Labhoo Ram vs Seetal

D.K. Mahajan, J.—This petition for revision is directed against the concurrent decisions of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller dismissing the landlords application for eviction of the respondent. On facts there is no dispute. The landlord was employed as an Assistant Accounts Officer and after his retirement was serving in the same capacity in Dehradun. As soon as his extended service came to an end, he came back to Ambala and occupied a part of the house in dispute. A part of this house is in occupation of the respondent. The other part was in occupation of one Banke. The landlord filed an application for eviction of the respondent on the 22nd of February, 1965 inter alia on the ground that the accomodation with him was insufficient for his own requirements. The other grounds which were raised are no longer in controversy and I have not, therefore, noticed them. During the pendency of the application, on the 22nd of September 1965, Banke surrendered the possession and with the consent of the landlord the premises were rented out to Miss Paul. It has been found as a fact by the Rent Controller that the accommodation with the landlord was insufficient for his requirements. In other words, need for more accommodation was bona fide But in spite of this finding the application was dismissed because Banke''s accommodation fell vacant and according to the Rent Controller that accommodation would have met the requirements of the landlord fully and, therefore, he should not have agreed to rent it out to Miss Paul. It is on this ground alone that the petition has failed.

On appeal the Appellate Authority remitted the case to the Rent Controller for a finding whether the landlord had vacated the premises without any reasonable cause after the passing of the Act. The Rent Controller returned the finding that the landlord had not vacated any premises within the urban area of Ambala Cantt, without any reasonable cause after the passing of the Act. After the report, the Appellate Authority proceeded to deal with the landlord''s appeal. The Appellate Authority rejected the application on the same ground on which the Rent Controller had rejected the landlord''s application, namely, the landlord''s consent to the letting of premises in occupation of Banke to Miss Paul would necessarily, lead to the dismissal of the eviction application. It is against this decision that the present application for revision has been preferred.

In my opinion, the petition must succeed because the entire approach to the application of the landlord by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Rent Controller is legally erroneous. It is well settled that the bonafides of the landlord claiming eviction of his tenant are to be seen at the time the claim for eviction is made. In this connection, reference may be made to C.L. Davar v. Amar Nath Kapur (1963) 65 P.L.R. 644, Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Parshad Seth (1954) 56 P.L.R. 545, and Shrimati Lita Tully v. S. Gopal Singh (1962) 64 P.L.R. 441, at the time when the application was made there were two tenants in the premises, the respondent and Banke. The landlord had the choice either to evict Banke or the respondent. He exercised his choice to evict the respondent. It has been found as a fact that the accommodation in his possession was insufficient. According to the landlord, the accommodation in possession of respondent if made available to him would meet his requirements and that is why he chose to evict the respondent. The question that arises is whether the later vacation of premises by Banke after six months of the application for eviction would in any manner adversely effect the same. In my opinion, it will not. There is no provision in the statute which warrants the dismissal of such an application merely because subsequently certain part of the premises in possession of another tenant falls vacant. It may be that the accommodation which calls vacant is not suitable so far as the landlord is concerned or it may be(sic)lar more than his requirement. If he were to keep part of that accommodation with himself the surplus accommodation may not be capable of renting out. Therefore, the mere fortuitous circumstances that a part of the building in possession of another tenant falls vacant cannot lead to the dismissal of the application which was otherwise bonafide and was in accordance with law. For instance, it the application had been granted before the 22nd of September, 1965, when the premises fell vacant, could the petition be dismissed thereafter on the ground that a few days later another tenant vacated the premises which would satisfy the requirements of the landlord. To this problem the answer given by the Learned Counsel for the respondent was that this would not nullify the cider of eviction. How can then the fortuitous circumstances that before an order for eviction is passed a part of the premises falls vacant could merit the dismissal of the eviction petition. As already stated if the intention of the Legislature was that accommodation which may fall vacant during the pendency of the eviction petition were to lead to the dismissal of the eviction petition, a provision to that effect would have been made. On the contrary the provision is that before the application is made the landlord has to satisfy the Rent Controller that he did not vacate any premises in his occupation in order to secure eviction of the tenant. In these circumstances, it appears to me that the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority had misdirected themselves in taking into consideration the vacation of premises by Banke on the 22nd September, 1965, for the purpose of rejecting the landlord''s application. There is no legal basis which would warrant such a result.

In this view of the matter I allow this petition, quash the orders of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller and direct that the tenant be evicted from the premises I, however, allow three months'' time to the tenant to vacate the premises. There will be no as to costs.