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Judgment
S.G. Shah, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. This petition is directed against the order of detention dated 24/4/2013 passed by the respondent no. 2 in exercise of powers conferred u/s 3[2] of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 [for short ''the Act''] by detaining the detenue as defined u/s 2[g] of the Act.
Ld. Counsel for the detenue submits that order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and the ground that registration of solitary complaint for the offences under Sections 3(1), 4(1), 5(1)(a), (b), (d) and 6(1)(a)(b), etc., of the Immoral Traffic [Prevention] Act, 1956 by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition u/s 2[g] of the Act. Further, Ld. Counsel for the detenue submits that illegal activity carried out as alleged cannot have any nexus or bearing with maintenance of public order and at the most it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statements of witnesses, registration of FIR and Panchnama, no other relevant or cogent material is available on record connecting the alleged anti-social activities of the detenue with breach of public order.
Ld. Counsel for the detenue further submits that it is not possible to hold in the facts of the present case that the activities of the detenue with reference to the criminal case/s had affected even tempo of the society, posing a threat to the very existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on the basis of the criminal case/s, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order.
Ld. AGP for the respondent-State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue itself indicate that the detenue is in habit of indulging into activities as defined u/s 2[g] of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and the detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR cannot have any bearing on the public order since the law of the land i.e. the Act, 1956 and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2[g] of the Act and unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2[g] of the Act. Except general statement, there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order.
In view of the above, I am inclined to allow this petition because simpliciter registration of FIR by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and authority can have recourse under the Act, 1956 and no other relevant or cogent material exists for invoking powers u/s 3[2] of the Act. That the State Government has filed affidavit in reply to this petition denying, in general, contentions made by the petitioner. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 24/4/2013 passed by the respondent no. 2 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.