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Judgment
Date : 24-08-2026 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the State. None appears on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2. Despite valid service of notice to O.P. No.2 in Cr. Misc. No. 1348 of 2019, there is no representation on behalf of the O.P. No.2.
Since all the five cases arise of same complaint case and have been filed seeking identical relief with the consent of the parties, they are being heard together and being disposed of by this common order.
The petitioners have filed their respective application for quashing of the order dated 13.07.2018, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-1st, Dalsingsarai, Samastipur in Complaint Case No. 51 of 2018, Tr. No. 885 of 2018, whereby cognizance was taken against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
As per the prosecution case, the complainant alleged that large-scale illegal appointments of Block and Panchayat Teachers in Chak Bahauddin Panchayat in collusion with the then Mukhiya, Panchayat Secretary and other officials were done. It has further been alleged that several persons, despite being ineligible or having discrepancies in their educational qualifications and dates of birth, were appointed as Panchayat Teachers and were paid salaries, causing substantial loss of government revenue. It has further been alleged that petitioner, Nusrat Hasmi @ Nuzhat Hashmi, changed her date of birth from 06.03.1987 to 06.01.1987 and had passed Inter Mediation Foquania Examination in the year 2004. On the basis of Moulvi degree obtained in the year 2006, she was appointed. It has further been alleged that petitioner, Sahista Shahin @ Saista Shaheen @ Shaista Shahin has also changed her date of birth. It has further been alleged that co-accused, Sajia had although failed in the Matriculation Examination, but nevertheless was appointed without producing a valid matriculation certificate. The complainant also relied upon enquiry reports and correspondence issued by the Divisional Commissioner, S.D.O., B.D.O. and other authorities of the Education Department concerning the alleged irregular appointments, despite the alleged irregularities and availability of relevant records, no effective action was taken by the concerned officials. It has further been alleged that the accused persons, acting in collusion, secured illegal appointments and thereby caused wrongful financial loss to the State.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners have falsely been implicated in this case. It has further been submitted that the complainant/Opposite Party No.2 claims to be a social worker and through the mechanism of RTI, collected information that because of the complicity of petitioner, Irshad Ahmed, many persons named in the complaint petition were appointed as teachers, who did not have the requisite academic qualifications for being appointed as teachers. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the petitioner, Laxmi Mahto is the Panchayat Secretary, while the petitioner, Adib Kaukab Faridi @ Adib Karib Faridi is the Ex-Mukhiya, petitioners, Nusrat Hasmi @ Nuzhat Hashmi and Sahista Shahin @ Saista Shaheen @ Shaista Shahin are the appointee Teachers and petitioner, Irshad Ahmad @ Md. Irshad Ahmad is the Block Education Officer.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the issue of limitation, as provided under Chapter XXXVI Cr.P.C., and has submitted that under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. limitation for cognizance has been provided for taking such cognizance and bar also.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the maximum punishment, in which the cognizance has been taken, is with respect to Section 420 of the I.P.C. and the maximum sentence provided is seven years. It has further been submitted that the year of alleged occurrence is 2006, while the complaint came to be filed in 2018 and the cognizance upon such complaint, examination of complainant, on solemn affirmation as well as inquiry witnesses came to be taken on 13.07.2018, when cognizance came to be taken under Section 420 of the I.P.C., much beyond seven years, and hence there was a complete bar for taking cognizance, after the said period of limitation, though the offence was known to the complainant, which was of the year 2006. It has further been submitted that the period of limitation has not been condoned as per Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., the cognizance itself is bad in law and is not sustainable.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that no offence, as alleged, is made out against the petitioners.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Sarah Mathew vs. The Institute of Cardion Vascular Diseases as reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62, wherein the constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. runs from the date on which the offence was committed and not from the date of complainant’s knowledge, however, in cases where the nature of offence is such that the complainant could not have reasonably known of its commission within the limitation period, the Court may invoke Section 473 Cr.P.C. to condone the delay, in the interest of justice provided its records specific reason, cognizance taken beyond the limitation period without the invocation of Section 473 and without recording reasons jurisdictionally infirm subject to quashing, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in the present case no such reasons have been recorded nor the delay has been condoned before proceeding to take cognizance and has drawn the attention of the Court to the impugned order taking cognizance, which is reproduced herein:-
“ifjoknh dh gktjh nh xbZA okn
iqdkjk x;k iqdkj ij ifjoknh vius vf/koDrk ds lkFk U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gq,A izLrqr okn vkt vkns”kkFkZ gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;kA vfHkys[k dk voyksdu fd;kA okn esa fn;s x;s “kiFk C;ku okn i= ,oa vfHkys[k ij miyC/k dkxtkrksa dk voyksdu fd;k vfHk;ksx i= ds ukfer ¼1½ bj”kkn vgen ¼2½ y{eh ekgrks ¼3½ ukxs”oj flag ¼4½ vknhc djhc Qjhnh ¼5½ thur izoh.k ¼6½ uljhu okuks ¼7½ uqljr gkleh ¼8½ lkfgLrk lghu ¼9½ lkft;k ¼10½ eks- “kkgtgk¡ ds fo:) /kkjk 420 Hkk-na-fo- ds vUrxZr izFke n`’V;k vkjksi gsrq lkexzh vfHkys[k ij miyC/k gSA vr% vfHk;ksxh }kjk vko”;d visf{krk,¡ nkf[ky djus ij mijksDr vfHk;qDrksa ds fo:) mijksDr /kkjk esa lEeu ds esjs djus dk vkns”k fn;k tkrk gSA lkf{k;ksa dh vfoyEc vko”;d visf{krk,¡ nkf[ky djsaA
fnukad 17-8-18 okLrs nkf[ky djus
vko”;d visf{krk,¡A”
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that no consideration for condonation of delay has been mentioned, least to say that the limitation period was condoned, rather the contradictory allegations makes the allegations itself non-credible. It has further been submitted that since petitioners, Irshad Ahmad @ Md. Irshad Ahmad is a government servant, no sanction, as provided under Section 196 Cr.P.C., has been taken before passing the order taking cognizance.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that there happens to be a case and counter-case between petitioner, Adib Kaukab Faridi Ex. Mukhiya @ Adib Karib Faridi and the complainant, and hence it has been submitted that the present prosecution against the petitioners is vexatious and malicious and the allegations appear to be in the backdrop of such serious dispute between the parties.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, referring to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly category nos. 1, 3 and 7 of paragraph 102 of the said judgment, has submitted that no offence against the petitioners is made out and the allegation is vexatious and malicious in nature.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the order taking cognizance is bad in law and on facts and the same is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted, referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PEPSI FOODS LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE AND OTHERS reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749, that a summoning order is not a matter of course, a Magistrate must apply his mind to the complaint and the material before him and must be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and also requires the Magistrate to be prima-facie satisfied that the accused may be guilty, a mechanical summoning order without application of mind can be quashed, and at the quashing stage, the High Court must ascertain whether the Magistrate has sufficient material for the prima-facie satisfaction, the Court cannot itself assess the truth of the allegation.
Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer of the petitioners.
Heard the parties and perused the records.
From perusal of the records, it is clear that the cognizance has been taken under Section 420 of the IPC, when the occurrence is alleged to have taken place in the year 2006 and the complaint came to be filed in the year 2018, there was a complete bar to taking cognizance, as the cognizance has been taken under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code beyond the period of limitation, the same not being condoned as the maximum punishment prescribed was of seven years, the delay has not been condoned, as under the provision of Section 473 Cr.P.C., the allegation appears to be vexatious one in the backdrop of serious litigation between some of the parties.
Reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Chief Controller of imports and exports vs. Ranjeet Kumar Acharya, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 139 wherein it has been observed that the Magistrate must carefully scrutinize a private complaint before taking cognizance and issue process, a complaint that rests on inference and surmises without positive material disclosing a prima-facie criminal act must not result in summoning order, the duty of pre-cognizance scrutiny in a private complaint case is more exacting than in police report case. In the fact of PEPSI FOODS LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE AND OTHERS (supra), as discussed above, the single most important check, a court should apply when a summoning order is challenged is (i) whether the Magistrate’s order reflecting application of mind?, a one line order complaint read; issue summons; without any reference to the material on the prima-facie satisfaction, may be quashable on this ground alone. The said judgment authorizes to intervene without leading to evaluate the underlying evidence on merits.
In the facts and circumstances discussed above, this Court is of the view that the order taking cognizance suffers from non-application of judicial mind and without following the procedure prescribed in Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the order taking cognizance with respect to petitioners only dated 13.07.2018, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-1st, Dalsingsarai, Samastipur in Complaint Case No. 51 of 2018, Tr. No. 885 of 2018, is hereby quashed. However, further proceeding with respect to co-accused persons may continue.
These applications are allowed.
Footnotes
- 1.AFR/NAFR NAFR
- 2.CAV DATE N/A
- 3.Uploading Date 29.08.2026
- 4.Transmission Date 29.08.2026
