Kuldeep Gochhwal vs State of Haryana

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

The substantive prayer made in the petition in hand reads thus:

The impugned FIR (as set out in the petition in hand) reads thus:

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal complaint filed against the petitioner (herein) under Section 138 of the NI Act, in proceedings whereof the petitioner was declared as a proclaimed person & hence the impugned FIR came to be registered against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner could not appear in the complaint case as the petitioner was having business in Raigarh, Chhatisgarh and had travelled outside the State to search better business opportunity, thus, the petitioner had no prior information regarding the complaint in question and had also not been served with any notice. Learned counsel has further submitted that thereafter, the petitioner was declared as proclaimed person. Learned counsel has also submitted that upon gaining the knowledge about pendency of complaint in question, he appeared before the concerned trial Court and was admitted to bail. Thereafter, the petitioner paid all the claim/ money to the complainant – Bank and nothing remains due. Learned counsel has further submitted that on 11.06.2025, counsel for the complainant – Bank suffered a statement in the complaint case before the trial Court and pursuant to which, vide order dated 11.06.2025 (Annexure P-3), the complaint in question was dismissed as withdrawn by the learned trial Court.

It has been further iterated that since the criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, has already been withdrawn as the rival parties had entered into a compromise, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings qua the impugned FIR. To buttress this aspect of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order dated 11.06.2025 (Annexure P-3) passed by the JMIC, Karnal, which reads thus:

On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed for grant of petition in hand.

Learned State counsel has filed reply by way of an affidavit dated 04.04.2026, in Court today, which is taken on record. Raising submissions in tandem with the said reply, learned State counsel has opposed the petition in hand. He, however, does not dispute the fact that the parties have amicably resolved the matter and the main complaint stands dismissed as withdrawn.

I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the paper-book.

The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising therefrom) under Section 209 of BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the IPC) deserves to be quashed in the factual matrix of the present case.

At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of this Court passed in CRM-M-51049-2019 titled as Mohammad Hanif Attari vs. State of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023; relevant whereof reads as under:

More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another, Criminal Appeal No.4359 of 2024 decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:

However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned FIR (therein) under Section 209 of the BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the IPC) since, inter alia, the original offence in the form of criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 in the said case had been settled and withdrawn by the rival parties.

It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/ 428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate that it should not apply the law in an austere, academic and exacting technical manner, without considering its practical implications. The law is not merely a set of programmed, nailed-to-the-ground rules, to be applied without context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that its purpose is to ensure substantive justice between the parties. The statutory provision of Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daljit Singh’s case (supra), unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the IPC does not proprio vigore become liable to be quashed, in case the rival parties have entered into a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has been compromised and quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the same time, the factum of the criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of proceedings whereof) having been compromised/settled, is indubitably, a relevant factor to be considered while dealing with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 174-A of IPC. This fact assumes greater significance considering that the initial proceedings pertain exclusively to a private criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881, which the legislature has expressly classified as a compoundable offence. Such litigation, especially in the backdrop of original offence having been compromised will have an adverse impact on the overburdened Court-dockets. Allowing such prosecution, when initial complaint has been settled/withdrawn would undermine the legislative intent and distort the remedial nature of Section 138 of NI Act of 1881. It would tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality, and justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may sometimes lead to unjust outcomes that also contradict the law’s underlined purpose. Therefore, the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of law with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach underscores law’s role as an apparatus for fostering societal harmony and addressing the real-world complexities, efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere literal/technical compliance.

The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/ Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may intervene to quash the criminal proceedings, recognizing the continuation thereof would be non-productive and unjust in the given circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posits of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority, in fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court, to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.

Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and circumstances of the case in hand; especially the original offence being an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the original offence alleged to have been committed in the year 2018, the subject matter of the original offence having been settled amicably between the parties and the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act having been withdrawn on the basis of such settlement/compromise; this Court deems it appropriate that the impugned FIR as also all proceedings emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.

It is, hence, directed as under: