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Judgment
Harisankar V. Menon, J
The petitioner, presently working as a District Judge, has filed the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge the punishment imposed upon him, by which a reduction to the lower post of Munsiff-Magistrate for a period of three years was ordered, while he was working as the Sub Judge, Muvattupuzha.
While the petitioner was working as the Sub Judge, Muvattupuzha, pursuant to Ext.P1 order issued by the 2nd respondent herein, he was placed under suspension. Ext.P2 memo of charges dated 24.03.2015 was issued to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent, containing as many as six charges. Not satisfied with the written statement of defense filed by the petitioner, an Enquiry Officer is appointed by the 2nd respondent to probe into the charges against the petitioner. Ext.P5 is the report dated 16.04.2016 submitted by the Enquiry Officer appointed as above, being not satisfied with the objections filed by the petitioner to the notice issued. On the basis of the enquiry, Ext.P8 notice proposing penalty of reduction to the lower post of Munsiff - Magistrate for a period of three years was issued to the petitioner. He submitted Ext.P9 reply to the afore notice. By Ext.P10, the 2nd respondent confirmed the proposal to impose penalty of reduction to the lower post of Munsiff - Magistrate. The 1st respondent Government issued consequential orders on that basis, by Ext.P12. The 2nd respondent, thereafter, issued Ext.P13 by revoking the suspension ordered by Ext.P1 order and reinstating the petitioner as Munsiff - Magistrate. The petitioner was later promoted as Sub Judge on 15.04.2024 and as District Judge on 24.04.2024.
It is challenging the disciplinary proceedings concluded against the petitioner as above, the captioned writ petition is filed.
I have heard Sri.P.Nandakumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Dheeraj, the learned Government Pleader for the 1st respondent and Sri.K.R.Ganesh for the 2nd respondent herein.
Sri.Nandakumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that:
i. The main allegation against the petitioner was on the basis of an anonymous complaint, which ought not to have been acted upon.
ii. The memo of charges was vague/non-specific.
iii. The copies of various documents used against the petitioner were neither furnished to him nor was he permitted to take extracts thereof, on account of which the enquiry was vitiated.
iv. The punishment imposed is highly disproportionate and unduly harsh.
Per contra, Sri.Ganesh, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would contend that:
i. The reliance placed on the anonymous complaint was perfectly justified.
ii. The anonymous complaint was only one of the charges raised against the petitioner and there were other independent charges against him that would justify the impugned action.
iii. The memo of charges is to be read along with the statement of allegations and there is no vagueness as contended by the petitioner.
iv. The punishment imposed was fully justified in view of the charges leveled against the petitioner and proved against him.
I have considered the rival contentions and the connected records.
The sustainability or otherwise of the punishment imposed against the petitioner herein as above is the issue arising for consideration in this writ petition. As already noticed, there were as many as six charges raised against the petitioner on the basis of which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated.
In Chandel R.C. v. High Court of M.P and Another (2012 (8) SCC 58), the Apex Court held as under:
“37. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.
…………..
The learned Single Judge examined the administrative decision of the Full Court to recommend to the Government to compulsory retire the Appellant as if he was sitting as an appellate authority to consider the correctness of such recommendation by going into sufficiency and adequacy of the materials which led the Full Court in reaching its satisfaction. The whole approach of the Single Judge in consideration of the matter was flawed and not legally proper. The learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the materials by observing, "The entire record pertaining to complaints against the Petitioner has also been produced before me during the course of argument by learned senior Counsel for Respondent No. 1. Thus, I am dealing each and every complaint one by one". We are afraid, the learned Single Judge did not keep the scope of judicial review in view while examining the validity of the order of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court in the intra-court appeal was, thus, fully justified in setting aside the impugned order.”
The challenge raised in this writ petition is to be considered with reference to the principles laid down in the afore judgment by the Apex Court.
The first contention raised by the petitioner is regarding the allegation raised against him on the basis of an anonymous complaint. According to the petitioner, the said anonymous complaint ought not to have been acted upon in view of Ext.P15 office memorandum of the 2nd respondent. The petitioner contends that unless the complaint is accompanied by a duly sworn affidavit and verifiable material, the allegations are not to be considered. In this connection, Ext.P15 is dated 15.10.2014. However, the complaint was received by the 2nd respondent on 05.05.2014 as noticed in paragraph six of the statement filed by the 2nd respondent. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the directions in Ext.P15 are not applicable to the facts of the case at hand. Furthermore, the allegation in the afore complaint is with respect to the acquaintance of the petitioner with one Sri.Anoop. The fact that the petitioner had acquaintance with Sri.Anoop is admitted by him. The allegation is that the said Anoop had several criminal cases against him. However, in Ext.P5, there is no finding to the effect that on account of the acquaintance with the petitioner, the said Anoop benefited in any manner. With respect to the criminal case, it is found that there cannot be any finding that the petitioner maintained the acquaintance with Anoop with the knowledge of criminal cases against him. Therefore, ultimately, the only finding in Ext.P5 is that the petitioner had close acquaintance with Sri.Anoop, who was a businessman.
The second allegation against the petitioner is to the effect that he did not obtain any prior permission from his superior before leaving the jurisdiction on 02.11.2013 and 03.11.2013. The fact that the petitioner had left jurisdiction on the afore dates is admitted by him. His only case is that he had prepared a letter seeking permission on the previous date (01.11.2013) and handed it over to the office so as to submit the same before the District Court. He had also relied on the despatch list to prove the afore. However, the Principal District Judge had reported that the afore permission was received in the District Court only on 05.11.2013, as seen recorded in the despatch register. The report conclusively finds that the reason for leave cannot be considered as an unexpected sudden case with respect to the contention that the permission application was despatched in time and with reference to the despatch register and the attending circumstances, the contention raised by the petitioner as above is found to be doubtful of acceptance. The reasons for doubting the veracity have been categorically noticed by the Enquiry Officer in Ext.P5. I find no reason to doubt the findings in the afore aspect.
The third charge raised against the petitioner is on the basis of certain criticism made by the petitioner on 03.12.2014 in open court as regards the functioning of the Additional District Judge, Muvattupuzha, etc. The afore charge is raised on the basis of the statement of the Additional Government Pleader, Muvattupuzha, that when he made a submission regarding the conduct of the pre-settlement in respect of National Lok Adalat, the petitioner did not show any earnestness and was not willing to refer the LAR cases to the Lok Adalat, etc. The Enquiry Officer has categorically found that all Judicial Officers other than the petitioner had conducted pre-settlement and there was no action taken from the side of the petitioner. The contention raised by the petitioner that he had conducted pre-settlement in “two cases” is also taken note of by the Enquiry Officer. It is after taking note of all the above that, ultimately, the report takes the stand that the case of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
Further, I also notice that in paragraph 380 of Ext.P5, it has been categorically recorded that the Chairman of the TLSC, Muvattupuzha had written a letter to the petitioner intimating about the conduct of the Mega Adalat, requesting the petitioner to furnish the list of cases to be included in the Adalat on or before a particular date and further that all other judicial officers of Muvattupuzha Station conducted pre-settlement hearings whereas the petitioner did not take any action in that regard. Furthermore, I notice that in paragraph 502 of Ext.P5, after referring to all the statements/explanations made by the petitioner, the fact that the LAR cases were referred to the Adalat on 28.11.2014 is accepted and hence, the allegations regarding non-referring of such cases were found in favour of the petitioner herein. This proves that the enquiry was conducted in a proper manner and whatever explanations supported with evidence offered by the petitioner were also accepted while finalising Ext.P5 report.
The fourth charge against the petitioner was with respect to the improper comments made by him against a lawyer, who is stated to be the junior of the Additional Government Pleader, referred to in the third charge earlier. The enquiry officer, first of all, considered as to whether the said person who is stated to be the junior of the Additional Government Pleader, was actually the junior of the said Government Pleader. After referring to the evidence of the senior most judicial officer in Muvattupuzha Station and also other witnesses, the enquiry officer categorically found that the person referred to in the fourth charge was, in fact, the junior of the Additional Government Pleader referred to above. It is on the basis of all the above, especially the inside–court-behaviour of the petitioner, that the fourth charge was also found against him.
The fifth charge was with reference to the refusal to accept the pre-settlement in the Lok Adalat in LAR Nos.50 of 1998, 139 of 2009 and 30 of 2010 on account of the personal grudge towards the Additional Government Pleader referred to above and re-opening of the proceedings in the above three cases. The enquiry officer, first of all, considered as to whether the petitioner had any legal competence to reopen the pre-settlement arrived at as above, finding that the same need not be considered in the enquiry proceedings. Thereafter, the enquiry officer found that the petitioner did not accept the settlement and the award in two cases on the basis of the documents produced at the time of enquiry. As regards the third case, the enquiry officer found that the petitioner adjourned the case for hearing on the question of the acceptability of the settlement arrived at before the Adalat as also the acceptability of the award. On the basis of the afore, the enquiry officer found that there was no closing of the LAR cases referred to above and so there was no re-opening of the cases as alleged. The enquiry officer further found that the afore actions were actuated on account of his personal grudge towards the Additional Government Pleader referred to above.
The sixth charge raised against the petitioner was regarding the long delay on the part of the petitioner in pronouncing judgments after hearing was over. The enquiry officer, first of all considered as to whether there was a long delay on the part of the petitioner in pronouncing the judgment and whether that was on account of the lack of earnestness on his part in the judicial work. The enquiry officer referred to a statement forwarded by the District Judge, Ernakulam, containing the details of the cases where the delay occurred. The petitioner tried to explain the delay on account of the death of his father during June, 2014, on account of which, he had stated that he could not concentrate on his work. The petitioner also requested the enquiry officer to call for the order sheets in the various cases and to assess the delay alleged, independently. On the basis of the afore request made by the petitioner, it is noticed that the enquiry officer had called for the documents and has found that in various cases, after concluding the hearing, the same was being reopened for further hearing and was being adjourned continuously thereafter for one reason or the other. In certain cases, the enquiry report finds that after completing the hearing, the matter was seen adjourned on various dates (as many as seven postings) for the purpose of pronouncement of the judgment and thereafter, the case was reopened for further hearing, etc. In one such instance, the enquiry report notices that the hearing was originally concluded during January, 2014 and the matter was kept adjourned on various dates and ultimately in December, 2014, it was recorded by the petitioner that the plaintiff was no more on account of which the files were removed from the list and adjourned for taking steps. It is on the basis of all the above that the enquiry report finds that there was serious laches on the part of the petitioner in pronouncing the judgment/s in various cases. On the basis of the above, the finding rendered by the enquiry officer that there was no earnestness on the part of the petitioner in the judicial work, cannot be said to be incorrect/arbitrary.
The seventh charge against the petitioner was as to whether the acts of the petitioner degrade the prestigious office held by him and amount to grave misconduct in-subordination and dereliction of duty which is unbecoming of a judicial officer. The enquiry officer referred to the findings on the earlier charges and found that the seventh charge was also proved against the petitioner.
I also notice the contention raised by Sri.Nandakumar that the memo of charges against the petitioner was vague and non-specific. However, as already found, the memo of charges was accompanied by a statement of allegations. In Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others [(2013) 6 SCC 515], it has been found by the Apex Court that when the charge sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and allegations, it cannot be said that the charges were not specific, definite and clear and hence, the enquiry is vitiated. In the case at hand, as already found, the charge sheet was accompanied by the statement of allegations and in my opinion, this was sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice.
Sri.Nandakumar further contended that the copies of documents used against the petitioner in the enquiry were neither furnished to him nor was he permitted to take extracts and hence the enquiry was vitiated. In this connection, I refer to the provisions of the Manual of the Disciplinary Proceedings as per which the petitioner is not having the right to demand copies of the records and at the maximum, he is only entitled to peruse the same and to take extracts from such records. It is further seen that the records relied on in the statement of allegations were permitted to be perused by the petitioner and that he has also taken extracts from them. In the light of the afore, I am of the opinion that the petitioner's contention that he was not supplied with copies of the relied on documents does not deserve to be accepted. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is highly disproportionate and unduly harsh. However, I notice that on the basis of the charges proved against the petitioner, the punishment imposed is quite proportionate. Sri.Nandakumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to various judgments on the “doctrine of proportionality”. However, as already found, the penalty imposed is only a lowering to the rank of Munsiff, for a period of three years as already noticed, which, in my opinion, does not appear to be harsh as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this connection, I notice the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others v. P.Gunasekaran [(2015) 2 SCC 610] wherein the Apex Court has held as under:
Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h)the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
In the light of the afore principles, I am of the opinion that the findings in the enquiry report or the ultimate punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be tinkered with, by re-appreciating the evidence on account of the adequacy/reliability of the same. I also find that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is proportionate to the various charges alleged against the petitioner and proved as noticed above.
I also take note of the various judgments relied on by Sri.Nandakumar. Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Another [(1988) 3 SCC 370], relied on by the learned counsel, would not be applicable, since the afore judgment was rendered with respect to the disciplinary proceedings taken against a judicial officer based on the complaints raised on “trifling matters” relating to judicial orders. Here, the allegations raised against the petitioner do not fall under the above category. Yoginath D Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Another [(1999) 7 SCC 73 9], relied on by the learned counsel is also laying down the same preposition.
Nirmala J Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another [(2013) 4 SCC 301] is again with respect to the tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled litigants, whereas the allegations against the petitioner in the case at hand are not falling in the above category. Abhay Jain v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and Another [(2022) 13 SCC 1], is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, insofar as the Apex Court in the afore judgment, was considering a situation where a probationer Sessions Judge was discharged on recommendation of the Higher Judicial Committee alleging his work “unsatisfactory during probation” after holding enquiry, which would put a stigma on his competence. Union of India and Others v. Gyan Chand Chattar [(2009) 12 SCC 78] is cited by the learned counsel in support of his contention as regards the vagueness of the allegations in the memo of charges. However, as already found, memo of charges has to be considered along with the statement of allegations and hence, the contention raised based on the afore judgment does not appear to be the correct preposition. P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 491] and Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Another [(2007) 4 SCC 247] were with respect to the initiation of the proceedings based on the “judicial orders”.
On the whole, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition. The writ petition would stand dismissed.