Lalla Saligram Singh vs Mohunt Ramgir

The question which we have to determine is whether the Plaintiff, on the findings of the lower Appellate Court, is entitled to the decree which has been given to him by that Court. The case is a somewhat curious one. The Plaintiff is a Mohunt of a certain muth, and there are certain lands which, according to his case, were passed down through three successions, from Mohunt to Mohunt. He claims that this property belongs to him in the private capacity and not as the Mohunt of the muth in which latter case he would hold it as trustee of the property belonging to the muth for the benefit of the Deity for whose purpose this muth has been established. He made an application to the Revenue Court under sec. 40 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, asking for commutation of the rent. The application came before the Commissioner who said in his judgment as follows :--"When the case came up for hearing it appeared that the main contention of the Appellant was that the Respondent raiyat who had applied under sec. 40 for commutation was not a raiyat at all but a tenant holding Guzashta purwasta, (in the past and in permanency or for ever) and also was not the tenant himself but applied on behalf of the tenant. The land has been granted to a muth, half the produce is to go to the muth, half to the maliks. It cannot be said that the Mohunt is a raiyat having rights of occupancy, having claimed to be something more; nor does it appear that the Mohunt of the muth is a tenant. He is the manager for the time being of the muth. The application should have been rejected by the Collector. The appeal is decreed and the order for commutation reversed." The reasons given therefore are that under the terms of the grant the property was to remain bhasli; secondly, that the Plaintiff is not a raiyat having a right of occupancy but is something more, and thirdly, that he is not the beneficial owner but a mere manager of the muth. That decision was passed by the Commissioner according to the powers vested in him by law.

In this suit the Plaintiff claims to hold this property as his own private property, and he asks for a declaration that he as raiyat "has 21 bighas 5 cottahs of Guzashta Vioshta land in mouzah Nargada, Pergunnah Arrah that the disputed land is not an endowed property of a muth; that the Plaintiff does not hold it as manager of a muth; and that the Plaintiff is by all means competent to get the character of the said land changed.

With regard to the first portion of that prayer of the plaint, the Plaintiff is entitled to have it determined in this suit. But the second portion is really asking for a declaration from the Civil Court to the effect that the Revenue Court is bound on the facts which the Civil Court is asked to find, to make an order of the kind which was refused on a previous application. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court, which contains the facts so far as we can act upon them, finds that it has not been proved by the Plaintiff that this property does not belong to this muth. It then goes on to say :--" It is quite clear, however, that the Plaintiff holds the land in suit either as tenant in his own right or as trustee for the muth or idol; as an idol itself cannot hold lands, the practice is to vest the lands in a trustee for the religious purpose of the endowment, or to impose upon the holder of the lands a trust to defray the expenses of the worship. The land or other property forming the endowment may even be held in beneficial ownership subject merely to a trust or to part of the income for the support of the religious endowment. In such a case the land or other property descends and is alienable and partible in the ordinary way, the only difference being that it passes with the charge upon it." Further on the learned Judge says :--" I am of opinion that whether the Plaintiff be a tenant of the land in suit in his own right or holds it as trustee for the muth or idol, he is entitled to apply under sec. 40 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to a commutation of the rent in kind, and that the lower Court has rightly given the Plaintiff-Respondent a decree declaring this right.

In the first place the learned Judge ought to have confined himself to the real question in the case, namely, the right of the Plaintiff to a declaration that this property was not debuttar property, and the Plaintiff failing as to that his suit ought to have been dismissed. Moreover the decree which has been given is, in our opinion, one which a Civil Court is not competent to give. The effect of the decision of the lower Appellate Court would be to place in the hands of the Civil Court not only the power of determining beforehand the way in which the Revenue Court ought to give its decision, but also to make the Civil Courts practically an Appellate Court from the decision of the Revenue Court. That is certainly not what the Legislature intended. The Legislature has given a judicial discretion in this matter to the Revenue Court and to the Revenue Court alone, and does not allow its decision to be hampered either in advance or afterwards by any decision come to by the Civil Court. The learned Judge is in error in the declaration ho has given to the Plaintiff. His decree must therefore be reversed and the suit dismissed with costs in all the Courts.