High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 09 MAD CK 1551

Kurinji Poo Mahalir Self Helping Group vs The Secretary To Government Of Tamil Nadu & Ors.

Madras High Court, Madurai Bench · Decided on 9 September 2026 · Citation: 2025 INSC 362

HON’BLE JUDGES
C.V. Karthikeyan, J · R. Sakthivel, J
CASE NUMBER
WA.(MD)No.1298 of 2026 and CMP.(MD)No.11116 of 2026

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Judgment

27 paragraphs · 1,683 words

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by C.V. KARTHIKEYAN, J.)

The writ appeal had been filed by the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.19713 of 2026 aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition by an order dated 14.07.2026 by the learned Single Judge.

2.

The appellant herein had participated in a tender process consequent to a tender notification issued on 10.06.2026 to run canteen at Virudhunagar Government Medical College Hospital, Virudhunagar for the year 2026-2029. In the notification, it had been stated that the tender application should be submitted on or before 02.07.2026. The petitioner had submitted the tender documents on 01.07.2026. She submitted the documents for the technical bid and quoted her bid amount at Rs.72,900/- for the canteen at new Building Complex near East entrance and Rs.46,800/- for the canteen near Maternity Complex near North entrance. It had been stated that however, the bids were opened only on 03.07.2026. The appellant had raised objections for postponing the opening of the tender from 02.07.2026 to 03.07.2026. When the technical bids were opened, the bids offered by the appellant were rejected on the ground that the solvency certificate did not contain the date, month and year. The appellant sought for the documents of the proceedings, which took place on 03.07.2026. The same had not been furnished. It was under those circumstances, challenging the tender process, the writ petition had been filed.

3.

It was further submitted that the practise of seeking solvency certificate, which was insisted upon by the respondents had actually been dispensed with by G.O.Ms.No.282, Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Revenue Administration Wing, RA-3(2) Section, dated 26.05.2025. It was therefore contended that directing production of solvency certificate itself was not a valid condition. It was also contended during the course of arguments in the writ appeal, that the successful bidder, who had been impleaded as the third respondent, had produced a FSSAI license as required, which revealed that he was a running coffee bar at Virudhunagar and was a petty retailer of snacks/ tea shops. It was stated that the certificate had actually been issued only on 06.07.2026 and was valid till 08.07.2031. Pointing out these facts, the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner had urged that not only was the bid offered by the writ petitioner wrongly rejected, but the bid offered by the third respondent had also been wrongly accepted. It was also under those grounds, alleging mala fide, arguments had been advanced.

4.

The learned Single Judge in his order had however asserted with respect to the solvency certificate, that the parties had known that the solvency certificate should be issued by a Bank, though not specifically stated, certifying the financial capability to operate the establishment. That particular certificate had also been produced by the appellant, but without any date, month or year. The learned Single Judge held that it had been correctly rejected by the authorities. With respect to FSSAI certificate of the third respondent /successful bidder and the allegations therein, the learned Single Judge held that even the appellant had been licensed only as trader/retailer and did not have requisite experience in running a food canteen or food stall and therefore, stated that the appellant cannot claim precedence over the third respondent. Challenging these reasons, the writ appeal had been filed.

5.

The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant primarily placed his arguments on the fact that one of the documents sought to be submitted was a solvency certificate production of, which had actually been dispensed with by the Government themselves. It was also contended that the successful bidder did not have satisfactory or valid FSSAI license and therefore, he should not have been considered as being eligible for selection at all. It was also contended that when documents were sought by the appellant, the same had not been provided by the respondents. The learned Senior Counsel therefore alleged mala fide on the part of the respondents in granting bid in favour of the third respondent.

6.

The learned Additional Advocate General however, disputed the said contentions. It was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the certificate produced by the appellant did not have the date, month or year and therefore, it had been correctly rejected. The appellant had produced a solvency certificate from a bank without a date certifying on which date it had been issued. The learned Additional Advocate General therefore, emphasized that having produced an incomplete document, the appellant cannot claim any right. With respect to the FSSAI license of the third respondent, the learned Additional Advocate General stated that the third respondent's experience had been properly assessed and certificate was also found to be in accordance with the requirements and therefore, the bid of the third respondent had been accepted. He also pointed out that the bids offered by the third respondent were more competitive than the bids offered by the appellant herein. The learned Additional Advocate General therefore, justified the grant of the tender to the third respondent.

7.

We have carefully considered the arguments advanced and perused the material records.

8.

The Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998 is a comprehensive Act dealing with issues relating to issuance of tender and circumstance surrounding the same. Section 11 of the Act is as follows:

11.

(1) Any Tenderer aggrieved by the order passed by the Tender Accepting Authority under section 10 may appeal to the Government within ten days from the date of receipt of order and the Government shall dispose the appeal within fifteen days from the date of receipt.

(2)

In disposing of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Government may, after giving the party an opportunity of making his representations, pass such order thereon as they may deem fit.

(3)

The order of the Government on such appeal shall be final.

(4)

The Government may, pending the exercise of their powers under this section pass such interlocutory orders as they may deem fit.”

9.

There is no reason advanced by the appellant as to why they had not taken recourse to the said provision. When the law stipulates a particular act to be done in a particular manner, it should be done only in that manner and in none else.

10.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Khereshwar Mahadev Va Dauji Maharaj Samiti, Aligarh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2025 INSC 362], had held as follows:

“Apart from that it is a settled law that when a law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all.”

11.

The learned Additional Advocate General had placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 in the case of State of Bihar and another vs. P.P.Sharma and another, in which it had been held as follows:

“55.

It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded eo-nominee as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegation would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. ....”

12.

In Tata Cellular v.Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651], it had been held as follows:

“94.

The principles deducible from the above are:

(1)

The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.

(2)

The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.

(3)

The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

13.

In (2007) 14 SCC 517 in the case of Jagdish Mandal vs State of Orissa and others, the Honourable Supreme Court had very clearly stated as follows:

“22.

Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold.”

14.

It is thus clear that the Court can never interfere in issues of tender particularly when an efficacious alternative remedy is available. Additionally, the claim of the appellant with respect to FSSAI certificate of the third respondent is not an issue, which this Court can examine. The third respondent had quoted a competitive price in comparison with the bids submitted by the appellant herein.

15.

We find no merits to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. There shall be no order as to costs.