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Judgment
The petitioner in this petition was earlier employed in the 1st respondent-Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''the Corporation''). After his retirement, he has enrolled himself as an Advocate. In this petition, he has called in question the validity of Regulation 229-A of the Karnataka Electricity Board Employees'' Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as ''the Regulations'') and also has prayed for quashing of the communication dated 12th January, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-D to the writ petition.
Sri S.V. Prakash, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of the prayer of the petitioner, made three submissions. Firstly, he submitted that the communication Annexure-D is totally illegal and suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the said communication has been issued on wrong understanding of Regulation 229-A of the Regulations. It is his submission that since the petitioner has enrolled himself as an Advocate after his retirement from the service of the Corporation, Regulation 229-A of the Regulations cannot be made applicable to the petitioner as he has become an Advocate. According to the learned Counsel, the Regulation in question can be applied to such of the retired employees of the Corporation who have not enrolled themselves as Advocates and who claim to represent the consumers before the Appellate Authorities. Secondly, he submitted that Regulation 229-A of the Regulations is also liable to be declared as unconstitutional, on the ground that it is highly arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory in nature and violative of the rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Elaborating this submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the classification made to prevent the retired employees of the Corporation from appearing before the Appellate Authorities of the Board is highly unreasonable and discriminatory in nature. It is his submission that when large number of other retired employees who were in the services of the Government and other institutions are allowed to appear before the Appellate Authorities, only the former employees of the Corporation are prevented from appearing before the Appellate Authorities of the Board. According to the learned Counsel, there is absolutely no nexus or rationale in the classification made with the object sought to be achieved. Finally, he submitted that the regulation impugned also interferes with the right of the petitioner to carry on his profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
However, Sri N.K. Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents strongly repelling all the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Regulation in question has been framed keeping in mind the public interest and also the interest of the administration of the Corporation. He pointed out that the Regulation in question would apply to such of those employees who after retirement from the service of the Corporation, have enrolled themselves as Advocates. According to him, the purpose of the Regulation is to prevent the employees of the Corporation from appearing before the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation as it was felt that former employees of the Corporation would have developed intimacy, close association with the members of the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation and also would have the facility of having access to the files and other records of the Corporation and the same would not be in the interest of the Corporation. Elaborating this submission, he pointed out that the First Appellate Authority of the Corporation would constitute employees of the rank of Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineers. In this background, if a Chief Engineer who had the advantage of working with his subordinates is to appear before an Appellate Authority who is only in the Rank of an Executive Engineer, it is likely to affect his objectivity while taking a decision. He further pointed out that a restriction is made preventing former employees of the Corporation who have become Advocates from appearing before the Appellate Authority for aperiod of four years from the date of retirement; and the restriction so imposed is a reasonable restriction even if it is to be examined from the point of view of the petitioner''s right to carry on his profession. It is his further submission that insofar as the petitioner who is an Advocate is concerned, he has no right apart from the right provided to him under the Advocates Act. It is the contention of Sri Gupta that when Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not yet been given effect to, the petitioner has no right to appear before any Tribunal or an authority like the Appellate Authority constituted by the Corporation. Therefore, he points out that the Regulation in question does not affect any of the rights of the petitioner. He also pointed out that Article 220 of the Constitution prevents Judges of the High Court from pleading or acting before any Court or Authority except before the Supreme Court and other High Courts. Therefore, when restrictions are imposed on the Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court from pleading or acting before any Court as set out in Article 220 of the Constitution of India, the restriction imposed on a former employee of the Board from appearing before the Appellate Authority of the Corporation for a period of four years from the date of his retirement cannot be held as either unreasonable or arbitrary.
In the light of the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, the two questions that would arise for consideration are:
(i) Whether Regulation 229-A of the Regulations does not apply to a retired employee of the Corporation who has enrolled himself as an Advocate?
(ii) Whether the Regulation 229-A is illegal and unconstitutional?
Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, it is useful to refer to Regulation 229-A of the Regulations which reads as hereunder:
"229-A. The retired employees of the Board, irrespective of the cadre/group to which they belong shall not be permitted to appear before the Appellate Authorities of the Board as representatives on behalf of the consumers, in the appeal cases for a period of 4 years from the date of their retirement".
Now, the first question is whether Regulation 229-A of the Regulations has no application insofar as it relates to retired employees who have enrolled themselves as Advocates are concerned, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Regulation 229-A does not make any distinction whether such a retired employee appears in his capacity as an authorised representative of somebody or as an Advocate. An Advocate also represents the cause of third parties, i.e., his clients by virtue of the provisions contained in the Advocates Act, 1961. In my view, merely because the retired employee has enrolled himself as an Advocate, he does not cease to be a retired employee of the Corporation. "Retired employee" is a permanent status such an employee acquires for having been in service of the Corporation. His enrolment as an Advocate is an additional qualification obtained by such a retired employee to carry on his profession as an Advocate subject to the terms and conditions and obligations imposed under the Advocates Act and Rules framed thereunder. Further, the object of the Regulation is to prevent retired employees of the Corporation from appearing before the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation for a limited period of four years. The emphasis is on the retired employee. The said Regulation has been made as contended by Sri Gupta, keeping in mind larger public interest and the interest of the Corporation. Therefore, if the Regulation is so understood as noticed by me earlier, merely because a retired employee gets himself enrolled as an Advocate, it will not take away the disability imposed on him from appearing before the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation. Therefore, the first contention of Sri Prakash is held against the petitioner.
Now, the next question is whether Regulation 229-A is required to be declared as illegal and void in law on the grounds urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. As noticed by me earlier, the learned Counsel has challenged the validity of the Regulation on two grounds. Now, let me examine whether the Regulation in question is required to be declared as unconstitutional on the ground of the same being violative of the rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Regulation in question takes away the right of a former employee of the Corporation to appear before the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation as representatives on behalf of the consumers in appeal cases for a period of four years from the date of retirement. The restriction imposed on a retired employee of the Corporation from appearing before the Appellate Authorities is limited only for a period of four years from the date of retirement. Further, the restriction imposed is only from appearing on behalf of consumers before the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation and that too, in appeal cases. Regulation 2.05 of the Karnataka Electricity Board Electricity Supply Regulations, 1988, defines a consumer and the same reads as follows.-
""Consumer" shall mean a person whose installation is supplied with Electricity and/or who has executed an agreement with the Board for supply of Electricity, and includes any person whose installation is, for the time being, connected for the purpose of receiving Electricity or whose installation has been disconnected".
Therefore, from the reading of the definition of "consumer", it is clear that "consumer" means a person whose installation is supplied with electricity and/or who has entered into an agreement with the Board for supply of electricity and includes any person whose installation is connected for the purpose of electricity or whose installation has been disconnected. It is only in cases of limited disputes between the Corporation and the consumer, a retired employee of the Corporation is prevented from appearing before the Appellate Authorities for a period of four years from the date of retirement. But, in cases of other disputes, there is no restriction put on the retired employee of the Corporation appearing before the Appellate Authorities. It is the case of the Corporation that such a restriction has been imposed keeping in mind larger public interest and the interest of the administration. I find considerable force in the submission of Sri Gupta that if the retired employees of the Corporation are allowed to appear before the Appellate Authorities, it is likely to result in an embarrassment to the officers presiding over as Appellate Authorities, as on many occasions such of the members of the Appellate Authorities would have worked under the retired employee of the Corporation who might appear before them; and such retired employees of the Corporation also may have access to the records maintained by the Corporation easily than others, which if permitted, on many occasions may harm larger public interest and the interest of the Corporation. Under these circumstances, if the Corporation has framed the impugned Regulation preventing a retired employee of the Corporation from appearing before the Appellate Authorities as representative on behalf of the consumers in appeal cases for a period of four years, in my view, such a restriction cannot be treated either as unreasonable or arbitrary or discriminatory or violative of the rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The object of the Regulation, it appears to me, is to maintain purity in administration and objectivity in disposal of cases by the members of the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation. It is needless to state that the Appellate Authorities of the Corporation are all Engineers and Executive Officers in the Corporation. Their perception to the rights of the parties on many occasions cannot be equated to the perception of a Judicial Officer or a Judge of High Court. Further, Rule 7 of the Bar Council of India Rules framed by the Bar Council of India in exercise of the power conferred on it under Section 49 of the Act, prohibits an officer after his retirement or otherwise ceasing to be in service, from practising as an Advocate for a period of two years in the area in which he exercised jurisdiction for a period of three years before his retirement or otherwise ceasing to be in service. The said Rule reads as follows.-
"7. An officer after his retirement or otherwise ceasing to be in service shall not practice for a period of two years in the area in which he exercised jurisdiction for a period of 3 years before his retirement or otherwise ceasing to be in service.
Resolved that nothing in these rules shall prevent any such person from practising in any Court or Tribunal or authority of superior jurisdiction to one in which he held office.
Explanation.-''Officer'' shall include a Judicial Officer, Additional Judge of the High Court and Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal or authority or such other officer or authority as referred to in Section 30 of the Act.
''Area'' shall mean area in which the person concerned exercising jurisdiction".
@BODY-LSP = 7. The object behind Rule 7 of the Rules is to maintain purity and transparency in administration of justice and not to give an impression in the minds of the litigant public that the officer who had the advantage of knowing his colleagues in the discharge of his duties would have certain advantages. Therefore, if a professional body like the Bar Council of India has imposed restrictions on an officer who retires from service, from practising in the area from where he has retired or ceased to be an officer for a period of two years, if a restriction similar to the said Rule is also provided in the Rules framed by the Corporation, it cannot be said that the Rule is either arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory in nature or in any manner interferes with the right to carry on profession guaranteed to the petitioner. Further, as noticed by me earlier even in respect of the permanent Judges of the High Court the Constitution of India imposes a restriction either from acting or pleading before any Court or Authority except the Supreme Court and other High Courts than the one in which he was a permanent Judge. The object of the Regulation in question, in my view to a large extent helps to maintain transparency and purity in administration, more particularly when the Appellate Authorities are required to dispose of the disputes pending before them as quasi-judicial authorities.
Now, one other question that would arise for consideration is whether the impugned regulation also affects the right to carry on profession guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner? In my view, it is not so. The right to carry on profession as an Advocate, is a statutory right provided under the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961. It is not in dispute that Section 30 of the Advocates Act which confers a right to an Advocate to practice throughout the territories before all Courts, Tribunals or any other authority, has not yet been given effect to, though the profession has been agitating for such rights for the last nearly thirty years. Further, even if it is held that the petitioner has a right to carry on his profession representing the cause of somebody either in his capacity as an Advocate or as a member of the public, in my view the impugned Regulation which curtails the said right for a limited period must be treated as a reasonable restriction imposed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Regulation is liable to be declared as one being contrary to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
In the light of the discussion made above, I do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, this petition is rejected.