Ku. Aruna D/o Domaji Shinde vs Priyadarshani Shikshan Prasarak Mandal & Ors.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned Advocates appearing for the parties.

By this Petition, the Petitioner challenges the judgment and order dated 14^th October 2021 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Additional School Tribunal, Chandrapur, in Appeal STC No.21 of 2005, whereby the learned Tribunal set aside the Petitioner's termination but denied reinstatement, continuity in service and backwages and granted only compensation equivalent to six months' salary.

The Petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher by Respondent No.1-Management by order dated 22^nd June 1996, against a clear and permanent vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. The Petitioner possessed the requisite qualifications of S.S.C. and D.Ed. and belongs to the Mahar Scheduled Caste. After completion of probation, the Petitioner continued to serve in Respondent No.2 - School and was also entrusted with the charge of In-charge Head Mistress. Her appointment and continuation were duly approved by the competent Education Authority by orders dated 9^th September 2000 and 6^th March 2002.

By order dated 20^th August 2003, Respondent No.1 i.e. the Management terminated the Petitioner's services with effect from 25^th August 2003, alleging that she had altered the caste and religion entries in the School records of two students. The termination was effected without issuing any notice or charge-sheet and without conducting a departmental inquiry or granting the Petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

The Petitioner submitted several representations to the Education Authorities challenging the termination. Despite communications directing the Management to conduct a proper inquiry and grant an opportunity to the Petitioner, she was neither reinstated nor was the termination withdrawn.

The Petitioner therefore filed Appeal STC No.21 of 2005 before the learned School Tribunal seeking quashing of the termination order, reinstatement, continuity in service and backwages. The Tribunal's earlier order dated 31^st March 2009 was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition No.4959 of 2009, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.

Upon remand, the learned Tribunal held that the School was recognized and that the termination of the Petitioner was illegal. However, it held that the appointment was not made in accordance with Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as, “MEPS Act”) and consequently granted only six months' salary as compensation.

The learned counsel for Petitioner submits that the entire approach of the School Tribunal is perverse and contrary to the provisions of the MEPS Act and Rules. He further submits that there was undisputed material showing that she was a duly qualified Assistant Teacher appointed on 22^nd June 1996 against a clear and permanent vacancy in an unaided School, whose appointment and continuation were approved by the Education Officer on probation and thereafter on permanent basis, the Tribunal erroneously held that her appointment was not in accordance with Section 5.

Lastly, Petitioner submits that the Tribunal misinterpreted the Full Bench decision in St. Ulai High School and another Vs. Devendraprasad J. Singh, 2006 SCC Online Bom, 1243 (FB) failed to appreciate that Section 5 casts an obligation to fill the vacancy with a duly qualified person and does not, in the facts of an unaided school, mandate the procedure assumed by the Tribunal, and that the documentary record of appointment, probation, confirmation and approval conclusively establishes the legality of her appointment.

As can be seen from the record of the matter, office note dated 24.4.2026 shows that the Respondent No.1 is served with notice for engagement of another Advocate, but none appeared on 11.6.2026, as is reflected in the order of even date of this Court. Thereafter, nobody appeared on 3^rd July, 2026 and 13^th July, 2026 also. Today also, nobody has appeared on behalf of the Respondent No.1 and 2. In that light of the matter, I have heard Mr. D.A. Mohgaonkar, learned Advocate for the Petitioner.

The Learned Advocate for the Petitioner took me through the judgment of this Court in earlier round of litigation, wherein the Petitioner herein had filed a petition bearing Writ Petition No.4959 of 2009. By taking me through the said order, the Learned Advocate for the Petitioner submits that this Court in the said matter has categorically recorded a finding that the petitioner has in fact placed a copy of advertisement on record published in daily newspaper “Mahavidarbha” on 13.2.1997 and the Education Officer granted approval after satisfying himself that the requisite formalities are duly complied with. This Court further went on to record that the appointment of the Petitioner cannot be said to be illegal only because or appointment order issued by the Secretary of Institution and not by the School Committee. This Court found support in earlier judgment of Gajanan Uddhaorao Garole Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2009 (5) Mh.L.J. 300. On the background of these facts this Court recorded that the mere fact that the order is not signed or issued by the Ex-officio Secretary of the School Committee may not necessary to render the appointment illegal much less void. The matter was remanded to the School Tribunal for deciding all issues including preliminary issues together after giving opportunity to the contesting parties to place on record such additional material and to lead such evidence as the contesting parties may deem fit.

It is noteworthy to mention that in the said matter also nobody appeared for the respondent. Thus, it is the submission of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner that the findings recorded in the impugned judgment of the School Tribunal and more particularly with respect to issue No. 2 are entirely contrary to the conclusive finding recorded by this Hon’ble Court. I have perused the said findings. The reason which has weighed with the School Tribunal is entirely within the teeth of the judgment of this Court referred Supra. The School Tribunal has unnecessarily gone into the fact that there is an omission to plead about the selection of the Petitioner being made after following due process of law. The School Tribunal has also given undue weightage to the omissions in the pleadings and contrary plea taken in the written notes of argument.

In fact, Para 24 of the judgment of the School Tribunal which records a finding that appointment made by the Secretary of the Society is without authority and without selection process is entirely contrary to what has been recorded this Court in the earlier round of litigation. It is only because the appointment order of the petitioner is not signed by the Ex-officio Secretary, would not render it void. The School Tribunal has unnecessary gone into irrelevant considerations instead of confining itself to the issue in hand.

Furthermore, even though the School Tribunal records a finding that the order of termination dated 20^th August, 2003 is illegal and quashes the same, but there is no discussion as to why reinstatement; which in my opinion would be a necessary sequitur to the quashing of termination; is not granted. The School Tribunal has granted six months’ salary along with pay and allowances, but there is no discussion why reinstatement is refused and the relief is confined to pay the six months’ salary. The judgment therefore suffers from perversity and liable to be interfered with in supervisory jurisdiction.

In that way of the matter, the following order is passed.

Accordingly, petition is disposed of.