Literacy House Staff Welfare Association and Another vs Registrar, Firms Societies & Chits, U.P.and Others

Rajiv Sharma, J.

Heard learned Counsel for the parties. In these writ petitions, common question of law and facts are involved, hence, decided by the present common judgment with the consent of Counsel for the parties.

Factual matrix as set out in the writ petitions as well as affidavits filed by the parties, in short compass is that the Literacy House was founded by one Mrs. Wealthy H. Fisher, Renowned Philanthropist. Late Mrs. Wealthy H. Fisher dedicated for removing illiteracy and to further the cause of adult literacy and nonformal education and got registered a Society under the name and style of India Literacy Board, under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. According to the Rules and Regulations of the India Literacy Board, as amended, membership of the Board consisted of the following categories:

"Article 2 MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD

(1) The Membership of the Board shall be divided into the following categories namely:

(a) Founder Member

(b) Outgoing Member

(c) Outgoing ViceChairman

(d) Nominated Members

(e) Official Members

(f) ExOfficio Members

(g) Staff members

(h) Director

According to Article 3, Late Mrs. Wealthy H. Fisher, the founder was to remain life member of the Board. After she left this world to her heavenly abode, no body could be appointed as life member. Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rules, which are reproduced below, deal with the Nominated Members, Official Members, ExOfficio members, Staff Members and Committee of five.

"Article 3: FOUNDER MEMBER

The name of Mrs. H. Welthy Fisher, the founder of India Literacy Board (ILB) will remain as founder member.

Article 4: NOMINATED MEMBERS

(1) The Board shall have NINE nominated members.

(2) The Members referred to in Clause (1) shall be nominated by a Committee constituted in accordance with Article 8;

(3) Where any person nominated under Clause (2) does not intimate his acceptance to act as a member or intimates that the does not wish to be such a member, the Board may hold its meetings with the remaining members, provided that the strength of the remaining nominated members is not less than five.

(4) The Committee of Five shall in the circumstances mentioned in clause (3) necessary steps to fill up the vacancy;

(5) Subject to the provisions of Article 28(2), a nominated member shall be eligible for renomination.

Article 5: OFFICIAL MEMBERS

(1) There shall be three Official Members of the Board, who shall hold office as follows:

(i) One person to be nominated by the Government of India in the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Elementary Education & Literacy.

(ii) The Agriculture Production Commissioner (or his nominee). (If the designation of this post is changed at any time by U.P. Government the new designation shall be deemed to have been adopted.)

(iii) Secretary to the Government of U.P. in the Department of Education (or his nominee).

(2) Where any person is nominated under Clause (i) (ii) and (iii) by virtue of any office, he shall cause (siccease) to be a member of the Board, as soon as he ceases to hold the said office, and his successor shall become a member for the remainder of the term.

Article 6: EXOFFICIO MEMBERS

(1) There shall be five exofficio members of the Board:

(1) The ViceChancellor of the Lucknow University, Lucknow.

(ii) The ViceChancellor of G.B.Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, Pant Nagar.

(iii.) The ViceChancellor of the Chandra Shekhar Azad University of Agriculture and Technology, Kanpur and

(iv)The ViceChancellor of Acharya Narendra Dev Agriculture University, Faizabad.

(v)The President of India Adult Education Association, New Delhi.

(2) If any exofficio member referred to in Clause (1) is unable to attend any particular meeting, he may nominate any other person not below the status of a Professor to attend such meeting and such nominee shall not have the right to vote.

Article 7: STAFF MEMBERS

(1) There shall be two staff members in the Board, who shall be nominated by the Chairman.

(2) One of the members nominated under this Article shall be an employee from category A & B and one from category C & D of the employees.

(3) No employee shall be eligible for nomination under this Article unless he has completed atleast 5 years of continuous/regular service on the date of such nomination.

Article 8: COMMITTEE OF FIVE

(1) There shall be a Committee consisting of the following persons namely:

(a) The Chairman of the Board.

(b) The ViceChairman of the Board.

(c) A nominee of the Ministry of Human Resource Development Department of Elementary Education and Literacy, Government of India.

(d)The President, Indian Adult Education Association, New Delhi.

(e) One person to be elected by the Board from amongst its members, other than the Chairman and the ViceChairman.

(2) The Committee may take its decisions either by holding a meeting or if the Chairman so directs, by postal communication.

(3) The quorum for every meeting of the Committee shall be three members.

(4) If any member of the Committee is unable to attend any particular meeting, he may send his views by postal communication, before the date of the meeting.

(5) In the case of difference of opinion, the decisions of the majority shall prevail.

(6) The said Committee may nominate members *[under Clause (1) of Article 4] either by name or by virtue of office. Where any person is nominated as a member by virtue of his office and such person ceases to hold such office before the expiry of his term as a nominated member, his successorinoffice shall become a member for the remainder of the term.

Article 9 provides that subject to the provisions of Articles 10 & 24, the term of office of the Chairman, ViceChairman and Members of the Board, other than Staff Members, shall be three years. The term of office of the staff members'' shall be one year and the term of membership shall be coextensive with the relevant Annual General Meeting.

Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 deal with the Annual General Meetings of the Board, Special Meeting Executive Committee, Meeting of Executive Committee and Power and Functions of the Executive Committees.

Article 15 provides for nomination of Chairman of the Committee referred to in Article 8 and his term. Article 16 deals with the powers of the Chairman. Article 17 provides the post of ViceChairman, who shall be nominated by the Committee referred to in Article 4(2) and his term.

Article 18 & 19 provide the procedure for appointment of Secretary & its powers. Article 20 provides for Treasurer & his duties. Articles 21 & 22 deal with the appointment of Director & his functions and powers and that Article 23 deals with appointment of Auditor.

Article 24 deals with the Casual Vacancies, which may occur and the same is reproduced as under:

Article 24: CASUAL VACANCIES

(1) Casual vacancies amongst the nominated and staff members of the Board shall be filled up at the next Annual General Meeting.

(2) If any casual vacancy occurs in the Office of the Chairman, the ViceChairman shall become Chairman only for the residue of the term or until the appointment of regular Chairman by the Committee referred to in Article 8 whichever is earlier.

2(a) If any casual vacancy occurs in the office of the ViceChairman, the appointment of ViceChairman will be made by the Committee referred to in Article 8 for the residue of the term.

(3) Casual vacancies amongst the elected members of the Executive Committee shall be filled up at the next meeting of the India Literacy Board.

(4) Casual vacancies in the office of the Secretary, Treasurer or Director shall be filled up by the Chairman.

(5) Other casual vacancies shall be filled by the Executive Committee.

Articles 25, 26 & 27 relate to Funds of the Board, Properties and Procedure for amendments of Rules & Regulations, respectively.

Article 28 is a Miscellaneous Article and the same is reproduced as under:

"Article 28: MISCELLANEOUS

(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to ensure that the Board and the Executive Committee are constituted in accordance with these Rules and Regulations as early as possible.

Provided that until the new Board is constituted in accordance with these Rules and Regulations, the existing Board, its Executive Committee and the Office Bearers of the Board shall continue to function as such as decided in Resolution No.ILB76/2 dated 14.8.1976.

Provided further that membership of the Board will commence from the date on which the Secretary, India Literacy Board intimates the formation of the new Board in accordance with these Rules and Regulations as per Resolution No.ILB 76/2 dated 14.8.1976 referred to above.

(2) No person shall hold office as a member of the Board or of the Executive Committee for more than two consecutive terms at a time. Provided that this clause shall not apply to the members referred to in Articles 5, 6 and 7.

(3) No act or proceeding of the Board or the Executive Committee shall be invalid merely by reason of:

(a) any vacancy or defect in the constitution thereof, or

(b) any defect in the election, nomination or appointment of a person acting as member thereof.

(4) In case of any doubt or dispute about the interpretation of these Rules and Regulations, or with regard to any matter not covered by the same, the question shall be referred to the Chairman, whose decision shall be placed before the next meeting of the Executive Committee and the Executive Committee''s decision shall be final."

On account of some dispute relating to Management of the India Literacy Board has arisen and the same was decided by this Court vide judgment and order dated 30.11.1998. While deciding the dispute vide order and judgment dated 30.11.1998, this Court constituted a temporary Committee of Five and provided that the temporary Committee of Five was to function for six months or till the Board and Executive Committee are constituted/reconstituted and elected Chairman and ViceChairman assume their offices. In compliance of the aforesaid judgment and order, the temporary Committee of Five was constituted, comprising of follower persons on 6.2.1999:

"(1)Mr. Justice R.S. Misra, Former Hon''ble Judge of Supreme Court.

(2) Mr. Justice A. N. Verma, Former Hon''ble Judge of Allahabad High Court.

(3) A nominee of the Ministry of Education & Social Welfare, Government of India.

(4) The Chairman, All India Adult Education Association, New Delhi.

(5) One person to be elected by the Board from amongst its members other than the Chairman and ViceChairman."

As per the provisions of Article 9(1) of the amended Rules and Regulations of the Board, the term of the office of Chairman and ViceChairman and members of the Board other than the staff members is three years and accordingly, the term of newly constituted Committee is to expire on 5.2.2002. Temporary Committee of Five appointed by this Court elected Justice Lumba as Chairman of the Board who, subsequently, resigned from his office on 24.7.2000 and thereafter, Shri J.C. Pant the then ViceChairman assume the office of the Chairman under the provisions of the Article 24(2) of the Rules and Regulations against casual vacancy. The said appointment of Shri J.C. Pant as Chairman of the India Literacy Board was approved on 2.8.2000 by the Committee of Five. The India Literacy Board in its special meeting held on 30.12.2001 resolved that the term of the Board constituted on 6.2.1999 which is due to expire on 5.2.2002 be curtailed and the same would last only up to 31.12 2001. It was also resolved and decided that w.e.f. 1.1.2002 a new Board should start functioning. Accordingly, in pursuance thereof, the new Board started functioning w.e.f. 1.1.2002 for a period of three years and the term of the said Board came to an end on 31.12 2004

No steps for reconstitution of the new Board was initiated during its term i.e upto 31.12.2004 by the erstwhile Board and it was only after the expiry of the term through postal communication, the Board'' was allegedly reconstituted on 22.2 2005 and vide a letter dated 13 3.2005, a list of the Office Bearers of the Board was sent for approval/registration to the Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Lucknow Mandal, Lucknow.

Against the aforesaid alleged constitution of the Board, the petitioners as well as another Society of the staff members namely; Dedicated Members of Literacy House Welfare Society submitted a representations on 7.4.2005 and 6.4.2005, respectively, indicating therein, various irregularities in the nomination of the members of the Board and requesting therein for cancellation of the list submitted by Shri P.K. Sundariyal and further steps be taken for constitution of the new Board. It was specifically stated in the representation so preferred that the term of the Board has expired on 31.12.2004 but no action for constitution of the new Board has been taken. It was also pointed out that in view of the Article 28(2) of the Rules/Regulations, no person is entitled to hold office as a member of the Board or of the executive Committee for more than two consecutive terms at a time whereas, in the instant case, Shri J.C. Pant, Chairman, the India Literacy Board, who had completed his two consecutive terms as Chairman and, as such, his nomination as Chairman of the Board was illegal. It was further pointed out that through the letter (datd) 22.2.2005, a list for appointment of office bearers sent by Sri J.C. Pant did not include his own name whereas by another letter of the same date i.e. 22.2.2005 the list submitted for approval includes the name of Sri J.C. Pant. The same is not liable to be approved as there is discrepancy in the two lists.

It was also stated that the name of Shri B.S. Garg was also included in the list sent for approval by Sri P.K. Sunderiyal though he had also completed two consecutive terms as Chairman of the Board.

It has also stated that certain members of the Board whose names have been mentioned in the list seeking approval had accepted remuneration, as such, they were disqualified for being members of the Board or of the executive Committee in view of the provisions of Article 2(2).

The Deputy Registrar after taking into account the entire relevant material on record and after affording opportunity of hearing to the Secretary of the Board passed the order in exercise of his powers under Section 25(2) and also directed that since the constitution of the Board had become barred by time, as such fresh election for constituting a lawful Board is to be held and for the said purpose, meeting of Committee of Five has been convened for 12.5.2005 vide orders dated 23.4.2005. The said order dated 23.4.2005 was reviewed by the Registrar by means of impugned order dated 29.4.2005. Being aggrieved of the aforesaid order dated 29.4.2005, the petitioners have filed the writ petition No.2741 (MS) of 2005 inter alia on the grounds that the power of review is creature of statute and therefore unless it is specifically conferred on the Court by the statute, it cannot be invoked and further no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Registrar before passing the impugned order dated 29.4.2005. Admittedly there is no provisions in the Societies Registration Act, 1860, permitting review of the orders passed. It has been urged that in exercise of powers conferred under Section 21 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the State Government vide notification dated 7.1.1982 conferred on all Deputy Registrars of the Firms, Societies & Chits all the powers of Registrar under the said Act to be exercised within the area of their respective jurisdiction under the Societies Registration Act. The word "Registrar" means a person appointed as such by the State Government, and included as Additional Registrar, Joint Registrar, Deputy Registrar or Assistant Registrar on whom all or any of the powers of the Registrar under the Act are conferred by general or special order of the State Government.

A short counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents along with the application for dismissal of the writ petition, raising a preliminary objection that the petitioners had no locus standi insofar as both the petitioners are illegal organization, which carry the name of the respondent No.5 in order to deceive and misguide the general public. It has also been stated that India Literacy Board has never granted recognition to the aforesaid Societies namely Literacy House Staff Welfare Association/the petitioner No. 1 and Dedicated Members of Literacy House Welfare Association, which have nothing to do with the welfare of the staff of the Literacy House. The aforesaid Societies do not serve the interest of the staff of the respondent No.5 but seek to serve only the vested self interests of their alleged respective Presidents and Secretaries.

It has also been stated that the petitioner No.1 has failed to disclose as to under what provisions of law it is registered i.e. whether the same is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under the Trade Union Act, 1926.

It has also been stated that it is neither a part of duty of the petitioner No. 1 nor the petitioner No.1 has any right, authority or jurisdiction to raise any dispute regarding election of officebearers of the respondent No.5.

It has also been stated that the findings recorded by the Deputy Registrar, Lucknow Mandal, Lucknow, are wholly arbitrary, malafide and without jurisdiction and are based on extraneous considerations. The said findings amount to a fraud on the rules of the respondent Society. The election is not barred by time, as alleged in the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 23.4.2005, as the process of elections had started within time in the month of December, 2004 itself in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the respondent Society. The Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits (UP.) vide the impugned order dated 29.4.2005, in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, has only corrected the patent illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Deputy Registrar.

Thereafter, a detailed counter affidavit has been filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5, controverting the contents of the writ petition. It has been stated in the writ petition that Secretary of respondent No.5 gave notice on 25.11.2004 to the Members of the Committee of Five regarding holding of a Meeting of the Committee of Five on 25.12.2004atUdaipur.

The Director General, National Literacy Mission, Government of India and Deputy Secretary, Government of India, vide leters dated 23.12.2004, informed the Chairman of the respondent No.5 that no Government of India representative can attend the meeting of the Committee of Five on 25.12 2004, due to the festival of Christmas falling on the said date. Vide letter dated 1.1.2005, the Chairman of the respondent No.5 initiated the process of reconstitution of the Board through postal communication amongst the Members of the Committee of Five in accordance with Rule 8(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the respondent No.5. On the basis of suggestions and recommendations received from the other Members of the Committee of Five, the Chairman of the respondent No.5, vide letter dated 22.2.2005, sent a proposal of the reconstituted Board to the Members of the Committee of Five for consideration and submission of objections. The Chariman of the respondent No.5 received objections dated 28.2.2005 only from the nominee of the Government of India regarding the reconstituted Board. Vide letter dated 9.3.2005, the Chairman of the respondent No.5 disposed of the objections of the nominee of the Government of India to the reconstituted Board.

As the Chairman of the respondent No.5 did not receive any objections from the remaining three members of the Committee of Five, he directed the Secretary vide letter dated 10.3.2005 to declare the reconstituted Board without delay.

Vide letter dated 11.3.2005, the Secretary declared the reconstituted Board of the respondent No.5 and vide letter dated 12.3.2005, the Secretary submitted the list of members of the reconstituted Board for the period 200508 to the respondent No.2 for its due registration.

Thus, there is no violation of any provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the India Literacy Board. It was also averred in the counter affidavit that Article 28 of the Rules and Regulations of the respondent No.5, it will be abundantly clear that the aforesaid provisions in the Rules and Regulations of the appellant Society nowhere provide that if the nominations of the new Board are not done by the Committee of Five within time, but are done subsequently to the prescribed period of three years, then so reconstituted Board shall be held to be illegal. On the contrary, the first proviso to Article 28(1) of the Rules and Regulations clearly provides that until the new Board is constituted in accordance with the Rules and Regulations, the existing Board, its Executive Committee and the Office Bearers of the Board shall continue to function as such as decided in Resolution No.ILB76/2 dated 14.8.1976.

As regards the appointment of Sri J.C. Pant, as Chairman, the India Literacy Board is concerned, it has been stated in the affidavit that first term of Sri J.C. Pant as Regular Chairman is for the period 2.8.2000 to 1.8.2003 and the second term of three years i.e. 1.8.2003 to 31.7.2006. Thus, there is no illegality in appointing Sri J.C. Pant as Chairman of the Board.

It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that the Registrar is only the competent authority for taking action under Section 25 of the Act and not the Deputy Registrar. It has further been stated that Section 21 does not permit any subordinate authority like the Deputy Registrar, to act as Registrar and usurp the functions of the Registrar under Section 25 of the Act.

Thus, the order passed by the Registrar dated 29.4.2005, only corrected the jurisdictional/administrative indiscretion committed by the Deputy Registrar/respondent No.2 and has rightly held that nomination of the new Board for the period 200508 by the Committee of Five to be perfectly legal while directing for its immediate registration.

A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by learned counsel for the petitioner controverting the contents of the counter affidavit and reiterating the contents of the writ petition as true and correct. It has been stated in the rejoinder affidavit that in the meeting of India Literacy Board dated 30.12.2001 only deliberations were held and the Minutes of the Meeting of 30.12.2001 substantiate the averments made by the petitioners in para 8 of the writ petition. A perusal of the Minutes of Meeting dated 30.12.2001 (Agenda Item No.6) reveals that it was decided that term of the existing Board should cease to exist on 31.12.2001 and the new Board would start functioning with effect from 1.1.2002. The said Minutes clearly indicates that all the members present in the said meeting approved the proposal.

It has also been stated that a perusal of the alleged notice dated 25.11.2004 itself reveals that the alleged meeting cannot be said to have been convened for the purposes of initiating the election process. The said letter/notice only states that a meeting of Committee of Five would be held on 25.12.2004 in Udaipur. The letter/notice dated 25.11.2004 does not contain any agenda item.

It has also been stated that in the letter dated 1.1.2005, the then Chairman has himself stated that the Notice for the meeting which was scheduled to be held on 25.12.2004 was not served on all the members and the said letter dated 1.1.2005 also nowhere makes a mention about initiation of any process for constitution of the new Board.

It has also been stated that the letter dated 22.2.2005, proposing nominations of nine members was written by the Chairman on receiving suggestions and recommendations from other members of the Committee of Five. As a matter of fact, in the letter dated 9.3.2005, it has been admitted by the Chairman himself that the task of proposing names through postal communication was performed by one Sri Kishan Pant and further that these nominations should have been approved by Prof. B.S.Garg as well as Sri K.C. Chaudhary. As a matter of fact, the contents of the said letter dated 22.2.2005 belies what has been stated by the respondent No.4 and 5 in para under reply and also in the letter dated 22.2.2005.

Thus, since the alleged proposal for nomination through postal communication was not lawful, as such, the nomination of the Government of India to the Committee of Five Dr. Mustaq Ahmad strongly objected to the letter dated 22.2.2005 by writing a letter on 28.2.2005.

It has further been stated that in view of the notification made by the State Government on 7 1.1982 in exercise of its power vested in it under Section 21 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 conferring on all the Deputy Registrars in the State of U. P., the powers of Registrar exercisable by him under the provisions of the said Act. The notification dated 7.1.1982 is reproduced asunder:

"In exercise of the powers under Section 21 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act No.XXI of 1860), the Governor is pleased to confer on all the Deputy Registrars of Firms and Society, Uttar Pradesh, all the powers of Registrar under the aforesaid Act to be exercised within the area of their respective jurisdiction."

Thus, the Deputy Registrar while passing the order dated 23.2.2005 did not act as a subordinate to the authority of the Registrar, rather he exercised his statutory powers vested in him under Section 21 of the Societies Registration Act read with the said Notification of the State Government.

It has also been stated that the order dated 29.4.2005 cannot be said to have been passed by the authority concerned to rectify the mistake. In fact, the same in an unambiguous term amounts to review of the earlier order dated 23.4.2005 passed by the Deputy Registrar, hence the order under challenge dated 29.4.2005 passed by the Registrar is completely illegal and without any authority of law and the same suffers from the view of inherent lack of jurisdiction.

The first question that falls to be considered is with regards to the preliminary objection as to whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Mr. L.P. Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents, argued that Literacy House Staff Welfare Association being an association of the employees have no locus standi to either raise a dispute before the Deputy Registrar or to file the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of the said submission, he relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1044], State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev. [AIR 1964 SC 685], Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar. [AIR 1976 SC 578], Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and others [(2002) (1) SCC 33], Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingh Charan Sarangi and others [1999(2) SCC 193] and T.N. Civil Supplier Corporation Workers'' Union v. T.N. Civil Suppliers Corporation Ltd, and others [(2001) (4) SCC 469].

In rebuttal to the aforesaid submission, Mr. C.B. Pandey, counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioners have been given a right of representation and participation in the management of the India Literacy Board by Article 2(1)(g) and Article 7 of the Rules. Employees are interested in the proper management of the Board as they depend their livelihood on the existence of the Literacy Board. It was also submitted that the Institution runs on the Government grant, which runs into crore of rupees every year. The petitioners have a stake in the proper and efficient management of the Board and they have a right to challenge the action of those persons, who have usurped the Board and further the funds received from the Government, in the form of grant should not be vested by those who have no right to continue their offices under the Rules framed by the Society.

After hearing the submission of learned counsel for the parties, with regards to the preliminary objections, in the case of Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal, [AIR 1962 SC 1044], the Apex Court has held that Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore clear that person other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the Court seeking a relief there under. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. Under the facts and circumstances, the Apex Court has held that as the appellant''s personal right to manage the Company and to receive remuneration therefor had been infringed by the provisions of the statute, it had locus standi to file the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev and others [AIR 1964 Supreme Court 685], the Apex Court in paragraph 8 has held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said Article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the Article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226.

In the aforesaid case, theApex Court has also held that where property has been granted by the State on conditions which make the grant resumable, after resumption it is the grantee who moves the Court for appropriate relief, and that proceeds on the basis that the grantor State which has reserved to itself the right to resume may, after exercising its right, seek to recover possession of the property without filing a suit. But apart from this aspect of the matter, it is difficult to see how the High Court was justified in issuing the writ in the present appeals, the inevitable consequence of which would be that the respondents would remain in possession of the property until the appellant files a suit against them; and that, in our opinion, would not be justified unless questions of title are determined and it is held that the appellant must file a suit before the respondents can be dispossessed. It appears that in issuing the writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of its conclusion that questions of title cannot be tried in writ proceedings. Once it is held that the question of title cannot be determined, it follows that no right can be postulated in favour of the respondents on the basis of which a writ can be issued in their favour under Article 226.

In the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar and others [AIR 1976 Supreme Court 573], the Apex Court in paragraph 12 has held that in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances. This takes us to the further question, Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are the qualification requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner''s interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or ''standing'' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

In the case of Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and others [(2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 33], the Apex Court in para 38 has held that there is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned actions is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be nonsuited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.

In the background of the case of Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusinqha Charan Saranqi and others [(1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 193], the Apex Court in paragraph 7 has recorded the facts that the record does not show whether the Selection Committee, in fact, gave or did not give credit for this qualification. What is more important, there is no reason to hold that if any additional marks were to be given to the first respondent for this qualification, he would be selected. His name does not figure in the list of candidates selected by the Selection Committee. Only two persons were selected out of 23 candidates who were interviewed. This contention, therefore, cannot be relied upon for the purpose of invalidating the selection of Dr. Surendranath Dash. It is in this context that the submission of the University regarding the locus standi of the first respondent to file the writ petition must also be considered. The University has rightly pointed out that the original writ petition does not disclose any legal injury to the original petitioner/present first respondent because there is no reason to come to a conclusion that he would have been selected even if all his contentions in the writ petition were accepted. It is in this background, the Apex Court has held that the first respondent stands more in the position of a meddlesome interloper than a person aggrieved.

In the case of T.N. Civil Supplies Corporation Workers Union v. T.N. Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. [2001 (4) SCC 469], the Apex Court in paragraph 7 has held that the Division Bench held that the questions raised by the appellants here in that appeal were the same which were pending in the writ petition filed by the 1a respondent against the orders made by the Inspector of Labour. The Division Bench held that the Union had to await the final outcome of those writ petitions. The Division Bench also agreed with the conclusion of the single Judge that since the services of the employees had been terminated, it was for the employees to seek their remedies in a manner known to law. We find no infirmity with the reasoning of the Division Bench and see no reason to interfere.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Tashi Delek Gaming Solutions Ltd, and another v. State of Karnatka and others [(2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 442]. The facts of the case are that the appellants were appointed as agents of State of Sikkim and Meghalaya to run online and electronic lotteries. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the State that as the dispute involved in the writ petitions related to two State Governments, the writ petitions were not maintainable, in view of the constitutional bar under Article 131 of the Constitution. The said contention was upheld by a learned Single Judge of the High Court holding, inter alia, that the agents of the State of Sikkim and the State of Meghalaya had no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions in view of the fact that they did not have any independent right in that behalf. The agents of the State of Sikkim preferred an intracourt appeal there against. The State of Meghalaya and its agents thereafter also preferred writ appeals. In this context, the Apex Court has held that if by a statutory provision the right of an agent is affected, he may maintain an action in his own right.

The Apex Court in the aforesaid case further held that if the agent was to be prosecuted for violation of the term of the notification, he could challenge the validity thereof. A fortiori, a quia timet application would also be maintainable. A person must be held to have access to justice if his right in any manner whether to carry on business is infringed or there is a threat to his liberty. Access to justice is a human right.

Thereafter, the Apex Court in paragraph 39 of the aforesaid judgment has observed that the High Court, therefore, was not correct in holding that they had no personal right to enforce despite the fact that they would suffer injuries or would otherwise be prejudiced by the notification issued by the State of Karnataka. It would, therefore, not be correct to contend that they could enfoce their rights only through their principal and not independently. The appellants had a legal right to carry on business. Such a right having been impugned (sicinfringed) by reason of the impugned notification, a writ petition at their instance was maintainable. Thus, the Apex Court has held that if the appellants herein had a legal right, they could seek redressal for violation thereof before an appropriate forum. The locus standi to maintain a writ application even otherwise has received liberal interpretation.

In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has considered the judgment rendered it in Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal [AIR 1962 SC 1044], which has emphatically relied by learned counsel for the petitioners and the Apex Court has came to the conclusion that aggrieved person has a legal right, they could seek redressal for violation thereof before an appropriate forum. The locus standi to maintain a writ application even otherwise has received liberal interpretation, as held in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and others [(2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 33].

In view of the aforesaid legal positions and facts, I am of the opinion that since the staff has been given the right to be represented in the management and two of the members of the staff have been nominated in the Board, it cannot be said that the petitioners have no locus standi to make a representation before the Deputy Registrar bringing to his knowledge the irregularities committed in the Society by the Board and further the action of those persons, who according to the petitioners have usurped the office of the Board as they are not entitled to continue in his office after 31.12.2004, is still continuing and the Board has not been reconstituted within the time specified in the Rules and Regulations of the Society. Thus, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have locus standi to file the representation as well as writ petition.

On the receipt of the said representation, the respondents were not given opportunity of hearing and, thereafter, by means of the impugned order, the Registrar has fixed the date of the meeting of the Committee of Five on 12.5.2005. Subsequently, the aforesaid order dated 23.4.2005 was reviewed by means of order dated 29.4.2005. Since the petitioners are aggrieved against the order dated 29.4.2005, they have preferred the writ petition No.2741 MS of 2005 before this Court and thus, the petitioners have locus standi to file a writ petition challenging the action of those persons, who according to the petitioners usurp the office of the Board as well as the impugned order dated 29.4.2005 passed by the Registrar without any authority of law. The said writ petition has came up for admission/hearing on 6.5.2005 and a preliminary objection of locus standi was also raised by learned counsel for the respondents, who preferred a caveat petition. The same was also overruled by this Court vide order dated 6.5.2005 and this Court has further been pleased to stay the operation of the order of the Registrar dated 29.4.2005.

During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition i.e. writ petition No.2741 (MS) of 21)05, Sri P.K. Sundriyal, Secretary, India Literacy Board, Lucknow has preferred another writ petition, which was numbered as writ petition No.4466 (MS) of 2005, assailing therein the order dated 23.4.2005 passed by the Deputy Registrar and this Court has been pleased to list the present writ petition along with records of writ petition No.2741 (MS) of 2005, inter alia on the grounds that the Deputy Registrar, Lucknow Mandal, Lucknow has exceeded his powers and jurisdiction vested in him under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act, which requires annual List of the Managing Body, entrusted with the management of the affairs of the Society, to be filed. The Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the alleged ''objections'' under Section 4 of the Act and thereafter to convert the said objections as a ''dispute'' under Section 25 of the Act and himself decide the said dispute. Section 25(1) envisages that the said disputes shall be decided by the Prescribed Authority either on a reference by the Registrar or on a representation made by at least onefourth of the members of the Society. It has further been urged that the Deputy Registrar has illegally assumed jurisdiction to decide the dispute and setaside the constitution of the Governing Body of the petitioner Society and has illegally assumed jurisdiction himself, in his administrative capacity under Section 25(2) of the Act, to hold the ''elections'' of the Board. It has further been urged that the Rules and Regulations of the petitioners'' Society envisage the Committee of Five to be a continuous Body, which can not be deemed as time barred. Both the outgoing Chairman and ViceChairman even after the expiry of the term of the Board, continue to be the members of the Committee of Five.

During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions i.e. 2741 (MS) of 2005 and 4466 (MS) of 2005, Sri Satya SagarSharma, Secretary (1/C). India Literacy Board, Lucknow, has filed another writ petition, which was numbered as writ petition No.3589 (MS) of 2006, assailing therein, the order passed by the Deputy Registrar dated 11.7.2006, by means of which, the Deputy Registrar has directed to stay the operation of the order dated 22.6.2006, passed by Sri J.C. Pant, Chairman of the petitioner''s Society. The said order was assailed by the petitioner''s Society inter alia on the grounds that Section 24 of the Societies Registration Act does not give any power to the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar to pass any interim stay order but it only empowers the Registrar to only inspect or investigate the affairs of the Society and further casts a duty on every officer of the Society to produce any books of account or other records of the Society or to render any assistance in connection with such inspection or investigation. Finally, the Registrar may after such inspection or investigation give such directions to the Society or members of its governing body as he may think fit for removal of any defect or irregularity within a specified time. In the event of default, the Registrar may proceed to take action under Section 12(d) or 13(b) of the Act.

During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions i.e. 2741 (MS) of 2005 and 4466 (MS) of 2005, 3389 (MS) of 2006, Sri Satya Sagar Sharma, Secretary, India Literacy Board, has filed another writ petition, which was numbered as writ petition No.3592 (MS) of 2006, assailing therein, the order dated 18.7.2006, by means of which, the Deputy Registrar has reversed the order of Sri J.C. Pant, who has placed Sri P.K. Sundriyal under suspension. While passing the aforesaid order dated 18.7.2006, the Deputy Registrar has fixed the date on 10.8.2006 for hearing of the case after calling the relevant record and further provided that Sri P.K. Sundriyal will continue on the post of Secretary till the final disposal of the Registrar has no jurisdiction to interfere in the day to day/administrative functioning of the petitioner''s Society including the terms and conditions of the service of its employees and to arbitrarily pass an ex parte order, staying the order of suspension of Sri P.K. Sundriyal, passed by the Chairman of the petitioner''s Society and reinstating him on the post of Secretary. There is no power under Section 24 or under any other provision of the Act, to pass ex parte stay order and the said provision does not empower the Registrar and Deputy Registrar to decide a complaint or raise a dispute regarding the day to day administrative functioning of a Society, including disciplinary action taken against the employees.

In order to appreciate the submission advanced by learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the crucial point for decision in the aforesaid writ petitions is the interpretation to be given to Section 24 of the Societies Registration Act 1860. The said Section with all its five subsections is set out below:

"24. Investigation of affairs of a Society (1) Where on information received under Section 22 or otherwise, or in circumstances referred to in subsection (3) of Section 23, the Registrar is of opinion that there is apprehension that the affairs of a Society registered under this Act are being so conducted as to defeat the objects of the Society or that the Society or its governing body by whatever name called or any officer thereof in actual effective control of the Society is guilty of mismanaging its affairs or of any breach of fiduciary or other like obligations, the Registrar may, either himself or by any person appointed by him in that behalf, inspect or investigate into the affairs of the Society or inspect any institution managed by the Society.

(2) It shall be the duty of every officer of the Society when so required by the Registrar or other person appointed under subsection (1) to produce any books of account and other records of or relating to the Society, which are in his custody and to give him all assistance in connection with such inspection or investigation.

(3) The Registrar or other person appointed under subsection (1) may call upon and examine on oath any officer, member or employee of the Society in relation to the affairs of the Society and it shall be the duty of every officer, member or employee, when called upon, to appear before him for such examination.

(3A)The Registrar or other person appointed under subsection (1) may, if in his opinion it is necessary for the purpose of inspection or investigation, seize any or all the records including account books of the Society;

Provided that any person from whose custody such records are seized shall be entitled to make copies thereof or to take extracts there from in the presence of the person having the custody of such records.

(4) On the conclusion of the inspection or investigation, as the case may be, the person, if any, appointed by the Registrar to inspect or investigate shall make a report to the Registrar on the result of his inspection or investigation.

(5) The Registrar may, after such inspection or investigation, give such directions to the Society or to its governing body or any officer thereof as he may think fit, for the removal of any defects or irregularities with such time as may be specified and in the event of default in taking action according to such directions, the Registrar may proceed to take action under Section 12D or Section 13B, as the case may be."

The reference of Section 22 made in subsection (1) of Section 24 refers to the power of Registrar, embodied in that section, to call for information and necessity of compliance there with. The said section is set out below:

"22. Powers of Registrar to call for information (1) The Registrar may, by written order, require any Society to furnish in writing such information or document within such time, being ordinarily not less than two weeks from the date of receipt of the order by the Society, as he may specify in the order in connection with the affairs of the Society or any documents filed by the Society under this Act.

(2) On receipt by the Society of an order under subsection (1), it shall be the duty of the President, Secretary or any other person authorized in this behalf to furnish such information or documents."

Section 23 deals with audit and said section with its three subsections is also set out below:

"23. Audit (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 4 or of Section 22, where the Registrar is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, he may, by written order, require any Society to furnish its accounts or copy of a statement of receipts and expenditure for any particular year duly audited by a Chartered Accountant;

Provided that the Registrar may, at the request of Society, permit it to have such accounts and statement audited by any other person approved by him.

(2) If the Society fails to furnish the documents referred to in subsection (1) within the period specified in the order or within such extended period as the Registrar may from time to time allow, the Registrar may cause the accounts of such Society audited for the said year and may recover the cost of such audit from that Society.

(3) If the Society neglects or refused to make its accounts or other documents available for audit under subsection (2) or, in the opinion of the Registrar, otherwise fails to provide requisite facilities to have the audit made with due expedition, the Registrar may proceed to take action under Section 24."

There is a judgment of Hon''ble Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court which lays down that the power of the Registrar acting under Section 24 is an administrative power. The case is reported at 2004 (54) ALR 375, being the case of J.N. Chaturvedi. In para 12 of said judgment, his Lordship said as follows:

"In my opinion the power exercised under Section 24 are purely administrative in nature hence the Registrar cannot be held to be authorized to issue interim direction. Under Section 24(5) of the Act the direction may be issued only on conclusion of enquiry."

The importance of deciding whether the power of Registrar under Section 24 is purely administrative or not is clearly seen. In case of a purely administrative power, the law that in a quasijudicial matter, the ancillary power for passing reviewing order cannot be implied, does not hold. The parties were agreed in regard to this proposition of law that if the power is not quasijudicial but only administrative then and in that event, the necessary power for reviewing that order must be implied into that power also. Regarding review, which becomes important when considering the second order of 29th September 2004, this distinction between an administrative and a quasijudicial order assumes crucial importance. In the case of Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta, the Supreme Court has laid down in clear terms that if express power of review is not given a quasijudicial authority is not to be implied as possessing of that power of review. In para 11 of said judgment, reported at (1987) 4 SCC 525 it was said that "it is now well established that the quasijudicial authority can not review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction."

This case be distinguished on the sole and single ground that the power of the Registrar, under Section 24 was an administrative power and therefore, a power of review was certainly to be implied as is necessary in case of all practical administrative powers.

About the manner of finding out as to which order is administrative and which order is quasi judicial, reference can be usefully made to two authorities extracted by the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Mahendra Pal reported at (1999) 4 SCC 43. At page 56 of said report, following quotation from Atkin, L. J. as his Lordship then was given in the case of Electricity Commissioner, is set out and same is as follows:

"Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King''s Bench Division exercised in these writs." The pronouncement was made at that time because the royal prerogative rights were available only against quasijudicial orders and not purely administrative order. Again at page 57 of the reports 1Halsbury''s laws is referred to and the very helpful, with due respect, point is given there that where a statute requires a decision to be arrived at purely from the point of view of the policy or expediency, the authority is under no duty to act judicially."

On the basis of this basic guidance, I have to examine whether the Registrar''s power under Section 24 is quasijudicial or not. First I give my clear opinion that the powers under Section 24 given to the Registrar are very wide. He can act either on information called for by him, under Section 22, or otherwise, may be spurred on by complaints by some members. He can act if there is apprehension that the affairs of the Society are being conducted in such a manner as to defeat the objects of the Society.

Once that apprehension is felt either the Registrar or a person appointed by him, can inspect or investigate into the affairs of the Society.

The process of investigation is aided by the subsections and it is seen there from those that the Registrar is to be assisted with all documents and information so that he can conduct the enquiry properly.

After the enquiry is complete, the Registrar has power under Section 24 of subsection (5) to give such direction as would remove the defects or irregularities found to be present in the affairs of the Society.

If the Society does not comply, then the drastic steps of deregistration or dissolution might be initiated under Section 12D or 13D of the Act. It should be remembered that the Registrar of Society is delaing with only those Societies which deal with, so to speak, other peoples'' money, a bare look at Sections 1 and 20 of the Societies Registration Act will show that only those Societies can be registered which have a public element in them when the Registrar enquires into the affairs of a public Society, it will most often be in regard to accounts and control of accounts. These are the principal irregularities which engage parties in controversy in matters coming before Registrars and Courts.

I utterly fail to see how the Registrar''s power of investigation in this regard can be said to be administrative in any view of the matter. There are in most cases, as also here, two groups or factions of the Society or perhaps even more, and one of the groups will be interested in maintaining that the affairs of the Society are being conducted in a perfectly regular and above Board manner and the other groups will be interested in assailing these assertions. The writ Courts are not supposed to enter into these facts.

The Registrar has thought it fit to initiate the process of investigation in regard to controversies of this nature. If I was to ask, are all these investigation, administrative investigations, the answer is, clearly, no. The eligibility of members would be decided on facts and submissions put forward before the Registrar by the said assailing and also by the said affirming; monetary matters will be put forward by the two sides exactly like two rivals in a Court of litigation. The Registrar must exercise quasijudicil functions and must held the balance of fairness even so as to reach a proper and fair quasi judicial conclusion. It is not a question of expediency, it is not a question of enforcing a policy, it is simply a question of ordering and doing what is right.

It would also be seen that in Section 24 the word "breach of fiduciary or other like obligations" occurs. The word fiduciary and obligations are not, generally speaking, administrative terminology. The word fiduciary is in the equity Courts of vocabulary. The whole cast of the section is in the nature of spelling out quasijudicial duties and not enumeration of purely administrative function.

The argument was made that under Section 24, the Registrar can only form an opinion and on the basis of that opinion proceed under Section 12D and 13B. Once the proceedings commence under these two sections, then the matter assumes a quasijudicial character but not before. A parallel was drawn with Section 10 of the industrial Disputes Act which empowers the Government to make reference of an Industrial Dispute or an apprehended Industrial Dispute. Two authorities were given for demonstrating that these are administrative orders made by the Government. The authorities are in the case of C.P. Sarathy, reported at 1953 SCR 334 and the case of Sultan Singh, reported at (1996) 2 SCC 66.

I am of the opinion that this similarity is not correctly drawn. It is quite clear that when the Government makes a reference of an Industrial Dispute, it is taking a step which is expedient and consistent with its policy. The avoidance of an industrial unrest is one of the consideration in this regard. It is not a matter of finding out whether, say the dismissed employee, has been dismissed unfairly or un justify. It is rather a question of what repercussions, the dismissal might have in the industrial situation. It is a question of expediency and policy and in the authority given above, it is laid down that Where it is a matter of expediency and policy, the decision is an administrative one. What is to be noted is that the Government at the time of the making of a reference is not pronouncing upon any rights or obligations, it is only commencing a process where rights and obligations might be affected or created by way of special judicial bodies empowered to grants special reliefs.

The case under Section 24 is not like that under Section 24, the Registrar makes an investigation and passes an order and direction so as to bring irregularities to an end. For a good boy Society, the direction will be complied with and the matter will end there. In regard to a reference under Section 10, the matter will not end with the compliance by the employer and the employee of the Government''s order of reference. When they comply with the order of reference, they will only land up before the Conciliation Officer or the Labour Court as the case might be. The matter is, therefore, substantially different.

From another point of view, properly read, the Section 12D and 13B have an aspect of enforcement machinery. If the Registrar''s orders are not complied with, those do not evaporate into thin air nor are the parties compelled to seek remedies out side the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. But in the case of recalcitrant Societies, the noncompliance with the direction, might cause the Societies to face deregistration or dissolution proceedings, as a result of which, a compliance might come and the deregistration or dissolution process might not have to be carried out to the very end.

In looking at the terminology of Section 24, one cannot help seen a similarity with the apparition and mismanagement Sections of the Companies Act i.e. Section 397 and 398. I do not wish to press this similarity too far but there also, the Court enquires into the affairs of the company and the Sections of Companies Act permit the Court to pass orders so as to bring the complaints of appression or mismanagement to an end.

The right similarity does not end there. If one were to look at the dissolution Section i.e. Section 13B, again one cannot help seeing a similarity between this and the winding up Sections near or about Sections 433 to 439 of the Companies Act.

These sketchy similarities spring from this common fact that in corporate finance handling also the defacto and defure Manager of the company deals with other peoples'' money. The case is the same with charitable and public organization. The power of the minority to complain against the majority fund handling has to be preserved in the public interest. This is not to encourage minorities into starting litigation about well geared and honestly running public charities and thus bring there charitable work into troubled litigation but a via media has to be found, good Societies must be allowed to run freely. Societies in trouble cannot be allowed to go into deeper trouble just because the majority happens to be acting in unison.

On behalf of the Registrar of the Societies, the case reported at AIR 1955 SC 25 (Adverd Mills) was cited and para 17 from the judgment of Justice B.K. Mukherjee was placed. It is stated there to this effect, that

"It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that everything necessary for the proper exercise of a power is included in the grant of the power itself."

This authority and several others cited at the bar would go to show that the implication of attendant powers to make a primary power effective is applicable not merely in the case of quasijudicial powers but in the case of practically all statutory powers. Reference can be made in this regard also to the cases of Savitri and Grindlays Bank Ltd., reported respectively at (1985) 4 SCC 337 and (1980) (Supp) SCC 420. The power to adjourn a meeting is certainly ancillary to the power of deciding who are entitled to vote to a meeting.

The orders assailed in writ petition Nos.2741 (MS) of 2005 and 4466 (MS) of 2006 are dated 23.4.2005 and 29.4.2005 passed by the Deputy Registrar and Registrar, respectively. The Deputy Registrar while passing the aforesaid order has afforded Opportunity to all the parties whereas the order (sic) administrative order but a quasi judicial order. The same has been passed without hearing the other party is in violation of the principal of natural justice.

In view of the aforesaid position, I am of the opinion that the orders dated 23.4.2005 and 29.4.2005 passed under Section 24 of the Act are quasi judicial order and not an administrative orders.

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, is reproduced as under:

"25. Disputes regarding election of office bearers (1)The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one fourth of the members of a Society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an officebearer of such Society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:

(Provided that the election of an office bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied

(a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office bearers; or

(b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected; or

(c) that the result of the election in so far it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception of any vote which is void or by any non compliance with the provisions of any rules of the Society.

Explanation 1 A person shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person

(i) induces, or attempts to induce, by fraud, intentional misrepresentation, coercion or thereat of injury, any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or any person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election;

(ii) with a view to inducing any elector to vie or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or to inducing any person to stand or not to stand, as or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being, a candidate at the election, offers or gives any money, or valuable consideration, or any place or employment, or holds out any promise of individual advantage or profit to any person;

(iii) abets (within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code) the doing of any of the acts specified in Clauses (1) and (ii)

(iv) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure;

(v) canvasses on grounds of cast, community, sect or religion;

(vi) commits such other practice as the State Government may prescribe to be a corrupt practice.

Explanation II A "promise of individual advantage or profit to a person" includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself, or of any one in whom he is interested.

Explanation III The State Government may prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts or disputes in respect of such elections and make provision in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insufficient provision exists in this Act or in the rules of the Society.

(2) Where by an order made under subsection (1), an election is set aside or an officebearer is held no longer entitled to continued in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of officebearers of a Society has been not held within the time specified in the Rules of that Society, he may call a meeting of the general body of such Society for electing such officebearer or office bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorized by him in this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications.

(3) Where a meeting is called by the Registrar under subsection (2), no other meeting shall be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or by any person claiming to be an office bearer of the Society.

Explanation For the purposes of this section, the expression "prescribed authority" means an officer or Court authorized in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the official Gazette."

A plain reading of Section 25 referred hereinabove shows that almost all the controversies relating to election dispute may be referred to the Registrar of the Society which affects the outcome of the election. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gandhi Smarak Uchchtar Madhvarnik Vidvalava v. State of U.P. and others. (2004 (5) SCC 795) had considered this aspect of matter and held that the order of any person or authority limiting the right to vote of election by certain person can be challenged before the competent authority or Court. The defective electoral roll can also be challenged before the competent authority or by filing a regular suit. There is no bar under the law to challenge the defective electoral roll as it affects the outcome of election.

Subclause ''c'' of Subsection 1 of the Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act provides that in case the result of any election is materially affected by the improper refusal or rejection of any vote or by non compliance with the provisions of rules of the Society, then the dispute can be referred to the Prescribed Authority by the Registrar of the Society. The Explanation 1 of Section 25 of the Act further provides that in case there is fraud, intentional misrepresentation of facts or to do a certain thing which may amount to corrupt practice may also be a ground for dispute before the Registrar. Accordingly, though the complaints submitted by the rival parties against the voter list has been decided by the Deputy Registrar, but it is still open to them to challenge the outcome of the election by representing the Registrar in pursuance to the power conferred by Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. After the declaration of the result, parties have got alternative remedy to challenge the outcome of the election including the alleged faulty electoral roll.

Subsection 2 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act further provides that in case the election is set aside under subsection 1 of Section 25 of the Act or in case the office bearers is no longer entitled to continue in office and the election has been not held within the specified time provided under the Rules of the Society, then the Registrar has got power to call a meeting of the general body of the Society for electing new office bearers of the Society.

Subsection 3 of Section 25 of the Act further creates a bar and prohibits by providing that in case the Registrar proceeds to call for a meeting of the general body in pursuance to the power conferred by subsection 2 of Section 25 of the Act, then any other meeting shall not be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or by any person claiming to bean office bearer of the Society.

It is now a settled principle of law that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule has been propounded with all firmness by Willes J. in Waiver Hampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 C.B. (N.S) 336, at p.356 in the following passages:

"There are three clauses of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. One is, where there was a liability existing or common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implications exclude the common contains words which expressly or by necessary implications exclude the common law remedy; the party suing has his election to pursue either that or his statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely; but provides no particular form of remedy; there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it......"The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to."

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Nevile v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. (1919) A.C. 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tabago v. Gordon Grant & Co.. 1935 A.C., 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.. 44 Cal. W.N. 709."

The aforementioned principle of English Law was made applicable by the Apex Court in a case reported in AIR (39) 1952 Supreme Court 64, N.P. Ponnuswami v. the Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency. Namakkal, Salem, Dist. And others.

Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the said case held that whenever a remedy has been provided by an Act or statute to challenge the outcome of the election or illegality committed during the course of the election, then extraordinary remedy of Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised. Relevant portion from the case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. the Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency. Namakkal, Salem Dist. And others (supra) is reproduced as under:

"(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme ''of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the "election" and if any irregularities are committed which it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the "election" and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election is in progress."

Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal Salem Dist. And others, (supra) has again proceeded to held as under:

"(18) The points which emerge from this decision may be stated as follows: (1)The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. (2) Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the Legislature to examine and determine all matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it."

This principle of law enunciated by N.P. Ponnuswami v. the Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal Salem Dist. And others''s case has been followed by a Constitution Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 851, Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, in the following words:

"3. The conspectus of provisions bearing on the subject of elections clearly expresses the rule that there is a remedy for every wrong done during the election in progress although it is postponed to the post election stage and procedure as predicated in Article 329(b) and the 1951 Act. The Election Tribunal has, under the various provisions of the Act, large enough powers to give relief to an injured candidate if he makes out a case and such processual amplitude of power extends to directions to the Election Commission or other appropriate agency to hold a poll, to bring up the ballots or do other things necessary for fulfillment of the jurisdiction to undo illegality and injustice and do complete justice within the parameters set by the existing law."

Keeping in view the provision contained under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act referred hereinabove, petitioners have got statutory remedy under subsection 1 of Section 25 of the Act to ventilate their grievance. Accordingly, on account of availability of alternative statutory remedy to approach the competent authority under subsection 1 of Section 25 of the Act, it can not be said that the petitioners are the remediless.

Article 10 of the Rules as reproduced herein above, is meant to meet out the emergent situation or to meet out the extraordinary situation for a reasonable period subject to condition that appropriate initiatives should have been taken by the office bearers to hold the election. The power conferred by Rule 10 of the Rules can not be utilized with ulterior motive or for continuance of office bearers without taking initiative to hold fresh election. In case, it is permitted to do so, then it shall give a set back to the democratic process which is the backbone of a Society formed under the Societies Registration Act. Accordingly, the office bearers who were elected in the year 1993 or who had continued in the office on the basis of resolution of the general body upto the year 1996 will have no right to usurp the office and run the Society for any reason whatsoever. The only remedy open to the members or the office bearers of the Society was to take appropriate steps for holding fresh election. They have no right to hold the office for such a long period that is for more than the period for which they were elected. In case, they are permitted to do so, it shall amount to give a setback to the democratic process in the Society. In such situations it shall be the duty of Registrar to take initiative under Section 25(2) of Societies Registration Act.

In the case of Basant Prasad Srivastava, Manager, Gandhi Smarak Uchchtar Madhvamik Vidyalaya, Kauriva, Azamgarh v. State of U.P. and others. [1994 All CJ 162], which has been relied upon by the Division Bench in earlier Judgment referred hereinabove, a Division Bench of this Court has proceeded to held as under:

"7. In our opinion the judgment of the learned Single (Judge) does not suffer from any infirmity. The election process having started it must come to its logical conclusion. Once, it has come to its logical conclusion by declaration of result of the election the aggrieved person may challenge the election by filing election petition or civil suit in accordance with law. In such a proceeding the election may not be set aside if the alleged illegality or irregularity has not materially affect the result of the election. Approach to Court at intermediate stages in the election is bound to result in an office either remaining vacant or being occupied by a person whose entitlement to hold the office has ceased. Neither is a happy situation. It is, therefore, desirable that the election process should end as early as possible and the declaration of result should not be deferred through repeated interim orders passed from time to time. In taking this view we have the support of authorities which may be immediately noticed.

13........It has been settled by this Court more than once that election of the Committee of Management of an educational institution can be challenged before Civil Court. Adispute with respect to the Management of such institution can also be agitated before Deputy Director of Education under Section 16A(7) of the Intermediate Education Act and the decision of the Deputy Director given under the above provision is subject to the decision of a competent Court. Neither Intermediate Education Act nor the scheme of administration limits/restricts the ground on which the election of the Committee of Management can be challenged. Election of such a Committee, as such, can be challenged, both on merits as well as on the ground that the persons who were not entitled to vote were permitted to vote or the persons who were entitled to vote were excluded. The order of any person or authority limiting the right to vote in the election to certain persons only is liable to be challenged, while challenging the election and competent authority or the Court can set aside the election of the Committee of Management on that ground. Under these circumstances, it is not open to challenge any order at the intermediate stage. The position would have been different had the law excluded the challenge to the election on the ground of defective electoral roll. But, as mentioned above, this is not the position in the instant case."

In the case of Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharai) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharastra and others. [(2001) 8 SCC 509], Hon''ble Supreme Court held that breach or non compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rules during the preparation of electoral roll can be challenged in an election petition. It has been further held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the preparation of voter list is a part of the election process for constituting Managing Committee of a specified Society, accordingly, the Court should not interfere with the election process at the intermediate stage. For convenience, relevant portion from the Judgment of Sant Sadquru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharafl Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) is reproduced as under:

"9. If the contention of the appellants is that there was a breach of rule or certain mandatory provisions of the Rules were not complied with while preparing the electoral roll, the same could be challenged under Rule 81 (d)(iv) of the Rules by means of an election petition. In view that the preparation of electoral roll is part of the election process and if there is any breach of the Rules in preparing the electoral roll, the same can be called in question after the declaration of the result of the election means of an election petition before the tribunal.

In view of our finding that preparation of the electoral roll being an intermediate stage in the process of election of the Managing Committee of a specified Society and the election process having been set in motion, it is well settled that the High Court should not stay the continuation of the election process even though there may be some alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll. It is not disputed that the election in question has already been held and the result thereof has been stayed by an order of this Court, and once the result of the election is declared, it would be open to the appellants to challenge the election of the returned candidate, if aggrieved, by means of an election petition before the Election Tribunal."

In one another case reported in (2004) 13 SCC 574, Tapash Majumderv. Pranab Dasqupta, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that when the election process is started the Court should not interfere with such election process.

In the case of New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, v. Rajesh Chawla and others, [2004(5) SCC 795] the Hon''ble Supreme Court has again reiterated the same principle and held that question relating to non payment of dues of the Society should be raised at the appropriate stage and the election process may not be interfered. Relevant portion from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, v. Rajesh Chawla and others (supra) is reproduced as under;

"4. The question whether a member was a defaulter had to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings and writ application prima facie was not a proper course. Assuming without accepting that the stand taken for the alleged defaulters can be entertained and gone into in the course of conduct of election, it could, if at all, be only for the limited purpose of election and the right of the Society or the member for having their rights and liabilities finally and effectively get adjudicated by arbitration proceedings statutorily provided for under the statute in lieu of proceedings before the civil Court, and the conclusions arrived at or recorded in the course of election proceedings shall be only without prejudice to and ultimately subject to all or any such proceedings shall be only without prejudice to and ultimately subject to all or any such proceedings and decisions by such statutory forums."

In the case of Umesh Shivappa Ambi and others v. Amngadi Shekara Basappa and others, [1998 (4) SCC 529] the Apex Court held that once the election is over, then the outcome of such election should be considered by preferring an election Petition and not by invoking the extraordinary remedy.

In the case of Naqri Pracharini Sabha and another v. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others [1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 36], Hon''ble Supreme Court held that once the tenure of election of office bearers is over by the passage of time, then the Court should decide the controversy keeping in view the subsequent development.

In the case of K. Murguqan v. Fencing Association of India. Jabalpur and others [1991 (2)SCC 412], where the tenure of office bearers of Indian Olympic Association was expired, Hon''ble Supreme Court had appointed a retired Judge of the Hon''ble Supreme Court to conduct the election in accordance to Rules and Regulations of the Society which was registered under the Societies Registration Act and Hon''ble Supreme Court had directed to hold the election by a secret ballot.

In the case of Sewa Samiti, Allahabad and another v. Asstt. Registrar, Firms. Societies and Chits. Allahabad and another. [(2002) 1AWC 771] after expiry of term of the Society, Hon''ble Single Judge of this Court appointed the District Magistrate of the district or his nominee to look after the affairs of the Society till the fresh election is held. The Deputy Registrar was directed to proceed with the election process in pursuance to the power conferred by subsection 2 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act.

In the case of Committee of Management and another v. Assistant Registrar. Firms. Societies and Chits and others [2000(3) AWC 1802] a Division Bench of this Court has held that after expiry of tenure of Committee of Management, erstwhile members of the Committee of Management can not hold the election and only the Deputy Registrar may proceed to hold the election in pursuance to the power conferred by subsection 2 of Section 25 of the Act. Relevant portion from the judgment of Committee of Management and another v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits and others (supra) is reproduced as under:

"3.........In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Assistant Registrar was justified in exercising powers under subsection (2) of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act in direting that a fresh meeting of the general body be held for electing office bearers of the Society. Sri Srivastava lastly urged that it is a case where there was a dispute in respect of election or continuance of office bearers of the Society and, therefore, the matter ought to have been referred to the Prescribed Authority for decision under subsection (1) of Section 25 of the Act. We are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The dispute referred to under this provision could arise only if the election had been held within the period of three years and two rival groups claimed to have been elected as office bearers of the Society. The claim made by both the parties was based upon the elections, which were admittedly held after more than five years. In these circumstances, the Assistant Registrar was perfectly justified in issuing direction to hold a fresh election under subsection (2) of Section 25 of the Act. We, therefore, find no illegality in the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge."

In the case of Committee of Management, Shiksha Prasar Samiti and another v. Deputy Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits. Azamgarh and another, Hon''ble Single Judge of this Court held that whenever the renewal certificate is impugned on the ground of commission of fraud then the competent authority will have got right to recall the order.

It is to meet out the special circumstances and emergent situation when the general body could not have elected the new office bearers under some extraordinary situations or compelling circumstances. But it lacks the power to extend the tenure of the executive body by a resolution.

In view of discussion hereinabove, the Writ Petition No.2741 (MS) of 2005 is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 29.4.2005. The writ petition No.4466 (MS) of 2005 is dismissed and further the writ petition Nos.3389 (MS) of 2006 and 3592 (MS) of 2006 has been filed assailing the order dated 11.7.2006 and 18.7.2006, respectively, are also dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Since, no validly elected Committee of Management is in existence or continuing in the Society in question and, as such, the Chief Secretary of the UP. is nominated as Receiver to discharge the routine duties of the Society in question, namely, India Literacy Board. The Receiver so appointed shall continue till the Board is constituted. The Receiver is further directed to constitute the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the Society, expeditiously, say, within a period of three months.

The Chief Secretary, so appointed, as Receiver shall take over the charge of the Society within three days from today.

It will be open for the Chief Secretary to nominate any three officers for his help in running the affairs of the Society. It is made clear that the officer so nominated/appointed by the Chief Secretary shall not be below the rank of Principal Secretary or Senior Secretary in the State of UP.

It will further be open for the Chief Secretary to nominate any one officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary from the Department of Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Elementary Education & Literacy, Government of India.

The Registrar of this Court is directed to send the copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of UP. today itself.

(Ordered accordingly)