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Judgment
This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed seeking the following relief:
"...to issue a Writ, Order or direction, more particularly, one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the action of the 2nd Respondent in continuing the petitioner under suspension, even after completion of 3 months after passing the order of suspension in No.P.Admn.A2/103/2026, dated 12.01.2026, in respect of Crime No.01/RCT-ACB-MBNR/2026, dated 08-01-2026 without filing any Charge Sheet/Charge Memo., as illegal and arbitrary and contrary to the judgment rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court of India, in the case between Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India, reported in 2015 (7) SCC 291, and contrary to the various orders passed by this Court, recent one in W.P.No.6316 of 2026, dated 17/03/2026 and consequentially declare that the petitioner is entitled to continue in service forthwith from the date of lapse of 90 days with all consequential and attendant benefits and to pass..."
Heard Mr. P.V. Ramana, learned counsel for the petitioner on record; learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr. T.P. Acharya, learned Standing Counsel for the State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, appearing for respondent No.2 and perused the record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was initially appointed as Attender in the respondent Corporation on 09.04.2003 and was subsequently promoted as Accountant Grade-III on 11.05.2007, Accountant Grade-II on 12.11.2012, Accountant Grade-I on 01.06.2017, Assistant Manager (Accounts) on 14.08.2024 and was entrusted with the additional charge of District Manager (FAC), Wanaparthy, on 27.01.2025. While he was discharging duties as District Manager (FAC), a news item dated 09.01.2026 reported that he had been caught by the ACB on 08.01.2026 while allegedly accepting a bribe. Solely on the basis of the said news report, the Vice Chairman and Managing Director placed him under suspension by proceedings dated 12.01.2026, without conducting any preliminary verification regarding the allegations.
It is submitted that FIR No.01/RCT-ACB-MBNR/2026 was registered on 08.01.2026 under Sections 7(a) and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in which the petitioner was arrayed as accused No.1 and one Sri Lavudya Laxman as accused No.2. As per the FIR, the complainant, Mr. Sri Ramavath Saman Nayak, stated that he had purchased Ac.1.07 guntas of agricultural land on the outskirts of Miraspally Village, Kothakota Mandal, Wanaparthy District and got it registered on 20.08.2025, after which Pattadar Pass Books were issued. He further stated that the land was subsequently converted into Non-Agriculture Land (NALA), following which the District Civil Supplies Officer, Wanaparthy, issued a No Objection Certificate on 26.09.2025 to the Assistant Director of Industries, Wanaparthy, for establishing a new rice mill, M/s Samba Shiva Agro Industries. Thereafter, he constructed a shed on the land and applied online under TS-iPASS. The complainant had established a new rice mill after obtaining the requisite permissions and had applied for allotment of Government CMR paddy. It was alleged that the petitioner demanded huge illegal gratification, which was later reduced to Rs.50,000/-, leading to an ACB trap on 08.01.2026. The petitioner contends that no tainted money was recovered from his possession and that there was neither any proof of demand nor any pending official favour with him. Nevertheless, he was arrested, remanded to judicial custody and was subsequently enlarged on bail by the competent Criminal Court on 10.02.2026.
It is further submitted that the suspension order was passed merely on the basis of a newspaper report. Even after the expiry of more than three months from the date of suspension, neither a charge sheet in the criminal case nor a charge memo in the departmental proceedings has been issued. Learned counsel would submit that the question that arises is whether any criminal case against the petitioner is the subject matter of the proceedings in the said FIR. The further question that arises is whether the petitioner has been kept under conditional suspension despite the fact that no charge sheet has been filed as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.
He would further submit that in similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India1 in Civil Appeal No. 1912 of 2015, decided on 16.12.2015, has, particularly in paragraph Nos.20 and 21, held as follows:
“20.It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar2 and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay3, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973 to moderate suspension orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.
21.We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.
In similar circumstances, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in W.P.No.6316 of 2026, vide order dated 17.03.2026, observed that the respondents are required to review the suspension order if neither a charge memo in the departmental proceedings nor a charge sheet in the criminal case is filed within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of suspension. Admittedly, in the said case, neither a charge memo nor a charge sheet has been filed within the said period. Accordingly, this Court directed the respondents therein to review the suspension order and reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith, if the conditions for continuation of suspension do not subsist.
He would further submit that in another writ petition, i.e., W.P.No.28549 of 2024, vide order dated 16.10.2024, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, at paragraph No.7, held as follows:
17.Having regard to the submissions made by learned counsel for respective parties and as the charge sheet is not yet filed in criminal case, this Court is of the view that it is appropriate to dispose of the writ petition directing the respondents to review the suspension order passed against the petitioner vide Proc. No.579/V/2024-1, dated 23.03.2024, in terms of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Chowdhary's case, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order
In relation thereto, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in W.P.No.24386 of 2024, vide its interim order dated 12.09.2024, held at paragraph No.6 as follows:
"Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), there shall be interim suspension of operation of the impugned suspension order vide proceedings No.A3/Estt/ACB Bases/PITDA/782/2024 dated 20.02.2024 pending further orders of this Court, and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service, forthwith".
In relation thereto, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in W.P.No.34607 of 2023, vide its interim order dated 09.01.2024, observed as follows. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted hereunder:
"Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even after passing of suspension order dated 14.07.2023, no charge memo has been furnished to the petitioner till date and placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India through its Secretary (2015)7 Supreme Court Cases 291), where in it is held that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee, if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension..." On instructions, learned Government Pleader for Services-II submits that no charge memo has been issued so far and that the respondents will review the impugned suspension order as per G.O.Ms.No.86, dated 08.03.1994. In view of the submissions made above, there shall be interim suspension of the operation of the impugned proceedings dated 14.07.2023 issued by the first respondent till 13.02.2024".
In view of the aforesaid submissions and the settled legal position, learned counsel would contend that the petitioner is entitled to the similar relief. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments and orders, learned counsel would seek to allow the present writ petition.
On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for respondent No.1 would submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), while placing reliance on Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., passed a reasoned judgment, which continues to hold and is binding as on date. It is further submitted that in terms of paragraph Nos.20 and 21 of the said Judgment, appropriate action would be taken by the official respondents by placing reliance on G.O.Ms.No.86, General Administration (Services-C) Department, dated 08.03.1994. In consonance with the said Government Order, the case of the petitioner would be reviewed by the official respondents in due course and appropriate orders would be passed in accordance with law.
Learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.2 would submit that the petitioner has not submitted any application or representation before the competent authority seeking review of the order of suspension. It is further submitted that, as averred in the writ petition and in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), if the petitioner submits an appropriate application seeking review of the suspension order, the case of the petitioner would be reviewed strictly in accordance with law, in true letter and spirit of the aforesaid Judgment and in consonance with G.O.Ms.No.86, General Administration (Services-C) Department, dated 08.03.1994. He would further contend that unless such an application is submitted by the petitioner before the competent authority, the contention that the official respondents are under an obligation to review the suspension order suo motu is wholly misconceived and unsustainable.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for respondent No.1 and learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.2, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner was placed under suspension consequent upon being trapped by the ACB on 08.01.2026, pursuant to which FIR No.01/RCT-ACB-MBNR/2026 was registered against him on 08.01.2026 under Sections 7(a) and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and thereafter, the petitioner was continued under suspension. The petitioner seeks the benefit of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), placing specific reliance upon paragraph Nos.20 and 21 of the said judgment, which are reproduced hereunder for the sake of clarity:
> “20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973 to moderate suspension orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.
21.We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.”
Learned counsel also relied upon the orders passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in similar circumstances.
In the present case, upon perusal of the material placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that though the petitioner has been under suspension, he has not submitted any application before the competent authority seeking review of the suspension order or his reinstatement into service. Accordingly, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of this writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to submit an appropriate representation before respondent No.2. Upon filing of such representation by the petitioner, respondent No.2 is directed to examine and consider the same, in the light of G.O.Ms.No.86 dated 08.03.1994 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and take appropriate action in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four (04) months from the date of receipt of such representation along with a copy of this order.
With the above directions and observations, this writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no orders as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall stand closed.