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Judgment
Wadsworth, J.—Petitioner contended in defence to a suit on a promissory note that the amount was not due because it represented rent
which must be deemed to be discharged by reason of Section 15 of Act IV of 1938. A Bench of which I was a member held in Ramadoss
Reddiar Vs. Munuswami Reddiar, , following The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zamindar of Kirlampudi (1931) 63 M.L.J. 20 :
I.L.R.1931 Mad. 830 that a decree on a promissory note for arrears of rent is a decree for a debt and not a decree for rent and that it is to be
scaled down under Sections 9 and 19 and not u/s 15. An attempt has been made to distinguish that decision on the ground that it related to a
decree, whereas, here, we are concerned with a suit on a promissory note to which a plea of failure of consideration may be raised. The distinction
made is, in my opinion, fallacious. The basis of our decision was that on the taking of the note the character of the liability changed and that it
ceased to be rent. Granted that the promissory note would operate only as a conditional discharge of the liability for rent and that if it was found to
be defective the promisee might (if it was not barred) fall back on the original right to claim rent, I do not think that it follows that the debtor can
compel the promisee to treat his claim as one for rent whereas in fact it is nothing of the kind, or that he can treat the note which was in substitution
for a liability for rent as being without consideration, because a claim based on the liability for rent, which has not been made, would be met by a
defence u/s 15. In this view I dismiss the petition with costs.