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Judgment
HARKESH MANUJA, J. (ORAL)
Vide this common order, the aforementioned two appeals shall stand disposed of as they involve common questions of law and fact. For the sake of brevity, the facts are culled out from SAO-21-2025.
By way of present appeal(s), challenge has been laid to the decision dated 17.04.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Karnal (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate Court”) whereby, the appeals preferred at the instance of objectors were allowed and the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court dismissing their objections was set aside with the following observations:-
“Hence the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Court of Ms. Ruhela Sharma, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Karnal is set aside and learned Trial Court is directed to decide the objections after framing issues and leading of evidence by both the sides. Memo of cost be prepared accordingly. Copy of this judgment along with LCR be sent back to learned Trial Court for compliance. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.”
Before proceeding further, it may be relevant to understand the relationship between the parties to the lis through the following pedigree table:
The present dispute relates to the estate left by Bahadur Singh who died somewhere in the year 1947-48 leaving behind the following land parcels:
i)104 kanals 1 marla of land in village Samani, District Kurukshetra.
ii) 206 kanals 2 marlas of land in village Samana Bahu, District Karnal.
iii) 66 kanals 14 marlas of land in village Manchuri, District Karnal.
Upon death of Bahadur Singh, his estate was mutated in the name of his widow Gurbachan Kaur vide mutation No.1178 entered on 12.02.1956. Gurbachan Kaur entered into Karewa; marriage with one Jaimal Singh and as such, the above estate was mutated in favour of Labh Kaur d/o Bahadur Singh vide mutation No.1179 sanctioned on 14.06.1956 on the basis of succession due to Karewa by Gurbachan Kaur; as recorded in the mutation. Labh Kaur, who had been residing with Amir Singh and others (collaterals of her deceased father), got married to one Sahab Singh in the year 1976. In the year 1991, she intended to sell some part of her land in the revenue estate of village Samani and, as such, requested Amir Singh and others to part with possession thereof. She was, however, confronted with an alleged decree dated 28.04.1972, said to have been suffered voluntarily by her in favour of Amir Singh, Lakha Singh, Sahab Singh and Joga Singh in respect of the entire estate left by the deceased Bahadur Singh, followed by mutation No.1655 sanctioned on 22.03.1973.
Soon thereafter, on 24.05.1991, Labh Kaur filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of possession and also for permanent injunction, which was decreed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Karnal vide judgment and decree dated 11.04.2002. However, the first appeal preferred by Amir Singh, Lakha Singh, Sahab Singh and Joga Singh was allowed on 07.01.2003 and consequently, the suit preferred by Labh Kaur was dismissed. Thereafter, RSA-1239-2003 titled as “Labh Kaur vs. Amir Singh and others” was allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 28.02.2022. The adjudication made by this Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court with the dismissal of SLP (C) No.8466 of 2023 preferred by Amir Singh and others on 24.04.2023. Based on the determination made by this Court on 28.02.2022 in favour of Labh Kaur, an execution application (Execution Petition No.451 of 2022, instituted on 17.10.2022) was preferred, in which warrants of possession were issued on 19.07.2023, whereafter the following 3 sets of objections came to be preferred:
| SET 1 | SET 2 | SET 3 |
|---|---|---|
| Objection petition dated 20.10.2023 under Section 47 of CPC preferred by: 1. Amir Singh 2. Lakha Singh (since deceased) 3. Yodbeer Singh s/o Takhvinder Singh. | Objection petition dated 22.02.2024 under Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 97(2) of CPC by: 1. Surjeet Kaur 2. Karamveer Singh 3. Parminder Kaur (All successors of Takhvinder Singh). | Objection petition by 1. Sanjay 2. Satpal 3. Parveen 4. Dheeraj claiming themselves to be bona fide purchasers through 2 separate sale deeds dated 25.05.1989 and 08.12.1989 with respect to land parcels measuring 33 kanals 7 marlas and 6 kanals 13 marlas respectively from the revenue estate of village Manchuri, District Karnal, through the judgment debtors. |
The present adjudication deals with the first and second sets of objections.
In short, the case set up in the objection petitions was inter alia to the following effect:-
Gurbachan Kaur, widow of Bahadur Singh, having entered into Karewa marriage with Jaimal Singh in the year 1955, lost even limited right in the estate of her deceased husband; both under customary law and in terms of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act, 1856 (hereinafter referred to as the “1856 Act”). The estate thereupon devolved upon Aroor Singh, the only surviving reversioner of Bahadur Singh and the grandfather of the judgment debtors as well as of Takhvinder Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the third party objectors. Upon the death of Aroor Singh in the year 1981, the estate devolved upon his successors, and the objectors, claiming through him who became co-sharers in possession thereof and were not bound by the decree. It was further pleaded that since the claim of the objectors was founded on inheritance, the objections were not hit by the law of limitation.
The aforesaid contentions were contested by the decree holder. The learned Executing Court vide order dated 14.02.2025 dismissed both sets of objections. Aggrieved thereof, two sets of objectors filed two separate civil miscellaneous appeals, i.e., CMA-29-2025 and CMA-28-2025 which came to be disposed of by the learned First Appellate Court vide decision dated 17.04.2025 whereby, the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court was set aside and the learned Executing Court was directed to decide the objections afresh upon framing of issues and leading of evidence by both the sides. Hence, the present appeals.
CONTENTIONS
ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
The short point raised on behalf of the appellant is that the objections filed by the judgment debtors as well as third party objectors (legal heirs of Takhvinder Singh) were meritless and filed just to stall the process of execution of the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2022 passed by this Court in favour of Labh Kaur after a long drawn litigation of more than 30 years. He points out that the learned First Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the well-reasoned order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court while remitting the matter for fresh adjudication upon framing of issues and recording of evidence. The pleas sought to be so adjudicated upon were never raised by the judgment debtors during the trial of the suit, nor by Takhvinder Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the third party objectors, during his lifetime, especially when he happened to be the brother of two of the judgment debtors, namely, Amir Singh and Lakha Singh (originally defendant Nos.1 and 2 respectively). He thus submits that the impugned decision dated 17.04.2025 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is liable to be set aside.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents (judgment debtors as well as third party objectors) relating to set Nos.1 and 2 of the objections presses upon the specific plea raised in the objection petitions to the effect that upon performance of Karewa by Gurbachan Kaur w/o Bahadur Singh, the entire estate was to devolve upon Aroor Singh, the reversioner of Bahadur Singh, through whom the judgment debtors as well as the third party objectors claim. He thus, submits that the specific plea to the aforesaid effect raised by the objectors needed evidence especially, when the case set up was that the estate in the hands of Bahadur Singh was ancestral in nature and thus, the adjudication thereupon required framing of issues as well as leading of evidence by the respective parties. He submits that the decision dated 17.04.2025, being well-reasoned, calls for no interference and the present appeals are liable to be dismissed.
DISCUSSION AND REASONING
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper-book. I find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.
A perusal of the pedigree table shows that admittedly, the objectors in relation to the present appeals are the judgment debtors namely, Amir Singh and Lakha Singh (since deceased) besides the successors of Takhvinder Singh, namely, Surjeet Kaur his widow, his sons Yodbeer Singh and Karamveer Singh and his daughter Parminder Kaur. Evidently, no case relating to the estate left by Bahadur Singh devolving upon Aroor Singh by virtue of custom or any plea in terms of Section 2 of the 1856 Act was raised by the judgment debtors in the civil suit filed by Labh Kaur. Such factual and legal pleas which do not lead to any patent jurisdictional error in passing of the judgment and decree in favour of Labh Kaur ought to have been raised during the adjudication of the suit, thus, cannot be permitted to be raised at this belated stage of execution, after the decree has attained finality. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Periyammal (Dead) and others vs. V. Rajamani and another” reported as 2025(9) SCC 568. Relevant para No.63 thereof is reproduced hereunder:
“63.What flows from the position of law, as afore stated, is that the issues that ought to have been raised by the parties during the adjudication of the original suit cannot be determined by the executing court as such adjudication may undermine the decree itself. This Court in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi reported in (2021) 6 SCC 418 has held that the benefit of Section 47 cannot be availed to conduct a retrial causing failure of realisation of fruits of the decree. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:
"24.In respect of execution of a decree, section 47 CPC contemplates adjudication of limited nature of issues relating to execution i.e. discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is aligned with the consequential provisions of Order 21 CPC. Section 47 is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits. It simply lays down the procedure and the form whereby the court reaches a decision. For the applicability of the section, two essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the question must be the one arising between the parties and secondly, the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is to prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as expeditiously as possible. 25. These provisions contemplate that for execution of decrees, executing court must not go beyond the decree. However, there is steady rise of proceedings akin to a retrial at the time of execution causing failure of realisation of fruits of decree and relief which the party seeks from the courts despite there being a decree in their favour. Experience has shown that various objections are filed before the executing court and the decree-holder is deprived of the fruits of the litigation and the judgment-debtor, in abuse of process of law, is allowed to benefit from the subject-matter which he is otherwise not entitled to. 26. The general practice prevailing in the subordinate courts is that invariably in all execution applications, the courts first issue show-cause notice asking the judgment-debtor as to why the decree should not be executed as is given under Order 21, Rule 22 for certain class of cases. However, this is often misconstrued as the beginning of a new trial. For example, the judgment-debtor sometimes misuses the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2 and Order 21, Rule 11 to set up an oral plea, which invariably leaves no option with the court but to record oral evidence which may be frivolous. This drags the execution proceedings indefinitely. 27. This is antithesis to the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code, which stipulates that in civil suit, all questions and issues that may arise, must be decided in one and the same trial. Order 1 and Order 2 which relate to parties to suits and frame of suits with the object of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, provides for joinder of parties and joinder of cause of action so that common questions of law and facts could be decided at one go."” 12. Further, Takhvinder Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the third party objectors, who happened to be the real brother of the judgment debtors namely, Amir Singh and Lakha Singh, never during his lifetime tried to set up any claim with respect to the estate left by the deceased Bahadur Singh especially when the estate, after the death of Bahadur Singh, was mutated in the name of Gurbachan Kaur vide mutation No.1178, then in favour of Labh Kaur vide mutation No.1179 dated 14.06.1956, and later in favour of his two brothers, Amir Singh and Lakha Singh, and his two cousins, Sahab Singh and Joga Singh, vide mutation No.1655 dated 22.03.1973 (since set aside in the civil suit preferred by Labh Kaur), none of which was ever questioned by him. As noted by the learned Executing Court, even Aroor Singh, through whom the objectors trace their claim and who died in the year 1981, as well as Sadha Singh and Shisha Singh, who died in the years 2003 and 2005 respectively, never challenged the aforesaid mutations or claimed any right in the estate as reversioners during their lifetime.
It is also pertinent to mention that the civil suit preferred by Labh Kaur, decree holder (since deceased), remained under adjudication for almost 32 years, yet, neither Takhvinder Singh during his lifetime nor the third party objectors, who are closely related to the judgment debtors, ever sought impleadment in the civil suit for the purpose of setting up any independent claim with respect to the estate left by Bahadur Singh. The learned Executing Court rightly found it highly implausible that the objectors, who claim to be co-owners in joint possession along with the judgment debtors, were unaware of the litigation between Labh Kaur and the judgment debtors from 1991 till 2023. Therefore, the third party objections preferred by the successors of the deceased Takhvinder Singh are devoid of merit, being preferred by fence sitters just to stall the execution of the well-earned decree of Labh Kaur. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Challani Ginning And Pressing Factory vs Kamal” reported as 2026(2) RCR (Civil) 773 wherein an objection by the mother of the judgment debtor, claiming a share in the attached property as joint family property only when dispossession was threatened, was held to be a deliberate attempt to stall the recovery and the order of the High Court holding that she ought to have been permitted to lead evidence was set aside. Relevant paragraph Nos.7 and 8 thereof are reproduced hereunder:
“7.The Executing Court and the Appellate Court have also found that there were two other properties in the same locality. Plot no. 10, belonging to the objector and plot no. 49 belonging to her other son; transacted individually by them despite a claim having been now raised by the objector that the properties acquired by the mother and the brothers were acquired with the nucleus of the joint family business. The other son had also entered into a similar transaction based on which Special Civil Suit No. 26/2014 had also been decreed in a like manner. It is also pertinent that the attachment in the execution proceedings with respect to the property, which is the subject matter of the present proceedings, being plot no. 11, was affixed in a conspicuous part of the property on 21.09.2017. The objector having asserted that she was all along residing in the said property, cannot feign ignorance of the execution proceedings and delay a proper objection being taken up till dispossession is threatened. The suit was decreed in 2017, and the execution proceedings are pending for the last nine years, when several objections were raised, all of which stood declined. A further objection by the mother of the original judgment debtor claiming 1/3rd share in the property at this stage, when all along the mother and the sons were carrying on the business together, to further the prospects of which, the loan admittedly was taken, is a deliberate attempt to stall the recovery.
8.We find absolutely no reason to sustain the impugned order. The facts are clear and the objection was declined on a proper consideration of the same. The opportunity to lead evidence and prove the claim of co-ownership of the subject property has been proffered merely on a possibility of the claim being sustainable, especially when there was nothing produced to prima facie substantiate such a claim and the obvious facts being clearly against such a claim. On the above reasoning, we set aside the impugned order and restore the order of the Executing Court affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court, rejecting the objection. The property, if not handed over as yet shall be expeditiously vacated and handed over to the appellant by the Executing Court. The appeal stands allowed.”
In view of the above, it is more than apparent from the record that the alleged third party objectors, who are the successors of Takhvinder Singh, are pursuing a proxy litigation on behalf of the judgment debtors. They claim no title independent of the judgment debtors, as their claim is traced through Shisha Singh and Aroor Singh, the very line through which the judgment debtors themselves claim. Nor do they assert any possession of their own, but only joint possession along with the judgment debtors, whose possession, as found in the suit, rested on a decree which was never passed. The learned Executing Court rightly held that they are, in substance, neither judgment debtors nor true third parties. Moreover, the first set of objections has even been preferred jointly by 2 of the judgment debtors namely, Amir Singh and Lakha Singh along with Yodbeer Singh s/o Takhvinder Singh, who claims himself to be a third party; therefore, the collusive objections deserve to be rejected outright. This is further borne out from the unfair conduct of the judgment debtors as recorded by this Court in its judgment dated 28.02.2022 in RSA-1239-2003. The relevant portion thereof is extracted hereunder:-
“What further corroborates the stand of the trial Court is illustrative from the report of the record room that no such record of the judgment/decree was available nor any entry has been made in the goshwara register and which is as is reflected from Ex.D-2 is primarily carrying cuttings, interpolations and over writings to substantiate the stand of the defendants now respondents. As has been argued on behalf of the appellant that even the rapat roznamcha (Ex. D-4) does not carry particulars of the Executing Court nor the name and designation of the authority which has entered in this roznamcha entry. More so, had there been a judgment/decree in question as claimed by the respondents in view of the assertion made by the counsel for the respondent, no such certified copy has been brought on the record much less any photostat copy of the same. What one can perceive from the impugned findings of the First Appellate Court that the Court is trying to side with the defendants now respondents on own presumptions and assumptions which are never supported on the records and none of the ratios cited by Mr. S.S. Salar, Advocate advanced the case of the respondents.
As has been observation of the Supreme Court of India and which is reproduced as below:-
"'Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal' observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree - by the first court or by the highest court - has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings."
Since, the plaintiff has clearly on the basis and strength of the revenue record an invariable admission of ownership by the then defendants now respondents of Labh Kaur and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited once she has established her title on the strength of the revenue records which remain undisplaced on the records. Being a case of fraud and deception, whereby, the plaintiff has sought her reassertion of her title and, therefore, being a recurring cause of action cannot be barred by any plea of limitation that too by perpetrators of such a fraud. Since, the respondents have been found guilty and convicted for such a fraud and on account of such illegal and fraudulent acts, the stand needs to be deprecated. The learned Trial Court has given a well reasoned findings and has rightly returned its findings holding that the plaintiff happens to be the owner of the suit property and, thus, is entitled to its possession and the findings of the learned Trial Court and all the issues are upheld. The impugned judgment/decree under assail is wholly illegal and needs to be set aside by way of the acceptance of the instant appeal. The present appeal stands allowed accordingly.”
Equally, the submission that the estate in the hands of Bahadur Singh was ancestral and therefore required evidence, does not merit acceptance. Such a plea was never raised by the judgment debtors in the suit and runs contrary to what this Court recorded on 28.02.2022, namely, that Bahadur Singh was the absolute owner in possession of the suit land and died leaving behind Labh Kaur and his widow as his lone heirs. These findings have attained finality and the learned Executing Court cannot go behind them. The learned First Appellate Court thus permitted evidence merely on a possibility of the claim being sustainable, which is precisely what the Hon’ble Apex Court deprecated in Challani Ginning And Pressing Factory (supra).
As regards the plea that a claim founded on inheritance is not subject to any period of limitation, this Court, at this juncture, need not delve into the question of limitation, as the objections fail at the threshold itself. The learned Executing Court, even while proceeding on the premise that inheritance can be claimed at any point of time, examined the plea on merits and found no substratum therein. The question, therefore, is not one of limitation for a suit founded on inheritance, but whether a plea available to Aroor Singh from 1956 onwards and to the judgment debtors throughout the suit, and never raised by either of them, can be permitted to be raised at the stage of execution, after the decree has attained finality. As already held hereinabove, it cannot.
Accordingly, the objections preferred by the respondents, being frivolous and highly belated, call for no further adjudication and there is no occasion for framing of issues or recording of evidence thereon.
RELIEF
In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, both appeals are allowed. The decision dated 17.04.2025 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is set aside and the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court is restored. The objections preferred by the respondents, being a proxy litigation to stall the execution of the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2022 passed by this Court in favour of Labh Kaur (since deceased), stand dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
