K.S. Suppuswami Iyer vs The Corporation of Madras

Phillips, J.—The main point argued in this appeal is that the regulations passed by the Standing Committee of the Madras Corporation in

respect of the rates levied for the supply of water are ultra vires. u/s 169, Clause (5) ""for all water supplied under this section, in excess of a

maximum determined by regulations of the Standing Committee, payment shall be made * * * * *"". The section relates to water supply for

domestic consumption and the contention for the appellant is that there can only be one maximum for the supply of such water. He takes no

objection to the regulation in so far as it provides a varying maximum in accordance with the rental value but yet he contends that there can be only

one maximum. The very fact of the word ""a"" being used before ""maximum"" would show that there was not intended to be one only maximum;

otherwise the words would be the ""maximum."" If the latter were the wording it might possibly be contended that the maximum must be a definite

number of gallons for every consumer irrespective, of the size of the house he occupies. That is not the contention now raised and, in fact, it would

reduce the case to an absurdity. I am satisfied that, on the language of the section the Standing Committee has power to determine what skill be the

free supply under varying conditions. They have determined this by regulations framed on the 15th of April 1921 and these have been

communicated to the plaintiff. As these regulations are not ultra vires of the Standing Committee, the plaintiff cannot object to their enforcement.

The next point raised is that these regulations were not approved by the Council. The evidence of the only witness examined snows that the

regulations were put before the Council and it is clear even from the extract from the minutes which is now before me that the Council did not take

any objection to these regulations. The power of framing them is versed in the Standing Committee and that this was done is proved by the

proceedings of the body.

A further objection is taken that the regulations have not been published in the manner determined by the Council. This point was not raised in

the plaint but apparently was taken at the time of argument. It is contended that to every regulation should be appended the manner in which the

Council determines to publish that particular regulation. Such, a proposition I think requires no argument, for obviously, if the Council decides to

publish regulations generally in a particular manner, that complies with the provisions of Section 355 of the Act. There is evidence that this

regulation was published in the usual manner ordered by the Commissioner and there is no evidence to show that it was not the way in which the

Council determined that it should be published. If really this objection were to be pressed, it should have been mentioned in the plaint for it is a

question of fact to be determined by evidence which evidence was naturally not available at the hearing. As this point was not raised in the plaint or

in the issues, I think that the learned Judge was wrong to consider it at all without an amendment of the plaint.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.