Lal Chand vs The Financial Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh and Another

P.C. Pandit, J.—This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the order dated 18th November 1960 passed by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab.

It appears that on 6th November 1958 Lal Chand, petitioner filed an application u/s 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Hissar, for the purchase of the suit land comprised in his tenancy on the ground that he had been in continuous occupation of the same for more than six years. This application was rejected on 14th August 1959 on the ground that section 19 of the Act was a bar to the filing of this application, because the suit land was evacuee property as defined in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (31 of 1950) on 15th April 1953, which was the date of the commencement of Act 10 of 1953. This order of the Assistant Collector was confirmed on appeal by the Collector on 29th February 1960. The petitioner went in revision to the Commissioner, Ambala Division, who made a recommendation to the Financial Commissioner that the orders of the Collector and the Assistant Collector be set aside and the petitioner be allowed to purchase the land. He was of the opinion that section 19 did not stand in the way of the petitioner because during the pendency of his application u/s 18, section 19 of the Act was amended on 13th August 1959 by the Punjab Security of Land Tenures (Second Amendment) Act (32 of 1959), by virtue of which the words ''at the commencement of this Act'' were omitted. The effect of this amendment was that section 19 would be a bar only if the land in dispute was evacuee property as defined in Act 31 of 1950. The property in suit, which was, admittedly, evacuee property on 15th April 1953, which was the date of the commencement of Act No. 10 of 1953, had ceased to be evacuee property on 14th August 1959 when the decision was given by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, because oh 9th November 1955 permanent rights were conferred on the allottee of this land, Jagjiwan Dass, respondent No. 2. He was further of the opinion that since the change in law had come into force before the decision by the Assistant Collector, he should have given effect to the amendment in section 19 of the Act.

When the matter went before the learned Financial Commissioner, he did not accept the recommendation of the Commissioner on the ground that the petitioner''s application was made on 6th November 1958, when it was legally not entertainable, because the Amending Act 32 of 1959 came into force on 13th August 1959, that is, after the application was filed and the conferment of permanent rights on the allottee had no material bearing on the eligibility of the petitioner-tenant to purchase the tend. Against this order, the present, petition has been filed.

It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the learned Financial Commissioner is correct, if the Amending Act 32 of 1959 was not to be taken into consideration for the decision of this case. He, however, contended that since the change in law had come into force before the application u/s 18 was disposed of by the Assistant Collector, he should have decided the matter in accordance with the provisions of the amended section 19 of the Act.

After hearing the counsel for the parties I find no merit in this contention. In the first place, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show that even after the conferment of the permanent rights on the allottee, this property was no more evacuee property as defined in section 2(f) of Act 31 of 1950. Secondly, the property in dispute being, admittedly, evacuee property at the commencement of Act 10 of 1953, the petitioner had no right to purchase the same on the date when he filed the application u/s 18 of this Act and, as such, his application was not entertainable by the Assistant Collector. The subsequent change in law cannot affect the rights of the respondent-allottee retrospectively. It is undisputed that when a law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights (see in this connection Colonel His Highness Raja Sir Harindar Singh Brar v. Bans Bahadur, Ruler Faridkot State (1957) 59 P.L.R. 386 (F.B.). No such intention is apparent from the Amending Act 32 of 1959.

In view of what I have said above, no interference is called for in these proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. As a result, this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.