AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
S.S. Subramani, J.—Petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 2560 of 1998 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai is the revision
petitioner herein. This revision is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India.
Vehicle belonging to petitioner. Tata Sumo car bearing registration No.Ka-17-2042 was seized as per Section 41 of Tamil Nadu Forests Act,
1882 and first information report was registered on 23.9.1997.
It is the case of petitioner that he came to know about the seizure of vehicle by Forest Department very late and when he was served with notice
of confiscation, he preferred a revision against the order before the Conservator of Forests, Vellore. But, no orders have been passed on the
same. Therefore, petitioner filed W.P. No. 14037 of 1998 for the issuance of writ of mandamus directing Conservator of Forests to pass final
orders.
When the matter in writ petition came up for argument before High Court, it was pointed out that against the order of confiscation, an appeal
alone lies before District Court. In view of this observation by Honourable High Court, petitioner withdrew the writ petition. Thereafter, petitioner
filed appeal before District Court with an application to condone delay of 319 days in filing the appeal, stating the reasons for the delay.
A detailed counter has been filed by the Public Prosecutor who opposed condonation of delay on the ground that sufficient reason has not been
made out.
By the impugned order, lower court found that even though filing of writ petition is not disputed, petitioner ought to have filed copy of the order.
Lower court also found that petitioner was awaiting orders of Conservator of Forests in the revision petition and subsequently filed writ petition
and therefore he was not able to file appeal in time. But, lower court rejected this explanation on the ground that petitioner himself admitted that
there is a delay of 319 days in filing appeal. Lower court further found that no tangible reason is given for excusing the inordinate delay.
I heard the learned Government pleader also.
In a recent decision of Honourable Supreme Court reported in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, , their Lordships considered this
question and in paragraphs 10 to 13 held thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for
approaching the court in different situation is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek
their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a
life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux
of time, newer causes would spurt up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for
each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics
but seek their remedy promptly. The ideal is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay
in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words ""sufficient cause"" u/s 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide: Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari and Others, and The State of West Bengal
Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others, .
It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to
turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory
startegy. The court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by
the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should
not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It
would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the
opposite party for his loss.
[Italics supplied]
In the earlier portion of the Judgment in paragraph 9, their Lordships also held thus,
It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion
can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.
Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a
very long range can also be cordoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory....
[Italics supplied]
If this is the principle that is to be applied. I do not think that the impugned order satisfies the grounds. Lower Court did not say that petitioner
has come to court with mala fide or with an oblique motive or he has filed the application only to protract the litigation. In this case, petitioner was
prosecuting proceedings before Conservator of Forest and also before this Court in writ petition. According to petitioner, he bona fide believed
that Conservator of Forests will hear the revision and pass orders. When no orders have been passed, he moved this Court in writ petition. Only
then, he understood that proceedings before Conservator of Forests or writ petition are not the right remedy, but he has to file an appeal before
District Court against the order of confiscation. Can it be said that such an explanation is mala fide or intended to protract the litigation? I do not
think so nor lower court entered finding in that way against petitioner.
Following the decision of Honourable Supreme Court cited supra, I feel it is the fit case where delay ought to have been condoned. Lower
court has acted illegally in rejecting application to condone delay in filing appeal before District court.
In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. Delay of 319 days in filing appeal is condoned and lower
court is directed to register the criminal appeal and proceed with the same in accordance with law. No costs.