Lakhan Prasad vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

“I. To quash the Miscellaneous order No. 108/2018 as contained in Memo No. 1306.09/2018 dated 19.03.2018 issued by the office of the learned District Judge, Purnia, whereby and whereunder it is ordered to recover the amount of worth Rs. 2,66,791/- (Two lac sixty-six thousand seven hundred ninety-one) from the salary of the petitioner, who is/was class - III employee (Clerk) in Civil Court Purnia, in terms of 12 instalments in which 11 equal instalments of Rs. 23,000/- and 12th instalment of Rs. 13,791/-, without appreciating the proper facts and prospective of law.

II. To hold and declare that the petitioner is entitled to get fixation of pay by granting the second modified assured career progression for Pay Band - 2 having Grade Pay of Rs. 5400/- under the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme as recommended by the 6th pay commission as well as 7th pay commission after considering the recommendation of Hon'ble Justice Shetty Commission and further hold and declare that he is also entitled to get payment of salary in view of the same by granting all consequential benefits.

III. To restore the recovered amount from the salary of petitioner being Class III employee, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and others versus Rafiq Masih, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law from employees belonging to class - III and class - IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D').

IV. For issuance of Pension Payment order by the concerned authority in view of the fixation of pay of the petitioner in correct prospective.

V. For payment of arrears of salary and pension along with statutory interests.

VI. For any other relief or reliefs for which petitioner is entitled to.”

“16.

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17.

In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons- who compete with "Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van Winkle". In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”

“11.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, the present writ petition stands dismissed, being barred by the principles of res judicata. This Court further finds that the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches as well, inasmuch as the petitioner has approached this Court belatedly after an unexplained delay of 26 years. Thus considering the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments, as referred to herein above in the preceding paragraphs, as also considering the maxim- “equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights”, this Court is of the view that since the petitioner has not filed the present writ petition within a reasonable period of time, this Court is not under any legal obligation to entertain the writ petition, especially considering the fact that the petitioner has not offered any reason whatsoever, for the enormous delay which has taken place in approaching this Court, hence, the present writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and latches as well.”