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Judgment
S.S. Sodhi, J.—The challenge here is to the order of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Faridabad, of April 9, 1986 summoning the petitioner in proceeding against them under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The facts relevance to this matter are that on February 10, 1983 the marriage took place between the petitioner Likhi Ram and Kamlesh, Kamlesh died on May 17, 1984, and a couple of months after her death i.e., on August 6, 1984, a complaint was filed against the petitioner under section 6 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, in which they were summoned by the Magistrate by his order of February 16, 1985. The petitioners went up in revision to the Additional Sessions Judge, who by his order of September 2, 1985, dismissed the complaint Annexure P 3, was filed on December 3, 1985, and the petitioners have now again been summoned by the impugned order of April 9, 1986.
The impugned order was sought to be impeached on the ground that his being a second complaint it could not be entertained, keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 S.C. 876. Further it was contended that a grave legal infirmity had been committed by the Magistrate in summoning the petitioners without recording any evidence. It was mentioned in this behalf that the Magistrate had merely relied upon the evidence recorded in the previous complaint, which had been dismissed for want of sanction. No fresh evidence had been recorded before the petitioners were summoned. Finally a contention was raised that the complaint was at any rate, barred by limitation inasmuch as according to the law as applicable in Haryana, it was incumbent upon the complaint to have filed the complaint within one year from the marriage. Admittedly, this complaint had been filed much beyond this period.
There can be no escape from the conclusion that the complaint in the present case is in fact barred by limitation and this being so, the impugned order cannot be sustained and has consequently to be set aside. The other plea raised against the impugned order need not, therefore, be gone into.
This petition is accordingly hereby accepted.