regard to the context and the object of the statute in which a provision appears, to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions, so as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. Thus, it is not possible to read completion of qualifying service in Regulation 105-B of the Regulations.”

“26.

The term Award has not been defined in the 2013 Act. However, in Sections 23 and 25 in Chapter IV titled “Notification and Acquisition” and in Sections 69 and 70 in Chapter VIII titled “Establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority”, there is a reference of the term “Award”. Under chapter IV, the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer has to pass an Award. In Chapter VIII the Authority has to pass an award under Section 69 of the 2013 Act. An Award passed by the Authority under chapter VIII as provided under Section 70(2) is a deemed decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of clause (2) and clause (9) respectively, of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908). Every such award, which is a deemed decree, is executable. Section 60(2) of 2103 Act confers original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon every reference under Section 64 to the Authority. However, as provided under subsection 3 of Section 60 of the said Act, the Authority is not bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of the said Act and of any rules made thereunder, it shall have the power to regulate its own procedure. It is clear that while regulating its own procedure while determining the award the provisions of the Act of 2013 and Rules made thereunder shall be followed by the Authority. However, the Authority has limited powers as vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure as provided under Section 60(1) of the Act of 2013. The Authority determines the reference after the reference application is made to him by the Collector/L.A.O. under Section 64 of 2013 Act or on the application made by the applicant on failure of the Collector to make a reference to him.”

“34.

Lastly, it was contended by Mr Sharan, learned Senior Counsel that under Section 36 of the 1996 Act, an award of the arbitrator has been equated to decree of the court for the purpose of execution. Under Section 35 of the 1996 Act, an arbitral award will be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them subject to the other provisions prescribed in the said part of the Act. Under Section 36 it is provided that where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 expired, or such application having been made and referred, the award can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. When we consider the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, at the very outset, it must be held that by referring to Sections 35 and 36, it is difficult to draw an inference that based on the deeming provision specifically meant for the enforcement and execution of an award, the arbitral proceedings can be equated to a civil court proceedings. As rightly contended by Mr Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Section 36 only creates a statutory fiction which is limited for the purpose of enforcement of the award. The deeming fiction is specifically restricted to treat the award as a decree of a court, exclusively for the purpose of execution, though as a matter of fact, it is only an award of arbitral proceeding. It is a settled proposition, that a statutory provision will have to be construed from the words that are expressly used and it is not for the court to add or substitute any word to it. Therefore, going by Sections 35 and 36 it cannot be held that the entire arbitral proceeding is a civil court proceedings for the purpose of applicability of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act.

35.

In this context, we draw support from the decision of this Court in Sadan K. Bormal [State of W.B. v. Sadan K. Bormal, (2004) 6 SCC 59 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1739] , para 25 is relevant for our purpose which reads as under : (SCC p. 69)

“25.

So far as interpretation of a provision creating a legal fiction is concerned, it is trite that the court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction is created and having done so must assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. In construing a fiction it must not be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. It cannot be extended by importing another fiction. These principles are well settled and it is not necessary for us to refer to the authorities on this subject. The principle has been succinctly stated by Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 : (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL)] , when he observed : (AC pp. 132-33)

‘If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.’”

36.

We also draw support from the decision of this Court in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. [Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322] , para 42 is relevant, which reads as under : (SCC p. 346)

“42.

The words “as if” demonstrate that award and decree or order are two different things. The legal fiction created is for the limited purpose of enforcement as a decree. The fiction is not intended to make it a decree for all purposes under all statutes, whether State or Central.” (emphasis in original)”

“44.

It must, at this juncture, be noted that in spite of Section 2(11), which included the words “but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the State”, these precise words were removed by the legislature and the definition was made limited as it has been finally legislated upon. It is to be noted that when the Bill came to be passed and received the assent of the Vice-President on 5-6-1969 and was first published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette Extraordinary, Part IV on 13-6-1969, the aforementioned words were omitted. Therefore, this would be a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the legislature being conscious of the fact and being armed with all the Committee reports and also being armed with the factual data, deliberately avoided those words. What the appellants are asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition. That would amount to supplying the casus omissus and we do not think that it is possible, particularly, in this case. The law of supplying the casus omissus by the courts is extremely clear and settled that though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature. But, that is certainly not the case here. (See decision in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh [(2005) 10 SCC 437 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1570] .)”

“4.

The following factors must be etched on the mental screen:

(1)

A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award unless the same material is produced and proved before the court.

(2)

So also the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial court open or exposed to challenge before the court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate court.

(3)

The court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it.”

“7.

The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) is with respect to a pending or disposed of “consumer dispute” before the State Commission.

7.1.

The consumer dispute, in the present case, had already been finally adjudicated by this Court vide judgment and order dated 19-9-2012 [K.A. Nagamani v. Karnataka Housing Board, (2015) 16 SCC 587 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 692] . The second round of litigation emanated from the execution of the final order passed by this Court.

7.2.

Section 25 of the 1986 Act provides for the enforcement of orders passed by the District Forum, State Commission or National Commission: Section 25(3) states:

“25.

Enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission.—(1)-(2) * * *

(3)

Where any amount is due from any person under an order made by a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, the person entitled to the amount may make an application to the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, and such District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may issue a certificate for the said amount to the Collector of the district (by whatever name called) and the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.”

An order passed for enforcement, would not be an order in the “consumer dispute” since it stands finally decided by the appellate forum, which has conclusively determined the rights and obligations of the parties.

7.3.

The nature of execution proceedings is materially different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint. Execution proceedings are independent proceedings. Orders passed for enforcement of the final order in the consumer dispute, cannot be construed to be orders passed in the “consumer dispute”.

7.4.

During the course of the hearing, the learned counsel for the appellant raised a contention that execution proceedings are a continuation of the “appeal”, and must therefore be considered to be a continuation of the “consumer dispute”. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Satguru Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. [Satguru Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd., 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 158 : (2007) 3 Mah LJ 843] , and Raghunath R. Shingate v. Jayant Gajanan Pathak [Raghunath R. Shingate v. Jayant Gajanan Pathak, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1288 : (2011) 6 Mah LJ 799] , as well as the Patna High Court in Parshava Properties Ltd. v. A.K. Bose [Parshava Properties Ltd. v. A.K. Bose, 1979 SCC OnLine Pat 74 : AIR 1979 Pat 308] , wherein it was held that execution proceedings are a continuation of the suit.

7.5.

On the other hand, the respondent complainant has placed reliance on a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Guntupalli Rama Subbayya v. Guntupalli Rajamma [Guntupalli Rama Subbayya v. Guntupalli Rajamma, 1987 SCC OnLine AP 207 : AIR 1988 AP 226] , wherein it was held that: (SCC OnLine AP para 11)

“11.

… Execution proceedings, in our view, cannot be regarded as continuation of the suit in the sense in which the proceedings in appeal are treated.” (emphasis supplied)

7.6.

A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Narmada Devi v. Ram Nandan Singh [Narmada Devi v. Ram Nandan Singh, 1985 SCC OnLine Pat 128 : AIR 1987 Pat 33] , has similarly held that execution proceedings cannot be regarded as a continuation of the suit.

7.7.

We affirm the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Patna High Court. Execution proceedings even though they are proceedings in a suit, cannot be considered to be a continuation of the original suit. Execution proceedings are separate and independent proceedings for execution of the decree. The merits of the claim or dispute cannot be considered during execution proceedings. They are independent proceedings initiated by the decree-holder to enforce the decree passed in the substantive dispute.

7.8.

There is no remedy provided under Section 21 to file a revision petition against an order passed in appeal by the State Commission in execution proceedings. Section 21(b) does not provide for filing of a revision petition before the National Commission against an order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

7.9.

In the present case, the National Commission committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the revision petition under Section 21(b) filed by the appellant Board against an appeal filed before the State Commission, in execution proceedings.”

“18.

It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or rewrite a provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute or any statutory provision is the determinative factor of legislative intent of policy-makers.

19.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312 : AIR 1998 SC 74] .) The intention of the maker is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moo PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] , courts cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act; they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (Also see State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel [(1998) 3 SCC 234 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 737 : JT (1998) 2 SC 253] .) It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1 All ER 948 : (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)] ] Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910 AC 444 (HL)] , quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah [AIR 1962 SC 847] .)

20.

The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid” Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547] .) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277 : AIR 1990 SC 981] .

21.

In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [(1977) 2 SCC 273 : AIR 1977 SC 842] , it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

22.

While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co. [(2000) 5 SCC 511] ) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

23.

Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute/statutory provision as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. But, at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All ER 539 (CA)] (All ER p. 544 I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result” we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC 557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 (HL)] where AC at p. 577 (All ER p. 664 I) he also observed:“This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”]

24.

It is then true that, “when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt”. “But”, on the other hand, “it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom” (see Fenton v. Hampton [(1858) 11 Moo PC 347 : 6 WR 341] ). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle of quod enim semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute — casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni juris communis relinquitur; “a casus omissus”, observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart [1 TR 44, 52 : 99 ER 963] (ER p. 967), “can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws”.

25.

The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: “The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.” (See Grey v. Pearson [(1857) 6 HL Cas 61 : 26 LJ Ch 473] ) The latter part of this “golden rule” must, however, be applied with much caution. “If”, remarked Jervis, C.J., “the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though they do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning”. [See Abley v. Dale [11 CB 378 : 138 ER 519] (ER p. 525).]”

Decisions cited on behalf of the Land-owners:-

“57.

A bare perusal of Section 25 of the Act clearly shows that thereby a legal fiction has been created to the effect that an order made by District Forum/State Commission or National Commission will be deemed to be a decree or order made by a civil court in a suit. Legal fiction so created has a specific purpose i.e. for the purpose of execution of the order passed by the Forum or Commission. Only in the event the Forum/State Commission or the National Commission is unable to execute its order, the same may be sent to the civil court for its execution. The High Court, therefore was not correct to hold that in each and every case the order passed by the District Forum/State Commission/National Commission are required to be sent to the civil courts for execution thereof.

58.

Furthermore, Section 27 of the Act also confers an additional power upon the Forum and the Commission to execute its order. The said provision is akin to Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or Section 51 read with Order 21 Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 should be read in conjunction with Section 27. A parliamentary statute indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that non-compliance with its order would be punishable by way of imprisonment or fine, which can be in addition to any other mode of recovery.

59.

It is well settled that the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute is that courts or tribunals must be held to possess power to execute their own order.

60.

It is also well settled that a statutory tribunal which has been conferred with the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass necessary order has also the power to implement its order. Further, the Act which is a self-contained code, even if it has not been specifically spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the Tribunal all powers in order to make its order effective.

61.

In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat [(1985) 4 SCC 337 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 556 : AIR 1986 SC 984] it has been held as follows : (SCC pp. 341-42, para 6) “Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim ‘ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest’ (where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist). (Vide Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., p. 1797.) Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties.”

62.

In Arabinda Das v. State of Assam [AIR 1981 Gau 18 (FB)] it has been held as follows : (AIR p. 31, para 22) “We are of firm opinion that where a statute gives a power, such power implies that all legitimate steps may be taken to exercise that power even though these steps may not be clearly spelt in the statute. Where the rule-making authority gives power to certain authority to do anything of public character, such authority should get the power to take intermediate steps in order to give effect to the exercise of the power in its final step, otherwise the ultimate power would become illusory, ridiculous and inoperative which could not be the intention of the rule-making authority. In determining whether a power claimed by the statutory authority can be held to be incidental or ancillary to the powers expressly conferred by the statute, the court must not only see whether the power may be derived by reasonable implication from the provisions of the statute, but also whether such powers are necessary for carrying out the purpose of the provisions of the statute which confers power on the authority in its exercise of such power.”

63.

The terminology used in Section 25 of the Act to the effect “in the event of its inability to execute it”, is of great significance. Section 25, on a plain reading, goes to show that the provision contained therein presuppose that the Forum or the Commission would be entitled to execute its order. It, however, may send the matter for its execution to a court only in the event it is unable to do so. Such a contingency may arise only in a given situation but in our considered opinion the same does not lead to the conclusion that the Consumer Courts cannot execute its own order and by compulsion it has to send all its orders for execution to the civil courts. Such construction of Section 25 in our opinion would violate the plain language used therein and, thus, must be held to be untenable.”

“41.

To sum up:— From the above analysis, we hold that the 2013 Act is a special law and a complete code to a large extent, but does not bar any assistance from the other enactments to give effect to its avowed object. After all, we must not lose sight of the fact that the right to get fair compensation is enshrined under Article 300A of the Constitution and when the statute itself provides so, it must be given effect to by the Court, notwithstanding any other possible technical interpretation. In other words, the provisions of the 2013 Act are meant to give effect to its object and, therefore, any contra interpretation would result in its destruction, and must be avoided by the Court.”

“59.

Much has been said and argued on this provision. This provision throws light on the interplay between the 1963 Act and special or local laws. It comes into play when the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law. This provision applies to a suit, an appeal, or an application. The first part of this provision speaks of the application of Section 3 over which there is no quibble. It gives due recognition to the period of limitation provided under the special or local law and imports it into the Schedule. In fact, it provides for an automatic change in the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3. However, for determination of the period of limitation, Sections 4 to 24, pertaining to extension and exclusion, shall apply. Thus, Section 29(2) is the provision that triggers the activation of Sections 4 to 24. This applies ordinarily to every special or local law, unless such law contains an express exclusion of the 1963 Act. To put it differently, the intention to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear, apparent and manifest. Therefore, the language of Section 29(2), indicates the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all special or local laws. A specific exclusion alone would take away its application. The application of Sections 4 to 24 can be excluded by such laws either individually or in totality. The provisions pertaining to the exclusion of time can also be applied at different stages. Suffice it is to state that Sections 4 to 24 will not apply only when their exclusion is expressly provided by such special or local law. In other words, there is a debarment of the exercise of any implied exclusion as a matter of rule. However, it can be done by the Court only in exceptional situations and that too, when the person claiming so discharges the burden of proving the same through the scheme of the legislation. Mere incorporation of a specific period of limitation under the special or local law does not amount to express exclusion of the 1963 Act. Rather, it must indicate that Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act are excluded. As a matter of rule, the said words must be present in the special or local law. Otherwise, it would amount to nullifying Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.

60.

When the Legislature has consciously incorporated Section 29(2) in the 1963 Act, its application cannot be ousted in an indirect manner. Applying this provision only for the purpose of extension while ignoring exclusion cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Also, one part of this provision alone cannot be followed while failing to adhere to the other part. When one can say that, the first part of this provision, which imports the period of limitation of the special or local law into the Schedule, can be accepted, the other carved part cannot be ignored. Hence, a piecemeal application of this provision shall not be permitted.

61.

Section 29(2) is not limited to the current laws but also covers laws that may be enacted in the future while they are in force and therefore must be interpreted harmoniously with other provisions rather than in isolation. When two enactments are to be interpreted, a court must construe them together, ensuring that both can co-exist and be given effect. Both must operate as a helping hand to each other and therefore, an approach that may lead to a conflict must be avoided. Reading a special or local law by ignoring Section 29(2) would be contrary to the object of the 1963 Act, makin60. When the Legislature has consciously incorporated Section 29(2) in the 1963 Act, its application cannot be ousted in an indirect manner. Applying this provision only for the purpose of extension while ignoring exclusion cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Also, one part of this provision alone cannot be followed while failing to adhere to the other part. When one can say that, the first part of this provision, which imports the period of limitation of the special or local law into the Schedule, can be accepted, the other carved part cannot be ignored. Hence, a piecemeal application of this provision shall not be permitted.

61.

Section 29(2) is not limited to the current laws but also covers laws that may be enacted in the future while they are in force and therefore must be interpreted harmoniously with other provisions rather than in isolation. When two enactments are to be interpreted, a court must construe them together, ensuring that both can co-exist and be given effect. Both must operate as a helping hand to each other and therefore, an appg it seem as though the said provision does not exist in the statute.

62.

To sum up:— From the aforesaid analysis of the provision, we hold that the compliance of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion. Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law. This, we say so, notwithstanding the principle governing harmonious construction as Section 29(2) is a very unique provision which seeks to be taken note of in the interpretation of other statutes.”

“74.

We have dealt with the provisions contained in both the enactments in extenso already. We have also dealt with the principles of law. Upon such analysis, we reiterate that the 2013 Act is a unique piece of legislation. The Collector is given two different and distinct roles up to a certain stage of the acquisition process. The first role is to facilitate the acquisition on behalf of the Government, and the other is with respect to the determination of the compensation. For both these roles, there is no question of application of any provisions of the 1963 Act, as the Collector either acts as a statutory authority on the executive side or as a quasi judicial authority while determining the compensation or as an authority dealing with rights having civil consequences while making a reference. In all these three acts, there is no role that is exclusively judicial. As we have already discussed, only when the issue of compensation is decided by the Authority, who is a legally trained person entitled to exercise the powers of a Civil Court, followed by the declaration of an award deemed to be a decree, does an out-and-out judicial forum enter the picture. The proceedings before him are original in nature, with two parties appearing before him, of which even the Collector is a party, since it is his award that is under challenge. There is a reason why the Authority is expected to exercise an element of fair play by following the principles of natural justice which would otherwise inhere in a party before it. It is only the Court that is given the inherent power of formulating its own procedure when it is not provided under the statute. Thus, the reference made by the Collector to the Authority, which is akin to the institution of a suit before a Civil Court, does not attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. However, an application filed during the pendency of the reference, being akin to an application filed during the pendency of a suit, would attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. For example, when a party to a reference dies, and an application for bringing the legal representatives on record is filed belatedly, Section 5 of the 1963 Act would have to be pressed into service. Such a situation might also arise in appellate proceedings. To that extent, there is no bar.

75.

Section 74 of the 2013 Act provides for a first appeal, both, on facts and on law. This appellate proceeding before the High Court is nothing but a continuation of the original proceedings before the Authority. As already discussed earlier, Section 74 provides a period of 60 days for filing an appeal before the High Court, with an additional period of 60 days as per the proviso. The proviso does not extend the period of limitation, but merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of the main provision. Being a mere proviso, it cannot be interpreted to mean an extension of the period of limitation.

76.

Thus, Section 74, along with its proviso, deals with only one period of limitation, which is 60 days. The proviso merely facilitates an appellant to file the appeal within a further period of 60 days which, in effect, brings the same within the fold of the initial 60 days. This provision, as a whole, does not involve an exercise of the power conferred to the Court under Section 5 of the 1963 Act. However, we must note that the 2013 Act does not take away from its purview the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act. We do not find any express exclusion contained in Section 74 of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview.

77.

As Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act, a limited interpretation of Section 5 of the 1963 Act alone cannot be given. What applies to exclusion shall apply to extension as well. In our considered view, the High Court, while exercising the power under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, is certainly entitled to draw its power from the sources available under the 1963 Act. We cannot introduce words that are not available in Section 74 through an imaginary interpretation in holding the existence of an express exclusion. It is a conscious decision made by the Legislature, and its knowledge must be inferred and implied. Thus, we are inclined to hold that there is not much difference between the main provision contained in Section 74(1) and its proviso. There is only one period mentioned for filing the appeal, meaning thereby that the other one mentioned under the proviso gets subsumed within the period provided under Section 74(1).

78.

Furthermore, the intention of Section 103 of the 2013 Act is also to be seen, which clarifies that it is in addition to and not in derogation of the existing laws. It facilitates adequate borrowing from other enactments. In fact, the completeness of the 2013 Act comes from such borrowing, including from the 1963 Act. Any interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013 Act, barring the application of other enactments which would include the 1963 Act, would make Section 103 of the 2013 Act redundant and otiose. When the Legislature introduces a provision, there can be no interpretation in ignorance of it. Such an ignorant interpretation would also be dangerous, as it would amount to striking down the very provision itself even without a challenge.

79.

Thus, we hold that the 1963 Act applies to the 2013 Act. Any interpretation to the contrary would result in a situation as if both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act have vanished from the respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible in law. We must also remain conscious that any interpretation having the impact of destroying a right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should be eschewed unless it appears so on the very face of it. Even when two interpretations are possible, the one that facilitates the filing of an appeal must be approved.

80.

Having understood Section 74 of the 2013 Act, we are inclined to hold that the issue being determination of just, fair and adequate compensation by the First Appellate Court having the trappings of the original one and keeping in mind the object and the intent of the enactment which Courts are duty-bound to give effect to rather than indulging in its destruction, a liberal approach has to be adopted, both, when dealing with a case coming under the proviso or on an application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.

81.

Thus, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgments rendered by the High Courts which have held that Section 5 of the 1963 Act has no application to Section 74 of the 2013 Act, particularly in view of the fact that the period of limitation provided under Section 74 must be read into the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3 of the 1963 Act.”

J. DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS:-

Bird’s Eye View of the Statutory Provisions of The Act of 2013:-

"Statement of Objects and Reasons

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families.

2.

The definition of the expression “public purpose” as given in the Act is very wide. It has, therefore, become necessary to re-define it so as to restrict its scope for acquisition of land for strategic purposes vital to the State, and for infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to the general public. The provisions of the Act are also used for acquiring private lands for companies. This frequently raises a question mark on the desirability of such State intervention when land could be arranged by the company through private negotiations on a “willing seller-willing buyer” basis, which could be seen to be a more fair arrangement from the point of view of the land owner. In order to streamline the provisions of the Act causing less hardships to the owners of the land and other persons dependent upon such land, it is proposed repeal the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons and their families.

3.

There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner.

4.

Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 were introduced in the Lok Sabha on 6th December, 2007 and were referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development for Examination and Report. The Standing Committee presented its reports (the 39th and 40th Reports) to the Lok Sabha on 21st October, 2008 and laid the same in the Rajya Sabha on the same day. Based on the recommendations of the Standing Committee and as a consequence thereof, official amendments to the Bills were proposed. The Bills, along with the official amendments, were passed by the Lok Sabha on 25th February, 2009, but the same lapsed with the dissolution of the 14th Lok Sabha.

5.

It is now proposed to have a unified legislation dealing with acquisition of land, provide for just and fair compensation and make adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the affected persons and their families. The Bill thus provides for repealing and replacing the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with broad provisions for adequate rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the project affected persons and their families.

6.

Provision of public facilities or infrastructure often requires the exercise of powers by the State for acquisition of private property leading to displacement of people, depriving them of their land, livelihood and shelter, restricting their access to traditional resource base and uprooting them from their socio-cultural environment. These have traumatic, psychological and socio-cultural consequences on the affected population which call for protecting their rights, particularly in case of the weaker sections of the society including members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs), marginal farmers and their families.

7.

There is an imperative need to recognise rehabilitation and resettlement issues as intrinsic to the development process formulated with the active participation of affected persons and families. Additional benefits beyond monetary compensation have to be provided to families affected adversely by involuntary displacement. The plight of those who do not have rights over the land on which they are critically dependent for their subsistence is even worse. This calls for a broader concerted effort on the part of the planners to include in the displacement, rehabilitation and resettlement process framework, not only for those who directly lose their land and other assets but also for all those who are affected by such acquisition. The displacement process often poses problems that make it difficult for the affected persons to continue their traditional livelihood activities after resettlement. This requires a careful assessment of the economic disadvantages and the social impact arising out of displacement. There must also be holistic effort aimed at improving the all-round living standards of the affected persons and families.

8.

A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which came into force with effect from February, 2004. Experience gained in implementation of this policy indicates that there are many issues addressed by the policy which need to be reviewed. There should be a clear perception, through a careful quantification of the costs and benefits that will accrue to society at large, of the desirability and justifiability of each project. The adverse impact on affected families-economic, environmental, social and cultural-must be assessed in participatory and transparent manner. A national rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply to all projects where involuntary displacement takes place.

9.

The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 has been formulated on these lines to replace the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, 2003. The new policy has been notified in the Official Gazette and has become operative with effect from the 31st October, 2007. Many State Governments have their own Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policies. Many Public Sector Undertakings or agencies also have their own policies in this regard.

10.

The law would apply when Government acquires land for its own use, hold and control, or with the ultimate purpose to transfer it for the use of private companies for stated public purpose or for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose. Only rehabilitation and resettlement provisions will apply when private companies buy land for a project, more than 100 acres in rural areas, or more than 50 acres in urban areas. The land acquisition provisions would apply to the area to be acquired but the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions will apply to the entire project area even when private company approaches Government for partial acquisition for public purpose.

11.

“Public purpose” has been comprehensively defined, so that Government intervention in acquisition is limited to defence, certain development projects only. It has also been ensured that consent of at least 80 per cent of the project affected families is to be obtained through a prior informed process. Acquisition under urgency clause has also been limited for the purposes of national defence, security purposes and Rehabilitation and Resettlement needs in the event of emergencies or natural Collectormities only.

12.

To ensure food security, multi-crop irrigated land shall be acquired only as a last resort measure. An equivalent area of culturable wasteland shall be developed, if multi-crop land is acquired. In districts where net sown area is less than 50 per cent of total geographical area, no more than 10 per cent of the net sown area of the district will be acquired.

13.

To ensure comprehensive compensation package for the land owners a scientific method for calculation of the market value of the land has been proposed. Market value calculated will be multiplied by a factor of two in the rural areas. Solatium will also be increased up to 100 per cent of the total compensation. Where land is acquired for urbanization, 20 per cent of the developed land will be offered to the affected land owners.

14.

Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, one acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation allowance and resettlement allowance is proposed.

15.

Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for livelihood losers including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, transportation allowance and resettlement allowance is proposed.

16.

Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional benefits of 2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each affected family; one time financial assistance of Rs. 50,000; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the district; free land for community and social gathering and continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc.

17.

Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to be provided in the resettlement area including schools and play grounds, health centres, roads and electric connections, assured sources of safe drinking water, Panchayat Ghars, Anganwadis, places of worship, burial and cremation grounds, village level post offices, fair price shops and seed-cum-fertilizers storage facilities.

18.

The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken.

19.

Land that is not used within ten years in accordance with the purposes, for which it was acquired, shall be transferred to the State Government's Land Bank. Upon every transfer of land without development, twenty per cent of the appreciated land value shall be shared with the original land owners.

20.

The provisions of the Bill have been made fully compliant with other laws such as the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996; the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and Land Transfer Regulations in Fifth Scheduled Areas.

21.

Stringent and comprehensive penalties both for the companies and Government in cases of false information, mala fide action and contravention of the provisions of the propose legislation have been provided.

22.

Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition have been enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in addition to and not in derogation of these Acts. The provisions of this Act can be applied to these existing enactments by a notification of the Central Government.

23.

The Bill also provides for the basic minimum requirements that all projects leading to displacement must address. It contains a saving clause to enable the State Governments, to continue to provide or put in place greater benefit levels than those prescribed under the Bill.

24.

The Bill would provide for the basic minimum that all projects leading to displacement must address. A Social Impact Assessment (SIA) of proposals leading to displacement of people through a participatory, informed and transparent process involving all stake-holders, including the affected persons will be necessary before these are acted upon. The rehabilitation process would augment income levels and enrich quality of life of the displaced persons, covering rebuilding socio-cultural relationships, capacity building and provision of public health and community services. Adequate safeguards have been proposed for protecting rights of vulnerable sections of the displaced persons.

25.

The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes on clauses explain the various provisions contained in the Bill."

"An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Be it enacted by Parliament in the Sixty-fourth Year of the Republic of India as follows:—"

"(e)

“appropriate Government” means,—

(i)

in relation to acquisition of land situated within the territory of, a State, the State Government;

(ii)

in relation to acquisition of land situated within a Union territory (except Puducherry), the Central Government;

(iii)

in relation to acquisition of land situated within the Union territory of Puducherry, the Government of Union territory of Puducherry;

(iv)

in relation to acquisition of land for public purpose in more than one State, the Central Government, in consultation with the concerned State Governments or Union territories; and

(v)

in relation to the acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union as may be specified by notification, the Central Government:

Provided that in respect of a public purpose in a District for an area not exceeding such as may be notified by the appropriate Government, the Collector of such District shall be deemed to be the appropriate Government;

(f)

“Authority” means the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority established under Section 51;

(l)

“entitled to act”, in relation to a person, shall be deemed to include the following persons, namely:—

(i)

trustees for other persons beneficially interested with reference to any such case, and that to the same extent as the person beneficially interested could have acted if free from disability;

(ii)

the guardians of minors and the committees or managers of lunatics to the same extent as the minors, lunatics or other persons of unsound mind themselves, if free from disability, could have acted:

Provided that the provisions of Order XXXII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in the case of persons interested appearing before a Collector or Authority by a next friend, or by a guardian for the case, in proceedings under this Act;

“26.

Determination of market value of land by Collector.—(1) The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the market value of the land, namely:—

(a)

the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or

(b)

the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area; or

(c)

consented amount of compensation as agreed upon under sub-section (2) of Section 2 in case of acquisition of lands for private companies or for public private partnership projects, whichever is higher:

Provided that the date for determination of market value shall be the date on which the notification has been issued under Section 11.

Explanation 1.—The average sale price referred to in clause (b) shall be determined taking into account the sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered for similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity area during immediately preceding three years of the year in which such acquisition of land is proposed to be made.

Explanation 2.—For determining the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the total number of sale deeds or the agreements to sell in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into account.

Explanation 3.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid as compensation for land acquired under the provisions of this Act on an earlier occasion in the district shall not be taken into consideration.

Explanation 4.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid, which in the opinion of the Collector is not indicative of actual prevailing market value may be discounted for the purposes of calculating market value.

(2)

The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule.

(3)

Where the market value under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) cannot be determined for the reason that—

(a)

the land is situated in such area where the transactions in land are restricted by or under any other law for the time being in force in that area; or

(b)

the registered sale deeds or agreements to sell as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) for similar land are not available for the immediately preceding three years; or

(c)

the market value has not been specified under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) by the appropriate authority, the State Government concerned shall specify the floor price or minimum price per unit area of the said land based on the price calculated in the manner specified in sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land situated in the immediate adjoining areas:

Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers its shares to the owners of the lands (whose lands have been acquired) as a part compensation, for acquisition of land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per cent of the value so calculated under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) as the case may be:

Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case compel any owner of the land (whose land has been acquired) to take its shares, the value of which is deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-section (1):

Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of any land acquisition proceedings in any area, take all necessary steps to revise and update the market value of the land on the basis of the prevalent market rate in that area:

Provided also that the appropriate Government shall ensure that the market value determined for acquisition of any land or property of an educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority shall be such as would not restrict or abrogate the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."

“51. Establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Authority.—(1) The appropriate Government shall, for the purpose of providing speedy disposal of disputes relating to land acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement, establish, by notification, one or more Authorities to be known as “the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority” to exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on it by or under this Act.

(2)

The appropriate Government shall also specify in the notification referred to in sub-section (1) the areas within which the Authority may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the references made to it under Section 64 or applications made by the applicant under second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 64. * * *

53.

Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.—(1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of an Authority unless,—

(a)

he is or has been a District Judge; or

(b)

he is a qualified legal practitioner for not less than seven years.

(2)

A Presiding Officer shall be appointed by the appropriate Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of a High Court in whose jurisdiction the Authority is proposed to be established. * * *

60.

Powers of Authority and procedure before it.—(1) The Authority shall, for the purposes of its functions under this Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:—

(a)

summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b)

discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence;

(c)

receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d)

requisitioning of any public record;

(e)

issuing commission for the examination of witnesses;

(f)

reviewing its decisions, directions and orders;

(g)

any other matter which may be prescribed.

(2)

The Authority shall have original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon every reference made to it under Section 64.

(3)

The Authority shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, the Authority shall have the power to regulate its own procedure.

(4)

The Authority shall, after receiving reference under Section 64 and after giving notice of such reference to all the parties concerned and after affording opportunity of hearing to all parties, dispose of such reference within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such reference and make an award accordingly.

(5)

The Authority shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within a period of fifteen days from the date of such award.

61.

Proceedings before Authority to be judicial proceedings.—All proceedings before the Authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)6 and the Authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). * * *

63.

Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.—No civil court (other than High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition in respect of which the Collector or the Authority is empowered by or under this Act, and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any such matter.

64.

Reference to Authority.—(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, as the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested:

Provided that the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate Authority:

Provided further that where the Collector fails to make such reference within the period so specified, the applicant may apply to the Authority, as the case may be, requesting it to direct the Collector to make the reference to it within a period of thirty days.

(2)

The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made—(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b)

in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire:

Provided further that the Collector may entertain an application after the expiry of the said period, within a further period of one year, if he is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the period specified in the first proviso. * * *

69.

Determination of award by Authority.—(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired including the Rehabilitation and Resettlement entitlements, the Authority shall take into consideration whether the Collector has followed the parameters set out under Section 26 to Section 30 and the provisions under Chapter V of this Act.

(2)

In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Authority shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under Section 11 in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation.—In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.

(3)

In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Authority shall in every case award a solatium of one hundred per cent over the total compensation amount.

70.

Form of award.—(1) Every award under this Chapter shall be in writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Authority, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of Section 28, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.

(2)

Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of clause (2), and clause (9) of respectively, of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)."

"77.

Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority.—(1) On making an award under Section 30, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2).

(2)

If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority to which a reference under Section 64 would be submitted:

Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:

Provided further that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under sub-section (1) of Section 64:

Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto."

Provisions of the Old Land Acquisition Act, 1894:-

“3 (d) - The expression Court means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the [appropriate Government] has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act.” * * *

“18.

Reference to Court.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2)

The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made,-

(a)

if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award;

(b)

in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collectors award, whichever period shall first expire.

(3)

Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1) the Land Reforms Commissioner may, where he considers the amount of compensation allowed by the award under Section 11 to be excessive, require the Collector that the matter be referred by him to the Court for determination of the amount of compensation.

Explanation. In any case of land under Chapter VII the requisition under this sub-section may be made by the Land Reforms Commissioner at the request of the Company on its undertaking to pay all the cost consequent upon such requisition.

(4)

The requisition shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken and shall be made within six months from the date of the award.”

"53.

Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court- .Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)] [Substituted by Act 68 of 1984, Section 28, for " Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 (14 of 1882)" (w.e.f. 24.9.1984).], shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act.

54.

Appeals in proceedings before Court - .Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to [the Supreme Court] subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), and in Order XLV thereof."

Comparing the Procedural Shift as noticed in Section 60 of the New Act of 2013 with Section 53 of the Old Act, 1894:-

“60.

Powers of Authority and procedure before it.—(1) The Authority shall, for the purposes of its functions under this Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:—

(a)

summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b)

discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence;

(c)

receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d)

requisitioning of any public record;

(e)

issuing commission for the examination of witnesses;

(f)

reviewing its decisions, directions and orders;

(g)

any other matter which may be prescribed.”

“109 Power of appropriate Government to make rules.–(1) Subject to the other provisions of the Act, the appropriate Government may, by notification, make Rules for carring out the provisions of this Act.

(2)

In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such Rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :-

(a)

x x x

(q)

any other matter under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 60;”

60.

Powers of Authority and procedure 53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to before it.—(1) The Authority shall, for proceedings before Court.—Save in so the purposes of its functions under this far as they may be inconsistent with Act, shall have the same powers as are anything contained in this Act, the vested in a civil court under the Code of provision of the 92[Code of Civil Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all respect of the following matters, namely: proceedings before the Court under this — Act.

(a)

summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b)

discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence;

(c)

receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d)

requisitioning of any public record;

(e)

issuing commission for the examination of witnesses;

(f)

reviewing its decisions, directions and orders;

(g)

any other matter which may be prescribed.

(2)

The Authority shall have original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon every reference made to it under Section 64.

(3)

The Authority shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, the Authority shall have the power to regulate its own procedure.

(4)

The Authority shall, after receiving reference under Section 64 and after giving notice of such reference to all the parties concerned and after affording opportunity of hearing to all parties, dispose of such reference within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such reference and make an award accordingly.

(5)

The Authority shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within a period of fifteen days from the date of such award.

"17.

A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. If it is a referential legislation the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made in the subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporated does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. So also any amendment in the statute which has been so incorporated that is made after the date of incorporation of such statute does not affect the subsequent statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of the statute which have been incorporated would remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent amendments are not to be read in the subsequent legislation. In the words of Lord Esher, M.R., the legal effect of such incorporation by reference “is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all”. (See: Wood's Estate, Re, [(1886) 31 Ch D 607 : 55 LJ Ch 488] Ch D at p. 615.) As to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier legislation and other relevant circumstances. The legal position has been thus summed up by this Court in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan [(1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589 : (1976) 1 SCR 6] : (SCR p. 14 : SCC p. 385, para 15)

“Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:

(a)

Where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;

(b)

where the two Acts are in pari materia;

(c)

where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d)

where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.”

“87.

However, since this aspect was argued by the learned counsel appearing for the parties at great length, we will proceed to discuss the merit or otherwise of this contention without prejudice to the above findings and as an alternative plea. These principles have been applied by the courts for a considerable period now. When there is general reference in the Act in question to some earlier Act but there is no specific mention of the provisions of the former Act, then it is clearly considered as legislation by reference. In the case of legislation by reference, the amending laws of the former Act would normally become applicable to the later Act; but, when the provisions of an Act are specifically referred and incorporated in the later statute, then those provisions alone are applicable and the amending provisions of the former Act would not become part of the later Act. This principle is generally called legislation by incorporation. General reference, ordinarily, will imply exclusion of specific reference and this is precisely the fine line of distinction between these two doctrines. Both are referential legislations, one merely by way of reference and the other by incorporation. It, normally, will depend on the language used in the later law and other relevant considerations. While the principle of legislation by incorporation has well-defined exceptions, the law enunciated as of now provides for no exceptions to the principle of legislation by reference. Furthermore, despite strict application of doctrine of incorporation, it may still not operate in certain legislations and such legislation may fall within one of the stated exceptions.

88.

In this regard, the judgment of this Court in M.V. Narasimhan [State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589] can be usefully noticed where the Court after analysing various judgments, summed up the exceptions to this rule as follows: (SCC p. 385, para 15)

“(a)

where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;

(b)

where the two Acts are in pari materia;

(c)

where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d)

where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.”

89.

With the development of law, the legislature has adopted the common practice of referring to the provisions of the existing statute while enacting new laws. Reference to an earlier law in the later law could be a simple reference of provisions of earlier statute or a specific reference where the earlier law is made an integral part of the new law i.e. by incorporation. In the case of legislation by reference, it is fictionally made a part of the later law. We have already noticed that all amendments to the former law, though made subsequent to the enactment of the later law, would ipso facto apply and one finds mention of this particular aspect in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In contrast to such simple reference, legal incidents of legislation by incorporation is that it becomes part of the existing law which implies bodily lifting provisions of one enactment and making them part of another and in such cases subsequent amendments in the incorporated Act could not be treated as part of the incorporating Act.

90.

Ultimately, it is the expression and/or the language used in the new law with reference to the existing law that would determine as to under what class of referential legislation it falls. In some of the statutes, expressions like “shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this Act in the same manner as if they were enacted in the body thereof” [ In Section 20 of 53 Vict. Ch 70, Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890.] or “the provisions of section of the said Act (set out in the Schedule) shall apply as if they were herein re-enacted” [ Section 1(3) of 54 and 55 Vict. Ch 19] are typical examples of legislation by incorporation. Another glaring example of incorporation one finds in the provision of the Bombay Municipal Provincial Corporations Act, 1949 where Section 284-N uses the expression “the LA Act … shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this chapter in the same manner as if enacted in the body hereof”.

91.

Another feature of legislation by incorporation is that the language is explicit and positive. This demonstrates the desire of the legislature for legislation by incorporation. Self-contained enactment should be clearly distinguished from supplemental law. When the later law depends on the former law for procedural/substantive provisions or is to draw its strength from the provisions of the former Act, the later Act is termed as supplemental to the former law. The statement of object and reasons of both the Acts i.e. the MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act as well as the scheme of these Acts, we have already discussed at length. They are Acts which operate in different fields. One is a Central Act while the other is a State Act. They derive their source from different entries in the constitutional Lists. * * *

121.

These are the few examples and principles stated by this Court dealing with both the doctrines of legislation by incorporation as well as by reference. Normally, when it is by reference or citation, the amendment to the earlier law is accepted to be applicable to the later law while in the case of incorporation, the subsequent amendments to the earlier law are irrelevant for application to the subsequent law unless it falls in the exceptions stated by this Court in M.V. Narasimhan case [State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589] . It could well be said that even where there is legislation by reference, the Court needs to apply its mind as to what effect the subsequent amendments to the earlier law would have on the application of the later law. The objective of all these principles of interpretation and their application is to ensure that both the Acts operate in harmony and the object of the principal statute is not defeated by such incorporation. Courts have made attempts to clarify this distinction by reference to various established canons. But still there are certain grey areas which may require the court to consider other angles of interpretation.”

Whether the Power of Execution can be Subsumed Under Inherent Powers or Under Section 60(3) of the Act of 2013:-

Inherent Powers:-

“103.

Examining this proposition first, it will be relevant to ascertain how and who can exercise inherent powers. The inherent powers generally are conferred on the Courts of law which are classically constituted under the Constitution whether it be the High Court and the Supreme Court who are also Courts of record. The Courts of original civil jurisdiction exercise inherent powers, which has been recognized by Section 151 C.P.C. Significantly, Section 151 does not confer powers, rather it recognizes the inherent powers vested with the Civil Courts.

104.

A judicial authority constituted under a special statute cannot be presumed to have inherent powers unless it is specifically so conferred on it by the Statute under which it is constituted.

105.

This can be seen in context with the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure envisages the conferment/recognition of inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. and simultaneously, it may also be noticed that the power of substantive review is also conferred by the Statute and it finds place in Section 114 read with Order 47 C.P.C.

106.

In contrast, the U.P.C.H. Act, 1953 is a special Statute which is a Code in itself, but it does not import the provisions of the C.P.C. as a whole. Neither there is any indication that the Courts/Adjudicatory Authorities constituted under the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 have inherent powers nor they have been conferred with the power of review

107.

This aspect was noticed by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Anar Kali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1997 (15) LCD 921 (FB), wherein the question before the Full Bench was :

''Whether it is open for the Consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers even though the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 does not vest them any review jurisdiction?''

108.

The Full Bench answered the aforesaid question in the following words :

''23. On the authoritative pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions, the legal position which is manifest is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the power of revision vested in him under the Consolidation Act exercises quasi judical powers and in the absence of any provision in the Consolidation Act, which expressly or by necessary implication vests in him the power of review, he cannot exercise such power. It follows that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not competent to revive a revision proceeding disposed of by him by a final order on a review application filed by one of the parties.”

“4.

The Presiding Officer of the LARRA is an appointee of the State Government. In the event he is a serving District Judge, the appointment would be on deputation, of course, with this Court's permission on the administrative side. In all other contingencies contemplated by Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 53, the appointment of the Presiding Officer of the LARRA is to be made by the State on such terms and conditions as the law prescribes. Section 54 of the Act of 2013 spells out some of these conditions.

5.

The trappings and the essential character of the LARRA show it to be not an established Civil Court, but an adjudicating authority established by a notification by the State Government for the purpose indicated in Section 51 of the Act of 2013. The Presiding Officer of the said Authority is also to be appointed by the State Government. The Presiding Officer in one contingency may be a serving District Judge, who could be appointed on deputation with this Court's permission. Else, the Presiding Officer recruited from any other source would be appointed by the State Government, of course, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, in whose jurisdiction, the Authority is proposed to be established. By no means, therefore, the LARRA is a Court subordinate to this Court within the meaning of Section 24(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083. The LARRA, described under the Act of 2013 as an "Authority", may be regarded as a Tribunal subordinate to this Court for the purpose of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, but not a Court subordinate to this Court under the Code.”

“11.

Thus the Tribunal refused to open the door to the appellant Company as the High Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction which is almost plenary for which no statutory constrictions could possibly be imposed. If a party complaining of fraud having been practised on him as well as on the court by another party resulting in a decree, cannot avail himself of the remedy of review or even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, what else is the alternative remedy for him? Is he to surrender to the product of the fraud and thereby became a conduit to enrich the impostor unjustly? Learned Single Judge who indicated some other alternative remedy did not unfortunately spell out what is the other remedy which the appellant Insurance Company could pursue. * * *

16.

Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly-discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim.’’

Impact of Section 60(3) of the Act of 2013:-

Award being a Deemed Decree and its Effect:-

“168.

Section 52 (2) does not only contain a non-obstante clause but it also has a deeming effect and thus it is to be given a strict meaning, as deeming provision cannot be liberally construed and it does not permit the Court to read something into the provision which is not envisaged as that would not only violate the provision but would also run contrary to the scheme of the Act and rob it of its finality.

169.

The scope of a deeming provision has been considered by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2025) 1 SCC 1, Para-115 to 117 read as under :

''(b) Scope of deeming fiction

115.

The use of the phrase "deemed to be" is not conclusive of a legal fiction. [See Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board, (1980) 3 SCC 358, paras 11, 12; Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2017) 5 SCC 598, paras 36, 37, 43, 44] The word deemed is used for many purposes, such as for the artificial construction of a word and to clarify uncertain constructions, or plainly just to mean "regarded as being". [St. Aubyn v. Attorney General, 1952 AC 15 at p. 53 (HL) (Lord Radcliffe)] A legal fiction is essentially a presumption that certain facts which do not exist in fact, will be treated as real and existing for the purpose of law. Courts have evolved two principles on the operation of legal fictions. The first principle is that a legal fiction must be confined to its "legitimate field", for the specific purpose for which it was created. [Industrial Supplies (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 341, para 25; K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754, para 39 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 451; See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1955) 6 STC 446 : 1955 SCC OnLine SC 2] In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 6 STC 446, a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that legal fictions are created only for a certain purpose and they must be confined only to that "legitimate field". In its decision in that case, this Court held that the deeming fiction in the Explanation to Article 286(1) (a), before the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, (by which a sale was deemed to have taken place in the State where the goods were delivered because of the direct sale) only applied to Article 286(1)(a) and not to Article 286(2). This Court held that the scope of Article 286(1)(a) which barred a State from imposing tax on sales outside the State, was different from the scope of Article 286(2) which stated that unless otherwise provided by law, State laws could not tax a sale or purchase which took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1955) 6 STC 446 : 1955 SCC OnLine SC 2:''… A legal fiction pre-supposes the correctness of the state of facts on which it is based and all the consequences which flow from that state of facts have got to be worked out to their logical extent. But due regard must be had in this behalf to the purpose for which the legal fiction has been created. If the purpose of this legal fiction contained in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) is solely for the purpose of sub-clause (a) as expressly stated it would not be legitimate to travel beyond the scope of that purpose and read into the provision any other purpose howsoever attractive it may be. The legal fiction which was created here was only for the purpose of determining whether a particular sale was an outside sale or one which could be deemed to have taken place inside the State and that was the only scope of the provision. It would be an illegitimate extension of the purpose of the legal fiction to say that it was also created for the purpose of converting the inter-State character of the transaction into an intra-State one. This type of conversion could not have been in the contemplation of the Constitution-makers and is contrary to the express purpose for which the legal fiction was created as set out in the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a).'' (emphasis supplied)

116.

The second principle is that the scope of the legal fiction must be extended to the consequences which "logically" flow from its creation. The opinion of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 (HL)] is the leading case for this proposition. The Law Lord observed that the effect of a legal fiction must not be limited to treating facts that do not exist as real but must be expanded to understand the effects and consequences that flow from the legal fiction. [East End Dwellings case, 1952 AC 109 at pp. 132-33 (HL):''If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. … The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.'' However, a law creating a deeming fiction cannot create presumptions in favour of a legal consequence but only presumptions about facts from which certain legal consequences may follow.”

Provisions of the Act to be Liberally Construed:-

“148.

It is true that the Act of 2007 is a social beneficial legislation for the senior citizens/parents and it should be construed liberally in their favour yet it also must be kept in mind that the rules of interpretation do not give right to the Court to read into a legislation or a provision of the Act a power which otherwise is conspicuously absent as shall be evident from the reading of the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder.

149.

It is now well settled that the courts do not legislate rather it interprets the law. Even though, the Act of 2007 is a social beneficial legislation but it cannot be lost sight off that the courts do not read something into the Act which has not been provided. It is the golden rule of intrepretation of statute that the Act must be read in the manner with all the words and provisions and to make it workable keeping in mind that all the sections are given full effect and no provisions as far as possible is made redundant or superfluous.

150.

The court may be tempted to read something into the Act by invoking the doctrine of Casus Omissus but even to do so even in a social beneficial legislation, while taking an approach of purposive interpretation, there are guidelines and unless the said guidelines are attracted, the court under the cloak of exercising the power of interpretation is not empowered to re-write the law. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, the Apex Court has held as under:—

“14.

We are at a loss to understand the reasoning of the learned Judges in reading down the provisions in paragraph 2 in force prior to November 1, 1986 as “more than five years” and as “more than four years” in the same paragraph for the period subsequent to November 1, 1986. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. Vide P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, (1990) 2 SCC 378, Mangilal v. Suganchand Rathi, AIR 1965 SC 101, Sri. Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459, Hira Devi (Smt) v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, (1952) 2 SCC 154, Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, (1953) 1 SCC 167, Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593, G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717, N.S. Vardachari v. G. Vasantha Pai, (1972) 2 SCC 594, Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth, (1977) 4 SCC 193 and CST v. Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad, (1986) 3 SCC 50. Modifying and altering the scheme and applying it to others who are not otherwise entitled to under the scheme, will not also come under the principle of affirmative action adopted by courts sometimes in order to avoid discrimination. If we may say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power.”

151.

In Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 6 SCC 672, the Apex Court has held as under:—

“17.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Water house, [(1997) 6 SCC 312 : AIR 1998 SC 74].) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, [(1846) 6 Moo PC 1 : (1946-50) 4 Moo IA 179], courts cannot aid the legislatures’ defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel, [(1998) 3 SCC 234 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 737 : JT (1998) 2 SC 253].) It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., [[1978] 1 All ER 948 : [1978] 1 WLR 231 (HL)]] Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, [[1910] A.C. 444 : 79 LJKB 954 (HL)] quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, [AIR 1962 SC 847].)

18.

The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, [218 FR 547].) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, [(1990) 1 SCC 277 : AIR 1990 SC 981] (SCC p. 284, para 16).

19.

In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr., [(1977) 2 SCC 273 : AIR 1977 SC 842] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

20.

While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co., [(2000) 5 SCC 511]) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

21.

Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou, [[1966] 1 Q.B. 878 : [1965] 3 All ER 539 : [1965] 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (All ER p. 544 I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC, [[1963] A.C. 557 : [1963] 1 All ER 655 : [1963] 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 he also observed : (All ER p. 664 I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”]

22.

It is then true that, “when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt”.

“But”, on the other hand, “it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom” (see Fenton v. Hampton, [(1858) 11 Moo PC 347 : 6 WR 341]). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute — casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; “a casus omissus”, observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart, [(1785) 1 TR 44 : 99 ER 963] (ER p. 967), “can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws”.”

Notification Dated 22.08.2022:-

"1.

Heard Sri Indresh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Akhileshwar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State respondents.

2.

The instant writ petition is preferred for a direction commanding the District Magistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar/Respondent no. 2 to pass award pursuant to order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the learned Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Tribunal, Basti in Reference No. 05 of 2024 (Chandrabhan Yadav Versus State of U.P.) expeditiously.

3.

At the outset, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents has raised an objection qua maintainability of the writ petition on the premise that Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short the 'Act, 2013') itself is self contained Code. Against the order passed by the learned Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Tribunal, Basti, efficacious remedy is to press the relief under Section 70 of the Act, 2013.

4.

We have considered the rival submissions and perused the provisions contained under Section 70 of the Act, 2913. For ready reference Section 70 is hereby reproduced as under:-

“70.

Form of award.–(1) Every award under this Chapter shall be in writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Authority, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of section 28, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.

(2)

Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of clause (2), and clause (9) of respectively, of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”

5.

What we find that Sub-Section (2) of Section 70 provides that every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of clause (2), and clause (9) of respectively, of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

6.

Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has also placed before the Court the Notification dated 04.08.2022 issued by the U.P. Government, Rajaswa Anbhag-13; Letter issued by the Under Secretary, U.P. Government dated 21.02.2024 to the Registrar General, High Court, Allahabad and the Circular dated 17.05.2024 issued by the Registrar General, High Court, Allahabad regarding power to here all matter (including execution matters) related to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities established in the State of Uttar Pradesh. For ready reference Notification dated 04.08.2022; Letter dated 21.02.2024 and Circular dated 17.05.2024 respectively are being quoted herein below:-

"Uttar Pradesh Shasan

Rajaswa Anubhag-13

In pursuance of the provisions of clause(3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India, the Governor is pleased to order the publication of the following English translation of Notification no. 5/2022/126/Ek-13-2022-1-13099/3630/2020 dated 04 August, 2022:

Notification No.-

5/2022/126/Ek-13-2022-1-13099/3630/2020

Lucknow, Dated 04 August, 2022

In exercise of the powers conferred under clause (d) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Governor hereby appoints presiding Officers of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities constituted under section 51 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as special judicial officers to perform functions of the Court under the said Act with respect to pending cases under the said Act within limits of the jurisdiction of the Authority of which they act as presiding officers.

By Order,

(Sudhir Garg)

Principal Secretary."

"संख्या-22/एक-13-2024-7क101/2014 घनश्याम चतुर्वेदी, अनु सचिव, उत्तर प्रदेश शासन। सेवा में, महानिबंधक उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद। राजस्व अनुभाग-13 लखनऊ: दिनांक 21 फरवरी, 2024 विषय:- Execution (इजराय) मुकदमों के निस्तारण के सम्बन्ध में। महोदय, उपर्युक्त विषय से संबंधित शासन स्तर पर अनेक अनुरोध/प्रस्ताव प्राप्त हो रहे हैं कि जनहित में भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वासन और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन प्राधिकरण (LARRA) को Execution (इजराय) द्वारा मुकदमों की सुनवाई का अधिकार प्रदान करने अथवा पुनः Execution (इजराय) मुकदमों को संबंधित माननीय सत्र न्यायालय में स्थानांतरित करने के लिए संबंधित को निर्देशित कर दिया जाए। 2- इस संबंध में उल्लेख करना है कि शासन द्वारा निर्गत अधिसूचना दिनांक 04-08-2022 के द्वारा भूमि अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 की धारा 3 के खंड (घ) के अधीन प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करके भूमि अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 के अधीन लंबित सभी प्रकार के मामले/केस, भूमि अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 के अधीन न्यायालय के कृत्यों का निष्पादन करने के लिए भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वासन और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम, 2013 की धारा 51 के अधीन गठित भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वासन और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन प्राधिकरणों के पीठासीन अधिकारियों को अधिकारिता प्रदान की गई है। 3- उपरोक्त से स्पष्ट है कि भूमि अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 के अधीन लंबित सभी प्रकार के प्रकरण (जिसमें निष्पादन (Execution) बाद भी स्वतः सम्मिलित हैं) हैं के संबंध में भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वासन और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन प्राधिकरणों के पीठासीन अधिकारियों को अधिकारिता प्रदान की जा चुकी है। कृपया तदनुसार कार्यवाही कराने का कष्ट करें। भवदीय, (घनश्याम चतुर्वेदी) अनु सचिव संख्या एवं दिनांक उपरोक्तानुसार। प्रतिलिपि निम्नलिखित को सूचनार्थ एवं आवश्यक कार्यवाही हेतु प्रेषित:-1. प्रमुख सचिव, न्याय एवं विधि परामर्शी, उ०प्र० शासन।

"From: Rajeev Bharti, HJS Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. To,

1.) All the District & Sessions Judges/OSD

2.) All the Presiding Officers, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Authorities, State of Uttar Pradesh.

C.L.No. 11/LARRA/Admin.(A-3)/Allahabad; Dated: 17.05.2024.

Subject:- Regarding power to hear all matter (including execution matters) related to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities established in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Sir/Madam,

On the above noted subject, I have been directed to say that upon consideration of G.O. No. 22/Ek-13-2024-7Ka/2014 dated 21.02.2024, the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to direct all concerned to take necessary steps to ensure strict compliance of the aforesaid G.O. dated 21.02.2024 issued with regard to power to here all matters (including execution matters) related to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities established in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

I, am therefore to enclose herewith the copy of G.O. No. 22/Ek-13-2024-7Ka/2014 dated 21.02.2024 dated 21.02.2024 with the request to ensure strict compliance of the orders of Hon'ble Court at your end, in letter and spirit.

With regards

Yours sincerely, Registrar General"

7.

Upon perusal of the notification, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of execution has also been provided to the Presiding Officers of LARRA Court. Therefore, there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner in the instant case.

8.

In view of the objection so raised on account of the efficacious alternative remedy, we are not inclined to entertain the instant writ petition.

9.

With the aforesaid observation, the instant writ petition stands disposed of."

A Quick Look at the Various Acts to ascertain Whether an Authority or a Quasi Judicial Body can Execute its own Order or Award

(a) Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987

“22.

Execution of orders of Claims Tribunal.-(1) An order made by the Claims Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Claims Tribunal as a decree of Civil Court and, for this purpose, the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Claims Tribunal may transmit any order may by it to a Civil Court having local jurisdiction and such Civil Court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that Court.”

“31-A. Execution of order.-An order of the Tribunal may be executed by the Bench which pass it if the respondent is within the territorial jurisdiction of the said Bench or by any other Bench or Court to which it is sent for execution, when the respondent is having his office within the territorial jurisdiction of such Bench or Court, as the case may be.

31.-B. Application for execution.-For execution the holder of an order shall make an application to the Tribunal in Form IX.

31.-C. Issue of process of execution.-(1) On receipt of an application under rule 31-B, the Tribunal shall issue a process for execution of its order in Form X.

(2)

The Tribunal shall consider objection, if any, raised by the respondent and make such order as it may deem fit and shall issue attachment or recovery warrant in Form XI and XII, as the case may be.”

(b) U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976

“Section 5: x x x

(7)

The order of the Tribunal finally disposing of a reference shall be executed in the same manner in which any final order of the State Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in any appeal preferred or representation made by the claimant in connection with any matter relating to his employment to which the reference relates would have been executed.”

(c) The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

“40. Recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and

enforcement of order, etc.-(1) If a promoter or an allottee or a real estate agent, as the case may be, fails to pay any interest or penalty or compensation imposed on him, by the adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder, it shall be recoverable from such promoter or allottee or real estate agent, in such manner as may be prescribed as an arrears of land revenue.

(2)

If any adjudicating officer or the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, issues any order or directs any person to do any act, or refrain from doing any act, which it is empowered to do under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, then in case of failure by any person to comply with such order or direction, the same shall be enforced, in such manner as may be prescribed.”

“57. Orders passed by Appellate Tribunal to be executable as a

decree.-(1) Every order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court, and for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by the court.”

(d) Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1965

(e) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

“174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue.-

Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.”

(f) The Uttar Pradesh State University Act, 1973

“68-A. Power of Vice-Chancellor to enforce his order against

Management.-(1) Where a decision of the Management of an affiliated or associated college to dismiss, remove or to reduce a teacher in rank or to punish him in any other manner or to terminate his services, has not been approved by the Vice-Chancellor or where an order of suspension of such teacher has been stayed, revoked or modified by the Vice-Chancellor in accordance with the provisions of this Act or of an Act repealed by Section 74, and the Management has committed default in paying the salary of such teacher which became due to him in consequence of the Vice-Chancellor's order, the Vice-Chancellor may pass an order, requiring the Management to pay the amount of salary as may be specified in the order and during the period of suspension, may also require the management to pay the suspension allowance at the rate of one-half of the salary payable, if the said amount has not been paid.

(2)

In any such case as is referred to in sub-section (1), the Vice-Chancellor may also order reinstatement of the teacher concerned subject to such terms and the conditions as he thinks fit.

(3)

The amount of salary or suspension allowance required to be paid under an order of the Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (1) shall on a certificate issued by him to the effect, be recoverable by the Collector as arrears of land revenue.

(4)

Every order of .he Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (2) shall be executable by the lowest Civil Court having territorial jurisdiction, as if it were a decree of that Court.

(5)

No suit shall lie against any Management or teacher in respect of any matter for which a relief can be granted by the Vice-Chancellor under this Section.”

(g) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

“Section 36. Enforcement -(1) Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.

(2)

Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate application made for that purpose.

(3)

Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2) for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, grant stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided that the Court shall, while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, have due regard to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.]

[Provided further that where the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out that, -

(a)

the arbitration agreement or contract which is the basis of the award; or

(b)

the making of the award, was induced or effected by fraud or corruption, it shall stay the award unconditionally pending disposal of the challenge under section 34 to the award.

Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the above proviso shall apply to all court cases arising out of or in relation to arbitral proceedings, irrespective of whether the arbitral or court proceedings were commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016).]”

“35.

Finality of arbitral awards.-Subject to this Part an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.”

K. CAPSULIZING AND SOLUTIONS:-

L. PERORATION:-