Lantu Chandrashekar vs A. Hari Prasad Reddy

This appeal is preferred by the appellant - claimant challenging the order dated 14.12.2010 in OP.No.82 of 2009 passed by the Motor Accidents

Claims Tribunal cum Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy.

The claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the claimant claiming compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- on account

of the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident.

The averments in the claim petition are as follows:

On 16.01.2009, at about 10 AM, while the claimant was proceeding on his motor cycle bearing No.AP 23 M 3203 from

Indrakaran Village, the driver of the Bajaj Auto Trolley bearing No. AP 23 W 2808 drove in high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed his

motor cycle. Due to which, the claimant received fracture of clavicle bone, left occipital bone, head injury and other injuries all over the body.

Immediately, he was shifted to Care Hospital, Nampally and he was treated as inpatient from 16.01.2009 to 27.01.2009. The claimant incurred a sum

of Rs.30,000/- towards medical expenses. The injuries were not healed and the claimant was not able to perform his normal duties. The Sarpanch of

the village lodged a complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Indrakaran and a case in Cr.No.3 of 2009 was registered under Section 337 IPC

against the driver of the crime vehicle and the same is pending before the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Sangareddy. The respondent No.1

is the owner and the respondent No.2 is the insurance company of the crime vehicle and they are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation.

The respondent No.1, owner of the vehicle, filed a counter denying the averments made in the claim petition. The rash and negligent act on the part

of the driver of the crime vehicle was denied and negligence was attributed to the claimant. Further, the respondent No.1 stated that the claim petition

is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. owner and insurance company of the motor cycle driven by the claimant. The

respondent No.1 further denied the age, occupation, earnings of the claimant, nature of injuries and the treatment taken by the claimant and subjected

him to strict proof of the averments in the claim petition.

The respondent No.2, insurance company, in its counter denied rash and negligent act on the part of the driver of the crime vehicle and attributed

sole negligence to the rider of the motor cycle. The respondent No.2 filed an additional counter stating that the driver of the crime vehicle was not

holding valid and effective licence at the time of the accident and contravened Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. As per the

registration certificate, permit and policy, the crime vehicle is a commercial vehicle and the driver should have LMV Transport driving licence, but as

per the driving licence issued by the RTA, the driver is not holding the said licence and thus, the respondent No.1 has violated the terms and conditions

of the insurance policy and as such, the respondent No.1 alone is liable to pay compensation and the respondent No.2 is not liable. It is further stated

that as per the MLC issued by Care Hospital, the claimant was admitted on 16.01.2009 but as per FIR and charge sheet, the accident occurred on

18.01.2009, which shows that prior to the accident, the claimant got treatment, as such, the insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation.

The owner and the insurance company of the motor cycle are also necessary parties, since there is a collision between the motor cycle and the auto

trolley.

F. The claimant got examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A1 to A7. On behalf of the respondent No.2, only Ex.B1, insurance policy was

marked and no oral evidence was adduced.

G. The tribunal below dismissed the claim petition by holding that there is a serious doubt with regard to the occurrence of the accident i.e. whether it

occurred on 16.01.2009 or 18.01.2009. The tribunal below held that as per Exs.A3, A5 and A6 â€" medical records of Care Hospital â€" the claimant

was admitted on 16.01.2009 with a history of road traffic accident, but the FIR and the charge sheet, Exs.A1 and A2, show the date of the accident

as 18.01.2009. Further, the report was lodged by the Sarpanch of the Indrakaran village on 22.01.2009 stating that the accident occurred on

18.01.2009. Since there was a serious discrepancy between the date of the accident, going by the documents filed and relied upon by the claimant, the

tribunal below held that the very genesis of the accident is not proved and thus, dismissed the claim petition.

H. Mr. Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the tribunal below could not have dismissed the claim petition since

the driver of the crime vehicle pleaded guilty. As per Ex.A4, order in CC.No.190 of 2009 dated 04.03.2009, the accused driver was convicted under

Section 252 Cr.P.C. and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for four weeks for the offence under Section

338 IPC and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks for the offence under Section 337 IPC.

Learned counsel vehemently submitted that in view of the conviction by plea of guilty, the involvement of the crime vehicle and negligence on the part

of the driver also stand proved, as such, the tribunal below grossly erred in doubting the date of the accident and involvement of the crime vehicle in

the accident. Learned counsel further submitted that that there is an admission by the respondent No.2 in its additional counter about the accident

having taken place on 16.01.2009 and in view of such admission, there was no necessity for the claimant to prove through any witness the factum of

accident and also the discrepancy with regard to the date of the accident.

Smt. S.A.V. Ratnam, learned counsel for the respondent No.2, submitted that the appellant was admitted as an inpatient in Care Hospital on

16.01.2009. There was collusion between the driver of the crime vehicle and the claimant, as a result of which, the driver pleaded guilty and fine was

imposed as per Ex.A4 judgment. It is settled principle of law, the judgment of the criminal Court is not binding on civil Court and the MACT. The

insured vehicle was planted by the claimant for fraudulently claiming compensation. The claimant or any of his family members have not lodged

complaint immediately on the date of the accident, which is highly unusual. If it was a medico legal case, as stated by the claimant, the police would

have referred him to a Government hospital. The Sarpanch of the village also colluded with claimant and lodged a complaint on 22.01.2009 by

mentioning the date of the accident as 18.01.2009. However, the date of accident in the claim petition is shown as 16.01.2009.

Heard both sides.

This Court perused the contents of the claim petition, counter and additional counter of the respondent No.2. In its counter, the respondent No.2

denied the allegations in the claim petition and did not admit the accident and involvement of the alleged crime vehicle. In para 3 of the additional

counter, the respondent No.2 specifically asserted that as per the MLC issued by the Care Hospital, the claimant was admitted on 16.01.2009.

However, as per the FIR and Charge Sheet, the accident occurred on 18.01.2009, which shows that the claimant got treatment on 16.01.2009 prior to

the date of the accident, as such, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. In ‘para 4’ it was stated that as per the police record

two vehicles were involved in the accident and there was collision between the vehicles. Further, in para 5, the respondent No.2 stated that as per the

records, the rider of the motor cycle drove it in a rash and negligent manner and contributed to the accident, as such the insurance company is not

liable to pay compensation to the claimant.

The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is an admission about the accident and involvement of the crime vehicle by the

respondent No.2 in paras 3, 4 and 5 of the additional counter is without any force. The respondent No.2, as pointed above, made such averments

regarding involvement of the vehicle and accident by stating that the same are as per the FIR, police records and medical records. Since the words

‘as per’ were prefixed in each of the sentences in paras 3, 4 and 5 of the additional counter of the respondent No.2, it cannot be said that there

is an unqualified or unequivocal admission by the respondent No.2 with regard to the occurrence of the accident. In M/s. JEEVAN DIESELS &

ELECTRICALS LTD. v. M/S. JASBIR SINGH CHADHA (HUF) & ANR (2010) 6 SCC 601. the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with passing

of judgment upon admission as provided under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, held as follows:

“16. In this connection reference may be made to an old decision of the Court of Appeal between Gilbert vs. Smith reported in 1875-76 (2)

Chancery Division 686. Dealing with the principles of Order XL, Rule 11, which was a similar provision in English Law, Lord Justice James held, ""if

there was anything clearly admitted upon which something ought to be done, the plaintiff might come to the Court at once to have that thing done,

without any further delay or expense"" (see page 687). Lord Justice Mellish expressing the same opinion made the position further clear by saying, ""it

must, however, be such an admission of facts as would shew that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the order asked for"". The learned Judge made it

further clear by holding, ""the rule was not meant to apply when there is any serious question of law to be argued. But if there is an admission on the

pleading which clearly entitles the plaintiff to an order, then the intention was that he should not have to wait but might at once obtain any order"" (see

page 689).

In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hughes vs. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) reported

in The Times Law Reports 1891-92 Volume 8 at page 81, similar principles were laid down by Lord Justice Lopes, wherein His Lordship held

judgment ought not to be signed upon admissions in a pleading or an affidavit, unless the admissions were clear and unequivocal"". Both Lord Justice

Esher and Lord Justice Fry concurred with the opinion of Lord Justice Lopes.

In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in Landergan vs. Feast reported in The Law Times Reports 1886-87 Volume 85. at page 42, in an

appeal from Chancery Division, Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not entitled to apply under the aforesaid rule unless

there is a clear admission that the money is due and recoverable in the action in which the admission is made.

The decision in Landergan (supra) was followed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Koramall Ramballav vs. Mongilal Dalimchand

reported in 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1918-19) 1017. Chief Justice Sanderson, speaking for the Bench, accepted the formulation of Lord Justice

Lopes and held that admission in Order 12, Rule 6 must be a ""clear admission"".

In the case of J.C. Galstaun vs. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd., reported in 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court

presided over by Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while construing the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code

followed the aforesaid decision in Hughes (supra) and also the view of Lord Justice Lopes in Landergan (supra) and held that these provisions are

attracted ""where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. This rule applies where there is a clear admission of the

facts on the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed"". In saying so His Lordship quoted the observation of Justice Sargent in

Ellis vs. Allen [(1914) 1 Ch. D. 904] {See page 787}.

Similar view has been expressed by Chief Justice Broadway in the case of Abdul Rahman and brothers vs. Parbati Devi reported in AIR 1933

Lahore 403. The learned Chief Justice held that before a Court can act under order 12, Rule 6, the admission must be clear and unambiguous.

(emphasis supplied)

The High Court of Bombay in WESTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. SWATI INDUSTRIES AIR 2003 Bom 369 dealing with issues arising out of

Order XII Rule 6 CPC and admissibility of an admission contained in a plea of guilty recorded by the criminal Court as evidence held as under:

Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. reads as under:

Judgment on admissions.-- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court

may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question

between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.

b) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under Sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the

date on which the judgment was pronounced.

d. In the matter of judgment on admission, general rule is that the pleadings are to be read as a whole; admissions in pleadings cannot be dissected.

The Court is vested with jurisdiction to pass a decree on admission on the strength of the principle laid down under Section 58 of the Evidence Act

that admitted facts need not be proved and as such admissions can be considered as substantive evidence on which a decree can be passed.

e. If one examines the pleadings particularly para 9 of the written statement which is in reply to para 6-D of the plaint, and paras 20 and 21 of the

specific pleadings, the admissions given by the defendant is not absolute, but it is conditional and it has been specifically stated that in terms of another

contract, the said amount is already appropriated. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that there is an unqualified admission

on the part of the defendant which would invite a decree against it for the said amount. The nature of admission made by the defendant cannot be held

to be conclusive so as to invite an order under Rule 6 of Order 12, C.P.C. The nature of admission is such that it is only a statement of the case upon

which the defendant intended to rely and would not operate as an estoppel against him as understood under Section 115 of the Evidence Act. As this

admission made by the defendant is qualified, it is to be read as a whole while considering whether a decree can be passed against the defendant on

such admission. As the admission is qualified and it is specifically pleaded that the said amount has been appropriated against another claim under

contract between the parties, the Court should not have proceeded to pass the impugned order which would be discretionary. (Dudhnath Pande v.

Sureshchandra Bhattasalli,). Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the Court ought not to have passed the impugned order in the manner it has

directed the defendant to deposit the amount in Court with a condition that on failure to deposit, the defendant will be liable to pay the interest on the

said amount which was to be determined.â€​

The further submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the driver of the crime vehicle pleaded guilty and as such, the accident is

deemed to have been proved is contrary to settled principle of law. The judgment of the criminal Court is not binding on the civil Court as per the

provisions under Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act. In SETH RAMDAYAL JAT v. LAXMI PRASAD (2009) 11 Supreme Court Cases

545 it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows:

“16. If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which

has been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding. The question came up for consideration in

K.G. Premshanker (supra), wherein this Court inter alia held:

What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is --

the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same

parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he

may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;

if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections

40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment

would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.

Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions

of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.

Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from A and

suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be

relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of B over the property. In such case, A may be

convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question

which would require consideration is--whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant--its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose,

such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.

It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad. v. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was

categorically held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled, stating:

Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding

recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts

of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as

Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.

[See also Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2009 5 SCC 528]

Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah. v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC

370]. Relying on M.S. Sheriff (supra) as also various other decisions, it was categorically held:

Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to

point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of

evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.

The question yet again came up for consideration in P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC

1884], wherein the law was stated, thus:

It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings

or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.

It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a

judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit. What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a party in a previous

proceeding.â€​

It would be relevant to point out further observations of the Apex Court in SETH RAMDAYAL JAT’s case (2 supra) dealing with

evidentiary value of an admission made in criminal Court notwithstanding the judgment of the criminal Court, which are as follows:

Section 58 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“58. Facts admitted need not be proved.â€"No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at

the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time

they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:

Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.â€​

In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be any doubt or dispute that a thing admitted need not be proved. (See KENDRIYA

VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN V. GIRDHARILAL YADAV [(2004) 6 SCC 325 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 785] , L.K. VERMA V. HMT LTD. [(2006) 2

SCC 269 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 278], AVTAR SINGH v. GURDIAL SINGH [(2006) 12 SCC 552] and GANNMANI ANASUYA V. PARVATINI

AMARENDRA CHOWDHARY [(2007) 10 SCC 296].)

We, therefore, are of the opinion that although the judgment in a criminal case was not relevant in evidence for the purpose of proving his civil

liability, his admission in the civil suit was admissible. The question as to whether the explanation offered by him should be accepted or not is a matter

which would fall within the realm of appreciation of evidence… “

The principle of law laid down in the above decision is that “in spite of judgment of criminal Court not being relevant for proving civil liability,

admission in a civil Court of statement of plea of guilty before a criminal Court was admissible in evidenceâ€​.

The High Court of Allahabad in RAJA RAM GARG v. CHHANGA SINGH 1993 ACJ 447 , while dealing with the issue of whether proceedings

in motor accident claim petition be stayed pending disposal of criminal case, observed as under:

“… The judgment in the Criminal Court would not be relevant in the claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act and certainly not for establishing

the fact in issue, by virtue of Sections 40 and 43 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, the judgment in the claim petition would be equally not relevant in the

criminal case/sessions case, and certainly not for establishing the guilt of the accused therein.â€​

The High Court of Gujarat in PANKAJBHAI CHANDULAL PATEL v. BHARAT TRANSPORT CO. 1997 ACJ 993, while dealing with

granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, held as under:

In our view, the judgment of the criminal court is not relevant to prove in a civil court or before the Tribunal, the guilt or innocence of the person

driving the vehicle. Evidence before the two courts on the same issue would not be the same as all the witnesses for one or another reason are not

examined in both the forums or do not state consistently. At times, somewhere material evidence is suppressed or witnesses are won over, or driver of

the vehicle is made to confess the guilt despite truth being otherwise; so that claimant may not fail before the Tribunal. The law, therefore, does not

provide to place sole reliance on the judgment of criminal court making the claim free from claimant's onus to prove the issue of negligence. The

claimant has to lead evidence to prove his case. Consequently, negligence or innocence will have to be established independent of the criminal court's

finding or judgment. The Tribunal determining the issues arising in petition for compensation has, therefore, to come to its independent finding

appreciating the evidence produced before it. The judgment of the criminal court can only show that the concerned driver was convicted or acquitted

in the criminal case. At the most, in our view the judgment of the criminal court may provide corroboration to the evidence adduced by the claimant,

but can never be the sole decisive factor qua negligent driving, for the negligence is required to be established by leading necessary evidence. If the

statement confessing the guilt is made by the driver of the offending vehicle before the criminal court, it will be, at the most, if made voluntarily,

corroborative piece of evidence provided of course it relates to the issue(s) in question before the civil court or Tribunal, but can never be the sole

decisive factor as the claimant in compensation petition has to establish his case independent of confessional statement made by the driver. Having

regard to the materials on record, if there is a reason to question or doubt the voluntary character of the confession for any reason, or owing to fraud,

undue influence, allurement, promise, plea, bargain, misrepresentation; or is made or got made pursuant to any device or design or collusion so as to

succeed in the claim petition, or there is nothing on record going to show that the statement made relates to the issue in question, or the same wrong

under investigation, or the fact made a base for a claim before the civil court or Tribunal, the same has to be kept out of consideration unless the driver

appears and explains ruling out the possibility of involuntary character or device or design, or makes it clear that it relates to the same wrong, fact or

issue.â€​

The appellant/claimant cannot be given benefit of principle of law laid down in the above judgments since the claimant did not choose to adduce

evidence of the driver of the crime vehicle and there was no admission of guilt by the driver before the civil Court.

In view of the above discussion, this Court finds there is no merit in the appeal. It is, hereby, dismissed.

As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.