Kumari Ruksana Begum vs Bachcha Prasad Varma

R.R. Misra, J.—The applicant was appointed as a teacher in a Primary School. Subsequently by an order dated 31st December 1985 the said order of appointment was cancelled by the opposite-party. Aggrieved, the applicant filed Writ Petition No. 5814 of 1987 and obtained an interim order dated 6th May 1988 staying operation of the said order dated 31st December, 1985. Thereafter the applicant filed a certified copy of the said order in the office of the opposite-party on 9th May 1988. The receipt of the said order on 9th May 1988 is alleged by the applicant in her own application dated 16th May 1988 filed as Annexure 3 to the affidavit in support of the contempt application. The grievance of the applicant is that despite passing of the aforesaid interim order, the opposite-party has neither restored back the services of the Petitioner nor has paid salary of the Petitioner.

After the present contempt application was presented in this Court, the following order was passed on 23rd February 1989:

List alongwith the record of Writ Petition No. 5814 of 1987 for admission at an early date.

I have heard learned Counsel for the applicant. He has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others, in which it has been held that if after the contempt was committed on 13-8-1984 and the contempt application came up before the Court for initiating the proceedings against the opposite-parties on 23-8-1985, no proceedings can be initiated in view of the bar created by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

In the present case, I find that although the interim order was passed by this Court on 6th May 1988 yet the same was served admittedly on the opposite-party on 9th May 1988 and the opposite-party has not given effect to the said interim order. In view of the aforesaid authority cited by the learned Counsel for the applicant and the bar created by Section 20 of the Act, in my opinion no proceedings can now be initiated against the opposite-party after a lapse of one year from 9th May 1988.

Learned Counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sarladevi Bharatkumar Rungta v. Bhirat Kumar shivprasad Rungta 1988 (1) C C C 1203 In that case it was held that the husband has willfully disobeyed the orders of Court for paying arrears of maintenance although the husband was sufficiently rich. The Court ultimately held as follows:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, I think that this is a fit case in which this Court should exercise the powers under the Contempt of Courts Act. The object of taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act is not to punish Respondent No. 1 but the object is to see that Court''s orders are complied with.

This finding obviously has got nothing to do with the question of limitation posed in the present application. Paragraph 7 of the said decision of the Bombay High Court no doubt proceeds to consider and hold that the proceedings were not barred by limitation u/s 20 of the Act but the distinguishing feature of that case is that because of an order dated 20th July 1986 the Court had issued notice to the Respondent-husband to show cause why he should not be punished under the Act. No such order has obviously been passed in this case. This authority is, therefore, in ray opinion, of no assistance to the learned Counsel for the applicant.

The third case cited by the learned Counsel for the applicant is a decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh Chandra Sharma v. B.K. Banerji Controler of Defence Accounts Central Command, 1988 (2) C C C 804. It has been held in that case that merely issuing notice to show cause why proceedings need not be initiated shall not amount to actual initiation of proceedings u/s 20 of the Act. This position does not at all operate in the present case. Therefore, in my opinion, this authority is also of no help to the learned Counsel for the applicant.

In view of what I have already stated above, in my opinion no proceedings can now be initiated in the present case in view of specific bar created by Section 20 of the Act.

In the result, the application fails and is dismissed summarily.

The office is directed to send back the file of the writ petition to the section concerned within a week.