Life Insurance Corporation of India vs CHANDRIKA BAI NEWLEY

-THIS appeal, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is directed against the order dated 27.4.2004 in Complaint No. 20/2004 by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Raipur, whereby the appellants have been directed to pay the assured sum to the respondent under the LIC policy obtained by her husband Motau Ram Newley. Since the appeal was filed belatedly by 18 days, an application for condonation of delay has also been filed.

IT appears that the impugned order passed on 24.4.2004 and this appeal has been filed on 15.6.2004. Copy of the order appears to have been delivered on 28.4.2004 to the appellant''s Counsel. Thus, the appeal appears to be belated by about 18 days as has been stated in the application. According to the averments in the application for condonation of delay, the Counsel stated that copy of the order was sent to Branch Manager of appellant at Saraipali. Thereafter the Branch Office of the appellant at Saraipali sent the records to Raipur Divisional Office where delay was caused in taking administrative decision after obtaining advice of the Counsel. However, no specific details as to at what point of time delay was caused have been given and it is also not specified as to what were the specific reasons resulting in the said delay. The vague and generalized statements regarding delay in the application, cannot furnish sufficient cause for the delay. It was obligatory for the appellant to explain the delay by specifying the details as to why and how it was caused. This was not done.

Learned Counsel for respondent while opposing the application relied upon the decisions of State Commission of Chandigarh in Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority and Another v. Surinder Kaur, III (2003) CPJ 390, of State Commission, New Delhi in National Insurance Company Limited v. Daljeet Singh, I (2004) CPJ 332=2004 (2) CPR 6, and in Chief Post Master, General Post Office, Parliament Street v. Bishan Seth, III (2004) CPJ 196, wherein it has been laid down that sufficient cause has to be shown in the application for condonation of delay. In the above context, the decision of the National Commission in Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 Consumer 2731 (NS), was referred to in the case of Daljeet Singh wherein it was laid down that it was the duty of the appellant DDA to show as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained and that inter office consultation for prolonged period cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

IN the instant case as noticed above the application for condonation of delay is rather cryptic and vague. Reasons for delay have not been properly specified. We are, therefore, of the view that the application for condonation of delay does not disclose sufficient cause of delay. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, as noticed above. However, we have also considered the merits of the case. In this case the repudiation of the claim of the complainant/respondent was mainly on the ground of suppression of material facts by the respondent. However, on perusal of the record of District Forum, we do not find that there is sufficient material to establish that the deceased insured suffered from any disease which he did not disclose in his declaration form for obtaining insurance policy. The appellant has only placed a certificate of hospital treatment in which it has been mentioned that the deceased suffered from Diabetes for 15 years. However, on what basis the said information was recorded in the said certificate is not clear. The documents regarding diagnosis and treatment of the said disease have not been placed on record. Moreover, even cause of death of the deceased insured has not been duly established. Therefore, merely on the basis of the certificate of hospital treatment as above, it cannot be established that the deceased insured suppressed material facts, as has been rightly held by the District Forum in the impugned order, which finding deserves to be affirmed.

CONSEQUENTLY, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. As a result the appeal is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.