High CourtsSingle Bench(1963) 01 KL CK 0001

Kunhammed vs Mattancherry Municipality

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 28 January 1963 · Citation: (1963) KLJ 767

HON’BLE JUDGES
S. Velu Pillai, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
S.A. No''s. 1111, 1112 and 1113 of 1959

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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 465 words

Velu Pillai, J.—These second appeals arise out of three suits by the respondent, the executive authority of Mattancherry Municipality for the realization from the appellant, of property tax for three years. The point taken here, was that the suits were not instituted in compliance with Section 364(g) of the Cochin Municipal Act, 1113, which reads as follows:

The executive authority may with the approval of the Council institute and prosecute any suit or withdraw from or compromise any suit or claim, which has been instituted or made in the name of the Municipal Council or of the executive authority.

In the lower appellate court, the respondent filed a copy of the resolution which was passed by the Municipal Council in approval of the institution of the suits by the respondent and which was admitted as an additional document. I do not find my way to interfere with the discretion exercised by the appellate court in admitting it. The resolution was actually passed a few days after the suits were filed. The question is whether this was sufficient compliance with section 354(g) aforesaid. The word "approval" has been defined in Black''s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, as "the act of confirming, ratifying, sanctioning or consenting to some act or thing done by another". The word "permit" may have a different connotation as giving leave. Though the word "permit" does not occur in the provision quoted, the distinction between "approval" and "permission" may be useful as elucidating the scope and content of the former. The distinction has been explained thus by the Supreme Court in The The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Vs. Its Workmen, :

''Approval'' according to its dictionary meaning suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place; it is in the nature of ratification of what has already happened or taken place. The word ''approval'' in contrast with the words ''previous permission'' shows that the action is taken first and approval obtained afterwards.

In Shakir Husain Vs. Chandoo Lal and Others Sulaiman Ag. C. J. as he then was, dealing with Order XXI, Rule 122 as introduced in Allahabad, which provided that subject to the approval by the Court the attaching officer may make such arrangement as may be most convenient and economic, observed that in the case of approval the act holds good until disapproved while in the case of permission, the act does not become effective until permission is obtained. The same view was held in Mohammad Ali Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, . I hold that the approval of the Municipal Council though made after the institution of the suits was sufficient for complying with Section 354(g) of the Act. The suits cannot be dismissed for non-compliance with the above. The second appeals are dismissed with costs.