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Judgment
S. Mohan, J.—This appeal arises out of a reference made under sections, 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
An extent of 3 acres 68 cents in S. No. 18/5 of Eraravur village in Saidapet Taluk, was acquired for the purpose of establishing a thermal station
in Eraravur village. A compensation totalling Rs. 67,185-30 was deposited into Court. Since there were disputes concerning this amount, a
reference was made under sections 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The question arose this way. The claimant (Lakshmi Ammal), who
is the appellant herein, put forth a claim on the basis that the property belonged to her absolutely under a registered will and testament of
Ponnambala Mudaliar, her paternal grandfather. The will is dated 18th October, 1918. The said Ponnambala Mudaliar died in 1919. The will was
duly probated in the High Court of Madras. Under the terms of the will, he created a life interest in respect of his properties in favour of his second
wife Sundarammal without any powers of alienation such as sale, mortgage etc. Sundarammal died on 5th May, 1936. After the lifetime of
Sundarammal, Lakshmi Ammal and her husband late Jayarama Mudaliar got the properties absolutely. It is provided in the will that in the event of
Jayarama Mudaliar marrying another wife without the consent or permission of Lakshmi Ammal, Jayarama shall lose all the rights in the properties
enjoyed by Lakshmi Ammal. Contrary to the above direction, Jayarama married a second wife against the wishes of his first wife and thereby
Jayarama forfeited all his rights. As a matter of fact, the High Court of Madras in its decision in C.S. No. 228 of 1938 held that Jayarama had
forfeited his rights to the property covered by the will in view of the forfeiture Clause above mentioned. This decision was affirmed in A.S. No. 27
of 1939. Jayarama died in 1949 leaving Lakshmi Ammal as the sole heir. His second wife had predeceased him. No children Were born to
Lakshmi Animal and Jayarama. As such, she became absolutely entitled to the amount lying in Court deposit representing the compensation. As a
matter of fact, her right had been recognised in the prior proceedings in the Court of reference (Sub-Court)(Chingleput) in C.R.O.P. No. 641 of
1968, on 17th February, 1969.
The other relations of Ponnambala Mudaliar, who were the legatees under the will, in short contended that what Lakshmi Ammal took under the
will dated 18th October, 1918, of Ponnambla Mudaliar was a life estate and not an absolute estate. On this, (two paints were posed for
determination:-
Whether the first claimant is entitled to draw the entire compensation amount as the absolute owner of the reference land as per the terms of the
will executed by the deceased Ponnambala Mudaliar on 18th October, 1918 ?
Whether the first claimant has been given only a life estate under the terms of the will above referred and she is entitled to draw only the interest
for the amount concerned in this reference and the compensation has to be drawn by claimants 2, 4, to 6 and 7 to 21 ; the claimants 2, 4 to 6 and
19 to 21 being entitled to l/4th share ; claimants 7 to 12 being entitled to half share and claimants 13 to 18 being entitled to the balance of l/4th
share? On a detailed consideration of the recitals of the will marked as Exhibit A-1 of; Ponnambala Mudaliar, dated 18th October, 1918, the
Court of reference held that what was taken by Lakshmi Ammal was only a limited interest. Accordingly, it answered the reference. Hence the
present appeal by Lakshmi Ammal, who figured as the first claimant in the Court of reference.
Mr. V.C. Veeraraghavan, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, after taking me through the recitals in the Will, Exhibit A-1, urges the
following:-
(1) having regard to the use of the words it would mean that what was taken by Lakshmi Ammal was an absolute estate. Wherever the testator
wanted to give only a life estate, he had clearly mentioned so. In the absence of any restrictive words of that kind would take in an absolute estate
and not a restricted estate. In support of this submission, he relies on a decision of this Court reported in Ratnasami Pillai Vs. Kathija Bivi Ammal, .
The contingency contemplated in the will, namely, children being born to Lakshmi Ammal, had not arisen. If the object was to preserve the estate
to the children of Lakshmi Ammal, and in the absence of any issue if it is construed to be a limited estate, it would result in a defeasance or
intestacy. Law abhors intestacy. Nor again, can there be a defeasance Clause. As to how defeasance brought about is dealt with by Mr. Mantha
Ramamurti on the Law of Wills, page 442, paragraph 31 on which the learned Counsel would place reliance. On the same lire of argument, he
would also draw support from Halsbury''s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 39 at page 929, praragraph 1405 and submits that a condition
to operate as a defeasance of a vested estate must be shown to have happened strictly and to the letter of it. That is not the position here.
The learned Subordinate Judge, had gone wrong in trying to construe the nature of the estate derived by Lakshmi Ammal with reference to the
later Clause found in the will in the event of the death of Lakshmi Ammal. The word must be given a definite meaning and according to the learned
Counsel, it must connote not her taking a life estate, but an absolute estate. If the property had already vested in Lakshmi Ammal, that vesting
cannot be cut down or that absolute estate cannot be whittled down by the later Clause. Then again, according to the learned Counsel, what is
important to be noted is, in the event of Lakshmi Ammal dying in the middle, her husband Jayarama would be deprived of his life enjoyment of the
portion of the estate. Lastly it is urged that this very will came up for interpretation earlier before this Court and it has been construed as if Lakshmi
Ammal took an absolute estate. That judgment, though not directly on point, Would support the stand of the appellant.
Mr. Srinivasagopalan, learned Counsel for the respondents would urge, after taking me through the entirety of the will that the object of the
testator was to benefit each and everyone of his relations. That the testator was a wordlywise man is evident from the language employed in the
will. By a reading of the entirety of the will, which is a cardinal principle in construing the will it appears that he did not Want any of his female
relations to take an absolute estate. On the contrary, he restricted the enjoyment during the lifetime of these female-holders. Even in the case of the
second wife Sundarammal, he had so provided. While dealing with the rights of Lakshmi Ammal, all that is said is Nowhere, right is created: The
said is followed by The later words cannot connote anything more than a mere enjoyment. If the object was to preserve the estate for the issues of
Lakshmi Ammal in the absence of the issue there is no defeasance Clause. As a matter of fact, the testator had provided a model devolution in
both the contingencies, in the event of Lakshmi Ammal predeceasing Jayarama without issues. This is clear by the use of the word That word
means only that. In such a contingency the property was to devolve on Lakshmi Ammal''s father Ganapathi Mudaliar on the one hand and
Subramania Mudaliar and Balasundara Mudaliar on the other, in equal moieties. Therefore, no intestacy whatever arises. If the construction as
sought to be made out by the appellant is accepted, all the later Clauses Would be rendered otiose or ineffective. That certainly is not the correct
way of interpreting a solemn document like'' a will, since it is well-settled law that each and every Clause must be given effect to. The decision
cited, namely, Ratnasami Pillai Vs. Kathija Bivi Ammal, . merely dealt with But that phrase alone cannot be pressed too much into service because
they are qualified by later words The passages in the text relating to law of Wills in Halsbury cannot support the interpretation sought to be placed
by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
Having regard to the above controversy, the only point that arises for my determination is, what is the nature of the estate taken by Lakshmi
Ammal. In order to answer this question necessarily a detailed reference has to be made to the various Clauses occurring in, the will. The will is
marked as Exhibit A-1, dated 18th October, 1918 executed by Ponnambala Mudaliar. He says in the beginning
After detailing out the property he adds on:
Stopping here for a moment, if a comparison is made between the nature of the estate conferred upon Sundarammal and Lakshmi Ammal, at the
first blush it may appear that what was conferred upon Lakshmi Ammal'' was not a mere life estate, but an absolute estate. A careful reading of the
later Clause dealing with the rights of Lakshmi Animal'' will disclose the following:There is no use of the word after the words In such a case alone,
a right or interest is created. Then again there is no gainsaying that the words would connote only a right of enjoyment. That is made clear by
stating in the later Clause:
There is a clear restraint against alienation. One way of looking at the matter would be having conferred an absolute estate on Lakshmi Animal, any
later restraint against alienation so as to defeat or whittle down that absolute estate, must be held to be invalid. But such a construction is not
possible in this case, because the object of conferring a life estate on Lakshmi Ammal is to preserve the property to the issues of Lakshmi Ammal
through Jayarama. As to how this conclusion is inescapable, I will also demonstrate by reference to a later Clause in the will. Suffice it at this
juncture to state the words alone may not connote an absolute estate because at the risk of repetition I maystate there is no word The decision in
Ratnasami Pillai Vs. Kathija Bivi Ammal, , dealt with a Clause That decision, in my view, has no application to the facts of the presenst case
because there are no qualifying words mentioned in the later Clause dealing with the nature of the estate conferred on Lakshmi Ammal.
What has to happen in the event of Lakshmi Ammal dying is also provided for under the will, since it proceeds to state:
It is relevant to note at this stage that the earlier forfeiture Clause in the event of Jayarama marrying against the wishes of Lakshmi Ammal alone
came up for interpretation in this Court in G. S. No. 228 of 1938 Vide Exhibit A-2. The learned Judge Venkataramana Rao, J., held :
The dominant intention of the testator was to provide for Lakshmi Ammal, and her husband was jointly associated with her in the bequest, the main
object being that they should jointly enjoy the property and thereafter transmit to their children. Whether in law a joint bequest can be taken by
them with a right of survivorship or whatever the testator may have intended, Lakshmi Ammal and her husband can in law only take the property
as tenants in common, the intention of the testator is clear that it should be enjoyed jointly by them both and the property that was meant to be
enjoyed by Lakshmi Ammal was the same as the property intended to be enjoyed by her husband. Therefore, when he used the expression,
properties enjoyed by her"" in the forfeiture Clause, he clearly meant the properties already bequeathed to both and intended to be enjoyed by
them in the previous Clause of the will.
This decision was appealed against in O.S. A. No. 27 of 1939 vide Exhibit A-3. A Division Bench consisting of Leach, C.J. and Horwill, J.
dismissed the appeal and held:
It is clear that the testator did not intend that they should have an absolute estate because the will then proceeds to direct that neither the husband
nor the wife shall ""gift mortgage or sell all the said properties"". This indicates that it was his intention that these properties should go to their issue. In
view of the words ""shall hold and enjoy absolutely from son to grandson and so on in succession"" which are used when conferring an estate on the
appellant and the respondent, the prohibition against alienation may not be a lawful one. But there can be no doubt that it was the intention of the
testator that the property should eventually descend upon their children.
Even these two judgments, in my view, do not support the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that what was taken by Lakshmi
Ammal was an absolute estate.
The word would only mean in my view, if Lakshmi Ammal were to predecease Jayarama without any issues and not as is contended by the
learned Counsel for the appellant. There is a further fallacy in the argument of the appellant''s counsel. If the construction as sought to be placed by
him is to be accepted, then the other Clause namely the devolution on Lakshmi Ammal''s father Ganapathi Mudaliar, and Subramania Mudaliar and
Balasundara Mudaliar, the brothers of the testator, would be rendered negatory. There is no intestacy here. Therefore, the general principle that
law abhors intestacy, cannot arise. After Lakshmi Ammal''s enjoyment during her lifetime, a portion of the property is carved out of the entire
estate conferred jointly on Lakshmi Ammal and Jayarama and that estate is to be taken in equal moieties by Ganapathi Mudaliar, the father of
Lakshmi Ammal on the one hand and Subramania Mudaliar and Balasundara Mudaliar, the brothers of the testator on the other, because it is
states'' in the above Clause
That means the house and garden of Than dayarpet are excluded for the purpose of devolution on the above legatees. From this, it is sought to be
argued that this Would have the effect of depriving Jayarama of his life enjoyment of the properties other than the house and garden at
Thandayarpet. That is so. In fact that is what the testator intended. After the death of Lakshmi Ammal as I observed above, a portion of the estate
is carved out for the purpose of devolution and the remaining alone would or could be enjoyed by Jayarama during his lifetime be -cause what was
conferred was a joint right of possession during the life of Lakshmi Ammal and Jayarama. By construing in this manner, certainly no part of the will
is rendered ineffective. It is axiomatic that in construing the will, it must be read as a whole and every Clause must be given effect to. Therefore,
these wholesome principles should be borne in mind in construing Exhibit A-1. In fact I may say that the learned Subordinate Judge has
approached the entire question in a proper perspective and I am in agreement with him. with regard to the interpretation of Exhibit A-l. In fine I
hold that what was taken by Lakshmi Ammal under Exhibit A-1 was-only a life estate and not an absolute estate as contended by the learned
Counsel for the appellant. As to how the estate would devolve after the lifetime of Lakshmi Ammal is not a matter which could be gone into within
the narrow compass in a reference under sections'' 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act and the parties, if so advised, would agitate the
same separately.
I have already referred to the fact that the total amount of compensation is Rs. 67,815-30P. The particulars of the same are as under:-
Particulars of Land acquired:
Survey Number : 18/5.
Extent : 3.60 acres.
Particulars of trees, buildings, wells, etc., tree value 576-00 Particulars of compensation awards u/s 11 of the Land Acquisition Act.
@ Rs. 130 - per cent. Rs.
Land Value . . 47,840-00
Well value . . 1,700-00
15% Solatium . . 7,517-00
Interest: @ 4 per cent from
9th November, 1964 to
18th March, 1969 . . 1-10,18-00
___________
Total. . . 67,815-30
Date of possession of the land 9th November, 1964.
Mr. V.G. Veeraraghavan, learned Counsel for the appellant Lakshmi Ammal would be well entitled, even on my finding, to that interest from 9th
November, 1964 to 18th March, 1969 amounting to Rs. 10,181-90 P: I think this contention is well-founded. Therefore, straightaway Lakshmi
Ammal would be entitled to draw the sum of Rs. 10,181-90 P. and any Other interest which had accrued subsequent to that date which can be
drawn by her once in six months. The remaining, namely, the value of the land, value of the well, 15% solatium Would continue to remain in Court
deposit and will be available to the claimants only after the death of Lakshmi Ammal and that portion of the judgment of the Court below in
paragraph 12 is, therefore, set aside. The appeal will, accordingly, stand allowed to the extent indicated above, however, confirming the finding
that what was taken by Lakshmi Ammal is only a life estate. The parties will bear their respective costs.