Kumari Supriya Chaturvedi vs State of U.P. and Others

M. Katju and R. S. Tripathi, JJ.—This special appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment dated 17.5.2004, passed by the learned single Judge.

Heard Shri R.N. Singh and G.K. Singh learned Counsel for the Appellant, Sri B.N. Singh learned Counsel for Nos. 2 and 3 and learned standing Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 4.

The Petitioner had been granted a fellowship for completing Ph.D. under the Faculty Improvement Programme. By the order dated 7.4.2004, passed by the University Grant Commission, the Fellowship awarded to the Appellant for completing Ph.D. under the Faculty Improvement Programme Scheme under the 10th Plan has been cancelled on the ground that on the date of submission of her application, the Appellant did not possess three years'' teaching experience. The learned single Judge upheld that order, and hence this appeal.

Clause 3.4 of the said Scheme, copy of which is Annexure-3 to the affidavit filed in support of stay application before us states:

3.4. The teacher should have at least 3 years of teaching experience on the date of submitting the application for award of teacher fellowship.

The language of Clause 3.4 is very clear. It is a settled principle of interpretation that when the language of a provision is plain and clear, then the plain and literal meaning should be given to it, and the Court should not stretch or distort that meaning.

In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , the Supreme Court observed:

It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statutes must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law giver.

Similarly, in Patangrao Kadam Vs. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh and Others, , the Supreme Court observed that where the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous the same has to be given effect. It is not open to the Court to first create an ambiguity and then look for some principle of interpretation.

Clause 3.4 uses the word "at least three years of teaching experience on the date of submitting the application." The words "at least 3 years" are significant. The language used here is categorical.

Thus, on the date when the Appellant filed her application, she should have at least 3 years teaching experience. As her teaching experience was three months short of three years, hence she was not eligible as per Clause 3.4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana and Others, . That decision pertains to an employee confirmed in Government service as a Statistical Officer. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the appointment of the Appellant as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer though he did not possess the necessary five years experience is regular and not void.

In our opinion, this decision is wholly distinguishable. It pertains to a different class of persons and has nothing to do with the Fellowship under the Scheme. Moreover, Ram Sarup''s case (supra), has been distinguished by a Division Bench of our Court in Sushil Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Basic Shiksha Adhikari and Others, . It was observed therein that in Ram Sarup''s case (supra), it has been specifically noted in para 2 of the judgment that there was specific power in the Government to relax the requirement of qualification.

There are a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court in which it was held that if a teacher does not possess the necessary qualifications on the relevant date, then his appointment cannot be held to be valid merely because subsequently he acquired such qualifications, e.g. U.P. Public Service Commission U.P., Allahabad and Another Vs. Alpana, ; Kishorilal Charmakar and Another Vs. Distt. Education Officer and Another, , etc. In Dr Prit Singh Vs. S.K. Mangal and Others, , the Supreme Court observed:

If he was not eligible for appointment in terms of the prescribed qualifications on the date he was appointed by the Managing Committee subject to the approval of the Vice Chancellor, then later he cannot become eligible after the qualifications for the post were amended. As such we are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court, that on the date of appointment the Appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications and as such his appointment had to be quashed.

The Latin maxim "dura lex sed lex" means "the law is hard, but it is the law". Hence, it must be obeyed. Once we start departing from law on equitable considerations, then the rule of law gets undermined and jeopardized. Equity can only supplement the law but cannot supplant it vide Chhetrapal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . If there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, even if it causes hardship to some persons. No doubt if there is some ambiguity in a rule, equitable considerations may apply, but in the present case the provision of Clause 3.4 is very clear.

For the reasons given above, this appeal is dismissed.