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R.S. Narula, J.—The Sirsa Cooperative Primary Land Mortgage Bank Limited, Sirsa (hereinafter called the Sirsa Bank is a society registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, hereinafter called the Act. It obtains its entire funds for doing the banking business from the Haryana State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Limited, Chandigarh, hereinafter referred to as the Chandigarh Bank, which has been created under the Punjab Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Act, 1957. The State Government has not subscribed to share capital of the Sirsa Bank; nor has the State Government directly stood guarantee for repayment of any liabilities of the Sirsa Bank. The State Government has, however, guarantee repayment of all loans raised by the Chandigarh Bank. By resolution dated January 14, 1969 (annexure A-1), Natha Singh respondent No. 3 hereinafter called the contesting respondent, was declared in an alleged meeting of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank to have ceased to hold office as a Director of that Bank under the provisions of bylaw 29 (i) (b) and rule 26 (a) of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the 1963 Rules, on the ground that an F.I.R. had been registered against the contesting respondent in Police Station, Gudha by his sister Amarjit Kaur alleging that he had cheated her by presenting his wife in place of Amarjit Kaur for getting her ancestral property and on the further ground that in a civil suit filed by Amarjit Kaur against, the contesting respondent in connection with the above matter, the Civil Court had found "against the moral turpitude" of the contesting respondent Several other allegations were also made in the said resolution of the Managing Committee. Similarly, by another resolution of the same date (annexure A/2) Bhan Singh respondent No. 4 was declared to have ceased to hold office under the same by-law and rule on the ground that he had cheated A class members of Zone No. II Ludesar by cheating the bank by reporting to the Manager that he had changed his address from village Odhan to village Malleka to adjust himself in that vacant zone. By order, dated February 16, 1969 (annexure B/2) the Deputy Registrar, Co operative Societies, Rohtak (respondent No. 1) declared the proceedings of the meeting of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank dated January 14, 1969, as invalid in purported exercise of his jurisdiction under sub-rule (1) of rule 86 of the 1963 Rules, while exercising the powers of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies on the ground (i) that the meeting of January 14, 1969, was not held with due notice of five days as required under the relevant bylaws, and (ii) that the said meeting was not held at the time specified in the agenda for the meeting. The decision of the Deputy Registrar, was conveyed in letter, dated February 16, 1969 (annexure B-l). Kulwant Singh, who claims to be a Director of the Sirsa Bank, then filed this petition on February 28, 1969, for quashing the orders (annexure B/I and B/2) after serving on the respondents advance notice of motion, of which annexure ''C'' to the writ petition is a copy. It is claimed by the petitioner that after receipt of the notice of motion in this case the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank passed resolution annexure R. 3/III purporting to remove the petitioner from the membership of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank under bylaw 33 on the ground that he had failed to attend three consecutive meetings of the Managing Committee. The said resolution was passed in a meeting held in pursuance of the agenda annexure D'' in which there is no mention of any item relating to the proposed removal of the petitioner from the membership of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank. Thereafter the petitioner amended his writ petition. The amended petition was admitted on March 7, 1969, but the motion Bench refused to grant any interim stay of the operation of the impugned orders. In the amended petition, the resolution annexure R. 3/III said to have been passed in the meeting held on March 1. 1969, was also sought to be quashed. Besides the written statement filed by the contenting respondent, a separate return to the rule issued in this case has been filed by respondent No. 1.
Mr. B.S. Khoji, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged only three points in support of this writ petition. He has, firstly, argued that the impugned orders of the Deputy Registrar (annexure B/2 and B/l) are wholly without jurisdiction, as authority under rule 80(1) (i a) is vested only in the Registrar and that on the date when the impugned orders were passed, the powers under the particular sub-rule had not been delegated to the Deputy Registrar. The opening part of rule 80(1) which has been quoted in paragraph 5 of the writ petition reads as follows-
80(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the procedure laid down in this rule shall apply to a society in which either shares have been subscribed by Government or liability by way of guarantee for borrowing exceeding fifty percent of the working capital of the society has been undertaken by the Government;
* * *
The two provisos to sub-rule (1" of rule 80 are not relevant for our purposes Out of the various clauses mentioned in sub-rule (1) of rule 80, we are concerned with clause (i-a). Clauses (i) and (i-a) are in the following terms-
(i) At least fifteen days clear notice specifying the date, place, time and agenda for a meeting of a general body/committee and at least seven days'' clear notice for a meeting of any smaller body set up by either of them, whether convened by the Registrar, the President or otherwise, shall be given to all the members of the general body/committee or smaller body, as the case may be:
(i-a) The Registrar, may, of his own motion or on a reference made to him. declare the proceedings of the meeting referred to in clause (i) as invalid, if he is satisfied that the meeting was held without proper notice or without all the members having received the notice for the meeting or if the meeting was not conducted at the appropriate place and time:
Clause (i-a) in sub-rule (1) of rule 80 was added to the 1963 Rules (which rules were for the first time published on January 3, 1964) by the Punjab Co-operative Societies (First Amendment) Rules, 1965, by notification, dated September 3, 1965. Section 3(2) of the Act authorizes the State Government to confer on any person appointed to assist the Registrar by general or special order all or any of the powers of the Registrar under the Act. By notification, dated September 12. 1963 (annexure ''A'' to the return of the Deputy Registrar) the State Government delegated all the powers of the Registrar exercisable under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act to the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrars of Cooperative Societies in the State. The argument of Mr. Khoji is that section 3(2) does not and, in fact, cannot provide for prospective delegation and that what can be deemed to have been delegated by the notification, dated September 12, 1963, cannot go beyond the field of powers which were exercisable by the Registrar on the date of the said notification. The learned counsel submits that inasmuch as the authority conferred by rule 80(1) (i-a) was conferred on the Registrar for the first time on September 3, 1965, the said jurisdiction could not be deem-ed to have been delegated in advance to the Deputy Registrar and could be validly delegated only if a proper notification in that respect was issued at any time after September 3, 1965. I find great force in this submission of Mr. Khoji, who is supported in this proposition by a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ravangouda Lingangouda Patil AIR. 1944 Bom. 259 which was followed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Amarsingh Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1965 M. P. 126. In both these cases it was held that the delegation of its powers under a particular rule by the State Government cannot be deemed to cover the delegation of such powers as might thereafter be brought into existence by amendment of the relevant rule. No judgment to the contrary has been cited by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent. Nor has any valid argument been addressed in reply to this submission of Mr. Khoji. I, therefore, hold that the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to pass an order under rule 80(1) (i-a) of 1963 Rules in exercise of the powers purported to have been delegated to him by notification, dated September 12, 1963
I am, however, unable to find any merit in the second submission of Mr. Khoji. This contention is again based on rule 80(1). The contention is that in as much as the State Government has neither subscribed to any shares in the Sirsa Bank nor undertaken liability by way of guarantee for borrowing by the Sirsa Bank exceeding fifty percent of its working capital, the Registrar could not have passed an order under that rule in respect of any member of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa. Bank The reason why I am unable to agree with Mr. Khoji in this behalf is that for all practical purposes the State Government had undertaken liability for repayment of the entire funds with which the sirsa Bank is carrying on its banking business. The relevant extract from paragraph 6(i) of the return of the Deputy Registrar may be quoted in this connection-
6(i) the entire borrowed money in this bank comes from the Haryana State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd : for distribution as loan to the individual members. The total amount borrowed by the Haryana State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. is passed on to the Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks in Haryana State including the Sirsa Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd; Sirsa and this amount of borrowing is guaranteed by the Government. Consequently the money, which flows from Haryana State Co-operative Lard Mortgage Bank Ltd. to the Sirsa Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. and which exceeds 50% of its working capital, stands and remains guaranteed by the Government through out and at all levels. Thus rule 80(i) is applicable because all the requirements of the said rule are satisfied as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders under rule 80(i)
The facts disclosed in the above quoted averment in the return of the Deputy Registrar show that the money which flows from the Chandigarh Bank to the Sirsa Bank and exceeds fifty percent of the working capital of the latter Bank, stands and remains guaranteed by the State Government throughout and at all levels. I, therefore, hold that the Sirsa Bank is subject to the jurisdiction of the Registrar under rule 80(1) of the 1963 Rules.
Before dealing with the third contention of Mr. Khoji, it appears to be necessary to take notice of certain submissions made by Mr. M. S. Ratta, learned counsel for the contesting respondent. His first submission is that, in fact, no valid meeting of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank was held on January 14, 1969, because the said meeting was not held- after due notice of five days and was held at a time different than the one specified in the agenda issued for that meeting. In the same strain he has submitted that even the requisite quorum was not complete in the meeting of January 14, 1969, and that, in fact, it was a one-man show. I am not concerned with these matters, as I am not called upon to pronounce upon the validity of the meeting held on January 14, 1969, in the present proceedings.
Counsel for the contesting respondent then submitted the it the writ petition merits dismissal as the impugned order has not resulted in any injustice to the petitioner. Mr. Ratta relied in this connection on the judgment of Sarkaria, J. in Hazara Singh and another v. The Punjab State, 1969 Cur. L. J. (Pb & Haryana) 96 In that case it was held that this Court is loath to interfere in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution even with an illegal order of a quasi-judicial authority, where the illegality has not caused any substantial injustice. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, I find great force in this submission of Mr. Ratta. All that has been done by the impugned orders, annexures B-l and B/2, is to annul the proceedings containing the resolutions declaring respondents 3 and 4 to have ceased to hold office on the various ground mentioned in the said resolutions. It is not disputed that the said resolutions were passed without affording the contesting respondent and respondent No 4 any opportunity to show cause against the passing of those resolutions. It is noteworthy that the petitioner had himself purported to have been removed from the directorship of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank by resolution, annexure R-3/1, dated September, 6, I968. but the said resolution was set aside by the order of the Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, dated September 16, 1968 (annexure R 3/II) on the ground, inter alia, that the Bank should have given a notice to the petitioner and should have afforded him a reasonable opportunity before he was declared to have ceased to be a member of its Managing Committee. Since this Court is unable to uphold an order or a proceeding, which has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, I am reluctant to annul or quash the impugned order, annexure B/2. because all that has been done under that order is to annul the ex-parte resolutions, annexures, A 1&A/2, which had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. In this view of the matter, no manifest injustice has been caused to the petitioner. The resolutions, dated January 14, 1969, were annulled on the ground that the meeting in which they purport to have been passed was not validly held. If the Managing Committee wants to take any valid action against the contesting respondent or any other member of the Managing Committee, it is always at liberty to do, so in a legal manner in a validly constituted meeting. There appears to be no reason why this Court should lend its hand to uphold the patently invalid resolutions, annexures A-1 and A/2, In these circumstance, I decline to interfere in the impugned order, annexure B/2, as this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, is not bound to interfere in a matter of this type. Grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and I feel that setting aside order, annexure B/2, would retard rather than advance the cause of justice, If I could be compelled to quash order, annexure B/2 (in view of my finding that it has been passed by an authority which was not empowered to pass it). I would then have simultaneously annulled the resolutions, annexure A 1 and A/2, also in the same manner as I am going to deal with the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. Khoji must, however, succeed so far as his third submission is concerned. This relates to the validity of the resolution annexure R-3/III, by which the petitioner is purported to have been removed from the membership of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank. The said resolution has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice without affording the petitioner any opportunity to show cause against the action which was proposed to be taken against him. His case is that even the agenda for the previous three consecutive meetings had not been issued to the petitioner and he could not, therefore, have possibly attended the said meetings. Even in the agenda issued for the meeting in which this resolution was passed, there was no item relating to proposed action against the petitioner. The correctness of these facts is not disputed. How could the petitioner then show cause against the proposed action? The resolution, annexure R 3/III, must, therefore, be quashed. In as much as the Sirsa Bank is a Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Hank within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Punjab Co operative Land Mortgage Bank Act, 1957, it is a statutory bank and is, therefore, amenable to a writ of certiorari.
Before concluding this judgment, I may take notice of another submission which was made by Mr. Ratta. This was to the effect that even if rule 80 did not authorise the Deputy Registrar to pass the impugned order, annexure B/2, the resolutions, annexures A-1 and A/2, could be set aside by the Registrar in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 68 of the Act There appears to be no force in this submission of the learned counsel because section 68 (l)(d) relates to the expulsion of a member and not to the removal of a Director from the Managing Committee of the Bank. More-ever, power, u/s 68(1)(d) can be exercised only, if an appeal is filed against a particular order and in as much as it has not been stated that any appeal was filed by the. contesting respondent against the resolutions, annexure A-l, it cannot be argued that the order, annexure B/2, is deemed to have been passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Registrar.
For the foregoing reasons, I partially allow this writ petition to the extent of annulling and quashing the resolution, annexure R 3/111, where under the petitioner is purported to have been removed from the membership of the Managing Committee of the Sirsa Bank Nothing stated by me would, in any manner, be deemed to be a pronouncement on the merits of the allegations made either against the petitioner or against respondents 3 and 4 in the various proceedings and resolutions to which reference has been made in this judgment In view of divided success and failure of the contesting parties, I leave them to bear their own costs.