Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Special Deputy Collector vs Annam Reddi Musilithalli

P. Venkatarama Reddi, J

In all these cases, there are delays ranging between 94 days to 550 days in preferring the appeals u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant namely, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narsipatnam (who is also incharge as Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition) has filed applications for condonation of delay supported by affidavits explaining the delay. The appeals arise out of the judgments and decrees passed by the, then Subordinate Judge, Chodavgram in the references u/s 18 of the said Act. Altogether, three affidavits have been filed either because the original affidavit filed did not clearly bring out the facts having a bearing on the delay or because there was a change of the Officer during the relevant time. We will first advert to the condone delay petitions (CMP Nos.5654 of 1998 etc.,) filed in the appeals preferred against the batch of OPs.47 to 72 of 1992. OP 62 of 1992 and 26 other OPs. of 1992 were disposed of in a batch on 3-4-1995 by a common judgment. The appeals with which we are concerned arise out of OP Nos.72, 71, 70, 69, 67, 65, 68, 54, 55, 51, 52, 58, 48, 63, 49, 59 of 1992 which for the sake of convenience is treated as first batch. The delay in this first batch is 519 days. The appeals were filed on 23-12-1996. During this period, there was change of three Officers incharge of land acquisition for Yeleru left main canal and in addition to these three Officers, for a spell of three months or so, the Deputy Collectors of some other station were placed in additional charge. The post of Senior Assistant in Land Acquisition Office fell vacant on two occasions i.e., from 27-7-1995 to 12-8-1995 and 11-11-1995 to 8-2-1996. The delay is sought to be explained as follows:

The Assistant Government Pleader (AGP), Chodavaram applied for. certified copies of the judgment and decree only in OP 62 of 1992 which is a common judgment in all the cases covering the batch of OPs. (47 to 73 of 1992) and they were made ready on 7-11-1995. The AGP having received the copy of the judgment and decree on 4-12-1995 forwarded the same to the RDO, Narsipatnam together with his opinion as regards the filing of appeal only on 5-2-1996. The RDO addressed a letter dated 13-3-1996 to the Special Officer, Government Pleader''s Office, High Court together with a copy of the judgment and decree in OP 62 of 1992 with a request to take steps to prepare the grounds of Appeal and obtain the stay of execution of the decree. The letter was received at the GP''s Office only on 16-4-1996. The reason for the delayed receipt of the letter which was sent through a Clerk of the Office is not spelt out. Be that as it may, on 18-4-1996, the Special Officer in the GP''s Office addressed a letter to the RDO, Narsipatnam requesting her to furnish the judgment and decree copies duly typed in each OP, Claim Petitions with the details of addresses of the claimants etc., together with requisite amount for meeting the process expenses etc. Some other information was also called for in the letter. It appears that by that date, the RDO was busy with the Parliament Election work in respect of which the Election Commission issued a Notification in the last week of March, 1996. The RDO was transferred on 22-5-1996 and a new RDO assumed charge on 27-5-1996. On 1-6-1996, the RDO sent a letter giving reasons for the delay. The Special Officer of the GP''s Office by his letter dated 3-6-1996 informed the RDO that appeal against the judgment in OP 62 of 1992 was alone filed with the available material and requested him to send the judgment and decree copies and the money required to enable him to take steps to file the appeals against other OPs, Mr. M. Rama Rao, RDO in his supplemental affidavit states that soon after lie received the letter from the GP''s Office, he contacted the AGP, Chodavaram and requested him to obtain certified copies of judgments and decrees promising immediate reimbursement of the expenses. He states that he was reminding the AGP at frequent intervals and all the while, he was informed by the AGP that he was yet to receive the certified copies. It is also stated by the deponent (RDO) that in connection with by-elections to the Assembly Constituency of Narsipatnam, he was busy till the second week of October, 1996. He further states that the AGP was giving evasive replies. He orally reported the matter to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam. While so, EPs were filed in a batch of OPs. and in order to comply with the Court''s order, a sum of Rs.5,94,86,482/- was deposited by the Executive Engineer in the Court on 7-11-1996. Reference has been made in the affidavit filed in the connected matters (forming part of this batch) that press reports appeared thereafter about the attempts to withdraw this amount. It is then stated that the certified copies were applied for only thereafter i.e., on 7-11-1996. However, it may be mentioned that the certified copies of the decrees were actually applied for on 18-11-1996 for the second time as per the information furnished by the District Judge. The AGP, Chodavaram gave it in writing on 6-12-1996 that the copy applications for obtaining decrees other than in OP No.62 of 1992 were filed on 7-11-1996 vide tabular statement signed by the AGP at page 17 of the paper book. The decree copies were delivered on 9-12-1996 and the appeals were filed two weeks thereafter.

It is also stated in the supplemental affidavit that on the basis of the report sent up by the RDO, Narsipatnam, a complaint was filed before the Bar Council against the AGP, Chodavaram by the Law Secretary to the State Government. It appears that the said complaint was dismissed by the Bar Council. The services of the Assistant Government Pleader were terminated by the Government.

To complete the narrative regarding the reasons set out for condonation of delay, we may also at this stage refer to the averments made in the affidavit filed in CMP No. 14469 of 1998 (relating to appeal arising out of OP No.71 of 1989) which is typical of the affidavit filed in all other cases. A common judgment was delivered in OP No.71 and 72 of 1989 on 30-3-1995. On receipt of a registered notice from the respondents'' Counsel on 2-6-1995, the RDO addressed the Assistant Government Pleader, Chodavaram on 9-6-1995 for obtaining certified copies. The RDO, Narsipatnam who was incharge of Land Acquisition Unit, was transferred on 15-7-1995 and the post of RDO was kept under additional charge of the Special Deputy Collector, Visakhapatnam. In the meanwhile, the post of Senior Assistant in the Land Acquisition Offic became vacant from 27-7-1995 to 22-8-1995. After the new RDO assumed charge, he addressed letters on 28-10-1995 and 4-11-1995 to the Asst. Government Pleader for obtaining the certified copies. The post of Senior Assistant again fell vacant between 11-11-1995 and 8-2-1996. From the first week of April, 1996 upto second week of May, 1996, the RDO was fully engaged in the work relating to Parliamentary Elections. The RDO, Narsipatnam was again transferred on 22-5-1996 and the new RDO assumed charge on 27-5-1996. It is stated by the deponent that he being a new Officer, it took some time for him to "understand the work" relating to land acquisition cases. The RDO states that on his instructions, the Senior Assistant contacted the Assistant Government Pleader several times, but the copies were not furnished. Then he states that between the third week of September, 1996 and second week of October, 1996, he was engaged in election duties in connection with the by-election to the Assembly Constituency. He further states that after completion of election work, he met the AGP and enquired about the certified copies of the judgments and decrees, but he did not get convincing reply. He reported the matter to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam. While so a sum of Rs.S.94 crores was deposited by the Executive Engineer concerned in the Court of Subordinate Judge on 7-11-1996 pursuant to the proceedings in EPs. filed in a batch of OPs. The applications for certified copies were made on 5-12-1996 and they were made ready on 7-12-1996 and the appeals were filed on 24-12-1996. It is alleged that the Assistant Government Pleader wrongly stated that he sent the copies of the judgment and decrees in the OPs without famishing any proof to that effect.

It is contended by the learned Government Pleader that there was steep and arbitrary enhancement of compensation without any basis and in utter disregard of the principles governing the fixation of compensation, that heavy amounts were awarded towards non-existence trees and that a Commission headed by retired High Court Judge as well as the CBCID is probing into the scam that has come to light involving amongst others, the Presiding Officer of the Court, the AGP, the Court staff, the Advocate who appeared in most of the cases and certain officials and it is therefore pleaded that it is a fit case to take a liberal view as far as condonation of delay is concerned and to adjudicate the appeals on merits rather than throwing them out at the very threshold. It is also submitted that the lapse of the Government Pleader in not obtaining the copies of decrees in time and forwarding the same to the LAO is the main cause for the delay. That apart, the frequent transfer of Officers and winding up of the Office of Special Deputy Collector who was exclusively incharge of Land Acquisition and the intervention of Parliamentary and Assembly elections have also contributed to the delay.

On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that each day''s delay has not been explained in any of the affidavits, that there are long unexplained gaps and the negligence and inaction of the Officers concerned cannot form the ground for condonation of delay. It is stressed that the appellants took the necessary action only after the EP amount was deposited into the Court and the fact that the EP was filed and notices were issued prior to the filing of the EPs. were all within the knowledge of the appellants and their higher authorities and therefore diligent steps should have been taken to secure the certified copies and to file appeals without further delay. Certain defects in the affidavit such as lack of proper verification and the omission to explain the need in filing supplemental affidavit are also pointed out by one of the learned Counsel. It is further commented that the report of RDO, Narsipatnam submitted to the Collector contains wrong information and is not entitled to any weight in the absence of filing the letter of AGP referred to therein.

We have called for information from the District Judge, Visakhapatnam as regards the details of the copy applications filed in these cases. Accordingly, the District Judge has furnished the requisite information which was also made known to the respondents'' Counsel. The statement furnished by the District Judge reveals that the copy applications in the first batch of OPs. (59, 70, 49, 63, 48, 71, 58, 52, 51, 55, 54, 68, 65, 67, 69, 72 of 1992) were filed by the AGP on 5-4-1995 le., soonafter the judgment was pronounced. Stamps were called for on 14-9-1995. But stamps were not deposited and therefore, CAs. were struck off. In some of the OPs i.e., 48, 52, 67 and 69 of 1992, no endorsement was made on the application after the stamps were called for. Obviously, in regard to those CAs also, steps were not taken to deposit the stamps or to pursue them. As already noticed, the copy applications were filed for the second time on 18-11-1996 and the copies of decrees were furnished on 9-12-1996. Thus, it is obvious that the inaction of the Assistant Government Pleader in not depositing the stamps within time resulted in the copy applications being struck off. Obviously the irresistible inference is that the revenue officials concerned were kept in dark about this relevant fact. The endorsement made by the AGP made on a tabular statement dated on 6-12-1996 mentions the date of copy application correctly as 5-4-1995, but the endorsement in the remarks column does not depict the correct picture. The endorsement is as follows: "Decree and order in OP 62 of 1992 along with opinion were given. Fresh CA for other decrees filed on 7-11-1996". Nothing was mentioned about the earlier CAs filed on 5-4-1995 having been struck off. It only probablises the version of the RDO who swore to the affidavit that the AGP was conveying the impression that the certified copies were yet to be received though applied for. This is one important aspect that has to be kept in mind while considering the question of condonation of delay.

The difference in facts between the first batch of cases and the remaining cases may be noted. In the first batch, the judgment and decree copies were applied promptly for only in one case i.e., in OP No.62 of 1992 (forming part of the group of OPs 47 to 73 of 1992) and the same was forwarded to the Land Acquisition Officer on 5-2-1996 and the decree copies in other OPs forming part of the same judgment were applied for only in November, 1996. Though the copy applications for decrees in all other OPs forming part of the batch 42 to 73 of 1992 were applied for soonafter their disposal, they were not pursued and they were struck off. In the remaining cases, as per the averments made in the affidavit filed by the RDO and as seen from the endorsements in the certified copies, the certified copies of the judgment and decree were applied for in December, 1996 only. But, as per the information furnished by the learned District Judge, Visakhapatnam, there is startling revelation that the certified copies of decrees were applied for in these matters much earlier and they were taken delivery on various dates between August, 1995 and December, 1995. The details are as follows:

CUP No. & ASSR No. Date of C.A. C.A. ready on Date of delivery

CUP 14472/98 in ASSR 78355/96 [OP 71/89] 31-3-95 12-12-95 13-12-95

CMP 14469/98 in ASSR 78404/96 [OP 75/89] 31-3-95 14-8-95 16-8-95

CMP 9757/98 in ASSR 78408/96 [OP 76/89] 31-3-95 29-6-95 17-795

CMP 6923/98 in ASSR 78651/96 [OP 128/88] 28-3-95 5-10-95 19-10-95

CMP 11776/96 in ASSR 78679/96 [OP 114/88] 28-3-95 31-10-95 1-11-95

As to what happened to the certified copies applied for and taken delivery between July and December, 1995 in the cases above mentioned, is a matter of guess. However, one possibility is that the Assistant Government Pleader having taken delivery of the certified copies did not forward the same to the Official/Staff concerned. The other possibility is that the concerned Official/Staff having received the same just kept them in their drawer without taking any action thereon. One of the two eventualities is of course certain. In either case, the State and public interest shall not suffer by reason of misconduct on the part of either Officials or the Government''s Counsel.

The above facts have to be considered in the light of certain important factors of which we can take judicial notice of and which have an undoubted bearing on the question of condonation of delay. We can take judicial notice of the fact that during the years 1996 and 1997, the issue regarding the award of compensation for the land acquired for Yeleru Canal and irregularities in connection with payment attracted lot of public attention. Press and other media flashed the news on what has come to be known as ''Yeleru land acquisition scam'', which has become the subject-matter of discussion and debate in various for a. This Court entertained public interest litigation on the reports of the District Judge and District Collector and on the basis of the petition sent by certain persons. There was discussion on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, a Commission of Enquiry headed by a sitting Judge of the High Court (since retired) was constituted and the Commission is going ahead with the enquiry. The State Government had already ordered investigation by CBCID. Number of financial irregularities and manipulations including tampering of Court records have come to light. The High Court has authorised the District Judge to prefer the Court complaints u/s 340, Cr.PC after due enquiry. The complicity of Court staff, the then Presiding Officer (Subordinate Judge), the Advocate who conducted cases on behalf of claimants, the Assistant Government Pleader and certain officials and staff of the State Government, were detected. Criminal prosecutions have been or contemplated to be launched. The accused including the Presiding Officer were arrested and later on released on bail. The disciplinary action was initiated against the Subordinate Judge and the staff and the enquiry report revealed their involvment Hundreds of land acquisition references pertaining to Yeleru left canal we are dispossed of by the same Subordinate Judge over a period of one year or so granting huge amount of compensation, not merely for the land, but also the trees said to be existing on the land. In AS No. 1544 of 1997 and batch, we found that the trees were not existent and the compensation was exorbitant and uncalled for. In some matters, compensation was awarded for trees at a much higher rate than what was sought for by the claimants in the reference petitions. While allowing the appeals substantially, we observed a follows:

"Neither the fact that in the award or even in the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) relied upon by the Subordinate Judge, no trees were noted nor the fact that there could not have been so many trees on small extents of cultivated lands had put the learned Judge on guard as to the veracity of their claims. Interpolations and corrections in material particulars in various claim petitions did not evoke an iota of doubt in the mind of the learned Judge. The discrepancies in value claimed by various claimants did not even engage the attention of the learned Judge. Whatever PW2 stated in his evidence was taken as gospel truth on the ostensible ground that rebuttal evidence was not adduced, what is more, whereas PW2 (claimant in OP 56 of 1988) claimed compensation at Rs.10,000/- per gold-flower tree as per his claim statement and Rs.8,000/- in his deposition, the Court thought it fit to award compensation at Rs.60,000/- per tree."

Another Division Bench allowed the State''s appeals against the judgment of the same Subordinate Judge in toto.

A perusal of the judgment against which the present appeals have been preferred prima facie indicates the disposal of OPs almost on the same pattern. Whatever compensation was asked for was awarded for the trees and wells mainly for the reason that the AGP did not specifically deny in the counter the existence of trees and wells and non-denial would amount to ''judicial admission''. In determining the compensation for trees and the land, multiplier of 20 was adopted while implicitly accepting the version of the claimants on the quantum of annual income. It is in this background coupled with the inaction of the Counsel in obtaining and forwarding the certified copies of the documents in time, the entire issue of condonation of delay has to be appreciated. We cannot shut our eyes to these aspects and events and stall the disposal on merits so as to allow the arbitrary, if not tainted decision to stand. Considerations of public interest and the paramount need to keep the scheme of justice unpolluted impel us to adopt a liberal and holistic approach while deciding the issue presented for consideration. As discussed hereinafter in adopting such approach, we are fortified by the pertinent observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in some of the reported cases. While it is true that even going by the facts stated in the affidavits filed by the RDOs, lack of diligence or inaction on the part of concerned I officials or staff for certain spells i.e., between February and April, 1996 and June and October, 1996, is apparent, those lapses have to be viewed in the background which we have set out supra. That apart, we should bear in mind the fact that at about the time the cases were disposed of, the post of regular Special Deputy Collector incharge of land acquisition was disbanded and the RDO or some other Officer in a different station was placed in additional charge. They were to look after the land acquisition work in addition to the normal and regular work within their jurisdiction. It is seen from the information furnished by the learned Government Pleader that between July, 1995 and 1997, there was change of four or five Officers. Apart from the regular duties as RDOs, they had to attend to the additional duties relating to the disbanded Land Acquisition Unit. Moreover, the Senior Assistant''s post also fell vacant for two fairly long spells. The work in relation to the Parliament and the Assembly By-Elections is also a contributory factor for not promptly attending to take necessary steps for filing the appeals.

No doubt, the officials concerned could have acted more vigorously and more diligently in the matter of obtaining certified copies and taken necessary steps more vigorously having due regard to the magnitude of the compensation awarded. But this by itself should not act as an impediment to condone the delay in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, especially when it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion that such inaction or lapse was attributable to any deliberate design or supine indifference on the part of the Officers of the State. To advance the cause of justice and public interest, it is proper to condone the delay.

We now consider it necessary to recapitulate the views of the Supreme Court on the aspect of condonation of delay with special reference to the appeals preferred by the State. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, , the Supreme Court pointed out that power to condone delay u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act had been conferred in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matters on merits and that the expression ''sufficient cause'' is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner to serve the ends of justice. The Supreme Court also observed that the proposition that ''every day''s delay must be explained'' does not mean that pedantic approach should be adopted. While indicating the need for a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, the following pertinent observations were made:

"When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay." It was then observed that there is no presumption that delay was occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or mala fides. The peculiar features permeating the functioning of administrative machinery are spelt out in the following words:

"In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one incharge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve."

The next decision which deserves notice is the case of Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 899. In that case, just as here there was considerable delay in preferring the appeals under Land Acquisition Act. There also, one of the main reasons advanced to explain the delay was the conduct of the Government Pleaders not applying for certified copies in time and forwarding them to the Government with their opinion. The Supreme Court put a seal of approval on the decision of the High Court in allowing the applications for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court observed:

"The expression ''sufficient cause'' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction of lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay"

The observations in Katiji''s case (supra), were cited with approval. While observing that there is no general principle of saving party from all mistakes of its Counsel and each case will have to be considered on its own facts, made the following pertinent observations as to how the approach should be in the litigations to which the State is a party.

"If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its Officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its Officers or agents and where the Officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes ''sufficient cause'' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have ''a little play at the joints.'' Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course within a reasonable limit-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters."

These observations will apply with equal force to the case on hand. The Supreme Court then referred to the delay after 20-1-1971 and observed as follows :

"Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after 20-1-1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps. have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in Office till 15-12-1970 had applied for certified copies on 20-7-1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader."

The above observations have great relevance to the facts of the case on hand. In fact in the context of the background and the special facts of the case we are dealing with, there is greater justification to condone the delay of 519 days.

The views expressed in Katiji''s case and Ramegowda''s case (supra) found their echo in a three-Judge Bench decision in Sate of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 (2) Scale 820. In that case, the Supreme Court in reversal of the order of the High Court condoned the delay of 109 days in preferring an appeal by the State of Haryana. The Supreme Court reiterated the proposition that liberal and pragmatic approach ought to be adopted in dealing with a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and that certain amount of latitude to the State is not impermissible in view of the special characteristics of the Governmental functioning and observed that the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual while taking a decision to file the appeal because an individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its Officers or servants.

A recent decision in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishna Murthy, 1998 (5) Scale 105, also deserves notice though the Supreme Court was concerned with an appeal between two private parties. The following observations are apposite:

"It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation docs not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation."

The Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, 1997 (7) SCC 566. Their Lordships observed that impugned order of the High Court has not recorded any satisfaction whether the explanation for the delay was reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite of condonation of delay. Having regard to the cryptic and irrelevant explanation given in the affidavit, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification to condone the delay of 565 days in preferring an appeal by the State against the Arbitration award. The Supreme Court observed; "We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days." It is in this context that the following observations were made.

"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus neither proper nor judicious."

These observations have to be understood in the light of the facts of that case. If there is no possibility of arriving at a finding of sufficient cause despite the adoption of a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach as enunciated in series of decisions of the Supreme Court, the period of limitation cannot be extended merely because the Court thinks it equitable to do so. Apart from reiterating that the statutory pre-requisite of ''sufficient cause'' should be made out before condoning the delay. We do not think that any proposition has been laid down by their Lordships which is in conflict with what was held in a catena of decisions cited above. Ramachandran''s case (supra) cannot therefore come to the rescue of the respondents.

A Division Bench decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. Bactchala Balaiah Vs. OVERRULED, , was relied upon by the Counsel. The learned Judges took the view that interdepartmental correspondence or consultation or such other administrative reasons do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is doubtful whether such proposition represents the correct legal position in the light of various decisions of the Supreme Court referred to supra. The subsequent decisions both of the Supreme Court and of this Court have set a definite trend for a different approach and view point. We cannot therefore follow this decision in preference to various subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are inclined to condone the delay. Accordingly, we allow the CMPs.