Kuldip Singh vs State of Punjab

S.D. Bajaj, J.

Vide memo No. 914/RII dated June 23, 1987, Joint SubRegistrar, Rajpura, reported to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rajpura that five petitioners in Cr. Misc. No. 7232M of 1988 had got sale deed No. 1582 dated June 15, 1987, registered in their favour through impersonation of vendor Bihari Charan, who was missing from the village for the last over two years by then as disclosed by attesting witness Balwant Singh, Headman. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, in turn, got the case registered against the petitioner with Rajpura Police vide F.I.R. No. 165 dated June 30, 1987, Annexure P1.

Vended in the sale deed arrayed as petitioners in Cr. Misc. No. 7232M of 1988, have come to this Court for quashing of the FIR on the grounds that being against law and facts, it is an abuse of the proces of the Court.

It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the land sold to them by Bihari Charan was in their possession for the last over thirty years; that it was practically a case of no evidence against the petitioners because Balwant Singh, Headman the only witness against them had himself identified Bihari Charan vendor before the Joint Sub Registrar and that after June 30, 1987, the challan against the petitioners had not been filed by the police in Court.

None of the grounds alleged on behalf of the petitioners warrants quashing of the FIR Annexure P1 because long permissive possession for about thirty years over the land allegedly sold to them by vendor Bihari Charan, inaction attributed to the police for a period of one year and three months from June 30, 1987 to October 1, 1988 and Balwant Singh Headman, being the solitary witness against the petitioners, in any way detracts from the criminality attributed to the petitioners in Annexure P1. The three grounds aforesaid can only be urged by the petitioners as their defence in the course of prosecution which may eventually be launched against them by the police cannot be availed of by them for getting the FIR against them quashed from this score.

The criterion for quashing the FIR prescribed by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945(32) Privy Council 18, which holds the field even today, in terms of Supreme Court observations in State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, AIR 1982 S.C. 949 is, "If anything, therefore the judgment in (King Imperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra)) shows is that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. It shall also have been noticed, which is sometimes overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to qualify its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases.

The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N. Sen, J. is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the FIR must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the FIR prima facie discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied the investigation must go on and the rule in Kwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received.

A First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provisions are prima facie satisfied cannot from the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation.

An investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a report (FIR which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. In the present case, as already stated, commission of cognizable offence by the accusedpetitioner is obviously made out from the contents of FIR Annexure P1. In line with the observations made in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak, 1962 SC 447, Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad and another, AIR 1972 SC 484, Kurukshetra University and others v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1977 SC 2229, State of Bihar and another v. JAC Saldanna and others, AIR 1977 SC 326, Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628, Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Kumar Sarda and another v. Shri Rajiv Poddar and others, AIR 1985 SC 1668 and J.P. Sharma v. Vinod Jain and others, AIR 1986 SC 833 that statutory right of police to investigate into circumstances of the alleged cognizable offence and file a challan and thereafter prosecute the petitioners cannot be interfered with by the exercise of the extraordinary powers envisaged in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

For the reasons given above, Cr. Misc. No. 7232M of 1988 is rendered wholly without merit and is consequently dismissed.

Revision dismissed.