Ladli Parshad vs J.C. Chandiok

Teja Singh, C.J.—This is a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Kapurthala, dismissing the plaintiff''s suit for the recovery of Rs. 15,800, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

The plaintiff''s allegation was that the defendant wrote to him on 5-4-1946 at Hamira asking him for a loan of rupees fifteen thousand. Later on the defendant himself came to Hamira on 14-4-1946 and borrowed from the plaintiff the said amount by means of a cheque on the Oriental Bank of Commerce Limited, Lahore. The plaintiff further alleged that at the time the cheque was given to the defendant the latter agreed to pay interest at the rate of Re. 1/-/- per cent, per menses. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds one of them being that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit, because neither the defendant resided within the Court''s territorial jurisdiction nor the cause of action wholly or in part arose within the said jurisdiction. The Court framed five issues, but of these only the first issue, which related to the jurisdiction, was decided.

Two points have to be taken into consideration while deciding the question of jurisdiction, (1) whether the plaintiff gave the cheque for Rs. 15,000/-/- to the defendant at Hamira, and (ii) whether the giving of the cheque at Hamira brought the case within the purview of Clause (c) of S. 20. Civil P. C. (On the first point his Lordship held that the defendant obtained the cheque from the plaintiff at Hamira on 14-4-1946.)

This brings us now to the second point Section 20 Clause (c). Civil P.C., lays awn that subject to the limitations, mentioned in the previous section, a suit can be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action whiny or in part arises, in Muiti v. Bnoia Ram'', 16 All 165, the cause of action was defines as consisting of every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. The learned Judges emphasis that the cause of action does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove such fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved. The appellant''s (respondent''s ?) counsel contended that in the present case it was the giving of the loan that was the necessary fact that the plaintiff had to prove with a view to outing a decree against the defendant and the giving of the cheque was only a piece of evidence in support of the loan. In my opinion the contention is wholly devoid of force. In a suit of this Kind the cause of action does not constitute merely the giving of the moan but it consists of a bundle of tracts including the agreement relating to the loan, the piece where the plaintiff delivered to the defendant the cheque for the amount of the loan and the piece where the loan was to be paid back. A reference to the contents of the paint would show that the delivery of the cheque by the plaintiff to the defendant at Hamira was a distinct fact alleged by the plaintiff. It was also alleged in the plaint that the defendant got the cheque from the plaintiff for purposes of the loan. Since these facts were denied by the defendant it became incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish them in order to succeed in the suit and consequently Hamira was the piece where the plaintiff''s cause. of action arose in part. Our attention was drawn by the appellant''s counsel to Jivatlal Purtapshi Vs. Lalbhai Fulchand Shah, . The suit in that case was based upon a promissory note. While discussing where a cause of action in respect of a promissory note could arise this is what the learned Judge observed. The promissory note in a suit is a negotiable instrument. The cause of action on a negotiable instrument generally arises wherever any one of the facts, the proof of which is essential under the circumstances of the case, occurred. The place of the making of the promissory note is an essential part of the cause of action so as to give the Court of that place jurisdiction to try the suit on the note. The promissory note was executed at Ahmedabad and the Court at Ahmedabad would certainly have jurisdiction to try the suit on the note. It may sometimes happen that a promissory note is executed in one place but delivered to the promise at another place and that moneys due there under are payable at a third place. In such a case part of the cause of action arises at any one of these places, and a suit may be filed at any one of these places at the plaintiff''s option." The learned counsel for the appellant (respondent ?) made an effort to distinguish the above-mentioned case from the present case on the ground that the present case is not based on a cheque and it is a suit for the recovery of a loan. This is, no doubt, correct, but since no cash was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant and it was the cheque that constituted the loan, in my judgment the place where the defendant got the cheque from the plaintiff did give rise to a part of the cause of action and the plaintiff had a right to institute the suit in the civil Courts of Kapurthala within whose territorial jurisdiction Hamira was situate.

In the result I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remand the case for decision on merits under O. 41, R. 23. Court-fees paid on appeal shall be refunded, other costs will abide the event. The parties have been directed to cause their respective clients to appear before the trial Court on 5-11-1951.

Gurnam Singh, J.

I agree.